History
  • No items yet
midpage
In Re the Estate of Kuralt
30 P.3d 345
Mont.
2001
Check Treatment

*1 OF ESTATE IN RE THE KURALT. CHARLES No. 00-745. 2001. Briefs Submitted on August Decided 2001 MT 153. 306 Mont. 73. P.3d 345. Appellants: Strong, Kützman, For Keith John Dorsey & LLP,

Whitney, Falls; Jardine, Great Gary Bjelland, Stephenson, Weaver, Blewett & Great Falls. Goetz, Goetz, Gallik, For H. Respondents: James & Baldwin Dolan, Bozeman. JUSTICE Opinion REGNIER delivered the of the Court. (“Bowers White”) Susan Bowers and Lisa Bowers Wbdte ¶1 appeal Co-Personal *2 Denying Appointment from the Order Petition for of Successor Representatives issued the Fifth Judicial District Court, County. Appellants Madison raise one issue: the We District Court erred when it denied their petition reverse and proceedings remand for consistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND 4, 1997, July On Charles Kuralt in hospital ¶2 City. died a in New York widow, Kuralt, His Suzanna “Petie” Baird thereafter a filed in petition seeking the state courts of New York his probate estate. 15, 1997, September Petie, On Domiciliary Foreign as the Personal Representative Kuralt, of the Estate of Charles secured Montana Authority counsel and filed a Proof of and seeking probate certain real personal property County, owned Kuralt in Madison Montana. 30,1997, September On Patricia Elizabeth an intimate ¶3 companion nearly thirty years, of Kuralt for filed a Petition for Ancillary Probate of petition challenged application Will. This the of Kuralt’s York personal property New will to the real and in Madison letter, County. part, In the petition basis for Shannon’s was a dated 18,1997, shortly June which she had received Mr. from Kuralt before indicating his death that he intended that Shannon “inherit” 90 acres of real property along Big the Hole River. Shannon claimed that the holographic letter constituted a valid real should not be allowed to will that entitled her to Kuralt’s County and, therefore, in Madison property property that the pass under the antecedent terms of Kuralt’s York New will. granted summary judgment The District Court in favor of partial 26,1998. Court, Kuralt, May the Estate on MT This in in re Estate of ("Kuralt 111, 354, 981 I"), 294 Mont. P.2d 771 reversed the District disputed Court and remanded the case for trial in order to resolve evidentiary of Following hearing issues material fact. on a valid an abbreviated remand, the District Court held that the June letter was holographic codicil to Kuralt’s formal will and entered judgement appealed favor of Shannon. Estate and on December Kuralt, MT we affirmed. In re Estate ("Kuralt II"). 335, 15 The critical events that rise to current occurred give appeal Petie, prior They to our issuance of Kuralt II. are as follows: Montana, York and personal representative of the Estate both New filed a Bench died October 1999. On the Estate Domiciliary Regarding Appointment Memorandum Foreign Termination Representative informing Personal the court of Petie’s death personal representation of her corresponding and the termination completely had been administered Estate the Estate. It stated distributed closed, property the contested Montana had been Petie, therefore, no and, successor to Estate that, 72-3- necessary. pursuant § Estate claimed was White, 522(2), daughters, MCA, two Charles Petie’s Montana Petie’s estate to which distributed, any relevant assets. The protect property had been if a successor suggested claims, the District Court prosecution of Shannon’s necessary for special representative, could administrator, or, successor Kuralt estate as alternatively, substitute the Petie the real in interest. petition On March Shannon filed representative or, alternatively, administrator. response, Shannon’s requested a court appeal denied its the Estate petition stay pending consideration Estate’s II. The District requested in Kuralt if the Court stay, grant for a the court Bowers and White a request seeking time within to submit reasonable which as the appointment of either themselves or nominee representative of the Estate. request On District Court denied Shannon’s she personal representative because the the appointed be litigant clouding court determined she was an active *3 Instead, special Estate. the court R. Neil as appointed Kent administrator ¶8 personal appointed Bowers and White were as successor 21,2000. representatives of the Estate in New York Kuralt on On August 21, 2000, petitioned Bowers and court to White the terminate appointment special the of the and to them They of the Estate in Montana. York, they pursuant contended their had appointment New priority appointment absolute for in Montana as well as the coincident administrator. Shannon right special the resisted remove Bowers right petition, they and that had arguing White’s renounced Alternatively, appointment. Shannon stated that she would withdraw her would file a if request appointment they to Bowers and White’s resistance satisfactory bond. 20, 2000, On the District Court denied Bowers and September court that Bowers request White’s and personal there determined informally right as successor White had renounced to serve Estate in Montana representatives of the Kuralt significant between Bowers and White and appeal. Shannon. Bowers White STANDARD OF REVIEW standard of review this dispute the ¶10 Court (1996), Mont. employ. Citing Estate 275 should of Goick 76 909 P.2d Bowers and contend we White review a respect district court order with appointment to determine correctly the court has contends, however, interpreted the law. Shannon that the question presented in the appointment instant case does not involve the initial personal representative, of a administrator rather replacement special but of a appointed by probate Citing court. re

Haagenson (1997), 952 P.2d Shannon maintains standard of review of a district decision court’s regarding a personal representative the removal of whether the district court abused its discretion. case, Neither is correct. As is often the the answer lies by somewhere between the two positions parties. advocated questions raised appeal actually White’s involve First, multiple standards of review. whether Bowers and have statutory priority personal representatives Estate Montana as a result their appointment York, representatives ofthe right Estate New as well as a coincident administrator, to which we review the law. See In re Estate P.2d removal of legal question obtain is a correctly interpreted to determine whether the court (1994), 110, 104, Peterson Mont. 265 874 1230, 1233. The District Court’s determination Bowers and right White renounced their interpretation involved the application governing of the statute renunciation. Questions statutory interpretation application are reviewed for See, W., 6, e.g., correctness. 975 P.2d In re A. MT ¶ ¶ Lastly, regard with to whether Bowers and White have a prevents conflict with Shannon which them being from appointed personal administrators, we review a district court’s refusal to appoint administrator to determine whether court 108, 874 abused its discretion. at P.2d atMont. Cf. 1232 (affirming removal of administrator because of a standard); conflict of interest under abuse of discretion Obstarczyk In re Estate of (same). (1963), 346, 352-53, 377 531, 534-35 141Mont. DISCUSSION Did the District Court err when it denied Bowers and White’s petition to be appointed Estate Montana? they Bowers and White contend that are entitled to ancillary as successor personal representatives because have been appointed domiciliary personal representatives of the Estate in New

York. responds Shannon and White are barred judicata relitigating doctrine of res entitled Shannon moved from the issue of whether are *4 appointment as could have raised that when issue representative. for appointment as however, White’s merits of this judicata failed to raise the defense of to Bowers and res petition for decline to address the appointment below. We argument appeal. for the first time on See Moore v. ¶ 1998 MT Imperial Corp., Hotels ¶ they have maintaining that and White are correct Bowers right as coincident obtain for as well priority appointment domiciliary personal As administrator. removal representatives, all other “priority securing appointment Bowers and White have over as 72-3-506, MCA.Incident persons.” Section “may obtain in this ancillary personal representative, Bowers appointed personal representative of another who was removal 72-3-526(3), MCA. to administer local assets.” Section state However, statutory priority appointment for Bowers and White’s may Any person appointment matter. entitled does renounce that end the court. right by writing filed with the Section 72-3-504(2), denied White’s Bowers MCA. District Court Bowers part, for because it determined petition appointment, statutory “informally” priority on White had renounced through 2000, by indicating local and March appointment. did not intend seek counsel ¶16 and White The District Court’s determination Bowers appointment is incorrect. essence priority renounced their for February 22, was the Estate’s Bench Memorandum longer personal representative no needed a because it Kuralt Estate had been that completely administered and closed. The Estate observed of the property subject the Montana which was instant Accordingly, dispute already had been distributed to Petie Kuralt. suggested the real that the court substitute Petie’s estate as Bowers were the interest and observed that and White ofthis estate. The Estate also contended that proving Shannon had burden petition necessary. subsequently was Shannon filed representative as In a seeking appointment petition filed on to Shannon’s for April response brief the Estate if it determined that appointment, informed court necessary, and White had personal representative a statutory priority Bowers pursue it. From the appointment forgoing, we cannot conclude that Bowers and White renounced their priority However, Bowers and White did not renounce their though even “A statutory district court can remove a a right. is not an absolute priority, priority for refuse to personal representative or is a for cause if there personal representative as interests and those the estate.” person’s between at 874 P.2d at 1232. District Court also denied and White’s it determined Kuralt Estate because Shannon and Patricia significant that “a conflict now exists between [Bowers White].” ¶18 only conflict of relevant and White maintain that prevent interest which could *5 representatives would be a conflict of interest with the Any Estate. they of interest have with Shannon not relevant to their suitability personal representatives. Bowers and White insist that by resisting Shannon’s claims fulfilling duty be their to strictly examine all against claims responds Estate. Shannon argument “the that [a] conflict needs to be with ‘the Estate’ rather

than awith devisee is so fatuous as to not response.” merit We conclude that the District Court’s refusal to appoint Bowers and White on the basis of a conflict with Shannon was an abuse of the court’s discretion. We have stated that a district court can “refuse to a for cause if there is a conflict of interest person’s between that interests and those of the (citing 534-35). Peterson, estate.” Estate at 874 P.2d at 1232 of (1963), Obstarczyk 351-53, 141 Mont. at 377 P.2d at of Peterson, In Estate upheld we a district court’s to decision of remove a potential administrator for cause because the estate had a against claim for excessive attorney 108-9, 874 fees. Estate 265 Mont. at P.2d at 1232- of However, 33. the District Court’s to appoint refusal Bowers and White was not based on a conflict between Bowers Estate, and White and the but rather a “conflict” Shannon, between Bowers and White and a devisee of the Estate. appears attempt This conflict to be based on Shannon’s concern that Bowers and White will paying to avoid and estate inheritance taxes due on the Montana property out of the residuary Estate as required Shannon claims is by Charles Kuralt’s will. We see no reason to refuse the of and White simply they may because White likely resist the claims of a devisee. As Bowers and observe, by resisting Shannon’s claims would be fulfilling duty their strictly See, to examine all against e.g., Estate. (1963), Obstarczyk 141 Mont. at 377 P.2d at 534. Furthermore, Bowers and White’s requiring below, as discussed Shannon’s regarding concerns adequately can be accounted for post Bowers and White to a bond. response to Bowers and White’s for appointment, Shannon stated that she would withdraw her resistance to their petition if Bowers and White would willing post be a satisfactory bond. The District Court did not reach the issue of whether Bowers and White should required bond, however, be post because it refused Bowers and petition. 72-3-513(2), MCA, White’s Section provides that a “bond is required of a representative ... if will relieves the representative of bond unless bond has been requested by an interested and the court is satisfied that it is desirable.” party, an interested has requested a bond. We agree that a bond is desirable in considering this instance the entire protracted context of these proceedings. Accordingly, we remand further proceedings opinion consistent with express this and with the direction that require the District Court post White to bond in an amount set the District Court. Reversed and remanded. GRAY, LEAPHART JUSTICES NELSON CHIEF JUSTICE concur. dissents. JUSTICE COTTER I majority opinion. dissent from the respectfully in this case presided has since Judge John Christensen

¶23 He matter, working knowledge filings related this has a all broad, understanding positions of the issues on-going evidentiary hearings Additionally, presided has over two parties. during he he the demeanor which was able observe intensity level representatives, as well as the and/or respective positions. case, Judge singular understanding of his this As result ¶24 Christensen found that Bowers and unwilling White “were assume taxes, management, protection payment responsibility in Montana.” He also found Estate’s assets preservation *6 the Charles represent not an Shannon was in that do little to resolve the Kuralt Estate many those her “would litigant the Estate in that she is an active clouding very claims.” majority states at 19: “We see no reason to refuse likely they may simply of Bowers because not we resist refuse district court abused its discretion the claims of a devisee.” or see reason Whether issue. The issue is whether refusing it. I hold it to determine was within the district court’s discretion White, matter, and Shannon for that should act as Therefore, I would conclude that it was decide that Judge not an abuse of discretion Christensen of all in this Estate” were better served “best interests affected I affirm. Special Administrator. would court-appointed

Case Details

Case Name: In Re the Estate of Kuralt
Court Name: Montana Supreme Court
Date Published: Aug 9, 2001
Citation: 30 P.3d 345
Docket Number: 00-745
Court Abbreviation: Mont.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In