OPINION
Aрpellants challenge the district court’s order in this probate dispute, arguing that the district court erred in applying the parentage act’s paternity presumption to exclude them as heirs as a matter of law.
FACTS
Decedent Prince Rogers Nelson was born on June 7, 1958. Decedent’s Certificate of Birth lists- his parents as Mattie Della, Shaw and John L. Nelson. Mattie Della Shaw and John L. Nelson married in 1957 and divorced in 1968. The district court identified decedent and Tyka Nеlson as children of Mattie Della Shaw and John L. Nelson in their marriage-dissolution proceeding. John L. Nelson died on August 25, 2001. Probate records identify decedent, Lorna Nelson, Sharon Blakely, Norrine Nelson, John R. Nelson, and Tyka Nelson as the children of John L. Nelson.
Decedent died on April 21, 2016, in Chanhassen, Minnesota. On April 26, Tyka Nelson filed a “Petition for Formal Appointment of Special Administrator” regarding decedent’s estate. The petition alleged that Tyka Nеlson is a sibling of decedent and that John R. Nelson, Nor-rine Nelson, Sharon Nelson, Alfred Jack
On May 6, the district court authorized the genetic testing of decedent’s blood. On May 18, the district court established a procedure for the genetic testing of persons claiming to be heirs of decedent. Under the procedure, any party claiming a genetic relationship to decedent that may give rise to heirship was required to file an affidavit with the district court “setting forth the facts that establish the reasonable possibility of the existence of such a relationship.” The district court directed the special administrator to develop a protocol for genetic testing, “after considering the positions of the parties claiming a genetic relationship.” In considering the positions of the parties claiming a genetic relationship, the district court instructed the special'administrator to consider “the Affidavit, any birth records or Recognition of Parentage, or any other information that establishes a presumption of parentage or án adverse presumption.”
On June 6, the district court approved the special, administrator’s propоsed “Protocol Prior to Potential Genetic Testing.” The protocol provided that any party claiming a genetic relationship to the decedent that may give rise to heirship was required to submit an affidavit and completed “Request for Parentage Information” questionnaire.
Between June 10 and 16, appellants Darcell Gresham Johnston, Loya Janel Wilson, Loyal James Gresham III, and Orrine Gresham (Gresham appellants) and Venita Jackson Leverette submitted affidavits of heirship and parentage information questionnaires to the special administrator pursuant to the protocol. Gresham appellants claimed that they were half-siblings of decedent through Loyal James Gresham Jr., who they alleged was decedent’s father. Leverette claimed that she was a half-sibling of decedent through Alfred Jackson, who she alleged was decedent’s father.
The special administrator rejected the appellants’ claims. The special administrator found that “[b]ecause they were married when Decedent was bom, Mattie Della (Shaw) ... and John Lewis Nelson .,. are presumed to be Decedent’s genetic parents” and that none of the appellants can challenge that presumption now. The special administrator reasoned that because appellants’ claims were “dependent upon another person other than John [L. Nelson] being determined to be Decedent’s father” and appellants cannot challenge the presumption that John L. Nelson was decedent’s father, appellants were not eli‘gible for genetic testing. Following a hearing regarding the special administrator’s protocol, the district court excluded appellants as heirs as a matter of law.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err in applying thе Minnesota Parentage Act to exclude appellants as heirs as a matter of law?
II. Does the protocol prior to potential genetic tests violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions?
ANALYSIS
I.
Appellants argue that the district court erred by using a paternity presumption under the Minnesota Parentage Act to determine that appellants are not heirs of decedent as a matter of law under the Uniform Probate Code.
“Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.” Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud,
The probate code provides that a decedent’s “intestate estate passes by intestate succession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in this chapter, excеpt as modified by the decedent’s will.” Minn. Stat. § 524.2-101 (2016). There is no dispute in this case that the decedent does not have a will and that the probate code governs the determination of decedent’s heirs. Under the probate code, the estate of a decedent who does not have a surviving spouse first passes to the decedent’s descendants. Minn. Stat. § 524.2-103 (2016). If the decedent does not have surviving descendants, the estate passes to the decеdent’s parent or parents. Id. If the decedent does not have a surviving descendant or parent, the estate-passes “to the descendants of the decedent’s parents or either of them by representation.” Id.
Appellants claim that they are descendants of one of the decedent’s parents. Gresham appellants assert that they are half-siblings of decedent through Loyal James Gresham Jr., while Leverette asserts that she is a half-sibling of decedent through Alfred Jackson. Thus, appellants claim that decedent’s biological father is someone other than John L. Nelson, the parent from whom John R. Nelson, Nor-rine Nelson, and Sharon Nelson trace their relation to decedent, and the husband of Mattie Della Shaw at the time of decedent’s birth.
The probate code does not directly define “parent” for the purposes of intestate succession. See Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201 (2016). Howevеr, it does provide that, except for exceptions not relevant here, “if a parent-child relationship exists or is established under this part, the parent is a parent of the child and the child is a child of the parent for the purpose of intestate succession.” Minn. Stat. § 524.2-116 (2016). Generally, “a parent-child relationship exists between a child and the child’s genetic
The parentage act’s presumption of paternity provides:
A man is presumed to be the biological father of a child if:
(a) hе and the child’s biological mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 280 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, dissolution, or divorce, or after a decree of legal separation is entered by a court.
Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(a) (2016).
“A child, the child’s biological mother, or a man presumed to be the child’s father under section 257.55, subdivision 1, paragraph (a)” may bring an action to declare the nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under that section, “only if the action is brought within two years after the person bringing the action has reason to believe that the presumed father is not the father of the child, but in no event later than three years after the child’s birth.” Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subd. 1(2).
The probate code provides that if a father-child relationship is established under the paternity presumption in the parentage act, the child’s “genetic father” is “only the man for whom that relationship is established.” Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(22) (emphasis added). Because decedent was born during John L. Nelson’s marriage to Mattie Della Shaw, John L. Nelson is decedent’s presumptive father under the parentage act. The district court identified decedent as a child of Shaw and Nelson in their marriage-dissolution proceeding consistent with that presumption. Appellants do not challenge John L. Nelson’s status as presumed father under the parentage act’s paternity presumption. Instead, appellants contend that the district court erred in applying that presumption to exclude them as heirs. Appellants argue that parentage for probate purposes is not exclusively determined under the parentage act and that they may still establish that they are heirs by clear-and-convincing evidence, relying on In re Estate of Palmer,
In Palmer, the supreme court held that the parentage act is not the exclusive means of establishing paternity, emphasizing that at that time, Minn. Stat. § 524.2-114(2) (2002), provided that a “parent and child relationship may be established under the Parentage Act,” and that the word “may” was permissive and allowed a claimant to establish a parent-child relationship by clear-and-convincing evidence.
In Jotham, the supreme court applied the parentage act in holding that a paternity challenge was barred by the parentage
In 2010, the legislature amended the probate code. 2010 Minn. Laws. Oh. 334, §§ 5-17, at 999-1010. As part of the 2010 amendments, the legislature removed the reference to the parentage act’s paternity presumption from Minn. Stat. § 524,2-114 (2008) and added a reference to it in a new definition of “genetic father” in Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(22) (2016). 2010 Minn. Laws ch. 334, §§ 5-6, at 999-1004. As noted above, that reference to the paternity presumption states that “[i]f thе father-child relationship is established under the presumption of paternity under chapter 257, ‘genetic father’ means only the man for whom that relationship is established.” Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(22). The legislature also added Minn. Stat. §§ 524,2-116 to -117 (2016) to the probate code regarding the parent-child relationship between a child and the child’s genetic parents and the effect of the recognition of a parent-child relationship under the probate code on intеstate succession. 2010 Minn. Laws ch. 334 § 7-8, at 1004-05.
■ Because Palmer’s holding that the parentage act is not the exclusive means of establishing paternity for the purposes of intestate succession is based on the permissive word “may” in the paternity presumption reference in the pre-amendment version of Minn. Stat. § 524.2-114, that holding does not apply to the current version-of the probate code. See
The supreme court in Palmer also reasoned that allowing a claimant to establish paternity independent of the parentage act wаs consistent with the legislature’s expressed desire to “remove the distinctions between marital and-nonmari-tal issue in inheritance claims” and the different purposes of the parentage act and probate code.
Appellants argue that because their heirship claims are not based upon a presumption of paternity under the parentage act Jotham allows the district court to forgo application of the paternity presumption to their claims. We disagree. Jotham interpreted the former version of Minn. Stat. § 524.2-114.
Leverette contends that she “is not seeking to- challenge or defeat the claims of others who have invоked Parentage Act presumptions” and that the district court’s “apparent concern that,[she] will attempt, to use the results of the [genetic] testing to challenge. the presumptions of paternity established for other parties is simply unfounded.” We disagree. Under Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(22), in the event that a fatherrchild relationship is established under the paternity presumption, the child can only have one genetic father: the man for whom that father-child relationshiр has been established under the presumption. When a claimant, in seeking to establish a genetic relationship to a decedent, asserts that the decedent’s father is someone other than the decedent’s presumed genetic father, that claimant necessarily challenges the presumed genetic father’s status. Leverette contends that she “is trying to establish her genetic relationship to Decedent by showing she is a ‘descendant of dеcedent’s parents,’ specifically his half-sibling” and seeks genetic testing to determine whether she .is related to decedent. Because Leverette attempts to establish that decedent had a genetic father-child relationship with a man other than John L. Nelson, decedent’s presumptive father, Leverette’s claim is a challenge to Nelson’s status as decedent’s father.
Gresham appellants, contend, that “[a] potential heir , need not share a genetic parent with a decedent in order to be determined to be an heir.” But Gresham appellants do not develop this argument. And they do not explain how their heirship claim is based on a ground other than that they share a genetic parent with decedent. Because Gresham' appellants, like Lever-ette, seek genetic testing to establish their genetic relationship to decedent by showing that they are dеscendants of decedent’s " father, their heirship claim is a claim that they share a genetic father with decedent arid is subject to the’ definition of “genetic father” in Minn. Stat, § 524.1-201(22).
Appellants contend that because there are clear differences between the underlying purposes of the probate code and the parentage act the district .court erred in applying the parentage act’s paternity presumption in deсiding that appellants are precluded as heirs as.a matter of law. Appellants note that the probate code governs questions. regarding the distribution of an estate after death, such as the determination of heirs, and that the parentage act governs issues regarding a living parent’s responsibility, to children, such as the payment of child support. They point out that the supreme court recognized the different purposes of the рarentage-act and probate code in Palmer. See 658 N.W,2d at 200. .Although appellants are correct. that the two acts generally
Because John L. Nelson is decedent’s presumptive father under the parentage act, he is the only person who can be decedent’s “genetic father” under the probate code. See Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(22). The two individuals that Gresham appellants and Leverette, respectively, allege are decedent’s real biological father thus cannot be decedent’s “genetic father” under the probate code. Under the probate code, a parent-child relationship exists between decedent and his “genetic parents” and decedent’s “genetic father” is a parent of decedent for the purpose of intestate succession. Minn. Stat. §§ 524.2-116 to - 117. John L. Nelson is therefore decedent’s father for the purpose of intestate succession and the estate passes to his surviving descendants аnd Mattie Della Shaw’s surviving descendants. See Minn. Stat. § 524.2-103. Appellants do not allege that they are descendants of John L. Nelson or Mattie Della Shaw. Appellants are' therefore not heirs of decedent as a matter of law based on the plain language of the relevant parentage act and probate code provisions. The district court did not err in excluding appellants as heirs.
II.
Gresham appellants also contend that the “рrotocol adopted by the district court violates the equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions.” Gresham appellants argue that the “United States Supreme Court has often struck down classification schemes that draw distinctions that exclude children born outside of wedlock ... from treatment as siblings.” Gresham appellants argue that “where, as here, the inquiry into parentage and granting of rights cannot destroy the integrity and privаcy of an extant marital family, the use of irrebuttable presumptions is not defensible.”
“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v. Stich,
Gresham appellants did not raise an Equal Protection Clause challenge in their objеction to the genetic-testing protocol in the district court, and the district court did not decide that issue. Although Gresham appellants filed a “Notice of Constitutional Challenge” in the district court, they filed it on September 27, 2016, more than a month after the district court issued its amended order regarding the genetic-testing protocol and their heirship claims, and the same day Gresham appellants filed their notice of appeal. The district court hаd no opportunity to consider their constitutional claim and decide that claim pri- or to this appeal. Gresham appellants’ equal-protection claim is thus forfeited.
DECISION
Because appellants are not heirs of decedent based on the plain language of the parentage act and probate code, the district court did not err in excluding appellants as heirs as a matter of law.
Affirmed.
Notes
. The petition states thаt Lorna Nelson predeceased decedent,
. Bremer Trust’s appointment as special administrator of the estate concluded on January 31, 2017. Respondent Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A., became personal representative of the estate, effective February 1, 2017.
.On August 11, 2016, the district court amended its order regarding the genetic-testing protocol and heirship claims to correct errors in the original order unrelated to the issues in these appeals.