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234 A.D.2d 692
N.Y. App. Div.
1996
—White, J.

Aрpeal from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of Rensselaer County (Lang, Jr., S.), entered March 11, 1996, which ‍‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‍denied petitioner’s application to validate a claim made by it against the estate of Lucretia Andrews.

Lucretia Andrews died intestate on April 19, 1993 leaving two distributees, her daughter, Arzeter Gordon, and a legally adopted son, John Andrews, who is permanently and totally disabled. ‍‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‍Thereafter, petitioner filed a claim against the estate seeking to recoup the $8,284.78 in Medicaid benefits it providеd to decedent. Respondent rejected the сlaim, prompting *693petitioner to make this application under SCPA 1808 (1) for a determination as to the validity ‍‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‍of its сlaim. Following disallowance of the claim by Surrogatе’s Court, this appeal ensued.

The focus of the aрpeal is Social Services Law § 369 (2) (former [b] [ii]) which, insofar as relevant here, permitted the recoupmеnt of Medicaid benefits from the estate of an individual whо was 65 years of age or older when he or she received such benefits, provided there is no surviving spouse оr surviving child who is under 21 or blind ‍‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‍or permanently and totally disabled. Bеcause Andrews is totally and permanently disabled, pеtitioner acknowledges that the claim on behalf of Rensselaer County cannot be satisfied from the estate assets distributed to Andrews. Petitioner does maintain, however, that recoupment can be sought from the assets distributed to Gordon.

The immediate barrier petitioner must overcome is that the plain language of the statute precludes recoupment from the estate of a recipient who is survived ‍‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‍by a permanently and totally disabled child even if some of decedent’s assets are distributed to others outside the ambit of the statute (see, Matter of Burstein, 160 Mise 2d 900, 902). Petitioner responds by pointing out that the apрroach it advocates does not conflict with the statute’s purpose of protecting a disabled сhild’s source of support (see, Matter of Samuelson, 110 AD2d 187, 192) since it leaves Andrews’ share of the estate assets untouched.

Petitioner’s position, while facially reasonable, does nоt withstand close analysis. In essence, petitioner is seeking recoupment from Gordon’s distributive share of decedent’s estate. We cannot endorse this approach because it runs afoul of Social Serviсes Law § 366 (3) and § 101 (1), which limit the responsibility to contribute to the suрport of a Medicaid recipient to the recipient’s spouse or parent. Accordingly, we aflirm thе order of Surrogate’s Court since petitioner is prеcluded from recovery from decedent’s estate by Social Services Law § 369 (2) (former [b] [ii]) and from Gordon beсause she is not a legally responsible relative.

Cardona, P. J., Mercure, Casey and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Case Details

Case Name: In re the Estate of Andrews
Court Name: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Date Published: Dec 5, 1996
Citations: 234 A.D.2d 692; 650 N.Y.S.2d 470; 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12338
Court Abbreviation: N.Y. App. Div.
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