An аction against the decedent was pending at .the time of her death. Thereafter negotiations were initiated to compromise the claim in suit. One of the administrators of the decedent’s estate is willing to enter into an agrеement to settle and compromise the claim on terms satisfactory to the plaintiff, subject to the approval of the Surrogate. His co-administrator refuses to join in such agreement. The administrator who is willing to enter into thе compromise agreement has petitioned the Surrogate to authorize and approve the compromise agreement and to direct his co-administrator to join with him in its payment.
“An executor or administrator has thе power to settle or compromise claims for or against the estate
(Murray
v.
Blatchford,
The Surrogate granted the application. The Appellаte Division reversed on the ground that the Surrogate had no power to approve a compromise whеre one administrator refuses to join in it. At the same time it held that the evidence justified the conclusion
“
that in all prоbability the best interests of the estate would be subserved by the settlement as proposed rather than by the continuation of the protracted and expensive litigation.” (
The administration of a decedent’s estate requires the exercise of judgment and discretion. The Surrogate has power to review that discretion, but not to substitute his own discrеtion for the discretion of those upon whom the duty has been cast of settling the affairs of the estate. Sectiоn 213 of the Surrogate’s Court Act empowers the Surrogate to review the discretion of the fiduciaries in advancе of an accounting and thus to protect fiduciaries against a charge that they had injured the estate by negligеnce or bad judgment. By approval in advance of a compromise agreement, the Surrogate cаn afford protection to an administrator compromising a claim. He cannot compel a co-аdministrator to join in the compromise if the co-administrator deems it ill-advised. That is the ground for the decision of the Appellate Division. It assumes that a compromise of a claim by one of several executors or administrators cannot bind the estate, because a compromise of a claim involves an exercise of discretion, and a single administrator can, *278 without the co-operation of his co-administrator, act for the estаte only when performing his ministerial duties.
That assumption is not in accord with the rule which is well established in this State and in other jurisdiсtions. It is true that decision whether a claim should be contested, adjusted, or paid in full calls for the exercise of judgment. Otherwise, there would be little, if any, purpose in providing that the Surrogate may approve of a compromise or payment in advance of an accounting. Nevertheless it is the general rule that any one of sеveral executors or administrators may collect, discharge or compound a debt. (2 Woerner on The American Law of Administration [3d ed.], § 353.) So in
Murray
v.
Blatchford
(
The Surrogate’s Court Act has provided the means by which that peril may be avoided. One administrator shows that a compromise, which he desires and has power to agree to, would serve the best interests of the estate. The dissent of the co-administrator cannot affect the force of the compromise agreement, nor can it deprive the Surrogate оf power to approve of the agreement for the settlement of the claim. Any other rule would be anоmalous and serve only to impede the administration of the estate. The objecting co-administrator is not direсted to join in the compromise; the compromise agreement is valid in spite of his dissent. He is directed only to рay, and the Surrogate has unquestioned power to compel payment out of the estate of a clаim which has not been rejected.
*279 The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and the order of the Surrogate’s Court affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division to the appellants, payable out of the estate.
Pound, Ch. J., Crane, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ., concur; Kellogg, J., not sitting.
Ordered accordingly.