In re the ESTATE OF Orville BRUCE.
No. WD 68051.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
May 13, 2008.
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied July 1, 2008.
Application for Transfer Denied Aug. 26, 2008.
Lawrence D. Love, Kansas City, MO., for respondent.
The Estate of Orville Bruce appeals the circuit court‘s judgment for the State in its claim against the estate for reimbursement of Medicaid payments made to Orville Bruce‘s deceased wife, Minnie. The State asserted a right to the reimbursement pursuant to
Minnie Bruce received Medicaid benefits from October 1990 until she died on February 28, 2002. No probate estate was administered for her. On April 17, 2005, Orville Bruce died. He never received Medicaid benefits. His estate consisted of a house and an automobile. Bruce had owned the house jointly with his wife as tenants by the entirety. His estate was liquidated to $97,000. Pursuant to
In its only point on appeal, Bruce‘s estate asserts that the circuit court erred because, although
Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program designed to assist the states in providing health care to people
Missouri has opted to participate in the Medicaid program. Gee v. Department of Social Services, Family Support Division, 189 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Mo.App.2006). In
For the purposes of this section, the providing of assistance shall create an obligation which may be recovered by filing a claim in the probate division of the circuit court against the decedent estate of the spouse of the deceased recipient upon such spouse‘s death as provided by the probate code of Missouri, chapters 472, 473, 474 and 475, RSMo. The amount of the state debt shall be the full amount of assistance without interest provided to the recipient during the marriage of such recipient and spouse; provided that the liability of the obligor estate shall not exceed the value of the combined resources of the recipient and the spouse of the recipient on the date of death of the recipient.
Orville Bruce‘s estate asserts that
When interpreting a statute, the judiciary‘s primary task is to ascertain legislative intent. The preferred means for doing this is to accord the statute‘s language its plain and ordinary meaning. Cline v. Teasdale, 142 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Mo.App.2004).
Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under a State plan
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan
A. In the case of an individual described in subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual‘s estate or upon sale of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual.
B. In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual‘s estate, but only for medical assistance consisting of — (i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and related hospital and prescription drug services, or (ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State plan.
C. (i) In the case of an individual who has received (or is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance policy in connection with which assets or resources are disregarded in the manner described in clause (ii), except as provided in such clause, the State shall seek ad-
justment or recovery from the individual‘s estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual for nursing facility and other long-term care services[.]2
In
Although
For purposes of this subsection, the term “estate,” with respect to a deceased individual —
A. shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual‘s estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
B. may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of
For the purposes of probate, the General Assembly has defined “estate” as “the real and personal property of the decedent or ward, as from time to time changed in form by sale, reinvestment or otherwise, and augmented by any accretions and additions thereto and substitutions therefor, and diminished by any decreases and distributions therefrom[.]”
Probate‘s non-application to tenancy by the entirety results from its being a form of ownership that is created by marriage in which each spouse owns the entire property, rather than a share or divisible part. Rinehart, 985 S.W.2d at 367. It is based on a legal fiction that the husband and wife own the property jointly as a single person. In re Estate of Hughes, 735 S.W.2d at 791. Together, each has an undivided interest. Id. When one of the spouses dies, the surviving spouse becomes the property‘s sole owner by virtue of being owner of 100 percent of the property. Id. Hence, property owned by Minnie and Orville Bruce as tenants by the entirety was not part of Minnie Bruce‘s probate estate and did not fit within the definition of “estate” enunciated in
Nor could the State recover from Orville Bruce‘s estate because the General Assembly has not taken the step required by
[A]ll real and personal property and other assets included in the recipient‘s estate as defined in N.J.S. 3B:1-1, as well as any other real and personal property and other assets in which the recipient had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of that interest, including assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the recipient through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
The State argues that
Each recipient of a recoverable transfer of a decedent‘s property shall be liable to account for a pro rata share of the value of all such property received, to the extent necessary to discharge the statutory allowances to the decedent‘s surviving spouse and dependent children, and claims remaining unpaid after application of the decedent‘s estate[.]
[A] nonprobate transfer of a decedent‘s property under sections 461.003 to 461.081 and any other transfer of a decedent‘s property other than from the administration of the decedent‘s probate estate that was subject to satisfaction of the decedent‘s debts immediately prior to the decedent‘s death, but only to the extent of the decedent‘s contribution to the value of such property.
To meet this definition, Bruce‘s house would either have to be a “nonprobate transfer of decedent‘s property” or “property ... that was subject to satisfaction of the decedent‘s debts immediately prior to the decedent‘s death.” Property held by tenants by the entirety does not fit within either of these categories.
Hence, Orville Bruce‘s house was not a recoverable transfer under
Equally flawed is the dissent‘s suggestion that the General Assembly used
For the purposes of this section, the providing of assistance shall create an obligation which may be recovered by
filing a claim in the probate division of the circuit court against the decedent estate of the spouse of the deceased recipient upon such spouse‘s death as provided by the probate code of Missouri, chapters 472, 473, 474 and 475, RSMo. The amount of the state debt shall be the full amount of assistance without interest provided to the recipient during the marriage of such recipient and spouse; provided that the liability of the obligor estate shall not exceed the value of the combined resources of the recipient and the spouse of the recipient on the date of death of the recipient.4
If, as has been suggested, the General Assembly intended for this statute to expand the definition of an individual Medicaid recipient‘s estate to include non-probate property, it could not have chosen a more oblique and crabbed manner for doing so. Indeed, many of the states whose courts have declared that the law permits spousal recovery did so only because those states’ legislatures had adopted definitions that closely track the language of
We are dubious that Missouri would have elected to shroud its expansion of the definition of a Medicaid estate in discussions of the limits on the value of the property to be recouped. Such a prospect is highly unlikely. Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed that the primary rule of statutory construction is to glean legislative intent by understanding the statute according to its objective. Nixon v. QuikTrip Corporation, 133 S.W.3d 33, 37 (Mo. banc 2004). The objective that the General Assembly articulated in
Although the General Assembly enacted
That
The State avers numerous public policy reasons as to why we should interpret
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court. We remand the case to it so it can vacate its judgment for the State and enter judgment for Orville Bruce‘s estate.
JAMES M. SMART, JR., Judge, concurs.
JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge, dissents in a separate opinion.
JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that federal law allows a state to recover Medicaid assistance from the recipient‘s spouse‘s estate if the state opts to expand its definition of “estate” to include property that the Medicaid recipient owned jointly with his or her spouse at the time of the recipient‘s death. However, I differ with the majority‘s conclusion that Missouri has not adopted such an expanded definition, finding rather that the legislature did so when it enacted the public assistance recovery statutes,
Statutes addressing the same subject matter are considered in pari materia, and must be construed together. KC Motorcycle Escorts, L.L.C. v. Easley, 53 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo.App. W.D.2001). “When one statute deals with a subject in general terms and another statute deals with the same subject in a more specific way, the two statutes should be harmonized if possible. If the statutes cannot be reconciled, the more specific prevails over the more general.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
A review of the Medicaid Act and its history is essential to an understanding of both the federal and Missouri statutory schemes. Congress created the Medicaid program when it amended the Social Security Act in 1965, in what is now codified as
Congress became concerned as early as 1980 that wealthy elderly Americans were “gaming” the Medicaid program by divesting themselves of their assets before entering a nursing home and then applying for Medicaid benefits. Thus, “[t]he first major restriction in the Medicaid program came in 1980 with the Boren-Long Amendment,
“Prior to 1993, states were permitted, but not required, to establish estate recovery programs.” West Virginia, 132 F.Supp.2d at 440. OBRA ‘93 made it mandatory that states “recoup benefits from the estates of certain deceased Medicaid recipients as a condition of receiving Medicaid Funds.” Id. But, as noted by the court in the West Virginia case, “OBRA ‘93 does not force estate recovery upon any citizen of a state. Persons subject to estate recovery elect to receive Medicaid benefits and the regulations demand that such recipients receive notice of the estate recovery requirement when choosing to accept or reject Medicaid long-term care benefits.” Id. at 441.
Although Congress expressed frequent concern about loopholes in the Medicaid laws in the decade or more leading up to its adoption of OBRA ‘93, it was similarly concerned about protecting the elderly from hardships. A person seeking to qualify for Medicaid as medically needy must have low income and low assets, and, therefore, the person‘s resources, to the extent they exceed the statutory and regulatory limit, must be spent down before qualifying. Shuh, 248 S.W.3d at 84-85. Congress recognized the potential hardship that “spend down” requirements could have on the spouses of medical assistance recipients. Id.
To ameliorate that hardship to spouses of Medicaid recipients, Congress enacted the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (“MCCA“) which includes provisions to financially protect the spouse who was not receiving medical assistance. These provisions, commonly called the spousal impoverishment provisions, allow the spouse to retain a certain level of resources and income and protect those assets from use as payment for medical care. Id.
Congress‘s concern over spousal hardship was also apparent in OBRA ‘93.
The spousal impoverishment provisions relating to eligibility for Medicaid benefits, and the estate recovery provisions of the Medicaid law authorizing such recoveries only after the recipient‘s spouse‘s death, are an expression of two salutary congressional goals.
First, expanding estate recovery furthers the broad purpose of providing for the medical care of the needy; the greater amount recovered by the state allows the state to have more funds to provide future services. Second, the MCCA [Coverage Act of 1988] serves as part of the overall effort to not impoverish a Medicaid recipient‘s spouse during the spouse‘s lifetime. According to the United States Supreme Court and the Congressional Record, the goal of the MCCA was to protect the community spouse from poverty, while protecting the Medicaid system from being abused by financially secure couples. Shuh, 248 S.W.3d at 86 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
All the while, however, Congress was expanding the Medicaid program, often without appropriate funding levels, which led to skyrocketing costs for the states. “The states, particularly after the passage of the MCCA, experienced rapid, and [from their perspectives] uncontrollable escalation of their state Medicaid expenditures.” Wiesner, supra, at 693. “In Florida, for example, the annual Medicaid expenditures for nursing homes increased over $100 million for a $1 billion budget for fiscal year 1992-1993.” Id. at 683 n. 14 (citing Burton D. Dunlop et al., Fla. Int‘l Univ., The Context of Long Term Care in Florida: Interrelationships of Medically Needy, Assets Recovery and Long Term Care Insurance Policy Initiatives 1 (1992)).
As a result, Governors and state legislatures concerned with balancing state budgets were creatively trying to reduce costs and secure recovery for payments made. “Prior to 1993, states were permitted, but not required, to establish estate recovery programs.” West Virginia, 132 F.Supp.2d at 440. Thus, the states, as is often the case in “cooperative federalism” programs, served as incubators of new ideas in cost management and recovery.
For example, as early as the late 1970s, New York adopted provisions granting eligibility to a Medicaid applicant even though he or she had a spouse with sufficient income and assets to provide medical assistance. See In re Estate of Imburgia, 127 Misc.2d 756, 487 N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (N.Y.Sur.Ct.1984) (aff‘d by 130 A.D.2d 658, 515 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y.App.Div.1987), disapproved on other grounds by In re Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 (N.Y. 1993)). The statute was interpreted to create an implied contract allowing for recovery from the spouse or the spouse‘s estate. Id.
California, on the other hand, adopted a statute prior to 1987 that permitted the state to “claim against the estate of the decedent, or against any recipient of the property of that decedent by distribution or survival an amount equal to the [Medi-Cal] payments received.” Citizens Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting
At least as early as 1990, Minnesota had a statute allowing for recovery from a surviving spouse‘s estate to the extent of “the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.”
And, of course, Missouri, also in 1990, adopted
Not surprisingly, there were legal challenges to some of these statutes, but they met with mixed results. In Imburgia, the state paid the cost of nursing home assistance for Mrs. Imburgia prior to her death in 1981 then sought to recover those costs from the estate of Mr. Imburgia after his death in 1983. 487 N.Y.S.2d at 264 (adopting facts from prior decision at In re Estate of Imburgia, 122 Misc.2d 1033, 472 N.Y.S.2d 305, 305-06 (N.Y.Surr.Ct.1984)). The estate claimed that, to the extent New York statutes permitted such recovery, they conflicted with the pre-1993 version of
The California statute was also challenged in Kizer, a 2-1 decision with one judge dissenting. In that case, survivors of Medicaid recipients who held assets in joint tenancy with the recipient during the recipient‘s lifetime claimed that the California provision was inconsistent with
Thus, when Missouri adopted
The Missouri law was not challenged prior to the adoption of OBRA ‘93, so it is unknown whether it would have passed muster based on the prior version of
This brings us to the relevant provisions of federal and Missouri statutory law that are applicable to the case sub judice. The pertinent federal law is set out in
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under a State plan.
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on be-half of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual‘s estate....
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(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual‘s surviving spouse, if any....
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(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term “estate“, with respect to a deceased individual —
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual‘s estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
1. As used in this section, the following terms mean:
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(2) “Obligor estate“, the estate against which an obligation under this section arises;
(3) “Recipient“, a person to whom or on whose behalf assistance is provided;
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2. For the purposes of this section, the providing of assistance shall create an obligation which may be recovered by filing a claim in the probate division of the circuit court against the decedent estate of the spouse of the deceased recipient upon such spouse‘s death as provided by the probate code of Missouri, chapters 472, 473, 474 and 475, RSMo. The amount of the state debt shall be the full amount of assistance without interest provided to the recipient during the marriage of such recipient and spouse; provided that the liability of the obligor estate shall not exceed the value of the combined resources of the recipient and the spouse of the recipient on the date of death of the recipient.
(Emphasis added.)
As noted supra, based on the history of the Medicaid program and the states’ efforts to control costs, it is certain that the purpose of the Missouri legislature in adopting
We start with the North Dakota Supreme Court‘s decision in the case of In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847 (N.D.1998). In that case, Nathaniel Thompson received Medicaid benefits prior to his death on December 20, 1992. Id. at 848. His wife, Victoria Thompson, never received any medical assistance benefits. Id. She died on September 15, 1995, leaving assets subject to administration. Id. An estate was opened and a personal representative appointed. Id. The North Dakota Department of Human Services filed a claim against Mrs. Thompson‘s estate for recovery of the medical assistance benefits provided to her husband. Id. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Department allowing the claim, and the personal representative appealed. Id.
On appeal, the court did not examine its general definition of “estate” but only looked at the following language in its estate recovery statute,
1. On the death of any recipient of medical assistance who was fifty-five years of age or older when the recipient received the assistance, and on the death of the spouse of such a deceased recipient, the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the recipient following the recipient‘s fifty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a preferred claim against the decedent‘s estate....
2. No claim must be paid during the lifetime of the decedent‘s surviving spouse, if any....
Id. at 849 (emphasis omitted). The court held that the “broad definition of the recipient‘s estate in
That expansive definition is broad enough to encompass the department‘s claim against the estate of a deceased
spouse of a deceased recipient of medical assistance benefits for the amount of medical assistance paid out, to the extent the recipient at the time of death had any title or interest in assets which were conveyed to his or her spouse “through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.”
Id. In so holding, the court also stated:
Because the expansive federal definition of “estate” in
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits recipient “had any legal title or interest in at the time of death,” it is a matter of little moment whether the department seeks to recover the benefits paid by filing a claim in the estate of the recipient after the death of the recipient‘s surviving spouse or by filing a claim in the surviving spouse‘s estate.
Id. at 851 n. 3 (emphasis added).
A Minnesota court reached a similar result in In re Estate of Jobe, 590 N.W.2d 162 (Minn.App.1999). In that case, Amos and Alice Jobe, husband and wife, owned 120 acres that they acquired in 1974. Id. at 164. Mr. Jobe entered a nursing home in 1993 and received Medicaid benefits from that time until his death in 1995. Id. Mrs. Jobe, who never received medical assistance, died in 1996 and was the sole owner of the 120 acres at that time. Id. The County Department of Social Services filed a claim against Mrs. Jobe‘s estate for the amount of medical assistance benefits provided to Mr. Jobe before his death. Id. The trial court allowed the claim, and the estate appealed. Id.
The estate asserted on appeal that the statute authorizing recovery of medical assistance was invalid because it conflicted with federal law. Id. The statute in question provides:
Subd. 1a. Estates subject to claims. If a person receives any medical assistance hereunder, on the person‘s death * * * or on the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, the total amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the person or the estate of the surviving spouse in the court having jurisdiction to probate the estate.
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Subd. 2. Limitations on claims. * * * A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse who did not receive medical assistance, for medical assistance rendered for the predeceased spouse, is limited to the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.
Id. at 164 (emphasis added);
The Minnesota court began its analysis by stating that there was a three-part test in determining whether a federal statute preempts a state statute, that being: “(1) compliance with the federal and state provisions is physically impossible; (2) preemption is express and unequivocal in language of the federal statute; and (3) congressional preemptive intent is implicit in the overall scheme of federal and state regulation.” Jobe, 590 N.W.2d at 165. The court found that the second and third parts of this test did not apply to the facts at hand and that the only basis for preemption was whether compliance with the federal and state provisions was physically impossible. Id.
The court then reviewed the federal statute,
The rules regarding eligibility for medical assistance do not necessarily override rules for recovery of benefits paid. Rather, because both federal and state law allow recovery only after the death of an individual‘s surviving spouse, dual interests are served. One policy prevents the impoverishment of the surviving spouse during his or her lifetime. Once that spouse dies and the need for protection from impoverishment ceases, allowing a state to recover medical assistance benefits previously paid furthers the broader purpose of funding future services to the medically needy. These policies are both served by allowing the state to recover medical assistance benefits paid to or on behalf of a predeceased spouse from a surviving spouse‘s estate, to the extent the assets contained in that estate were jointly owned by the couple during their marriage.
Id. (internal citations and parentheticals omitted).
The Minnesota court‘s holding is clear and concise:
Because federal law now allows states to opt for a definition of estate that may include “assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement,” the state statute that allows medical assistance benefit reimbursement from the estate of a surviving spouse from “assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly-owned property at any time during the marriage” is entirely consistent with federal law and not preempted. We therefore affirm the district court‘s allowance of this claim against the estate.
Id. at 166-67 (internal citation omitted).
It is important to recognize that the Minnesota statute under review in Jobe, like Missouri‘s statute, predated the passage of OBRA ‘93. It remained essentially unchanged from the time it was adopted until Jobe was decided (and thereafter). Accordingly, Jobe, like Demille, supra, also stands for the proposition that it matters not whether the statute was efficacious prior to 1993 because even if it was not, it became effective upon passage of OBRA ‘93.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed this issue again, albeit in a different factual situation, in In re Estate of Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709 (Minn.App.2002). In Gullberg, the recipient spouse had conveyed the homestead, which was marital property held in joint tenancy, to the surviving spouse before applying for and receiving medical assistance benefits. Id. at 713. The court reaffirmed its holding in Jobe, declaring that “the county‘s claim against the estate is clearly allowed by Minnesota‘s estate recovery statute,” but asserted that “the issue is whether allowance of the claim in its entirety complies with federal law.” Id. The court stated
Thus, allowing a claim like this serves to fulfill the purposes of the Medicaid Act by protecting the surviving spouse‘s right to enjoy and use assets during his or her lifetime, while enabling the county to recoup a portion of its expenditures and to prevent “capable individuals from using Medicaid as artificially inexpensive long-term care insurance.”
Id. (quoting Jon M. Zieger, The State Giveth and the State Taketh Away: In Pursuit of a Practical Approach to Medicaid Estate Recovery, 5 Elder L.J. 359, 374-76 (Fall 1997)).
The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ most recent pronouncement on the subject came in the recent case of In re Estate of Barg, 722 N.W.2d 492 (Minn.App.2006). The issue in Barg was the proper calculation, pursuant to Gullberg, of the value of a Medicaid recipient‘s interest in transferred joint-tenancy property that was part of the surviving spouse‘s estate. Id. at 494. Nonetheless, the court again reaffirmed the holding in Jobe, stating:
Minnesota‘s estate-recovery statute provides that the state may assert a claim against the estate of a surviving spouse to recoup medical-assistance benefits provided to the predeceased spouse. The Minnesota statute thus reflects the legislature‘s exercise of the option to expand the definition of estate to allow claims against the surviving spouse‘s estate.
Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
Several other courts have reached similar results. See In re Estate of Laughead, 696 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 2005) (holding that the probate definition of “estate” and the general probate laws do not apply because the estate recovery statute “is a specific law that addresses the particular matter at issue“); Estate of DeMartino v. Div. of Medical Assistance & Health Servs., 373 N.J.Super. 210, 861 A.2d 138, 145 (N.J.Super.Ct.2004) (holding that the estate recovery statutes define the term “estate” consistent with federal law and the assets of decedent‘s testamentary trust, which was merely a vehicle for transfer of the decedent‘s assets to his heirs, are part of decedent‘s “estate” for purposes of estate recovery act); State of Nevada Dep‘t of Human Resources v. Ullmer, 120 Nev. 108, 87 P.3d 1045, 1050 (Nev.2004) (Nevada estate recovery “statutes broaden the definition of ‘estate’ to include ‘assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased [Medicaid] recipient through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.’ ” (quoting
Cases ruling to the contrary are limited. In Hines v. Dep‘t of Public Aid, 221 Ill.2d 222, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. 2006), Beverly and Julius Tutinas were husband and wife and owned their home and an automobile in joint title. Id. at 150. Julius entered a nursing home and received Medicaid benefits prior to his death. Id. Beverly died several years later still owning, as the survivor, the home and automobile. Id. An estate was opened and
The only other case to which we have been referred, or have found through our own research, is In re Estate of Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245 (Wis.App. 1995).3 In that case, Paul and Grace Budney were husband and wife. Id. at 246. Grace entered a nursing home and received Medicaid benefits prior to her death. Id. Paul subsequently died, and the Department of Health & Social Services filed a claim in his estate to recover medical assistance benefits paid on behalf of Grace. Id. The estate objected, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the estate. Id. The court, in one short paragraph with virtually no analysis, and without any mention whatsoever of the federal law‘s expansive definition of “estate,” concluded that
Budney has only been followed in one case, Bienemann v. State, 577 N.W.2d 387 (Wis.App.1998), and otherwise has rarely even been mentioned.4 The North Dakota Supreme Court in Thompson discussed the holding in Budney, but it stated that “the Budney court did not address the effect of the broad definition of ‘estate’ in
Returning now to the instant appeal, Missouri‘s estate recovery statute,
The amount of the state debt shall be the full amount of assistance without interest provided to the recipient during the marriage of such recipient and spouse; provided that the liability of the obligor estate shall not exceed the value of the combined resources of the
recipient and the spouse of the recipient on the date of death of the recipient.
(Emphasis added.) This language is very similar to the Minnesota statute, which limited recovery from the spouse‘s estate to “the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.” Jobe, 590 N.W.2d at 164. Although the statute in Thompson did not include this limiting language, the North Dakota Supreme Court still found that it fell within the expansive federal definition of “estate” in
As noted above, the Bruce‘s residence was titled as a tenancy by the entirety. Under Missouri law,
“[a]n estate by the entireties is created by a conveyance to the husband and wife by a deed in the usual form. It is one estate vested in two individuals who are by a fiction of law treated as one person, each being vested with entire estate. Neither can dispose of it or any part of it without the concurrence of the other, and in case of the death of either the other retains the estate. It differs from a joint tenancy where the survivor succeeds to the whole estate by right of the survivorship; in an estate by entireties the whole estate continues in the survivor. The estate remains the same as it was in the first place, except that there is only one tenant of the whole estate whereas before the death there were two.”
In re Estate of Honse, 694 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo.App. S.D.1985) (quoting Greene v. Spitzer, 343 Mo. 751, 123 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Mo.1938)) (emphasis supplied by Honse court). Thus, although the estate passes in its entirety to the surviving spouse upon the death of one spouse, the predeceased spouse clearly has a “legal title or interest” in the property at the time of death. The Missouri statute does not define “combined resources.” “When a term is not defined, the legislature is not held to a technical meaning, but rather reference is made to the dictionary to find the meaning that the legislature intended.” Fisher v. Waste Management of Missouri, 58 S.W.3d 523, 526 (Mo. banc 2001). “Combine” is defined as “to come or bring into union; to unite or join,” and “combined” is defined as “united closely.” Webster‘s New Twentieth Century Dictionary 360 (2d ed.1979). The word “resource” is defined among other ways as “wealth; assets; available money or property.” Id. at 1542. Accordingly, “combined resources,” by definition, means joint wealth or assets. Nothing could be more unqualifiedly “combined resources” than a tenancy by the entirety, where one estate is vested in two individuals.
Thus, it is my view that the legislature expanded the definition of “estate” sufficiently in
I am mindful that the Eastern District of this Court, like the majority here, recently concluded that “Missouri‘s statutory definition of ‘estate’ does not allow for spousal recovery.” Shuh, 248 S.W.3d at 89. Curiously, the Shuh court found Thompson and Jobe “persuasive,” and relied on them in holding that “Congress intended the term ‘estate’ can have a broad meaning under the Medicaid Act allowing for spousal recovery,” but it did not apply their reasoning in analyzing Missouri‘s statutory scheme. Id. at 88. In any event, since Shuh reached essentially the same result as the majority here, I must respectfully differ with it as well.