*1 proceeding; federal civil tax could be used state officer already significant been effect attained due had deterrent level). here therefore state Exclusion cru- exclusion at any is to be deterrent effect at all. cial if there exclusionary applicability of the state rule is even emphasis rule, clear. Unlike the federal our more rights protecting personal rule rather than on state "is on governmental curbing White, State v. actions." right 92, 110, "[WJhenever P.2d unreasonably remedy violated, White, at must follow." right remedy 110. Here the was violated—the must there- irrespective follow, in which fore of the nature of the action isit invoked. suppression of
The trial court's the fruits second inspection property proper. The evi- of Mrs. Primeau's inspection, however, was not from the third dence derived suppressed. one those fruits and it should not have been County's dis- should therefore not have been action missed. part part affirm in and remand would and reverse
trial. December C.D. En Banc. 1982.] 6705.
[No. Proceeding Disciplinary In the Matter of Against Jr., F. McGrath, Thomas Attorney at Law. *2 Farrell, Robert T. for Bar Association. Guterson,
Murray B. respondent. Following an in a res argument
Brachtenbach, C.J. McGrath assaulted lounge, Thomas taurant seriously wounding shooting and gun, individual with him. to a Kirkland restau- gone p.m. McGrath had
About 4:30 gun a concealed holster wearing He was lounge. rant and He special. nose .38 caliber snub which contained a loaded carrying the he no reason for specific that had later testified on he it as he had just carried day, rather gun happened incident shooting occasions. many other 2 a.m. about McGrath discussed
During evening, course client, person with another case business with discussed handling, persons he to other about con- was talked evening social. project. dominium rest was McGrath's affidavit is the rendition on record account, he evening. According the events of that his *3 stranger, at the bar at 1:15 a.m. when he and a sitting victim, dispute. in Strong ultimate became involved words McGrath exchanged, stranger fight. were and the offered to outside, suggested they stranger resolve the matter so the stayed, others hoping and his friend left. McGrath fight. would leave and avoid a lobby. in leaving, he the victim
Upon encountered place stranger and the Another took exchange verbal McGrath, handed, open on the face. McGrath went slapped the rear door. through back into the restaurant exited again stranger he encountered the When he went outside and his friend. McGrath, and McGrath told started toward stranger kept McGrath stranger approaching,
him When the stop. to hit in the him. The bullet the victim gun drew his and shot him. seriously injured neck and Later, away. in his and drove after call- car got
McGrath attorney, police. he turned himself in to the ing his assault charged with two counts of McGrath degree. plea bargaining, pleaded first As a result of he guilty degree, one count to assault the second B class felony. years' probation, McGrath was to 10 sentenced year County King program, Jail on the work release pay victim, $14,668.91 make restitution and to to jail compensation the crime victims fund. The work release sentence was later reduced to months. practice
Thomas McGrath was admitted to the of law in Washington the State of in March 1970. Because his fel- ony suspended conviction, this court McGrath from the pending law on December the final disposition disciplinary proceedings against him. complaint DRA 9.1. A formal filed the bar association charged that McGrath's conduct constituted a crime involving turpitude, warranting moral thus disbarment. 1.1(a). hearing hearing panel A DRA was held before a offi- engaged cer, who found that McGrath had involving turpitude moral he recommended that be Disciplinary adopted disbarred. The Bar Association Board hearing panel findings, officer's conclusions recom- dissenting mendations, with two members and recommend- ing 2-year suspension. We hold that McGrath's conduct did involve moral and that disbarment is the proper disciplinary sanction. Discipline Attorneys perti state, Rules for part:
nent subjected disciplin- An at law to the ary any sanctions or actions set forth in 1.2 Rule following . . causes .: (a) any turpi- involving The commission of act dishonesty, corruption, tude, or whether the same committed in the course of or her his conduct as an attorney, otherwise, *4 or and whether the same constitutes felony not; a or or misdemeanor and if the act constitutes felony misdemeanor, a proceeding plinary or conviction thereof a criminal precedent shall a not be condition to disci- Upon judg- conviction, however, action. such ment and sentence shall be conclusive evidence at the
341 guilt respon- of the hearing of the disciplinary ensuing or in the indictment crime described attorney of the dent of the statute information, his or her violation and of as hearing pro- disciplinary A it is based. upon which determine, be had rules shall in Rule 3.2 of these vided of the (1) element turpitude was fact an moral whether (2) and, respondent committed crime disciplinary therefrom. recommended to result action 1.1(a). conclusively rule, it is In with this DRA accordance crime respondent guilty McGrath presumed that purposes 9A.36.020. For the of second assault. RCW degree will treated plea guilty a a proceeding, Krogh, re In See 85 jury guilty. as the same a verdict Johnson, Wn.2d In re (1975); 462, 74 P.2d 578 Wn.2d 536 Dalton, 726, 21, (1968); 375 P.2d 948 (1962). P.2d 258 issue, then, turpitude moral
The first whether McGrath was con- respondent element of McGrath's crime. 9A.36.020(b) (c) which state violating victed of RCW crime of second assault is committed when one:
(b) bodily upon harm knowingly grievous Shall inflict weapon; or a or another with without (c) weapon with a or knowingly Shall assault another harm; produce bodily thing likely other instrument or 9A.36.020(b) (c). RCW argued
Counsel
bar association has
inflic
involving
"knowing"
assault or a
"knowing"
crime
necessarily
involving
harm
a crime
moral
bodily
tion of
held,
deporta
turpitude.
immigrant
have
Other courts
cases,
deadly weapon
involves
tion
that assault with
Tayo
v.
"beyond any question." Weedin
Yamada,
United
(9th
1925);
kichi
455,
F.2d
Cir.
Corsi,
(2d
ex rel.
v.
Cir.
States
63 F.2d
Zaffarano
rule in
1933).
decline, however,
per
such a
se
adopt
We
Each case must
disciplinary proceeding.
the context of
Egger,
its
facts.
determined on
own
addition,
disciplinary rules
P.2d 864
*5
that,
provide
while a conviction is conclusive evidence of
guilt,
hearing
necessary
is
if
turpitude
to determine moral
1.1(a). Thus,
was involved. DRA
a finding
turpi-
of moral
separate
tude is a
issue
guilt
from the
of
in a
determination
proceeding.
turpitude
criminal
Moral
must be determined
from
act,
"the inherent
immoral nature of the
rather
than
of
which the statute
law
In
Hopkins,
imposes".
569,
572,
54 Wash.
Now, do against the acts found appellant, and for he ., which was . . commonly convicted violate the accepted good morals, his of honesty, justice? standard Suppose by regard, measure conduct not any puritanical standard, but right the standard of conduct generally prevailing our among people, uninflu- by the enced fact that the statute punishes law also such What, as a then, conduct crime. is the answer to the question whether or not such acts involve moral turpi- tude?
In re Hopkins, supra at 572.
This
turpitude
necessarily
definition of moral
general.
setting
of attorney discipline,
application depends
its
upon the collective conscience and
the mem-
judgment of
bers
phrases
of this
It
meaningful
court.
as
as other
Bar,
See
v.
adopted by
Searcy
State
other
courts.
(Tex.
1980)
App.
S.W.2d
Civ.
which sets forth the
various
"Its
gain
clarity
definitions.
definition does not
re Jacoby,
by prolixity
statement."
App.
Ohio
(1943).
See also
Moral
II
Finding
involved moral tur
that McGrath's conduct
impose.
pitude,
proper
issue is
sanction to
the second
the
panel
hearing
dis
The bar
officer recommended
association
adopted
Disciplinary
majority
and a
Board
barment
this
The
the Board is
recommendation.
recommendation of
given
consideration,"
"serious
but this court retains ulti
proper
responsibility
determining
measure
the
mate
any
Krogh,
discipline
given
462,
re
case. In
(1975).
McNerthney, supra. dis- already this has been offense seriousness an indi- dispute. McGrath assaulted
cussed wounded gun; seriously he shot and with loaded vidual him. factor, repetition, is difficult to second avoidance of instance, crime is unrelated to where the
evaluate. imposed by sanction *7 will respondent or not may not affect whether court this Hopefully, in future. the a incident the in similar involved Court, include Superior the which imposed by sanctions alcohol, that he admission and McGrath's abstention any repeti- preclude to will suffice gun carries a longer no by respondent. of conduct type of this tion disciplinary sanctions factor, strict Addressing the third attorneys this court to notice other may serve as here for the law from those respect a high demands court. While officers the bar and who are members deter- not does rest on our decision important, factor alone. rent to disbar in our decision factor persuasive most for honor and respect maintenance
respondent in An Ethical Consideration legal profession. of the dignity Responsibility states: of Professional the Code minor violations society, in even position of his Because public confidence to lessen lawyer may tend of law exemplifies law to Obedience legal profession. the law respect for lawyers especially, respect law. To for a platitude. be more than should not manda- are The Ethical Considerations CPR EC 1-5. character, represent principles they do tory in but CPR rules. enforcing guidance serve as Preliminary Statement. respon with recitals of replete
While the record affect the this does not competency practice to dent's Krogh, is based. See grounds which our decision upon (1975). necessary P.2d It is not practice of law crime committed to be related to for the Henry S. As out pointed warrant severe sanctions. to Drinker, Committee on Standing former chairman Bar and Grievances of the American Professional Ethics Association, Legal in his book Ethics: or other disci- dealing cases with disbarment [T]he characteristics,
pline lawyers involve two distinct clearly recognized: although the distinction is often him lawyer's has shown 1. Cases which the to properly to one who cannot be trusted advise act for clients that, 2. Cases in which his conduct has been such profession him remain member of the and to permit appear court, on the would cast serious reflection pro- dignity reputation of the court and on the fession omitted.)
(Footnote Ethics, Drinker, 42-43 Legal at H.S. hearing category. This case falls the latter As did the into officer, of our it to the basic standards repugnant find pro- 10-year serving to allow one who is profession conviction, involving felony for a an act bation sentence clients represent law and to turpitude, as attor- competence of this state. McGrath's the courts *8 ney question permitting is not relevant to the of whether profession him to remain a member of the cast would a dignity serious reflection on the of the court and on reputation profession. of the imposed by Disciplinary
Costs of $859.43 Board are approved. The bar association has not filed statement a expenses Supreme additional Court within the allot- period, ted time so these are additional costs deemed 7.2(a). waived. DRA Disciplinary
The recommendation of the Board is approved, respondent's name shall be stricken from attorneys the roll of in this state. JJ., concur.
Rosellini, Stafford, Dore, Dimmick, (dissenting)—There J. can be mistake that no Williams, McGrath, the actions Jr., Thomas F. were wrong. especially by behavior, Such bar, members of the agree Therefore, cannot be tolerated. that Mr. McGrath's deserving conduct is action this court. agree, analysis however, cannot with the inflexible majority it which leads to conclude disbarment appropriate Accordingly, sanction. for reasons set forth below, I dissent.
Thomas McGrath's conviction for assault in the second majority is, states, is a serious matter. It as the involving turpitude. appears Yet, crime this incident impulse, have been crime committed in the heat of say an alcohol induced state. That is not to Mr. McGrath's excusable, for it is not. The circumstances of this temporary case, however, indicate to the crime me permanent behavioral than aberration rather moral fail- ing. my such, As I think far harsh. In disbarment too nothing gained removing view, will be Thomas McGrath and, indeed, from the of law much be lost. majority opinion employs analysis the traditional determining appropriate disciplinary sanction imposed. By using determining appro- this method of majority priate its inevitable sanction, arrives at *9 ques- validity that answer is of answer: disbarment. pieces important of however, tionable, because several equation. Missing are omitted from the were information any positive of Thomas attributes of the considerations of this case. circumstances or the individualized McGrath analysis Apparently, cannot accommodate the traditional reasoning I believe such information. Since additional overly injustice simplistic majority works an and of the propose analysis here, of must be I that our method itself accomplished by recognizing changed. can This be qualitative crimes moral tur- between various of differences attorney discipline pitude acknowledging is, at and that part, punishment. dispensing our harsh- Instead of least regardless circumstances, could then est of the sanctions befitting discipline more of the case before us. mete out profession legal image if better served The equality would be proportionality justice our stand- and of become following my analyzing be of and ard. The would method dealing with this case. Turpitude Moral majority's quarrel
I have no
with the
determination
turpitude
degree
is involved in the crime of second
moral
analysis
My disagree-
assault,
cannot end there.
but the
majority's
to rec-
ment on this issue stems
failure
may
types
ognize
turpitude
differing
of
that moral
be
depending
turpi-
degrees,
act.
on the nature of the
Moral
variety
component of a
can be identified as a
wide
tude
reprehensible
A crime
crimes,
than others.
some more
spontaneously
involving
moral
committed
aforethought
less condemnable to me than
without
seems
planning and consid-
after
crime committed
some
involving
turpitude the
To treat all crimes
eration.
purposes
discipline
sim-
cases
same for
ple
hardly
princi-
convenient,
our stated
it
reflects
but
ple
deciding
basis. See
case on an individualized
each
re Egger,
596, 598,
86 Wn.2d
Some like those involving dishonesty, partic- are ularly incompatible practice with the of law. legal pro- fession concerns itself with a search for the truth in each A case. lawyer dishonest can disrupt the entire legal process diverting truthfinding function. our most recent disciplinary case requiring felony disbarment for a convic- Stroh, tion, 289, 295, (1982), P.2d 1161 we noted that "the legal system is virtually defenseless against the united forces of a corrupt attorney per- and a jured witness." type conduct, submit, That is the deserves our severest equate sanction. To then such con- duct that strikes at the heart of the profession with assault, a crime wholly unrelated to the seems to me to fundamentally Further, unfair. to focus *10 single-mindedly on the existence or nonexistence of moral turpitude as the triggering device for severe disci- plinary sanctions makes it almost impossible to arrive at an appropriate decision. simply
Instead of
looking to see
turpitude
whether moral
is a component of a given crime and making that one factor
dispositive
case,
of the entire
I suggest we ask one further
question: Does the crime charged
important
relate to some
aspect of the practice of
law? While there
be some
crimes,
homicide,
like intentional
which will warrant dis-
despite
barment
having
impact
little direct
practice
on the
law, I
believe the above distinction is valid. Other courts
apparently differentiate
between crimes related or unre-
lated to
and,
of law
accordingly,
impose differ-
Johnson,
sanctions. See In re
ent
73,
106 Ariz.
To point illustrate the the moral in this
349
disbar
warranting
that previously
in kind from
case differs
In
each of
ment,
past
to our
cases.
one need
look
dis
cases,
were
following
attorneys
convicted
felonies
Stroh,
witness); In re
supra (tampering
In re
with
barred:
(subornation
Kerr,
(1976)
655, 548
297
86 Wn.2d
P.2d
(1976)
Egger,
re
596,
P.2d
In
Wn.2d
547
864
86
perjury);
(1975)
462,
Krogh,
re
P.2d 578
In
(robbery);
85 Wn.2d
536
Johnson,
re
21, 442
948
In
P.2d
74 Wn.2d
(conspiracy);
Anderson,
In re
587, 439
(1968)
Wn.2d
larceny);
73
(grand
re
Caffrey,
In
(1968)
71 Wn.2d
(grand larceny);
P.2d 981
re
In
(subornation
(1967)
554,
perjury);
Nothing in the crime of assault the second can impugn attorney honesty integ- be said to McGrath's rity lawyer. or his as skills And the facts this case anything flagrant demonstrate but a calculated and disre- gard Granted, for the law. Thomas McGrath's decision to carry weapon drinking into a establishment was not a thing do, wise as can seen from the results of this aggres- Nevertheless, case. Mr. McGrath was not the initial attempted by remaining sor. He to avoid the confrontation closing leaving by way at the bar until after hours and outside, the rear When exit. he went he received a hostile reception from the victim his As the men friend. two approached apparently McGrath, Mr. with the intent of doing bodily harm, him he reacted self-defense. Unfor- tunately, potentially he answered their threats of force with deadly shooting force. The was the almost inevitable result gun, carrying legally illegally, of one or under such cir- cumstances. While there is no doubt his viola- laws, tive our criminal Thomas submit McGrath dangerous reacted to a situation as most individuals who carry guns immediately gun. would—he for his reached His response reaction was an instinctive to what he believed threatening carefully situation, abe not a considered act clearly conduct, I believe, criminal violence. Such distin- guishable type previously warranting from the of conduct disbarment.
Although Thomas McGrath's conduct have involved turpitude, indicate facts to me that was an repeated. isolated instance that will Disbarment will purpose deterring attorneys serve no McGrath or other similarly reacting dangerous under such circum- protect public stances. Nor will disbarment from an unscrupulous lawyer, and dishonest Thomas McGrath short, neither. In to borrow the words of Justice Rosellini:
351 the act be no relation between appears to There attempted pre- to be evil which is discipline and the pound desire to obtain to be blind vented. It seems to line gives It credence the committed. wrong flesh for that," supposes said "If the law in Oliver Twist: found a ass—a idiot.” "... the law is Mr. Bumble (1963) 456 Greiner, 306, 318, P.2d re 378 In 61 Wn.2d (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
II
Attorney
Discipline
Is Punishment
repeated
oft
words
reiterates
the
majority opinion
are to
attorney discipline
purposes
the
basic
that
two
attorney
of an
public from future misconduct
protect
the
profession.
preserve
legal
in the
public
and to
confidence
re McNerthney,
In
Majority opinion, at 344. See
95 Wn.2d
Zderic,
777,
In re
41,
(1980);
P.2d
92 Wn.2d
every
disci-
nearly
attorney
600 P.2d
case,
magical
like some
pline
we seem to mouth those words
which, if
will
repeated
enough,
often
somehow
incantation
I
all
no
to the idea
problems.
longer
solve
our
can
subscribe
imposed
protect
solely
sanctions are
to
preserve
profession.
confidence
public
admirable,
certainly
are
two of
purposes,
Those
while
attorney discipline
we
many
concerns
must address
By
to
cases.
its decision
disbar Thomas McGrath
grounding
. .
.
preserve
"dignity
the need to
of the court and
on
reputation
profession", majority opinion,
at
are
majority
impression
the mistaken
creates
appearances
than individual-
public
more concerned with
approach
To
ized fairness.
achieve a balanced
cases,
pur-
must reexamine our basic
discipline
believe we
disciplinary measures.
poses
imposing
repeatedly
punish-
denied that
Although this court has
see
sanctions,
imposing disciplinary
ment is the basis for
Brown,
(1982); 273, 275,
(Italics mine.)
Rosellini,
In re
646
Wn.2d
P.2d
(1982)
(Dolliver, J., dissenting). See also
re
In
Saul-
nier,
676, 678-80,
(1982)
97 Wn.2d
(Dolliver,
Punishment in attorney discipline the area of is not imposed simply penalty to exact for a wrong committed. Instead, punishment is directed to important achieve other purposes. proper The punishment measure of works not only protect public incompetent attorneys the from and preserve public profession—the confidence the in two purposes attorney most often cited for discipline. Punish- permits ment also of consideration the deterrent effect of the sanction in preventing future misconduct as well as the attorney whether can rehabilitated. While we have occasionally recognized these and other purposes additional in the past, application principles our of these the cases has been inconsistent best. I recognition at believe our of attorney disciplinary "punishment" sanctions as will allow us positive some, to achieve the we in just results seek not but in all cases. concept encompasses of the
two
purposes given by
traditional
this court for
discipline, but also a number of other factors often utilized
inus
determining
appropriate
the
sanctions.
Smith,
the case of For
in
example,
659, 663,
(1974),
Since our as the final arbiters of *14 necessary pline sentencing is akin to that of a it is judge, for of guidelines establish some the exercise our broad setting punishment. Although in powers appropriate the must to fit the of punishment be tailored circumstances Egger, see In re case, particular each (1976), should for possible P.2d 864 whenever we strive uniformity to fit in results. Our decision some semblance therefore, not be punishment wrong, the to the should ability to like cases alike. foreclosing viewed as our treat Further, punish- I believe we should reserve our harshest wrongs we find most offen- ment—disbarment—for those Otherwise, its I this severest of sanctions loses sive. think outrage as at attor- effect this court's ultimate statement results, I suggest these would ney misconduct. To achieve following approach. First, attorney's if the offense involves conviction if the conduct involves dis turpitude, a crime of moral or activity upon the honesty touching some individual's or ability suggest presume we some punishment short of disbarment will suffice until shown My impression otherwise. approach of our current is that presume disbarment appropriate sanction unless mitigating sufficient factors are approach shown. Such an far too harsh and causes unfair results. We should not for get the severe immediate and long-term effects a term of suspension can attorney's practice.1 have on an law A term suspension, with its attendant pecuniary loss and the loss of an attorney's good standing public with the and fel low attorneys, often will Therefore, enough. sanction, would choose some say 1-year lesser a suspen sion, and then if determine there are sufficient mitigating factors to reduce suspension the term of or aggra sufficient vating factors to length suspension increase the or even warrant giving flexibility disbarment. While in us some impact suspen 1 It is worthwhile to consider the severe even a short term of attorney's practice. During suspension, sion can have on an the term of the attor ney accept any attorney any cannot new retainer or act as an case or 6.7(c). any suspended attorney notify matter of nature. DRA must all clients representing pending suspension he or she is matters that an order of has been suspended attorney attorney entered and that the will be unable to act anas dur ing suspension. addition, suspended attorney attorneys notify must parties representing any pending litigation proceed adverse or administrative 6.7(a) ing (b). suspended. suspension that he or she has been DRA A notice of published Washington newspaper will be in both the State Bar News a general county suspended attorney practices. circulation in which the DRA 6.7(e). Further, copy suspension presiding of the notice of will be sent to the judge superior county disciplined attorney court in the in which the main 6.7(f). practice. tains a DRA Beyond matters, procedural practical the above effects of term of sus- pension Certainly, suspended attorney are obvious. will be denied income from practice during suspension likely represent significant his or her will which pecuniary Depending practice, pecuniary loss. on the nature and extent of the may any imposed Many loss far exceed fine that could be the criminal courts. legal representation clients lose confidence and trust in and seek staff, attorney's prospect elsewhere. The faced with the work no or income during suspension, may unwilling attorney's the term of to await the reinstate- *15 may employment Finally, perhaps ment well and seek another office. and most importantly, suspension significant impact disciplined a term of will have a on the attorney's relationships attorneys—the future with fellow source of much new attorney's professional reputation, referral business. These adverse effects on an moreover, beyond suspension. will last far the term of severity punishment, establishing such an of the the wrongdoer strong punish enough approach the to would be public's preserve and the bench the confidence and still bar. having a criminal nor
Second, as conduct neither to ability attorney's impact this to on the direct only necessary dispense and when sanctions court should public necessary protect only degree the and deter the to to agree any we and should I can reoccurrence. While expect higher mem- of conduct from a somewhat standard recognize lawyers, too, bar, we should also bers recognizes prone public to human mistakes. are expects punishment fact, think, that some imposed If misconduct commensurate with the offense. reoccurs, in order. harsher would then be sanctions disciplinary determining proper sanctions
Third, in impose, the nature and to severity we should take into account imposed punishment courts, criminal attorney any. engages in that would if conduct When an but, reason, no crime for whatever otherwise constitute a may commenced, need to be criminal action is stronger our sanctions punish adequately If the offender. the criminal attorney's imposing courts have dealt with the penalties, however, measure criminal a lesser adequately punish that individual. be needed to punishment aspect discipline should work conjunction for criminal laws. or as a substitute with punishment, imposition with- of a second severe think the already considering punishment exacted, out first proportionality principles of fairness undermines attorney discipline in our criminal law and our embodied cases. luxury permit
Finally, of com- ourselves should punishments imposed paring with past. approach imposed Such an cases in the in similar uniformity predictability some should add disciplinary cases. results of our *16 III Appropriate Punishment Having actually demonstrated that discipline is punishment, I think analysis the following sets forth the appropriate punishment McGrath, for attorney Thomas Jr.
Since Mr. McGrath was convicted of the crime of assault in the second degree, wholly even that crime is though unrelated his to ability begin would 1-year assuming a suspension adequate punish Mr. McGrath yet and integrity maintain the of judiciary and respect for the profession. point, At that I would con- sider and aggravating mitigating factors set forth in Smith and Salvesen. way circumstances, of aggravating I must conclude
the nature very crime was serious. When Thomas victim, McGrath his injuries shot he inflicted severe required attention, a good along deal of medical with the attendant expenses Attorney of such treatment. McGrath placed in danger himself of inappropriately his using weapon he pistol when carried his into the bar and con- sumed too much alcohol. The amount force used Mr. repel was, course, McGrath to attack forthcoming excessive under circumstances. conviction of attorney for felony crime some brings shame disrepute upon and profession. The nature of the crime and the amount force used would dictate to me that some greater 1-year suspension than may be in order. factors, terms of mitigating would conclude Mr. temporary
McGrath's conduct was a aberration that will not reoccur. The shooting spontaneous apparently preconceived. Mr. McGrath's plead guilty decision to cooperate with Disciplinary the Bar Association investigation Board's indicates to me a of his recognition attempt wrongdoing and to rehabilitate himself. As a penalty, attorney criminal McGrath received a sentence of years' probation. probation of that conditions require county that he serve make jail, a term resti- crime vic- victim, $14,668.91 to the pay
tution to his he has done. things Each of these fund. compensation tims him to abstain Further, probation require his the terms of and, felon, longer he can no from alcohol as convicted Therefore, the likelihood of reoccurrence carry a firearm. Mr. probation subject could slight since violation 10-year maximum McGrath to the remainder of his serving in jail. sentence leniency merit is the over-
Another factor which would support enjoy Thomas McGrath continues whelming with community. replete The record people *17 support for Mr. written numerous letters of McGrath clients, relatives, attorneys, profes- and friends. His fellow sionals, person, praised lawyer. to a his as a His abilities expressed ability clients their confidence his and noted they willing would be to have him handle their letters, despite work this incident. these one reviewing McGrath, escape impression cannot that Thomas incident, except competent, hardworking for this one is a attorney.
Finally, although may always this be a valid consid- eration, attorney's also it should be noted that ability working constituted a tort. Without to continue attorney, unlikely as an it seems that Thomas McGrath will judgment be able to make his victim whole should a against Although rendered him. McGrath's disbarment bar, certainly it not aid reputation enhance the will which I ability just compensation, his victim's to recover prefer. am sure most victims would by attorney McGrath The nature of the crime committed penalty a stiffer than a justify is serious and would seem Nevertheless, 1-year suspension. enough mitigat- there are short of factors here for me to conclude a ing disbarment, the criminal sanctions conjunction with pro- the intended results of already imposed, will achieve misconduct, pre- public, deterring future tecting in the bench and bar. public's confidence serving suspend Thomas McGrath from the Accordingly, would practice of law for period 2 years, with credit for the time already he has served suspension. under This would make him eligible for reinstatement on December 1982. condition, As a further I would require attorney McGrath to maintain his continuing legal educational requirements during his suspension so as to insure compe- his continuing tence as an upon his reinstatement of law. punishment, believe, Such a adequately will dem- onstrate our disapproval of Thomas McGrath's conduct and maintain our usual public's concerns for the interest. JJ., Dolliver,
Utter J. Williams, concur with Reconsideration denied February 1983. 48457-1. En Banc.
[No. December 1982.] Anthony Washington, State of v. Respondent, Saltarelli, Michael Petitioner.