In RE the Detention of Anthony Geltz Anthony Geltz
840 N.W.2d 273
Iowa
2013
Check Treatment

In re the DETENTION OF Anthony GELTZ, Anthony Geltz, Appellant.

No. 12-0647.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 6, 2013.

WATERMAN, Justice.

substitute for the predicate conviction re-quired to commit an offender as an SVP. As further explained below, other Code provisions explicitly mention both convic-tions and juvenile adjudications together when the legislature chooses to impose the same consequences for each category of offense. Accordingly, we hold that a juvenile adjudication does not constitute a conviction within the meaning of Iowa Code § 229A.2(11). We therefore reverse the judgment and order of the district court that committed Geltz as an SVP.

Michael H. Adams, Chief Public Defend- er, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John B. McCormally, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

WATERMAN, Justice.

This appeal presents the narrow ques- tion of whether a juvenile adjudication of delinquency on a charge of sexual abuse can serve as a predicate conviction to adju-dicate the offender as a “sexually violent predator” (SVP) under Iowa Code section 229A.2(11) (2011). The district court or-dered Anthony Geltz, then age eighteen, confined as an SVP at the Civil Commit- ment Unit for Sexual Offenders at the Cherokee Mental Health Institute, based on an offense Geltz committed at age four- teen. Geltz was charged as a juvenile and adjudicated delinquent for that offense in 2008, but has never had an adult convic- tion. He cannot be committed as an SVP without a qualifying prior conviction.

We must apply unambiguous operative statutory language as written without second-guessing the policy choices of the legislature. Iowa Code section 232.55(1) expressly provides that a juvenile adjudi- cation “shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime,” and chapter 229A nowhere states that a juvenile adjudication can serve as a

substitute for the predicate conviction required to commit an offender as an SVP. As further explained below, other Code provisions explicitly mention both convictions and juvenile adjudications together when the legislature chooses to impose the same consequences for each category of offense. Accordingly, we hold that a juvenile adjudication does not constitute a conviction within the meaning of section 229A.2(11). We therefore reverse the judgment and order of the district court that committed Geltz as an SVP.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Geltz was born in 1993. As a child, he was sexually abused by his mentally handi- capped sister and by two adult men, one of whom lived in the family home. Geltz in turn abused his stepsister and other neigh- borhood children. At age twelve, Geltz was sent to live at the Annie Wittenmyer Home in Davenport. Two years later, Geltz escaped from Wittenmyer and went to a Chuck E. Cheese‘s® restaurant, where he sexually abused a child. Geltz was prosecuted as a juvenile and adjudi- cated delinquent for sexual abuse in the second degree. He was placed in the State Training School for Boys in Eldora and has remained institutionalized. At El- dora, he was disciplined a dozen times for infractions involving sexual misconduct.

After Geltz turned eighteen, the State petitioned on June 7, 2011, to have him declared an SVP. After hearing conflicting expert testimony, the district court evalu- ated Geltz under Iowa Code section 229A.2(11), which defines “sexually violent predator” as

“a person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnor- mality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sex- ually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility.”

The district court ruled Geltz‘s juvenile adjudication constituted a conviction and found he is an SVP. The district court therefore ordered him committed to the Cherokee facility. This appeal followed.

II. Scope of Review.

Geltz raises one issue in his appeal: whether the district court erred by ruling that his juvenile adjudication constitutes a conviction within the meaning of section 229A.2(11). We review the district court‘s construction of this chapter for correction of errors at law. .

Geltz argues that Iowa Code section 232.55(1) prohibits the State from using his juvenile adjudication as the conviction re- quired under section 229A.2(11). The State argues that the term “convicted” in Iowa Code section 229A.2(11) should be read broadly to include juvenile adjudica- tions. We must decide this question of first impression as to the meaning of “con- victed” in section 229A.2(11).

When interpreting chapter 229A and related statutes, “our primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the legisla- ture.” . We look “first and foremost to the language it chose in creating the act.” . “We read the statute as a whole and give it its plain and obvious meaning, a sensible and logical construc- tion, which does not create an impractical or absurd result.” Id. (citation and inter- nal quotation marks omitted). “‘If more than one statute relating to the subject matter at issue is relevant to the inquiry, we consider all the statutes together in an effort to harmonize them.’ Kolzow v. State, 813 N.W.2d 731, 736 (Iowa 2012) (quoting ).”

We begin with the history of chapter 229A. In 1998, the Iowa legislature enacted a new chapter entitled “Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators,” placed within the Code subtitle pertaining to mental health. See 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1171 (codified as amended at Iowa Code ch. 229A (1999)). The legislative findings in chapter 229A state:

“The general assembly finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exists which is made up of persons who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treat- ment pursuant to the treatment provi- sions for mentally ill persons under chapter 229.... The general assembly finds that sexually violent predators’ likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high and that the existing involuntary commit- ment procedure under chapter 229 is inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to soci- ety.

The general assembly further finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating sex- ually violent predators in a prison set- ting is poor.... Therefore, the general assembly finds that a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of the sexually violent preda- tor is necessary.... The procedures should ... reflect the need to protect the public, to respect the needs of the victims of sexually violent offenses, and to encourage full, meaningful partic- ipation of sexually violent predators in treatment programs.”

Iowa Code § 229A.1 (2011). We have rec- ognized these findings “reveal the legisla- ture‘s intent in creating the act: to ensure public safety and to provide ‘treatment of the committed individual rather than pun- ishment.‘” (quoting ).

“This legislative intent guides our resolution of the issues presented.” Id.; see also (analyzing section 229A.2(10)(g) in light of the legislative intent expressed in sec- tion 229A.1).

The State argues the commitment of Geltz under chapter 229A furthers the legislative goals of protecting the public and ensuring he gets the long-term treat- ment he needs. The State notes that Geltz is now an adult and the SVP definition is based on behavior and mental state rather than age. The State predicts that upon his release from his current detention, Geltz will promptly reoffend. We share that concern, but are constrained by the language of the statutes. “Ours not to reason why, ours but to read, and apply. It is our duty to accept the law as the legislative body enacts it.” (quoting ).

Against this backdrop, we focus now on the operative statutory language. Section 229A.2(11) defines “sexually violent predator” as

“a person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility.”

The parties disagree on the meaning of the term “convicted” in this definition.1

When interpreting chapter 229A and related statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Det. of Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 2006). We look “first and foremost to the language it chose in creating the act.” Swanson, 668 N.W.2d at 574. “We read the statute as a whole and give it its plain and obvious meaning, a sensible and logical construc- tion, which does not create an impractical or absurd result.” Id. (citation and inter- nal quotation marks omitted). “If more than one statute relating to the subject matter at issue is relevant to the inquiry, we consider all the statutes together in an effort to harmonize them.” Kolzow v. State, 813 N.W.2d 731, 736 (Iowa 2012) (quoting ).

We read the SVP statute in tandem with Iowa Code section 232.55(1). Found in the juvenile justice chapter of the Iowa Code, section 232.55 is entitled, “Effect of adjudi- cation and disposition.” Subsection 1 states:

“An adjudication or disposition in a pro- ceeding under this division shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime and shall not impose any civil disabilities or oper- ate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment.”

Iowa Code § 232.55(1). This subsection was enacted in 1978. See 1978 Iowa Acts ch. 1088, § 35 (codified at Iowa Code § 232.55 (1979)). Geltz argues that section 232.55(1) applies generally to limit the def- inition of “convicted” in chapter 229A to exclude juvenile adjudications. We agree.

The plain language of section 232.55(1) unambiguously provides that juve- nile adjudications are not convictions. “‘When a statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its express terms.‘” State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998). Interpreting the term “convicted” in section 229A.2(11) to include juvenile adjudications would contradict the statuto- ry command of section 232.55(1). We

must read section 229A.2(11) together with section 232.55(1), and we hold juvenile adjudica- tions are not convictions for the purposes of committing an individual as an SVP. See Christiansen v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exam‘rs, 831 N.W.2d 179, 189 (Iowa 2013) (“[T]he more specific provision controls over the general provision.“); State v. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1978) (“[S]tatutes will be construed in such a manner as to be consistent with each other.“).

The State nevertheless cites our caselaw interpreting the term “conviction” broadly under certain circumstances, arguing such a broad interpretation is appro- priate here. “While we have construed the word ‘conviction’ to have a relatively narrow and technical meaning where it appears in statutes used to enhance pun- ishment, we have accepted a broader defi- nition when protection of the public has been at stake.” . Of course, protection of the public is a key goal of chapter 229A.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); (holding deferred judgment constitutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

Our cases that broadly construe “conviction” to include deferred judgments for adult offenses are inappo- site here in light of section 232.55(1), which expressly provides that juvenile adjudica- tions are not convictions. “[W]e are bound to follow the legislature‘s definitions and may not add words or change terms under the guise of judicial construction.” Iowa Dep‘t of Transp. v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

We also reject the State‘s argument that section 232.55(1), enacted in 1978, should not apply to limit the term “convicted” as used in chapter 229A, enacted twenty years later. The State accurately asserts the 1978 legislature that enacted section 232.55(1) did not contemplate how to define an SVP. The problem with the State‘s position is that we must presume that the 1998 legislature, as it enacted chapter 229A, was aware of the existing Code pro- vision providing that juvenile adjudications do not constitute convictions. Cf. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d at 434 (“The legislature is presumed to know the existing state of the law at the time of the enactment of a new statute.“). The legislature has amended section 229A.2(11) numerous times and yet has not chosen to revise the definition of “sexually violent predator” to include juve- nile adjudications.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication. Our cases that broadly con- strue “conviction” to include deferred judgments for adult offenses are inapposite here in light of section 232.55(1), which expressly provides that juvenile adjudica- tions are not convictions. “[W]e are bound to follow the legislature‘s definitions and may not add words or change terms under the guise of judicial construction.” Iowa Dep‘t of Transp. v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication. Our cases that broadly con- strue “conviction” to include deferred judgments for adult offenses are inapposite here in light of section 232.55(1), which expressly provides that juvenile adjudica- tions are not convictions. “[W]e are bound to follow the legislature‘s definitions and may not add words or change terms under the guise of judicial construction.” Iowa Dep‘t of Transp. v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (“[A] deferred judgment con- stitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon in possession statute], where the de- fendant (as here) has not completed his term of probation.“); Schilling v. Iowa Dep‘t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment consti- tutes a conviction for driver‘s license revo- cation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372 (holding deferred judgment is a con- viction for purposes of restitution law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication.

We recognize that other state legisla- tures have chosen to include juvenile adju- dications as a ground to commit sex of- fenders.3 Doing so makes sense from the standpoint of public safety. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2410, 81 L.Ed.2d 207, 217 (1984) (“[C]rime prevention is a ‘weighty social objective,’ and this interest persists undiluted in the juvenile context.” (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 363 (1979))). Yet, there are also differences between juvenile and adult offenders that rationally explain the legis- lature‘s decision to treat juvenile adjudica- tions differently than convictions. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1195, 161 L.Ed.2d 1, 22 (2005) (“[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.“); Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 647 (“By limiting section 902.14 to convictions as opposed to adjudications of delinquency, the legislature has at- tempted to avoid enhancing the punish- ment of less culpable offenders.“).

We cannot judicially revise the Iowa Code in the guise of interpretation. See id. (“[W]e are bound by what the legislature said, not by what it should or might have said.” Soward, 650 N.W.2d at 571). We must apply the statutory lan- guage as written and, therefore, hold Geltz cannot be committed as an SVP solely on the basis of his juvenile adjudication for the offense he committed at age fourteen.

IV. Disposition.

For these reasons, we reverse the judg- ment and order of the district court that committed Geltz as an SVP. We remand this case for an order dismissing the State‘s petition.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR DISMISSAL.

2 3

WATERMAN

Justice

Notes

1
1. The State does not contend Geltz can be sexually violent offense” can be committed under this chapter only if found insane or incompetent to stand trial. Iowa Code § 229A.4(2)(5)-(c) (2011). Geltz was not found insane or incompetent to stand trial.
2
2. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 81.2(1), (4) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (ef- fective July 1, 2014) (requiring certain indi- viduals to submit DNA samples, with separate subsections for those with convictions and those adjudicated delinquent); Iowa Code § 321.213 (2011) (applying to license suspen- sions, stating “[n]otwithstanding section 232.55, a final adjudication in a juvenile court ... constitutes a final conviction ...“); id.; id. § 670A.1(2) (“As used in [the forcible felon liability] chapter, ... ’ [c]onvicted’ means a finding of guilt, irrespective of imposition or execution of any sentence; a final and valid admission of guilt or a guilty plea; an entry of judgment of conviction; an adjudication of delinquency....“); id. § 915.42 (requiring, under certain conditions, those convicted or adjudi- cated delinquent for sexual assault to submit to an HIV test); see also Schweitzer, 646 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Iowa Ct.App.2002) (“We believe that section 321.213 carves out a specific exception to the general rule set forth in section 232.55 prohibiting a juvenile adjudication from being later used in an adult criminal proceeding.“).
3
3. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 394.912(2) (2013) (” ‘Convicted of a sexually violent offense’ means a person who has been ... [a]djudicat- ed delinquent of a sexually violent offense after a trial, guilty plea, or plea of nolo con- tendere.“); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/5(f) (2013) (” ‘Sexually violent person’ means a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, [or] has been adjudicated de- linquent for a sexually violent offense....“); 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 6401 (2013) (“This chap- ter establishes rights and procedures for the civil commitment of sexually violent delin- quent children....“); S.C.Code Ann. § 44- 48-30(6) (2012) (” ‘Convicted of a sexually violent offense’ means a person has ... been adjudicated delinquent as a result of the com- mission of a sexually violent offense.“); Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.030(1) (2013) (“A petition may be filed alleging that a person is a sexual- ly violent predator and stating sufficient facts to support such allegation when it appears that ... a person found to have committed a sexually violent offense as a juvenile is about to be released from total confinement.“); Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2) (2013) (“A petition filed un- der this section shall allege that all of the following apply to the person alleged to be a sexually violent person: ... The person has been found delinquent for a sexually violent offense.“).
Read the detailed case summary