186 A.D. 669 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1919
The city of New York, for the purpose of constructing, using and maintaining the Williamsburg bridge over the East river, acquired title by condemnation proceedings to a strip of land in the borough of Manhattan 150 feet in width along the southerly side of Delancey street from Clinton street easterly to the East river, excepting that part thereof which had been acquired theretofore for public street purposes. Attorney street had been opened and was in use as a public street for upwards of 100 years and ran northerly and southerly next easterly of Clinton street. The approach to the bridge was to pass over Attorney street, and in constructing the bridge and effecting changes of grades of other streets incident thereto it became necessary to close 122 feet of that street extending southerly from the northerly line of the 150-foot strip. On the 9th day of March, 1906, the board of estimate and apportionment duly adopted a resolution closing that part of Attorney street. That resolution was duly approved by the mayor on the nineteenth of the same month, and a map showing the closing was duly filed on the 16th of July, 1908. The 122 feet of Attorney street had been completely closed to public travel, however, by the erection of a fence across the southerly end thereof on the 26th of June, 1907, and it thereafter remained closed and subsequently a permanent retaining wall was constructed across it at that point. After erecting
The city failed to institute proceedings to have the damages to the easements of the appellants by the closing determined pursuant to the provisions of chapter 1006 of the Laws of 1895 until it was compelled so to do by mandamus in a proceeding instituted by the appellant Hoyt. (Matter of Hoyt [Closing Attorney Street], 162 App. Div. 469; affd., 213 N. Y. 651.) The facts with respect to the closing of Attorney street and the opening of these outlets in the same block accessible to the appellant Hoyt were presented in opposition to her motion for a writ of mandamus, and it was held that she had easements in that part of Attorney street which was closed, for the reason that she was entitled to access to and from her premises both ways, at least in the block in which her premises were, and that the city had acquired the premises for the bridge in fee simple absolute and, therefore, her use of the outlets over part of these premises was by sufferance only. It was, therefore, held that she was entitled to some award for damages, and no opinion was expressed with respect to the amount of the damages. Thereafter and on the 31st day of March, 1915, on the petition of the city, the order
These facts were all shown before the commissioners, over objection and exception duly taken by the appellants; and other facts were presented tending to show recognition of the street as thus laid out by some of the appellants and by the building department of the city.
It appears by a formal ruling of the commissioners that they made the awards on the theory that the city was Hable only for the damages to the easements of the claimants caused by such closing of the street as occurred after the fiüng of the map, and that they assumed that the claimants were not entitled to any award for such closing as had taken place before that time. That, manifestly, was error. To the extent that there was a closing before the filing of the map, it was a trespass, and the commissioners should have made their awards on the theory that there was no closing until the map was filed. Counsel for the city contended before the commissioners that they should offset against the damages to the easements of the appellants which had accrued on the filing of the map (Matter of Mayor, etc. [Walton Ave.], 131 App. Div. 712; affd., 197 N. Y. 518; Matter of Newton Ave. [Harris], 173 App. Div. 23; Matter of Newton Ave. [Van Cortlandt], Id. 32; affd., 219 N. Y. 399; Matter of City of New York [West 151st St.], 149 App. Div. 64) the benefits that accrued to the parcels of the claimants from these outlets subsequently afforded them, and the awards were made on that theory. It is not entirely clear that the “ south clearance roadway,” by the proceedings to which reference has been made, has become a pubfic street, for the city has received no compensation therefor (Matter of Mayor, etc., 186 N. Y. 237; N. Y. Const. art. 8, § 10); but in the view I take of the case, it is not necessary to decide whether, by virtue of these statutory provisions and the action taken thereunder, or on the theory of estoppel or otherwise, said twenty-eight-foot strip has become dedicated in perpetuity for pubfic street purposes, for I am of opinion that the claim
The order must, therefore, be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to appellants, and, in accordance with the practice in such cases (Matter of Collis, 144 App. Div. 382), the matter must be referred to new commissioners to be designated in the order.
Clarke, P. J., Page and Shearn, JJ., concurred; Merrell, J., dissented.
Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to appellants, the matter to be referred to new commissioners to be designated in the order. Order to be settled on notice.
Since amd. by Laws of 1917, chap. 632.— [Rep.