65 N.Y.S. 168 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1900
The appellant has been much in court during the past few years in matters growing-out of the estate of his late wife, Elizá T. White, and this appeal is from an order of the surrogate of Kings county, denying the petition of Josiah J. White, as the former administrator of his wife’s estate and as general guardian of his infant son, in which he prayed for .an order vacating and setting aside a decree of the said Surrogate’s Court, entered April 25, 1898, confirming the report of James Troy, as referee u¡3on a reference to pass upon the account of the said Josiah J. White, as administrator, and settling his accounts as such administrator, and directing him to surrender to the respondent Davenport securities of large value, and charging him personally with upwards of $13,000. The authority for- this proceeding, as contended by the appellant, is subdivision 6 of section 2481 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that the surrogate has power “ to open, vacate, modify, or set aside, or to enter, as of a former time, a decree or order of his court; or to grant a
It is contended by the appellant that “ Mr. White had no notice of the order of reference or of the proceedings before the referee, and took no part in them; that he was not represented by attorney upon the reference; that Messrs. Veeder & Sullivan, who are said to have been served as his attorneys with notice of these proceedings, were not his authorized attorneys; that his authorized attorney, Mr. Graves, had no notice or knowledge of the proceedings; and that the report was confirmed and the decree was made against his opposition and that of his real attorney, Mr. Graves; neither he nor Mr. Graves being allowed by the Surrogate to be heard in opposition to the report or to the motion to confirm it.” If these allegations were in fact true in spirit, there would be little trouble in holding that they had operated fraudulently upon the rights of the, appellant, and -that there was reason for exercising the jurisdiction and in granting, in some degree at least, the relief prayed for in the petition. After a careful reading of the affidavits, and the
The facts, as they appear from the record, show that on the 17th day of November, 1891, Josiah J. White was appointed administrator of the estate of Eliza T. White. On the 15th day of February, 1897, the Long Island Loan and Trust Company, as temporary guardian of Frederick Hall White, the sole next of kin of Eliza T. White, filed a petition in the Surrogate’s Court of Kings county for a citation requiring Josiah J. White to show cause why he should not file an account of his proceeedings as such administrator. On the 23d day of February, 1897, William D. Veeder and William Sullivan filed a notice of appearance for Josiah J. White as such administrator in said accounting proceeding, and served a copy thereof upon George S. Ingraham, attorney for the Long Island Loan and Trust Company. This was done with the authority of Mr. White. There has never been any substitution of attorneys, nor has any other notice of appearance ever been filed or served in this proceeding. It appears, however, that on the 24tli day of February, 1897, the day following the filing of the notice of Veeder and Sullivan, Mr. White wrote a letter to Mr. Veeder, personally, in which.he withdrew from Mr. Veeder the authority to appear for him in the proceeding, but no notice of this fact appears to have been given to Mr. Sullivan, to the surrogate, or to the other'attorneys interested in the proceeding. On the 25th day of February, 1897, the Surrogate’s Court made its order directing said White to file-an account of his proceedings on or before March 11,1897, this order reciting the appearance of White by William D. Veeder and William Sullivan as attorneys. While it does not appear clearly from the record, there is a suggestion, both in the letter of Mr. White to Mr. Veeder and in the affidavit of Veeder and Sullivan, that Mr. White w’as unwilling to- include in his account matters which his attorneys believed should properly be included, particularly in reference to certain securities, and it was probably owing to this fact that Mr. White on the twenty-fourth day of February withdrew his authorization from Mr. Veeder. On the 22d day of April, 1897, Mr. White filed a document which he called an account of his proceedings as administrator. ■ This document does not bear the indorsement or
Mr. White, in his letter of the twenty-fourth of February, the day following the filing of notice of appearance by Messrs. Yeeder and Sullivan, says: “ In the matter of the proceeding instituted by the Long Island Loan and Trust Compairy, Guardian, wherein a citation is purported to have issued by the Surrogate’s Court, requiring me to appear Febry. 25th, 1897, and show cause why I should not render and settle my account as administrator. I hereby withdraw my authorization for your appearance in my behalf in that matter and forbid your doing so, and request that you take no part in the proceeding in Court when the citation is returnable.” The appellant was thus aware of the fact that proceedings had been instituted, and the notice of appearance having been filed on the twenty- ■ third day of February by his then attorneys, he must be deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of tlie court. Section 799 of the Code of Civil Procedure says : “ Where a party has appeared, a notice or other paper, required to be served in an action, must be served upon his attorney.” The only attorneys of record in this proceeding are Messrs. Yeeder and Sullivan, and it is not disputed that all of the papei’S in the proceeding were duly served upon these attorneys. But, if it be conceded that the letter of Mr. White to Mr. Yeeder operated to dismiss these attorneys, the service of the same notice upon
So far as the record shows, therefore, Mr. White not only submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by reason of the notice of appearance filed by his attorneys, but -he was personally aware of the'nature of the proceeding. His' attorneys of record were duly served with- whatever notices were necessary to bring on the hearing-of the issues before the-referee appointed for that purpose, and these notices,-out of an abundance of caution, were mailed to the residence of Mr. White, and the mere fact that he had absented himself from the State, knowing that these proceedings were pending,, without-taking any steps to have his mail forwarded to him, cannot give him any rights upon this appeal. He was a resident of this State, and additional and unnecessary notices served upon him in the manner prescribed by law for the service of papers cannot be'said to have afforded him no notice of the pendency of the proceedings. He
While there is no doubt of the power of the court to relieve against a judgment rendered against a party upon the unauthorized appearance of an attorney in his name in a direct application to the court by motion in the action in which the unauthorized appearance was entered ( Vilas v. P. & M. R. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 440), we find no case in which a party who has been duly served, and who has appeared by his authorized attorneys, has been allowed to evade the consequences of a judgment because he may have disagreed with his attorneys and dismissed them without substituting others in their places or taken any steps to inform his adversaries of the changed relations. Nor do we find any case in which the appellant has been relieved because he has voluntarily, during the pend-ency of an action, placed himself in a situation where he could not be served with papers. Subdivision 6 of section 2481, under which the appellant claims the right to relief, further provides: “ The powers conferred by this subdivision must be exercised only in a like case and in the same manner as a court of record and of general jurisdiction-exercises the same powers,” and as no court of record would set aside a judgment under the facts presented on this review, we are confirmed in the proposition that the court has no power to grant the relief which the appellant asks on this appeal.
From our review of' the record we are convinced that the appellant has suffered no injury; that he has been unwilling to act upon the advice of reputable counselors of this court in respect to his
We are unable to discover any rights of the appellant which accrued upon his appointment as guardian of his son after the latter became fourteen years of age. The proceeding for an accounting had been commenced when the appellant was appointed, and the Long Island Loan and Trust Company, as temporary guardian,, was 'responsible under the provisions of section 2828 of the Code of-Civil Procedure for the rights of the infant under, that proceeding. (See, also, § 2837.) .
While the question of the release of the appellant from custody under a warrant of attachment does not appear to have any proper place in this discussion, and was apparently introduced into the affidavits for the purpose of arousing sympathy, the truth seems to be that the appellant was released upon a formal order in habeas corpus proceedings, with the acquiescence of all parties, in an effort to bring about a. settlement of the various matters in which Mr. White had become involved.
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.
Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.