IN RE COMMITMENT OF MAURICE BLUITT
No. 18-1053
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
May 15, 2020
Argued January 7, 2020
Chapter 841 of the
I
Maurice Bluitt has a troubling history with the criminal justice systems of both Texas and Colorado. In 1987, he pled guilty to sexual assault in Texas and completed two years of deferred-adjudication probation. Several years later, he was charged with kidnapping and sexual assault in Colorado. Bluitt pled guilty to the kidnapping charge in 1998 and again was given probation. While back in Texas a year later, Bluitt was charged with indecency with a child by contact. He was convicted on that charge in 2000 and sentenced to twenty years. After serving sixteen years of that sentence, Bluitt was granted parole.
Before Bluitt‘s release, however, Colorado placed a detainer on him and took him into custody after Bluitt‘s parole. Colorado subsequently revoked Bluitt‘s probation, and, in 2016, he began serving a ten-year sentence on the Colorado kidnapping conviction. Meanwhile, the state‘s attorney in Texas filed a civil suit against Bluitt to determine whether Bluitt should be committed for treatment as a sexually violent predator following his release from prison. See
Enacted over twenty years ago as Chapter 841 of the
Although classified as a civil proceeding, the chapter has broad implications for the rights of those facing commitment as a sexually violent predator. The civil commitment is a supplement, not an alternative, to a prison sentence. The process of designating someone a sexually violent predator does not begin until the person is nearing the end of a prison term. See
The Texas Civil Commitment Office is the agency responsible for “providing appropriate and necessary treatment and supervision” and “developing and implementing a sex offender treatment program” for committed persons.
Because a person prosecuted under Chapter 841 risks a serious deprivation of liberty if determined to be a sexually violent predator, the chapter provides several procedural protections. For example, an alleged predator is entitled to a speedy trial, which must commence before “the person‘s sentence discharge date” and within 270 days after service of the state‘s petition alleging predator status, although a continuance may be granted.
Because of his incarceration in Colorado, Bluitt was not free to attend the proceedings in person, but he nevertheless claimed he was entitled to do so under the statute. After the state‘s attorney was unable to reach an agreement with Colorado for Bluitt to travel to Texas for the civil commitment proceeding, the state‘s attorney asked the trial court to allow Bluitt to participate through video. Bluitt responded
Bluitt declined to participate under this arrangement, insisting that he was entitled to personally appear at the trial. A jury trial proceeded without him. Bluitt‘s attorney, however, appeared on his behalf. At trial‘s end, a jury unanimously found Bluitt to be a sexually violent predator. See
Bluitt appealed. He claimed that the trial court‘s conduction of the trial without him was a violation of his statutory and constitutional rights. He further complained that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel throughout the proceedings. The court of appeals did not reach the constitutional arguments, although it did express some concern in the matter. See 562 S.W.3d at 673 n.4 (noting “that proceeding to trial without the person‘s physical presence could present constitutional concerns” and citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–60 (1997), which evaluated Kansas‘s civil commitment statutory scheme in light of substantive due process concerns). The court found further discussion of these concerns unnecessary after holding that Chapter 841 itself guaranteed Bluitt‘s right to appear at the trial in person. Id. at 673 & n.4. The court accordingly reversed the commitment, remanding for the trial court to determine whether the case could be retried under the statute. Id. at 676.
The state appealed next, arguing that Chapter 841 does not grant the defendant an unqualified right to physically appear at the trial. The state‘s petition for review presents that complaint as two issues: (1) whether the defendant‘s “right to appear at the trial” to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator includes the defendant‘s physical presence at that trial, and (2) whether the trial court‘s efforts to include Bluitt in the trial sufficiently complied with the chapter‘s requirements, given that Bluitt‘s incarceration in another state prevented his physical presence.
II
Under its first issue, the state contends that Bluitt‘s “right to appear at the trial” does not necessarily include his physical presence.
The definition and civil rules on which the state relies speak to how a litigant may appear—either personally or through an attorney—but do not speak to the substance of the right itself. Because the chapter grants the defendant the “right to appear at the trial,” the question is whether Bluitt had the right to appear personally or whether his appearance through an attorney could be required instead. Having previously observed that it is a violation of
III
The state next argues that, even if Bluitt was entitled to be at his trial, the trial court‘s decision to permit his participation through videoconferencing was all that the chapter required. To support its argument, the state points to another provision in the chapter that approves the use of “closed-circuit video teleconferencing” for certain post-commitment hearings.
The court of appeals disagreed. It concluded that the chapter‘s express provision for closed-circuit video teleconferencing in lieu of the committed person‘s personal presence was limited to the post-commitment hearings identified in the videoconferencing provision. 562 S.W.3d at 671–72. Because the provision did not also mention the initial commitment trial, the court reasoned that the Legislature did not intend video as a substitute for the accused‘s right to appear at that trial. Id.
When interpreting statutes, we presume the Legislature chose the statute‘s language with care, purposefully choosing each word, while purposefully omitting words not chosen. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). And when the statute‘s language is unambiguous, we interpret it according to its plain meaning, informed by context and consistent with the statute‘s other provisions. Id. at 439, 441. The videoconferencing provision quite clearly applies only to certain post-commitment hearings: “a hearing on the modification of civil commitment requirements under Section 841.082 or a hearing under Subchapter F or G.”
We thus agree with the court of appeals that Bluitt‘s right to appear at the trial included the right to appear in person and concur with the court‘s decision to remand the case for the trial court to determine whether the case can be retried within Chapter 841‘s constraints. As the court of appeals notes, the chapter requires trial within 270 days of the petition‘s service, but it also permits continuances beyond that deadline for good cause or when the “administration of justice” so requires. See 562 S.W.3d at 676 (citing
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The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
John P. Devine
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: May 15, 2020