269 A.D. 218 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1945
This is an appeal by the three trustees of Columbus Council No. 126 of the Order of the Knights of Columbus from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, dated February 24, 1942, which affirmed an
Two principal issues are involved, (1) whether Columbus Council No. 126 of the Order of the Knights of Columbus, a subordinate council of the Knights of Columbus, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Connecticut, or the trustees of Columbus Council No. 126 of the Order of the Knights of Columbus, elected pursuant to the Benevolent Orders Law, is the employer of claimant, and (2) whether the employer was exempt under the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Law.
We should first examine the charter of the Knights of Columbus. That charter was granted by the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut in 1882. The charter permitted the corporation to exercise the right and privilege of rendering aid to its members and their beneficiaries by way of insurance and otherwise; of rendering assistance to its sick or disabled members; of promoting social and intellectual intercourse among its members; of providing facilities for educational, charitable, religious and social welfare. In order to carry out such purposes the corporation was permitted to accumulate and maintain a reserve fund in such sum and in such manner as it might determine. The corporation was given power to purchase, hold- and dispose of property, both real and personal, to make effective its objects. It was given power to sue and be sued. It was given power to adopt a constitution and by-laws, to regulate its membership, to elect officers and define their duties, and things of that nature. Nowhere in its charter is there any provision that this fund shall be used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes. Among other things the charter gives the Knights of Columbus power to establish subordinate councils. Such councils are to be governed by the rules and regulations of the parent organization.
Apparently Columbus Council No. 126 of the Knights of Columbus was organized about 1921. Its by-laws provide that it shall be subject to and governed by the charter, constitution and rules of the parent organization. These by-laws also provide that the objects of the council are to promote the moral
Under date of June 9, 1921, Columbus Council No. 126 of the Order of the Knights of Columbus filed a certificate with the Secretary of State under the provisions of the Benevolent Orders Law. This statute (§§ 2-5) provides that a council of the Knights of Columbus, pursuant to the constitution of the parent organization, may elect trustees who are to be members of the council. The law provides that such trustees may acquire and dispose of the property of the council and generally may manage the temporal affairs of the council. Any vacancy in the membership of the trustees may be filled by the council. The powers of the trustees are governed by the rules and regulations of the council and must be consistent with the rules and charter of the parent organization. A council entitled to file a certificate with the Secretary of State shall be deemed a corporate entity for the purpose of making contracts and incurring liabilities.
It would seem that the trustees are endowed with some corporate powers. They are not, however, a separate entity and must conform to the powers they derive from the council, as well as its directions.
Various powers are given to effect purposes which were not ■ classified as exempt from the Unemployment Insurance Law, and since it cannot be said that the employer of claimant was organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes, it was not exempt under the provisions of paragraph (d) of subdivision 3 of section 502 of the Labor Law (now § 560, subd. 4), part of the Unemployment Insurance Law.
It is conceded that the claimant was employed as a night cook in the restaurant operated by the council or the trustees where ten or more employees were working.
All concur.
Decision affirmed, with, costs to the Industrial Commissioner.