168 Misc. 407 | New York County Courts | 1938
In this proceeding, commissioners of appraisal, appointed by this court under section 33 of the Highway Law to ascertain and determine the compensation to be paid to the owners of land taken for the purpose of and in connection with the relocation and reconstruction of portions of the highway on Route 7, referred to in the petition as the Bainbridge-Unadilla Part 1, State Highway, have made and filed their report and the same is now before the court for confirmation.
Parcels of land owned by and comprising part of a farm of Irvin J. Bush, Elsie Bush and others, and hereinafter referred to as the Bush property, and other parcels comprising part of a farm owned
The contention of the county is that the amount allowed for the last-mentioned items is an allowance of damages for a change of grade in the highway and that the owners are not entitled to compensation for damages caused by a change of grade in the highway.
Under the common law the owner was not entitled to damages occasioned to his land abutting on the highway or street by reason of a change of grade by the act of the State or a municipality. The law is well settled now that neither the State, nor a municipality is liable to the owner for damages to land occasioned by the mere change of grade of a highway or street unless authorized by statutory provision. (Fries v. New York & Harlem R. R. Co., 169 N. Y. 270; Matter of Torge v. Village of Salamanca, 176 id. 324; Smith v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 181 id. 132; Matter of Lawrence v. Village of Mamaroneck, 263 id. 455.) Recognition of the injustice to a property owner who had been damaged by a change in the grade of a street or highway on which his land abutted is found in the legislative enactment applying to the city of New York in the change of grade in the streets in that city (Laws of 1882, chap. 410, § 873; Greater N. Y. Charter, § 951) and in the Village Law, giving owners of land adjacent to streets the right to compensation for damages where the municipality causes a change in the street grade (Laws of 1883, chap. 113; Village Law, § 159, subd. 2.) Owners of land adjacent to a town highway repaired, graded or macadamized may recover from the town damages resulting from any change of grade. (Highway Law, § 197.) The references mentioned apply to cases where no land has been acquired by the municipality for the purposes of the improvement resulting in a change of grade. No statutory provision for the recovery of damages by a property owner resulting from mere change of grade of a highway lying outside of a city or village, exclusive of a town highway, has apparently been made. However, those cases holding that the mere change of grade of a highway where no property has been acquired does not constitute taking property (Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N. Y. 27; Matter of Railroad Crossings, 226 App. Div. 255; Miller v. State of New York, 229 id. 423; Buffalo Valley Realty Co. v. State, 248 id. 674) are distinguishable from the instant case for the reason that the Bush lands were appropriated to be utilized in and for the purpose of straightening the highway and the damages follow as the direct consequence of the appropriation and the use to which the land has been put. In Van Aken v. State (261 N. Y., at p. 362) the court said: “ Such consequential damages
We are not dealing here with a situation where a mere change of grade has been made on the site of the former highway without the taking of land. If such were the case the owners of the Bush property would not have been necessary parties to this proceeding. Their lands have been appropriated without their consent for the purpose of highway reconstruction. The law provides a method for ascertaining and assessing damages in such cases (Highway Law, § 34), and a person whose land is taken for public use by a municipality or the State is entitled to fair and full compensation for the damages sustained, both direct and consequential. In South Buffalo Railway Co. v. Kirkover (176 N. Y. 301, at p. 306) the court said: “ The exercise of the right of eminent domain is allowed upon the theory that while the taking of property may greatly inconvenience the individual owners affected, it is in the interest and to promote the welfare of the general public. This being so, there is no reason why the citizen whose land is taken in invitum, should suffer any financial loss that may be prevented by awarding him proximate and consequential damages.”
The report of the commissioners in relation to the Bush property and the damages awarded the owners thereof is confirmed.
The owners of the Lawrence property have filed objections to the report of the commissioners. Before the acquisition of the lands, Route 7 passed along the northerly side of the claimants’ farm and in front of the residence, and between same and the farm buildings, and, a short distance westerly of the residence, curved in a southwesterly direction across an overhead crossing above the tracks on lands of the Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corporation and thence continued westerly to the westerly line of the farm. Since appropriation of the land, the section of the highway passing between the residence and buildings has been rerouted so that the new or relocated portion leaves Route 7 near the western boundary of the farm and cuts nearly through the
By reason of the rerouting of the highway over the lands or a portion of the lands acquired for such purposes, the buildings and residence on the farm were left a distance of approximately 1,990 feet from the new highway at the head end of the former highway which will be used in the future only by the owners of the farm, the relocation of the highway on the land taken thus isolating the residence and buildings of claimants from the new highway, making it necessary that the owners travel over a quarter of a mile further to reach such new highway and placing the buildings and residence off the mail route, milk route and bus line for said distance. Concerning this feature of the case the report reads: “ That this isolation of the buildings and residence of the owners from the new highway, necessitating such owners to travel approximately 1,990 feet farther to reach such new highway and leaving such buildings and residence off from the mail route, milk route and bus line for such distance, will undoubtedly greatly diminish the desirability and value of the farm as a place of residence, and we find its market value will thus be cut forty per cent on account thereof, inclusive of damages above awarded. No satisfactory evidence was offered on the hearing as to whether or not this former strip of Route 7 had been or would be abandoned by the town or county as a public highway or as to whether the owners of the Lawrence farm, or the public authorities, would keep such strip of highway in repair and
The commissioners have found and so report that the market value of the owners’ property after the appropriation of a part thereof is forty per cent less than it was before the part was taken for highway purposes, and also report: “ We do find that the fair market value of the entire farm before the appropriation was made was $6,000.”
No award has been made for consequential damages to the land not taken resulting from the use to which the land taken has been put, although conceding diminution in value to the remainder of the farm for the reasons set forth in the report. The finding by the commissioners that the market value of the farm is forty per cent less than before the appropriation of the land taken for highway purposes and giving the value of the farm before such appropriation, but making no award for consequential damages, reasonably gives rise to the inference that they were in doubt as to the propriety of awarding claimants consequential damages by reason of the use to which the land taken has been put. The claimants are not seeking damages here because of the mere relocation of the portion of the highway which isolates the buildings from the new section of the road. Had no land been taken from their farm and the new portion of the road been located on the land of some other owner, it is quite probable that the claimants would not have been entitled to damages for the inconvenience and injuries occasioned by the relocation. An entirely different situation is present here. A portion of claimants’ land has not only been taken but its very use has provided a
Where land is taken from the owner against his will for public use, he is entitled to have the various items of damage considered that may affect the fair market value of the property, including such elements as might influence a reasonably prudent person interested in purchasing such property. (South Buffalo Railway Co. v. Kirkover, supra.) In Matter of City of New York (198 N. Y. 84, at p. 88) the court said: “ By analogy it would seem that when the state compels a man to give up his land for public use, and permits him to recover, not what he thinks it is worth, but only its fair market value, he should at least have the right to prove every element that can fairly enter into the question of market value.” In Matter of City of Rochester (234 App. Div. 583, at p. 586) it is said: “ One whose land is taken by eminent domain is entitled to receive its greatest value for any available use to which it may be put. As bearing on such value, it is competent to show any fact which the owner would naturally and properly bring to the attention of a buyer with whom he was negotiating a sale. * * * If a portion only is taken, the owner is entitled to be compensated for the difference between the fair market value of the entire property and that of the remainder, after the needed portion has been pre-empted. * * * In determining the value of the portion not taken, all damages resulting thereto by reason of the use to which the part appropriated is to be put must be taken into consideration.” In Troy & Boston R. R. Co. v.Lee (13 Barb. 169), the court said: “ The true rule, the only rule which will do equal justice to all parties is to determine what will be the effect of the proposed change upon the market value of the property. The proper inquiry is, what is it now fairly worth in the market and what will it be worth after the improvement is made? ” This statement was approved in Henderson v. New York Central R. R. Co. (78 N. Y. 423, at p. 433). In Bohm v. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. (129 N. Y. 576, at p. 585) Judge Peckham writing says: “ Generally in taking land the rule may be said to be to pay the full value of the land taken at its market price, and no deductions can be made from that value for any purpose whatever. Then as to the land remaining, the question has been to some extent mooted, whether the company should pay for the injury caused to such land by the mere taking of the other property, or whether, in case the proposed use of the property taken would depreciate the value of that which was not taken, such proposed use could be regarded and the depreciation arising therefrom be awarded as part of the consequential
In the instant case, a part only of the owners’ land has been taken. The proper measure of damages is the difference between the fair market value of the farm before any appropriation of land had been made and that of the remainder. (Adirondack Power & Light Corp. v. Evans, 226 App. Div. 490, 495; Matter of City of Rochester, supra; Henderson v. New York Central R. R. Co., supra; South Buffalo R. Co. v. Kirkover, supra.)
I have examined Matter of Simmons (130 App. Div. 350); Matter of Public Service Commission (92 Misc. 420); Matter of Daly (72 App. Div. 394); Matter of East River Gas Co. (119 id. 350), cited by counsel for the board of supervisors, and find nothing in those decisions in conflict with the well-established principles enunciated in the cases referred to herein. In my opinion, the case of Matter of Board of Supervisors (215 App. Div. 147) is distinguishable from the instant case.
This court has no power to increase or diminish the amount of the award. Its powers are confined to confirming the report or setting it aside. (Matter of Board of Supervisors, 150 Misc. 461; affd., 242 App. Div. 720; Matter of Luzerne-Lake George County Highway, 145 Misc. 736; Matter of New York Municipal R. Corp., 181 App. Div. 896; Hawley v. Village of Elmira Heights, 163 Misc. 787.)
The commissioners having found that the market value of the Lawrence property has been diminished forty per cent, including