78 N.Y.S. 281 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1902
On the 20th of February, 1901, the appellant was discharged by a decree in bankruptcy from all debts and claims which were prov
■ It is contended that the discharge was ineffectual to release the appellant from his indebtedness to Moore for the reason that such indebtedness was not duly or properly scheduled in the bankruptcy proceeding. Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Law (30 IT. S. Stat. at Large 550) provides, in effect,, among other things, that a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all provable debts, •except such as “ have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy.” Section 7 of the Bankruptcy Law {supra, 548), provides, among other things, that it shall be the duty of the bankrupt to prepare, make oath to, and file in- court a list of his creditors showing their residences, if known; if unknown, that fact to be stated.
In the schedule filed by Mollner in his bankruptcy proceeding John A. Moore, the judgment creditor, is named as a creditor, but it is stated that his address was unknown. The allegation of Moore is that that statement was “ not true or correct in fact,” and that, therefore, the judgment debt was not properly scheduled as required by the Bankruptcy Law, with the name and known address of the judgment creditor. It is nowhere directly alleged by Móore, nor is there any proof to show, that the statement that his address was unknown to Mollner was fraudulently inserted in the petition or
We think the evidence was entirely insufficient to show that there was fraud, either by way of assertion or concealment, in Mollner inserting in his schedule that the residence of Moore was unknown.
The order appealed from should, therefore, be reversed, with costs, and the motion to cancel the judgment granted, with costs.
Ingraham and Hatch, JJ., concurred; Van Brunt, P. J., concurred in result; Laughlin, J., dissented on the ground that scheduling this creditor as unknown was fraudulent and that the judgment debtor is not entitled to discharge.
Order reversed, with costs, and motion to cancel judgment granted, with costs.