*1 judgment, the written the oral nouncement of sentence controls. See Rosa,

United v. Munoz-Dela States 495 F.2d (9th Cir.1974); Johnson, supra. State

Therefore, the action of the trial did modify

not appellant’s only sentence but

corrected record. record,

In reviewing the we note the minute entry also in error in

stating appellant to 28 sentenced

years on count one of burglary

counts. The sentence actually imposed by

the trial court was 20 years. The record is to show appellant’s

corrected sentence years’ Count is 20 imprisonment,

run concurrently with the other sentences.

The record is also corrected to show that

appellant was sentenced to imprisonment

rather than to the Department of Correc

tions, as stated in the minute entry. See Gutierrez,

State v. 130 Ariz. 634 P.2d

960 (1981). attempted conviction for armed rob-

bery is reversed and the sentence is modi-

fied to correct the above errors. judg-

ment is affirmed in every respect. other

HATHAWAY BIRDSALL, JJ., con-

cur. P.2d Matter of the APPEAL IN

MARICOPA COUNTY JUVENILE

ACTION NO. J-84984.

No. 1 CA-JUV 181. Arizona,

Court Appeals

Division Department C.

Aug.

Review Sept. 13, Granted

old, riding automobile with three in an juveniles sitting pas- in the front other at an senger stopped seat. When the car intersection, appellant exited the passenger side, went car behind him and According in the face. punched driver *3 an appellant, response to this was in to As a gesture by obscene made victim. blow, the victim seri- result of suffered injury eye. to his This to a right ous act led being petition delinquency of filed on De- 7,1981, appellant that was charging cember he had delinquent a child in that committed aggravated the crime of assault in violation 1203(A)(1). of A.R.S. § 13— offense, of of the gravity Because prior that had a appellant adjudication fact he had delinquency subsequent^ of and that Phoenix, Baggot, appellant. for Atmore turned 17 and would reach his 18th birth- ly Collins, 7, 1982, County state, Maricopa Thomas E. on December on day Miller, 30, 1981, County K. filed a for Atty. by Deputy request Barbara December Phoenix, superior to appellee. appellant for transfer of court Atty., an Pursuant

for trial as adult. to Rule conducted a transfer probation officer OPINION a prepared transfer re- investigation and JACOBSON, Presiding Judge. hearing to the transfer port prior presented The sole from appeal issue on 27,1982. At April April was set for transferring order of an court began with hearing, proceedings juvenile appellant to adult court for required as Rule by of the assault evidence prosecution is Arizona’s criminal whether conclusion, the At its court found 14(a). to of grounds “reasonable believe” standard and that the offense had been committed 14(b), in Rule Rules of Pro- proof embodied cause to believe probable that there Court, A.R.S.,1 17A, cedure for Juvenile appellant that had committed the offense. proc- requirements meets minimum of then requested counsel Appellant’s trial ess under the fourteenth amendment. psychological the court order further 14(a). Rule evening of October evaluation as authorized A early In the years hearing then whether a who was almost further on transfer appellant, stated, private agency, by person public qual- refers to the or or a Unless otherwise “Rule” 1. for Juvenile Court. Rules Procedure ified to make such examinations. (b) may Hearing; The court transfer for action Transfer Order hearing (a) prosecution appropriate shall include evi- The transfer to the waived, alleged, having jurisdiction offense unless dence of the offense if the court investigation report. At transfer and probable finds and cause reasonable hearing, of the transfer the conclusion believe to that: has whether offense determine an court shall (1) The child not amenable treatment to ex- and that cause been committed delinquent child or rehabilitation as committed the to child ists believe through facilities; available prob- alleged. the court finds such If offense (2) insti- The an child is not commitable to has cause able cause or evidence deficient, mentally defec- mentally tution for waived, upon or the its own been motion mentally persons; and tive or ill order, may any party, it motion interested public re- (3) safety or interest investigation, transfer an addition crimi- quires be transferred the child investigation including physical a mental and prosecution. nal child, made examination of the to be should occur under the circumstances of cases Maryland up- cites from Texas and May was held after holding of the evidence” “preponderance judge which the entered his standard of all of a trans- aspects following or- findings, concluding with hearing. fer der: point At necessary this it is to THE COURT FINDS reasonable fact differentiate in finding process to believe that: in the aspects volved dual The child is not amenable to treat- (Rule 14(a)) The first deals with delinquent or as a ment rehabilitation an the issue of whether offense has been facilities; through child available and whether the juvenile committed has The child is not committable an the offense. The committed deficient, mentally institution for men- aspect inquiry is that tally defective mentally persons; ill (Rule 14(b)) cause.” second *4 court, with whether the after finding deals public The safety or interest of the juvenile the has probable cause com requires that the child be transferred charged, should mitted offense transfer prosecution. for criminal court for trial juvenile superior as an 9, 1982, June a of timely On notice by adult under the criteria established appeal was filed transcripts and were re proof 14(b). Again, the standard of re quested. The state filed its to the response here is cause and reasona quired appeal notice of and matter was con ble to believe.”3 by sidered this on court at conference No that the fact appellant The contends find- days vember eight appel before 14(b) requires under involved a ing process lant’s 18th birthday.2 of proof beyond a reasonable appeal, appellant argues On that under without doubt. state differentiating balancing Eldridge, test of Mathews v. finding fact between the different func- 319, 893, 424 96 47 18 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (b) 14(a) argues of Rule and tions for a (1976), standard of “reasonable evidence preponderance standard. grounds to believe” established by in zeroes party Neither whether “proba- constitutionally is impermissible and is of a ble cause” less standard than “pre- that a standard of a reasonable ponderance of the evidence” and if so doubt” should be to this applied aspect whether that standard is constitutionally the transfer In proceedings. opposition, the juvenile adequate remove from the argues only state would the “be- not protection juvenile court. a reasonable an yond place doubt” standard We resources, will now upon undue burden the state’s embark in upon that However, quiry. some probably background but it would unconstitutional against Jones, 519, which this inquiry Breed v. 421 U.S. 95 S.Ct. to be under is neces made Arizona, 1779, sary. L.Ed.2d 346 The state fur- as all jurisdictions, 44 other has the juvenile’s guilt developed that because argues ther based court system issue at the transfer sociological pri is not at its innocence philosophy with high- hearing, by objective due satisfied treats process mary designed to aid er standard doubt ment and offend beyond reasonable youthful rehabilitation of which comes No. later the trial during Appeal, into ers. Juvenile play Maricopa Cty. (App. adult 644 J-86509, court or adjudication hearing 380, 124 P.2d 604 Ariz. if States, supra. transfer is not ordered. state Finally, 1979); v. Kent United appellant “probable cause” The fact that subsequently terms opinion, reached our In syno- are birthday grounds to believe” his 18th does not “reasonable moot the transfer and nomous proof. same standard appeal. to the States, and refer issue on v. Kent United 383 Rubio, 404 v. F.2d States 541, 1045, United See 86 U.S. S.Ct. 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (7th Cir.1968). 678 Constitution, 71 L.Ed.2d places Arizona Art. ex- U.S. S.Ct. § original jurisdiction Superior Texas, clusive in the Addington (1982), relying upon proceedings affecting Court over all chil- 60 L.Ed.2d years age dren under 18 who are accused chosen (1979), it clear that a state’s makes gives juvenile of a crime. The article court against the fed- be measured standard must judges power “in their discretion” to em- fairness” doctrine eral “fundamental suspend prosecution for offenses process clause of the in the due bodied by committed children goes and on to state Therefore, amendment. Arizo- fourteenth power shall be prescribed as by grounds to believe” stan- na’s “reasonable law.. The legislature has juve- clarified the measured in of federal light must be dard nile court’s powers by placing jur- exclusive guidelines.5 determining process isdiction within that juveniles court over particular whether a sat- charged with criminal acts. A.R.S. See Mathews v. process, Eldridge, isfies due su- 8-202(A) Additionally, § 8-222. § three pra, held that factors must be con- Court, Arizona Rules Supreme in the (1) private sidered: interest affected Court, specif- has Procedure for Juvenile (2) the risk of proceeding; error created judges from ically limited procedure; (3) state’s chosen superior jurisdiction transferring governmental countervailing sup- limited circumstanc- except under porting challenged procedure. the use of the 14. With this back- es in Rule outlined mind, it is well settled that ground in applying Before the Eldridge factors hearing is divided into these two to Arizona’s “reasonable to be *5 analogous that the first is phases phase and standard, appellant’s lieve” we first address of Pima preliminary hearing. to a Matter argument proper standard is “be J-47735-1, County, Juv. Act. No. 26 Ariz. yond Addington a reasonable doubt”. In v. 46, App. (1976). 546 P.2d 23 The safe- Texas, supreme court was supra, con guards against finding an erroneous fact with the minimum burden of proof cerned provided a double by subsequent trial and proceeding in a civil under required state jeopardy problems higher inherent in a commit an individual involuntarily law to (see Jones, supra), standard Breed v. con- to a period for an indefinite state mental vince us that the cause rejected The court a hospital. a 14(a) proof is the correct burden standard reasonable doubt” because it seri the first phase hearing. of the transfer whether a ously questioned state could ever however, remains, question whether prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an proof the burden of of “reasonable mentally individual is both ill likely and to 14(b) adequate to believe” within Rule to dangerous. be The transfer criteria satisfy process.4 This is a in- of Rule 14(b) analogous are to quiry. majority proceed of the United commitment States Kramer, Santosky Court in v. 455 Supreme ings juvenile’s in that the social background Santosky Kramer, By by ceedings required order filed November the Arizo- v. 455 Supreme 745, 1388, amended Rule 17 effective na Court (1982). U.S. 102 S.Ct. 71 L.Ed.2d 599 1, 1982 to read as follows: December There is no indication that the court considered Proof Burden of amending the issue before us in this rule or that proof juvenile proceed- “preponderance The burdens es- evidence” standard ings, hearings, shall be: other than transfer by tablished to over- subsection 3 was intended doubt, (1) Beyond as to delin- a reasonable modify rule or cause” quency involving offenses matters 14(b). established incorrigibility; and (2) By evidence, convincing clear as and to has the point We also this out concerning matters the termination power responsibility determine the va- to and parent-child relationship; and promulgat- constitutionality lidity rules and (3) By preponderance evidence, of the as Supreme when a case Court ed the Arizona types to all other proceedings. raises the issue. State v. before this designed This amendment comply Meek, Ariz.App. 9 proof with the burden of in termination psychological large evaluation are to a We reject therefore the state’s im upon extent based impressions plied 14(b) drawn from contention that Rule establishes “preponderance of the subjective evidence” standard analysis psychologist and focus Thus, upon whether the stated standard probation officer. for the same rea- believe,” of “reason to juvenile which the Addington, sons outlined in we find that found, judge process. satisfies due the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” is an unrealistic burden of making this evaluation under U.S. Su- applied be in a preme guidelines process, Court of due we must first identify private nature of the position the state’s predicated Since (juvenile’s threatened right to be an argument that preponderance of treated as a for otherwise criminal the evidence is sufficient to satisfy a Rule acts) and the permanency of threatened determination, and the Rule itself Kramer, Santosky loss. v. supra; Mathews speaks terms of cause and rea- v. Eldridge, supra. believe, son to we must first determine whether the standards of established “It is clear that the beyond dispute by these terms are equal. jurisdiction waiver of [by is a action de ‘critically important’ court] While it is difficult to articulate termining vitally important statutory rights criteria, what are basically conceptual prob States, juvenile.” Kent United able cause refers to that state of mind 1055,16 at at L.Ed.2d U.S. requires only a level of probability, statutory provides scheme Arizona’s is, given facts, a certain set of jurisdiction” in the “original and exclusive circumstances, a person of reasonable cau jurisdiction confers juvenile court and tion would hold a belief that the facts as special rights juve and immunities perceived are true. probably State v. Bra nile. with de Although juvenile charged zil, Ariz.App. (1972); delinquent, may P.2d 76 or found to be linquency, States, confined, Brinegar v. United the confinement must be in a separate 5.Ct. 93 L.Ed. 1879 detention center from adults who have charged been with or convicted *6 evidence, Preponderance of the on adjudication crimes. 8-226. The A.R.S. § hand, the other requires something more of a conviction of delinquency is not deemed probabilities. than This requires standard conse crime and does not result in the same proof that the be such that the state of as an adult’s conviction such as loss quences person mind of a of reasonable caution be a adjudication civil or use of the as rights satisfied and convinced of the truth of the 8-207. Addi prior conviction. A.R.S. § Miami, matter. Cole v. Town of 52 Ariz. be tionally, delinquency may the record of 83 P.2d 997 We therefore con circumstances destroyed appropriate under while the difference clude that of the stan upon application juvenile to the court and between proof probable dards of cause and of confinement potential length may may of the evidence be preponderance hazy, not extend beyond eighteenth child’s proof upon preponder a standard of based Juve birthday. Appeal, Maricopa Cty. in J-86509, 124 greater of the evidence is than a stan nile No. ance Ariz. juve- Finally, cause. 8-247.6

dard based A.R.S. § always years if In for an act which does not benefit the child. more than five 6. This Kent, by a misde- between transfer meant done an adult would constitute the difference five-year punishment confinement and a meanor with a maximum that in a the difference hand, potential confinement and a fine of sentence. On the other time of a six-month death Maricopa Cty. why exemplify Juvenile Appeal, stan- $300. in These extremes in the case of J-86509, proof may supra, year juvenile dards of not be determined on a case No. the fifteen old time, by determining shoplifting. stan- charged case basis. with At that proof, subject juris- error inherent in the juveniles the risk of dard were Thus, applied finding process twenty-one. must be age if truth treated until diction exceptions generality potential of cases and not the rare juvenile, there was commitment as a s to the state 8-203), and has full access (Rule 4) and from publicity § nile is shielded child. This of the in evaluation judge has considerable resources of- probation in that the delin- conflict between disposition potential discretion error in child, in care of its a risk of quent may placed child creates ficer and the repu- against a parents, probation department, weighs favor of the state citizen, the De- private agency, table upon based proof burden of maintaining a partment of Corrections. 8-241. A.R.S. § as discussed Additionally, probabilities. Thus, private involved is com- to be earlier, the evidence quality manding. nature, imprecise by is its evaluated being of discretion in a deal great results permanency As to of the note a We also in the trial court. placed decision, the transfer is irrevocable unless of evidence quality to relax the tendency Additionally, reversed on appeal. Rule 24. Mat- hearing. See admissible in a transfer any charges against as to filed subsequently No. J-47735- Juv. Act. County, ter of Pima juvenile, previous decision to trans inferred that the court supra, where decisively fer would if not weigh heavily, delinquency was admissible finding prior subsequent only to transfer not decision showing that though even there was no previous finding because of the factual but counsel in the represented by child had been would have point because at that the child waived counsel. or had prior proceeding the environment of the adult been cast into error Thus, the risk of we conclude factors, Considering all these system. plus and does not weighs in the state’s favor prior the fact that to the actual decision proof adopted. support standard transfer, both the state and the child have an interest in maintaining parens patri We the differences recognize relationship, ae we conclude that the first as “rea proof involved in burdens of such Eldridge factor of the test favors the use of grounds “prepon sonable to believe” and greater a standard that than the mere always not derance of the evidence” do inherent in the “probabilities” in the outcome of a great make difference cause and reasonable to believe However, adoption case. particular standard. futile the standard of is more than a Turning Eldridge to the second fac involving In cases in semantical exercise. tor —the risk of error created the state’s re rights, dividual standard chosen procedure again find on those society places flects the value —we based upon probabilities inade Texas, Here, supra. rights. Addington quate. stan the “reasonable to believe” accu requires only dard a threshold factual adversary The decision to transfer is an impress racy adequately which does not proceeding request initiated to trans- the fact finder the importance *7 being county attorney fer filed allocation proper decision involved and the probation the officer. Rule 12. Once the against the risk of falls error. If error requested, juvenile probation transfer is the child, parens patriae it the ejected is from investigation officer conducts a transfer The socio court. juvenile umbrella of the child, and transfer the report evaluating to which is directed logical atmosphere including background the child’s social as the child is is lost wards rehabilitation any previous Under history delinquency. In con criminal arena. adult cast into the procedure, juvenile the is in a disadvan- against government, falls the trast, tageous if error position probation because the offi- from is not removed offender cer who the criminal prepares report, may transfer delinquency there is still a grasp, initially have filed the state’s petition, works di- delinquent, adjudicated face. If rectly juvenile (A.R.S. hearing for the court judge, necessary Santosky litigants be Kram- to met. so that the and the fact finder know at proceeding er, supra. the outset how the risk of error will be allocated and the standard of juvenile potential faces a loss of liberty the private interest involved in a transfer and a stigma attaches. In re Winship, 397 substantial, hearing is liberty loss of L.Ed.2d 368 stigma and the attached to a determination are similar delinquency to that involved in guilt a determination of for an adult. Turning to the final Eldridge fac re Winship, supra. Although juvenile governmental tor —the involved in system court is directed toward rehabilita- procedure state’s chosen again find —we tion, it complements very vital interest no compelling argument in favor of main of the state in its enforcement of its crimi- taining the existing standard. Until nal difficulty prov- laws. The inherent in juvenile transferred, is actually govern ing transfer criteria to a high degree ment shares the child’s interest in par- weighs correctness against also a burden of patriae ens relationship between the child proof greater preponderance than a and the state. It only is after the decision Additionally, evidence. because the trans- to transfer is made that the parties’ inter fer not hearing guilt ests does determine diverge earlier, and as indicated if er ror the factors state, weighing against is made against may the conse quences are not be considered the trial at sentenc- judge so substantial as total re lease. if a ing prosecution brought court, adult we conclude that “preponder- Additionally, raising of the stan ance adequate. of the evidence” standard is dard would not create any substantial fiscal C., Accord In re Bobby Md.App. or administrative burden upon the state (1981); State, A.2d 435 Strange v. such as is involved when a procedural right (Tex.Civ.App.1981). S.W.2d such as right to counsel is imposed. Al though a higher standard of proof may procedure upon usual a rever impose some limited increase in the state’s sal of a transfer order is to remand the burden mustering evidence, its pri matter court for a new mary change would be the conceptual im However, because appellant has pression upon the fact finder of the degree n now his passed eighteenth birthday and the of correctness expected in the factual con no longer jurisdiction, court has Thus, clusions. we conclude that Arizona’s Appeal, in Juvenile No. J- Maricopa Cty. grounds “reasonable to believe” standard of 86509,124 (1979), Ariz. 14(b) does not meet minimum stan order of transfer is vacated. dards of process under the fourteenth amendment and therefore is unconstitution J., CONTRERAS, concurs. al. BROOKS, Judge, dissenting.

Earlier, disposed we of the appellant’s contends that argument Appellant “reasonable standard should “beyond to believe”1 standard of em- reasonable doubt”. After re- factors, viewing Eldridge 14(b) we conclude bodied in Rule is not fundamentally the minimum permissible process fair and is violative of due and that “preponderance of the evidence”. While a standard of a reasonable doubt” 14(b) provides may 1. Rule that the trans- determination is to be made based prosecution fer the action for criminal if the on “reasonable to believe.” This is- finds however, cause and sue, reasonable is immaterial to this matter be- grounds to believe” three factors cause, out, majority points as the the terms *8 14(b) present. are It is not clear whether grounds” “probable and “reasonable cause” applied the standard to be in this determination equivalents are substantial of the mean- same grounds is “reasonable to believe” or whether States, Draper 307, ing. See v. United 358 U.S. the standard includes both cause” 3, 329, 310 n. 79 S.Ct. 331 n. 3 L.Ed.2d 327 grounds and “reasonable to believe.” can It purpose opinion, For the of this “rea- argued phrase “probable that the cause” in grounds sonable to believe” will be referred to 14(b) applies probable cause detér- 14(b). as the standard embodiéd in Rule 14(a) mination made under Rule and that the

313 aspect procedural safeguards.” this the trans- substitute Math applied should be to of Eldridge, v. 424 U.S. S.Ct. at fer The state and ews proceedings. responds, test Eldridge It is that the re clear concludes, the the majority opinion that the risk of consideration of both erro quires standard of a reasonable doubt” is interests and private of deprivation neous an of proof unrealistic burden to be applied procedure or the likelihood that a substitute in a transfer I agree with this would reduce standard higher evidentiary however, conclusion. The majority, makes Kramer, v. Santosky that risk. See the further conclusion that the stated stan- at 1398. S.Ct. dard 14(b) in Rule of grounds “reasonable to believe” is a lesser standard “pre- than analysis majority’s of agree I with the ponderance of the evidence” and that it in which finds Eldridge the first factor lesser satisfy standard does not due process interest in that the has a critical requirements. From this I re- conclusion that the I also find un- transfer decision. spectfully factor, dissent. state der the third the does Eldridge in impos- interest countervailing not have a that the concluding “reasonable on proof” the ing a “lesser standard grounds to believe” standard of Rule second Eldridge The proceedings. does not meet minimum standards of due I factor, however, find significant. is most process, majority analyzed each of the substituting that value of probable three in factors set forth Mathews v. Eld the evidence” “rea- “preponderance of ridge.2 The. second factor is critical negligible sonable believe” is grounds to determination in this matter. majority The provided regarding and procedures that concludes that a risk of error is in present prosecu- transfer of a for criminal provided standard due to a “potential requirements tion meet the minimum probation conflict between the officer and due process. child”, “great deal of discretion initially majority I that suggest in placed the trial court” to due [which is] more than a semantical engaging nothing the imprecise quality of evidence and the “preponder- that a exercise when it finds fact “the ‘reasonable to be proof ance of the standard evidence” lieve’ requires only standard a threshold than requires something probabilities more factual accuracy does not adequately and that this meets minimum re- standard impress the fact finder the importance quirements of while standard process due of the decision involved and allo to believe” based on “reasonable cation of risk of error.” v. majority does not. relies Cole In determining the propriety a particu- Miami, 83 P.2d Town of 52 Ariz. lar given case, in a how- (1938) “preponderance for its definition ever, enough simply it is not we say that of the The actual definition evidence.” are trying to minimize the risk of error. as satisfies vided that ease is “such Kramer, See Santosky v. carries conviction an conscience and 1388, 1411, (1982) 71 L.Ed.2d 599 P.2d at intelligent Id. at mind.” J., (Rehnquist, dissenting opinion). Indeed, opinion, majority Contrary to Eldridge provides factor second “prepon- there is no under the requirement requires consideration of “the process derance of the evidence” risk deprivation of an erroneous of such and convinced of fact finder satisfied “be used, through procedures more interest and com- truth of the matter.” value, any, accepted if or mon and definition of judicially additional finally, specific procedural safeguards; dictates of due stitute “[I]dentification interest, process generally requires including consideration the function Government’s First, private three distinct factors: involved and fiscal and administrative bur action; procedur that will be affected the official dens that the or substitute additional second, deprivation requirement the risk of an erroneous entail.” Mathews El al would 893, 903, used, through procedures dridge, such interest 96 S.Ct. 424 U.S. value, any, if of additional or sub- L.Ed.2d 18 *9 314

this test is whether the fact sought to be assess the cumulative effect of such safe- proved is more probably true than not true. guards. The courts must consider fair- “the See, e.g., Todd v. Weikle, 663, 36 Md.App. reliability ness of the existing ... 376 104, 108 A.2d (1977); Appeal Tucker, holding cedures” before that the Constitu- 538 626, P.2d 629 (Okl.App.1975). Indeed, tion more. Mathews v. requires Eldridge, the Arizona Supreme 343, Court in Cole conclud 424 at 907. Only U.S. 96 S.Ct. ed that “the is, ultimate test through may does evi such a inquiry broad courts dence convince the trier of fact challenged govern- one determine whether a theory of the case is more probable than the process mental action satisfies the due re- other.” Cole v. Miami, Town of 52 Ariz. at quirement of “fundamental fairness”. See 497, 83 P.2d at 1001. Contrary Kramer, to the ma Santosky v. 102 at 1405. S.Ct. jority’s conclusion, the “preponderance J., (Rehnquist, dissenting opinion). the evidence” standard is based on “mere In determining which essentials of due probabilities” in the same manner as the process required and fair treatment are “probable cause” standard and the “reason delinquency adjudications, emphasis able grounds to believe” standard.3 finding. accurate fact Matter of Pima Notwithstanding 63212-2, the semantical County discus- Juvenile Action 129 No. sion, assuming arguendo, that “reasonable Ariz. (1981). Although grounds to requires believe” something less is not evidence”, than a “preponderance doubt”, reasonable as conceded the ma- question still remains whether the existing jority, a similar emphasis on accurate fact procedures are fundamentally fair and in finding present in the in- procedures compliance with minimum due re- process volved in a transfer Additional quirements. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 procedural safeguards provided are in Rule 335, 343, U.S. at transfer, 96 S.Ct. at 14(c), which requires juvenile court shall state the reasons for the It is established procedures that the of a procedural transfer. This additional re- transfer hearing must measure up to the quirement proce- insures that the transfer essentials of process. due Kent v. United dure constitutionally adequate protec- has States, 541, 562, 383 U.S. 86 S.Ct. 16 tions. (1966). law, L.Ed.2d 84 process Due however, is a principle. flexible The re- it Although proce- is established quirements which it imposes upon govern- dures of a transfer must due hearing satisfy mental vary actions with the situations process to' requirements, the United States Su- applies. it As the United preme States Su- com- following Court has made the preme Court has recognized, “not all situa- regarding quantum ment of evidence calling tions procedural safeguards call that must support a decision transfer for the same procedure.” kind of Morrissey juvenile: Brewer, 471, 481, 408 U.S. S.Ct. attempted pre- Court has never [T]he L.Ed.2d 484 for, scribe criteria or the nature and quantum support, of evidence that must Given this it is flexibility, obvious that a decision to transfer a for trial process inquiry cannot be made adult court. by focusing upon one narrow provision of challenged statutory Jones, 519, 537, scheme. Such a Breed v.

focus threatens 1779, 1790, to overlook factors which 44 L.Ed.2d 346 I disa- introduce may constitutionally adequate gree majority’s with the conclusion that protections a particular government into ac- a “preponderance order based on tion. Courts must examine all procedural require- meets minimum evidence” protections state, offered and must a transfer process ments of due but that Compare preponderance 6358-4, Ariz.App. the definition of P.2d (whether theory (1971), the evidence one of the case is of this court said that Division Two other) require- more than the with the at a conclusion of order to arrive “[i]n showing for, ments for a cause” under cause there be more evidence rather must 14(a). against, guilt....” Matter of Juvenile No. than Court *10 order based on “reasonable to be-

lieve” is constitutionally infirm.

Article 15 of the Arizona Constitu- § provides that

tion judges discretion, in their

may, suspend criminal

prosecution of age children under the eighteen and the powers judges of such

to control such children provided shall be as by law. I regard- find that the procedures

ing prosecution for criminal

vided Rules of the Arizona

Rules Procedure for the Juvenile Court

meet requirements minimum proc- of due I

ess. would affirm the order which trans-

ferred prosecution. COMPANY,

INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY corporation,

a California

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. GOETTL; Adgus Properties, part

Gust

nership composed of Adam D. Goettl Goettl; Billy Clyde

and Gust Hart man, Defendants-Appellants,

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE

COMPANY, foreign corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE

COMPANY, foreign corporation,

Crossclaimant-Cross-Appellant, PROPERTIES,

ADGUS partnership composed of Adam D. Goettl and Gust

Goettl, Defendant-Cross-Appellee.

1No. CA-CIV 5729.

Court Appeals Arizona, 1, Department

Division D.

Sept.

Reconsideration Denied Nov.

Review Denied Dec.