*1 representatives of constituen- includes those subcommittee cies. PORITZ and reversal and remandment —Chief Justice
For GARIBALDI, STEIN, COLEMAN, O’HERN, LONG Justices and VERNIERO —7.
Opposed—None.
Toby (Ms. Solomon, Kathleen M.J.S., attorney; Ms. Solomon and briefs). Morehouse, on the General, Seaton, Attorney argued Deputy Senior
Ann Marie Family of Youth and Ser- amicus curiae Division the cause for (John Farmer, Jr., Jersey, Attorney of New General vices J. *3 General, Jacobson, Attorney of coun- attorney; Mary Assistant C. sel). by opinion was delivered
The Court GARIBALDI, J. 9:2-7.1 appeal pursuant whether to N.J.S.A.
The issue this (the Statute”), by grandparental visitation “Grandparent objec- over the biological grandparents can be enforced a child’s issue, we adoptive parents. To resolve that tions of nonrelative the Grand- an award of visitation under must determine whether public policy conflicts with Visitation Statute (the Act, “Adoption to Jersey Adoption N.J.S.A. 9:3-37 -56 New family. Act”), adopted by intact when a child is a nonrelative I. 11, 1994, parents August on to unmarried JH
V was born old, placed nonrelatives six months JH her with TS. When V was (the TS, “petitioners”). “adoptive parents,” or WP and MP father, execut- biological was incarcerated at that time. JH child’s n rights were adoption parental and her ed a consent for Vs terminated. prospective adoptive parents eomplaint
The adoption. filed a for 2,1995. objecting adoption May TS filed formal answer to the on (the parents, His “grandparents” “respondents”), KS and MS or V, application custody filed an to intervene permit to obtain visitation, grandparental permit complaint and to them to file a adoption granted of V. The court right on custody intervene the issues of if visitation and However, granted. application was not their adopt July In was denied. prison. TS was released from He parents resided with his Septem- worked for his father. On 15, 1995, granted rights, ber TS was and an order was allowing parents entered accompany during his him his visita- The grandparents’ tions. order later was amended to make the presence mandatory. January TS’s visitations TS was again, possession handguns arrested this time for and theft of action, from his father’s home. As a result of that TS’s Restraining against obtained Final him Order under the Domes- tic Violence Law.
Ultimately,
parental rights
TS’s
were terminated
court order
objection.
appeal
over his
TS’s
from that order was denied
Appellate
M.P.,
Division. In re
a Child W.P. and
N.J.Super.
(App.Div.1998).
706 A .2d
panel
supported
found that the record
the court’s conclusion that TS was
unfit to act in a
role and that continuation of TS’s
parental relationship
place
jeopardy.
would
V in substantial
It
drugs,”
noted TS’s “chronic addiction to
that he “has lived a life of
*4
crime,”
punctuated by lengthy periods
and that his “life has been
observed,
of incarceration.” Id. at
An hearing By was held in March 1998. order dated 1, 1998, April the court that grandpar- directed visitation the Sunday every ents on the third of month was to continue. The grandparents to adoptive parents and the directed the order also following continue the visitation should briefs on whether submit adoption. final order of 1, 1998, Judgment a Final of trial entered April, the court
On part: Adoption provided that Judgment all shall terminate relationships of this 3. The entry father, [TS], as well mother, [JH], and the birth and putative between the child obligations rights, those founded on relationships, all and duties, any person including rights of the State of New of inheritance under the laws intestacy the rights of this which have vested the prior entry for any may Jersey except
judgment; and rights, Judgment shall establish the same relationships, 4. The of this entry adopting obligations ifas the child the child and the parents between duties, including marriage, adopting all in lawful was to the parents born laws of intestacy. inheritance under the opinion, the trial court found Subsequently, unpublished in an constitutional even as Grandparent Statute was that the that the “intact” families. The court also held Grand- applied to Adoption Act were not inherent- and the Visitation Statute Instead, parental rights court that when ly in conflict. the found terminated, statutory required an assess- scheme have been basis, case-by-case grandparental visitation on ment of continued determining factor. being the child with the best interests of V, grandparents and existing relationship between the Given hearing to afford the trial court held that there should be opportunity to demonstrate that continued visita- grandparents an pursuant to the factors enumerated tion will in Ws best interest 29, 1998, the On October in the Visitation Statute. ongoing continuing the court entered an order hearing on the issue of what scheduling a for December visitation, any, if should be ordered. grandparental appeal a motion for leave to filed order, unpublished Appellate granted. In an Division which interlocutory appeal had opinion, panel concluded ruling panel that a improvidently granted. The determined been Grandparent Visitation Statute and interplay between the on hearing from the best interests Act would benefit *5 Nonetheless, by Appellate called for the trial court. Division Among offered numerous and tentative observations conclusions. implicitly them was the court’s conclusion that the Act contemplates rights post-adoption by biological family members. granted adoptive parents’
We motion for leave to file within 328, appeal. time and their motion leave 161 N.J. 736 A.2d (1999). II. appeal question statutory interpreta
We view this as a Act, Grandparent tion of the Visitation Statute and the applied biological grandparents to the who seek objections adoptive parents visitation over the of nonrelative fol lowing parental rights biologi the termination of the of the child’s parents, by cal either consent or court order. We conclude present that such the two cases inherent conflict between overriding public statutory policy statutes and find regarding adoptions preclude application Grandpar law intact, adopted by ent Visitation Statute when the child is nonrela adoptive parents. statutory tive Because we decide this case on grounds, argument we do not address the constitutional raised parties. Grandparent
A. The Visitation Statute 1972, Jersey Legislature the New enacted its first version of (L. 1971, Visitation Statute. 9:2-7.1 c. N.J.SA 1972). 1, Statute, § effective Feb. The Visitation amended 1973, standing only afforded to seek visitation ... when “either or both of the of a minor child is or are deceased, living separate apart or divorced or different (as 100, by L. habitats----” N.J.SA 9:2-71 amended c. 1). § subsequently again was Statute amended 1987 to siblings apply allow for visitation with child. N.J.S.A. 9:2- (as 2). Thus, prior § L. 7.1 amended c. *6 divorce) (those disrupted not death or were “intact” families subject statutory rights grandparents. of to visitation not 9:2-71, provide: to In was amended N.J.S.A. sibling residing in this make or of a child State may a. A any Court, in with the Rules of for an Court, before the accordance application Superior of the to aby order for visitation. It shall be the burden applicant prove granting of visitation is in the best interests of the evidence that the
preponderance of child. the making on an filed to this the section, In a determination application pursuant b. followingfactors: court shall consider the (1) the child and the The between applicant; relationship (2) of child’s or the with whom The between each the parents person relationship residing the the child is and applicant; (3) which has since the child last had contact with the applicant; The time elapsed (4) that such visitation will have on the between the child The effect residing; child’s or the with whom the child is and the parents person (5) sharing arrangement which If the are divorced or the time parents separated, regard to child; exists between the with the parents (6) good filing The faith of the in the application; applicant (7) neglect or of emotional or sexual abuse the Any history applicant; physical, and (8) the child. other factor relevant to the best interests of Any regard section, c. to made to this it shall be prima With any application pursuant if the had, facie evidence that visitation is the child’s best interest applicant for the child. the been a full-time caretaker past, (as (effective 1993)).] § [N.J.S.A 9:2-7.1 L. c. June 1993, 161, amended by expanded scope grandparents’ The new statute of rights requirement removed the the birth and Visitation Stat- deceased or divorced. amended 29,1993. ute became effective June B. 9:3-50 Act N.J.S.A. of Legislature Toward the end of amended N.J.S.A. 9:3- Act, adoption; relationships 50 of the entitled “Effect of inheritance,” child; parent rights provide: of of and (Deleted 345). 14.a. c. amendment, P.L.1993, judgment same b. The of a of shall establish the entry adoption relationships, rights, adopting if and between the child and the as the child parent responsibilities adopting good born to the in lawful wedlock. For the court cause, were parent judgment action was direct the of nunc tunc as of the date the may entry pro applying instituted. In the intestate laws of this child shall have State, adopted rights adopting same of inheritance if in lawful born wedlock. parent judgment c. The of a of shall: entry adoption (1) rights terminate all and of the towards the responsibilities parent child for a who is the of the except parent spouse petitioner except rights judgment those have vested of the prior entry adoption; (2) rights through terminate all or inheritance under from intestacy parent unless that is the or that or other relative parent spouse petitioner judgment had died to the prior adoption; (3) through all terminate inheritance under from or the child intestacy which to the existed prior adoption. counseling adopting d. The court order for the may parents. (as (effective 27,1994)).] [N.J.S.A. 9:3-50 L. § c. amended by April 9:3-50, revising Legislature language N.J.S.A. deleted terminate, appearing setting, rights, duties *7 obligations any person upon” “founded biological parents. between the child and the That amended 27,1994. April statute became effective on Legislature, revising assert that the in Adoption in Adoption Act intended to harmonize the Act Statute, year. with the Visitation enacted earlier in the same However, legislative history an examination of the of the two Legislature statutes reveals that the did not revise the it, it, Act Grandparent to conform or harmonize with the Visitation Statute, adoptions. but amended the Act to facilitate History Legislative Grandparent
C. Visitation Statute 20, 1993, May Assembly approval gave On the General final to Grandparent signed The bill was into law Statute. by Governor Florio on June and became effective that stated, day. previously same As the new law eliminated the deceased, requirement sepa- that a child’s divorced or rights. in grandparent apply rated order for a to for visitation Instead, provides any sibling that “a or statute visitation, residing may apply a child in this for and it State” Superior eight instructs the Court to consider enumerated factors determining grant in the when whether the of such visitation is best interests of the child. form, factors, original requiring
In its the bill did not enumerate child, only in the of the with no that visitation be best interests response that guidance apparent the courts. In an to concerns .sanctity gross privacy of the it constituted “a invasion amended, unit,” setting eight forth the factors the bill was way limiting the intrusive elements of the act. See Letter as a Cheifetz, Wolfe, Cary Esq., B. & to Gov. Jim Florio from Skoloff (Dec. 1992) (enclosing proposed setting specific forth bill interests). protect criteria that child’s best Assembly Bill precursor A to the current statute No. was expressly That bill prefiled for introduction the 1990 session. objections required of a would have that the court consider (i.e., application parent’s parent grandparent). Assembly Bill the child’s See No. Prefiled for According the bill statement Introduction the 1990 Session. purpose provision accompanying Bill No. of that was to parent’s grant “ensure that the court does not visitation to a own object considering parent may whether the blood relatives without added). 2 (emphasis Although Id. at such visitation.” bill, provision suggests not enacted in the final it that the was autonomy Legislature believed that should be afforded Moreover, deference. we observe that the statement was written that, parent’s suggests in terms of “a own blood relatives.” That form, at least its earlier Visitation Statute was apply adoption. not intended to to a nonrelative *8 History Legislative Adoption D. Act after it On December almost 7 months enacted Statute, Assembly Grandparent gave approval final Assembly to Bill Bill That enactment No. No. 685. 1418/Senate revisions, Jersey’s updated Adoption New Act. The revised number, comprehensive many represented the first set of nearly years. amendatory changes adoption to the laws in The twenty-three separate including act contained sections revised N.J.S.A. 9:3-50. history Adoption 18 of the reveals that section legislative
The section, That most controversial of all the revisions. Act was the 9:3-39.1, permits of intermediaries the use now found N.J.S.A. passed- settings private adoptions. The non-agency to facilitate Scott Weiner to Governor memorandum from Chief Counsel bill amendatory of the bill without Florio summarized the sections Jim See Memoran- to the Visitation Statute. reference Weiner, Counsel, to Jim Florio A. Chief Gov. dum from Scott 1993) (Dec. (summarizing amendatory sections of Act). history that the amendments to N.J.S.A. legislative reveals package revisions to the part larger of a were a small
9:3-50 laws, early years. revisions adoption the first set of such reported that: newspaper Typically, the articles providing aim of more laws would be revised with the New adoption Jersey’s including allowing the use of unpaid for prospective adoptive parents, options arrange ... to adoptions, intermediaries Aid to Laws as an [Tom Prospective Bill Voted Johnson, Update Adoption Ledger, Feb. Parents, 2,1993.] Newark Star reported: Another article a measure that New Jersey’s on Thursday revamps
State lawmakers approved legalize and allow intermediaries unpaid laws private adoptions adoption arrange adoptions. Bergen Record, 1Y, Dec. Advances, Law Revision [Dunston McNichol, Adoption 1993.] Scalera, Director, Division of R. also Letter from Nicholas See Human Jersey Department of Family of New Youth and Services (June 8, Jr., Jersey Services, Senate Emery Ungrady, New J. involvement, 1993) intermediary advisability (questioning the only adoption be authorized continuing recommendation Curtin, Jersey Thomas R. New by approved agencies); letter from (Dec. 23,1993) President, to Florio Bar Gov.Jim State Association Jersey adoption in New it makes easier (supporting bill because laws). current and clarifies pertaining to the documents in the available Nowhere the issue of specific reference to Act is there a history contain some references legislative does visitation. The *9 object addressing parent may the a standards which to termi- parental rights, grandparent nation of but not to visitation. In- deed, 9:3-50, including very heading, “rights N.J.S.A. its of inheri- tance,” suggests Legislature rights that the was concerned with of issues, grandparental inheritance and not rights. other visitation The absence of discussion of visitation indicates Legislature Adoption that the did not revise the Act to harmonize it Grandparent with the Visitation That Statute. is further evi- passage nearly denced 7 months —between the time — Legislature two enactments. If the had wanted to harmonize the Act, Adoption Visitation Statute with the it could expressly have done so the time it revised the latter act. legislative history Based on examination of the of the Grand- Act, Adoption and the Statute we find that the Legislature did not intend to harmonize or conform the two Moreover, separate. statutes. The two statutes are we believe permits parents the statute that of the biological parents adopted by of a child intact nonrelative provisions Adoption conflict with the Act. An statutory Adoption examination of the scheme Act further supports that conclusion. Statutory Adoption
E. Scheme Act
It is a
principle
discerning
well-established
that “[i]n
[the
Legislature’s]
only
particular
intent we consider not
statute in
question,
legislative
but also the entire
scheme of which it
ais
Comblatt,
Barow,
part,”
218, 234,
Alan
P.A
J.
v.
153 N.J.
(1998)(quoting
Inc.,
A.2d 401
Kimmelman v.
McCoy,
Henkels &
(1987)).
108 N.J.
statutory
information n nn child added).] 41.1(a) (emphasis [N.J.S.A. 9:3— all records of provide 9:3-51 was amended N.J.S.A adoption: judgment of court order. be made accessible by
shall be sealed and shall only thereafter added).] (emphasis [N.J.S.A 9:3-51 9:3-52(a) provides that: N.J.S.A. including judgment proceedings relating
[a]U complaint, records of adoption, orders and other relevant briefs, affidavits, testimony and all reports, petitions, and shall at no time under seal the clerk the court shall be documents, filed good copying shown, cause shall court, unless the or upon open inspection order. otherwise added).] 9:3-52(a)(emphasis [N.J.S.A reveal, the Adoption Act provisions of As the above-cited by closed and confi adoption process is characterized traditional final, are adoption is the records proceedings. Once the dential All sealed, only by court order. opened inspection and can be completely are natural legal ties of the child to its of the the child severed. The child becomes permanently family. intent of the part of their extended parents and family unit without promote the creation of a new Legislature is to parents. natural In re interference from the fear of (1994), D.M.H., A.2d 235 cert. 135 N.J. Child denied, Hoxworth, 967, 513 U.S. Hollingshead v. sub nom. (1994). 433, 130 L.Ed.2d change S.Ct. That intent did not upon the enactment of the 1993 amendments to the Act. Jersey directly
No New
court has
addressed the issue of
statutory
whether the
biological grand
of a child’s
following
can continue
parental rights
termination of
However,
of the child
nonrelatives.
Mimkon v.
Ford,
(1975),
66 N.J.
designed
protect
placed
children
adoption
because their
parents
“unwilling
Mimkon,
were
or unable to care for them.”
434,
supra,
III. the Legislature did not intend finding the that Our adopted the child is where apply to situations Statute by Legis- the supported is further adoptive parents by nonrelative provision open adoption rejection proposed the of specific lature’s agreement be- an Open adoption “reflects Adoption Act. to the 172 adoptive parents
tween the
and one or more members of the
biological family permitting
child’s
visitation after the child has
formally
been
adopted.” In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J.
337, 361,
(1999).
exactly
The 1993 Adoption rejected amendments to the Act proposed a open adoption provision provided: which would have adopting
With the consent of the
court
parent
may
provide
adoption
order for visitation or other
of communication with the
type
child after the adoption
biologically
by
who had a
any person
with or was
related to the
child. This
adopted
be modified
provision may
court,
subsequent
good
on
of
petition
cause shown.
th
st
13(d),
(N.J.
Leg.,
1992) (above
§
[A 1418,
1
language
Sess.
May 14,
enacted).]
was never
language
rejected
provision
of that
contemplated
post-
that
adoption contact could continue between a
biological
child and
family only
voluntary
with the
consent of
adopting parent.
It
was
anticipated,
thus never
even if the concept
open adoption
of
enacted,
had
compel
been
against
visitation
the wishes of the
adoptive parents.
case,
(and
adoptive parents
this
do not
never)
have
consented to such a
agreement.
visitation
permit
To
post-adoption
represents
this ease
direct
Legislature’s
conflict With the
rejection
open adoption.
of
Jersey
New
repeatedly
courts have
reinforced
principle
open adoption will not be
express
enforced absent
legislative
See, e.g.,
command.
K.H.O.,
In re Guardianship
supra, 161
1246;
N.J. at
736 A.2d
D.M.H.,
In re Guardianship
(1999);
N.J.
A.
736 2d 1261
In re
a Child
D.M.H., supra,
173 highlighted importance of cited cases have above raising parents’ autonomy in their child after preserving adoptive biological are terminated. This parental rights parents of of the of primary purpose has that the termination Court noted “protect adoptive adoption rights provision in the statute is in their with post-adoption disruptions from parents children, parents chil adoptive by natural who have surrendered In re adoption parental rights been severed.” dren for or where D.M.H., 491, at A.2d by supra, 135 N.J. 641 Adoption Child of F., N.J.Super. 170 (quoting 235 In re Children of (Ch.Div.1979)). 422-423, acknowledged 406 986 This Court A.2d adop policy that adoption that the statute “maintains revised biological of and transfers tion ends the role parents.” In re a Child that role to the of D.M.H., arrange supra, A.2d 235. Even 135 N.J. ments, permitting into with mutual consent con that are entered child, biological adopted and the relatives tinued contact between given potential disruption judicially enforced “cannot arrangements and the child’s life under such fact para adoptive parents’ are under the laws the K.H.O., Guardianship supra, 161 N.J. at mount.” re added). (emphasis 736A.2d IV. legislative history
An
of the
demonstrates
examination
Adop
revising
Legislature
overarching purpose
encourage adoptions.
It is a well-
Act was
facilitate and
tion
agencies
entitled
principle that administrative
are
established
Mayflower
expertise.
in the area of their
substantial deference
(1973).
92-93,
Secs.,
We reliance on the of that to DYFS application Grandparent adoption by of the Visitation Statute to or involuntary nonrelatives where there has been an termination ease, rights, parental chilling of inas this would have a effect on prospective adoptive parents. DYFS, According January of as 1,049 1995 there legally adop- were children who were for freed tion, awaiting Only and finalization 33 of status. of those awaiting adoption. majority children were a relative The vast of adoptive homes biological have no connection to the child’s family. The effect of Grandparent very Visitation is Statute important the children DYFS serves. purpose Adoption support
The ultimate of the Act is to newly-created family encourage adopt and to other families knowledge biological child with the not relatives will interfere family with the unit. new As DYFS stated in its brief: legislative compelling protecting It is under this scheme that the State’s interest children in a stable and is permanent home established as firmly This paramount. strong biological must not be undermined the forced public policy imposition visitation after must adoption. Statute not be or condition an To interpreted qualify adoption. two statutes in these interpret other would lead to an result any way unintended undermine the effectively derogation governing intended Act, purpose the rules construction. statutory Cooper 5, 12-13, See Hosp., N.J.Super. Adams v. 684 A .2d denied, (1997). 148 N.J. 690A.2d 610 certif. adoptive parents Some reasons fear visitations are evident in adoptive parents this ease. The do not any TS, want further connection with whose were terminat presented ed he continuing safety because threat to Vs M.P., well-being. In re supra, W.P. and Child N.J.Super. They at 706 A.2d fear 198. that on his release prison, from pursue TS will daughter, them and their on either his through parents. observed, own or his As the trial although court parents TS’s have Restraining against obtained a Final Order him Act, vacated at an order can be such under the Domestic Violence their own very to turn aside any It difficult time. is always prison from he past, was released In the when TS child. Certainly, possible it that the parents’ to his home. returned unsupervised opportunity for may provide visitation grandparents’ V, parental rights though his with even to have association TS on unfitness. severed based have been protract- faced Moreover, adoptive parents have the nonrelative subject rights. To expensive litigation over ed and hearing, proposed interests parents now to a best already lengthy and cum- dissent, prolong the further would 539). (Post A.2d at As proceedings. court bersome *15 encourage is to statute the intent of previously, noted hinder them. adoptions, not to and facilitate
V. maintain close contact grandparents wish to that We understand Nonetheless, changes the situation grandchildren. their with adoptive parents also Vs adopted nonrelatives. when a child is grandparents of son, than If the adopted slightly older V. have an rights as sought the same visitation biological parents his case, imagine the confusion in this one can respondents do family unit would be stability the new The of be created. would comply parents would have adoptive seriously jeopardized. families. Under two different schedules with with two visitation adoptive circumstances, very difficult for the it would be such family unit. and intact maintain a new stable family to create and develop right grow given the adoptive must be An very tied to family, and must not be as an autonomous adopted. being position in the put the child relationship “ ‘second- adoptive parents to relegate the Any ruling would other ” Mimkon, A.2d 199 N.J. at supra, 66 class’ status.’ observed, correctly (Clifford, J., dissenting). As Justice Clifford (a ease), every purpose in that is “for mother adoptive parent as much any save blood and in terms every perspective and from the maternal any to the child as is other mother to her (who daughter.” grandparents Ibid. The true of V would have rights Statute) visitation Grandparent under the are now the of her parents. They are now Ys family. judgment
We vacate the Appellate Division and reverse 29,1998. the order of the trial court filed October PORITZ, C.J., dissenting.
This case raises the issue whether who have had a relationship with granddaughter their since she was born can seek (the visitation under “Grandparent N.J.S.A. 9:2-71 Visita Statute”) 1, tion after the age adopted child at four non- relatives. adoptive parents claim, The child’s majority and a agrees, Court that the Visitation Statute conflicts - policies with Act, enunciated in N.J.S.A. 9:3-37 to 56, and given should not be full 163-64, force and effect. Ante at 748 A.2d at adoptive parents 517-18. The applica also claim that tion of the visitation statute to them right would violate their privacy, and specifically, more right their autonomy. I believe that Act and the Grandparent Visitation another, Statute are consonant with one designed each provide for the best interests of the children who come under the Acts’ provisions. I further statute, believe that the applied case, in this impinge does not impermissibly parental rights on *16 showings because of the that must be made grandparents may allowed, before visitation be and because of the restrictions may placed be on visitation protect parents’ interests. I uphold would therefore Visitation Statute. every Because highly dependent case is on the facts adduced statutory standards, under the I would remand the matter to the majority, As does the I will refer to the statute as the "Grandparent although Statute,” I grandparents note that under siblings its terms both and are rights. allowed for visitation petition determine, hearing, visitation would after a whether
trial court interests. in the child’s best
I 11,1994. V, February August On girl, to a on gave birth JH old, voluntarily placed V with JH was six months when V adoption arrangement. On the private through and MP a WP MP, preliminary and a adoption WP filing complaint of a and, April in JH’s adoption hearing was held were terminated. family. biological At her not related to V or and MP are
WP father, TS, was incarcerated placement, her time of the child’s thé subsequently proceedings. He unaware of the objection with adoption and filed an proposed about the learned 21,1995, released July TS was spring in of 1995. On the court parents his and worked he resided with prison, after which from daughter and with his petitioned for visitation father. He for his him at least permitting to visit V September an order obtained twice, thereafter, modified Shortly the order was once a week. (the “grandparents”), to be parents, KS and MS first to allow TS’s at three visits, visitation and then to establish present during his at grandparents require presence per and to hours week during between TS V. all times the visits guns stealing January 1996 for again was incarcerated TS incident, grand- of this As a result parents’ his house. from against their son under restraining order a parents obtained Law, restraining order The 2C:25-28. Violence N.J.S.A. Domestic later, grand- February month is still in effect. One and to adopt themselves court to V petitioned the trial adoption proceed- during the custody or extended obtain ings. they claim that established born, WP claim that is contested day was from the she
with V however, indicates, there has been record and MP. The grandpar- paternal and her ongoing contact between V least some *17 infancy ents from her present. until the The trial court allowed grandparents to intervene in adoption pro- WP’s and MP’s ceedings that, on the provided visitation issue and if adoption was granted MP, not to grandparents WP would have the right custody. to be heard on the issue of The court ordered visitation between grandparents every V and her Sunday third the month from p.m., 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 but grandpar- denied the application proceed adoption. ents’ to with prison TS was released from May on bail in and WP and sought MP to vacate grandparents out of fear gain Vs father would through access to her grandparents. her 30, 1996, On October the trial grandparents’ court denied the request to intervene at preliminary adoption hearing, as well request custody, as their for permission proceed adoption, to with and increased however, visitation. The provided, court’s order adoption granted MP, that if was hearing to WP and would be promptly scheduled to determine visitation. The order also stated adoption that if granted MP, was not grandparents WP and right would have participate in custody trial.
Adoption hearings were held in November and on Decem- ber the trial court opinion issued a written terminating parental rights of TS followed a formal order of termination January on 1997. The termination in part was based on TS’s history drug addiction and criminal appealed convictions. TS ruling unsuccessfully. time, At the grandparents same continued to seek increased permission visitation and proceed adoption, with which the trial court deny. continued to The trial court did allow the intervene future-scheduled hearings visitation, on the sole issue of and continued their same visitation schedule. 1,1998. of V WP and MP was April finalized on provided
The order Judgment that the Adoption: shall all terminate between the child and relationships the birth mother, [JH], and rights, obligations father, all putative [TS], well as duties, and of any person on founded those ... relationships which except any have vested may judgment. to the of this prior entry *18 briefing further on the issue of The trial court also ordered visitation, hearing adoption stayed the final grandparent study. home updated of an On pending the submission opinion trial issued a written September court Grandparent claims that the rejecting WP’s and MP’s Statute, 9:2-7.1, applied is unconstitutional as to this N.J.S.A Act, case, with the N.J.SA and that the statute conflicts grandparents continued seq. et The court awarded the 9:3-37 hearing to determine how visita- visitation and scheduled another initially appealed. Although proceed. WP and MP tion should visitation, stay they sought obtained a they agreed to later however, Division, Appellate Appellate Division. The from the in improvidently granted subsequently appeal dismissed the as 14,1999. opinion May dated July appeal for leave to on granted WP’s and MP’s motion
We 16,1999. years five old. V is now
II
A. The
Visitation Statute
grandparent’s right
petition
a
Legislature first codified
1971,
363, § That
focused on the
in L.
c.
1.
statute
for visitation
parent was de-
parents, specifically, whether one
status of the
ceased,
grandparent
prerequisite
a
to a court’s consideration
statute,
required
apply
a
courts were
visitation. Under
test,
the “consideration of the
of the child
much like
best interests
on common law
in earlier cases decided
child’s welfare” standard
430,
Ford,
426,
preponderance of the child. making on an b. determination filed to this application section, pursuant following court shall consider the factors: (1) The between the child and the applicant; *19 (2) The between each of the child’s or the with whom relationship parents person residing the child is and the applicant; (3) The time which has since the child last had contact with the elapsed applicant; (4) The effect such visitation will have on the between the child residing; and the child’s or the with whom the child is parents person (5) sharing arrangement If the are divorced or the time parents separated, which regard exists between the with to the parents child; (6) good filing faith of the in the applicant application; (7) neglect or emotional or sexual or Any history physical, abuse the applicant; and (8) other factor relevant to the of Any best interests the child. regard c. With to made to this it shall any application section, pursuant prima
facie evidence that visitation is in the if child’s best interest the in had, applicant been a full-time caretaker for the child. past,
[N.J.S.A. 9:2-7!.] Generally, required the court relationships consider child, between always the various members and the with a impact relationships view toward the of those on “the best inter- 9:2-7.1(a). ests of the child.” N.J.S.A.
B. The Act inception, purpose Jersey’s From its of New Act children, protect has also been to parents as well as their natural 1953, 264, adopting parents. § and their L. (repealed c. 1 1977 (effective 1999, 53, 31, § and recodified as amended at L. c. 1 Mar. 1999)). purpose, undergone In of that the Act has furtherance 1977, 1993, major twenty-three years, in past revisions over the recently, Legislature sought time and most 1999. Each response perceived impediments, “to sim- facilitate plify clarify provisions governing adoption proceedings,” and adoption, promote early adoption when private to ease and to Committee, Judiciary accompanying possible. Statement Senate (N.J. 1976). 12, 1631, Leg., Aug. Most relevant S. 197th 1st Sess. revisions, ease, policy public before the 1977 a stated to this “protect adopting parents from ... later distur- Act was to parents.” relationships of their to the child the natural bance 1977). 1953, 1977, 264, (repealed Legislature § L. c. parents by replacing child this shifted focus from the to the liberally that the Act should be provision with a broad statement children, and that promote the best interests of construed persons regard given rights of all affected “[d]ue shall be to the 367, adoption.” (repealed § L. c. 1993 and recodified as 1). 53, § of the Act at L. c. The current version amended adds, safety language goal, and as a “that the retains (effective 1999, 53, § L. c. paramount children be of concern.” 31,1999). Mar. adoption. legal consequences
The 1977 Act also set forth time, entry judgment of a provided At that the Act that the relationships adopted adoption shall “terminate all between duties, any rights, obligations all child and his L. relationships.” on such c. person that are founded *20 9:3- (repealed § 14 and recodified as amended N.J.S.A. 1993 50). read, Legislature revised this section to In 1993 the pertinent part: rights judgment and of shall ... terminate all parental
The of entry for a is towards the child who parent of responsibilities except those that have vested prior entry of spouse petitioner except judgment of adoption. 50(c).] [N.J.S.A. 9:3— today. Act provision That remains signed into law passed in houses and was The Act both 28,1993. Florio on December Governor 182
III
any
analysis
statutory
role of this Court in
is to determine
The
Legislature
give
if
the intent of the
effect to its enactments
Servs.,
reasonably possible.
Department
G.S. v.
Human
Div.
of
Servs.,
161, 172,
(1999);
Family
Youth
157
the similar
matter and common
of both statutes—
protecting the best interests of children.
In re Return
Cf.
J.W.D.,
(1997)
Weapons
(reading
149 N.J.
183
when,
case,
ly pertinent
question
as in this
the
statutes
were
passed
Mimkon,
433-34,
in the same
supra,
session.
at
66 N.J.
199;
Borough
Spring
A.2d
Sellitto v.
Heights,
Lake
277, 288,
N.J.Super.
denied,
(App.Div.1995),
tween
policies
and of the
that motivated their
accept
enactment.
I cannot
majority’s assumption
that the
Legislature
members of the
they
did not know or understand what
doing;
accept
were
nor can I
majority’s
conclusion that the
Legislature
fully
did not intend both statutes to effective. Ante
Moreover,
majority
A.2d at 521.
holds that the
applied
Visitation Statute as
families
purpose
would thwart
encourage
Act—to
adoption. Ante at
IV
Grandparent
Application of the
Visi-
Legislative Intent:
A.
Adoptive Families
to Non-relative
tation Statute
Legislature
never have
majority
that
the
could
The
believes
apply
adopted
children
non-
statute to
intended the visitation
reading
166-67,
this
First, Grandparent Visitation Statute has I observe limiting biological and rela- language visitation never contained allowing grandparent or provision “[a] tive-adoptive families. applies on its face sibling apply for visitation any of a child” 7.1(a). Although the siblings. grandparents all and N.J.S.A 9:2— passed granted a statute that Legislature could have cases, many non-adoption adoption other only in or relative have,3 Alternatively, Legislature it chose not to do so. states specifically Act provision could have added adopted child terminating all contact between post-adoption Exactly opposite is true. biological grandparents. and her (1990); 25-409(F) (Supp.1999); § § Cal. 26-10A-30 3 Ala.Code Ariz.Rev.Stat. 1994); 19-1-117(l)(b) 3102(c) (West (Supp.1996); § § Colo.Rev.Stat. Fam.Code (1999); 752.01(3) (1997); 19-7-3(b) § 750 Ill. Stat. ch. Ga.Code Ann. Comp. Fla. (1997); s/607(b)(2)(B)(West 1999); § Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. Ind.Code 31-17-5-9 Stat. 1998); (West (Supp.1999); § § ch. 39D 19-A, Mass. Gen. Laws tit. (1999); (1998); § § Mo. Miss.Code Ann. 93-16-7 257.022, Minn.Stat. subd. 3 40-9-102(5) (1999); 452.402(6) (Supp.2000); § § N.C. Mont.Code Ann. Rev.Stat. (Michie 1994); (1999); 40-9-2(F) 50-13.2(b)(l) § § Ann. N.M. Stat. Gen.Stat. (Michie (1997); § § 25-4-54 S.D. Laws N.D. Cent.Code 14-09-05.1 Codified 30-5-2(3) 36-6-302(d) 1999); § (Supp.1999); § Utah Code Ann. Tenn.Code Ann. (Michie (1989); (1998); § § 63.1-233 tit. Va.Code Ann. Vt. Stat. Ann. 767.245(3)(c) (1991); 48-2B-9(b) (1999); § § Supp.1999); Wis. Stat. W. Va.Code 1999). 20-7-101(c) (Lexis § Stat. Ann. Wyo. earlier, unequivocally As noted Act severs the child, relationship biological parent between the and the but the 9:3-50(c) (“The stops entry judgment Act there. N.J.S.A. of a See responsibili- shall ... terminate all and child____”); parent ties of adopted towards the N.J.S.A. 9:3- 41(a) (stating permanent that instrument of “means the surrender relationship end of the and all parent contact between the and child”). provisions relationship parent These cover the between only, any biological relationship. and child not other Al- though rights, had 1977 Act terminated “all duties and obli- gations any person [on are founded child],” between which would include *23 1977, 1993) relatives, § (repealed (empha- and other L. c. added), provision sis this was deleted in 1993. It defies common language deliberately dropped, sense to claim that this was not especially since it would have with the conflicted Statute, by Legisla- which was under consideration the ture at the time. same majority proposed Grandpar
The to a of the points also version Assembly containing provision ent in the a Visitation Statute objections would allow trial courts consider the of a to an application “parent’s the own blood visitation relatives.” 166, Ante at A.2d at 520. The Court attributes to this proposal significance simply Legislature a it If the does not have. give parents power intended to veto visitation over blood relatives, it provision would have included this the final version Legislature’s I of the bill. It intent did not. understand the to be expressed clearly in more the enacted statute rather than the Barrett, provision. Petrangeli N.J.Super. unenacted v. case, (App.Div.1954). any In A.2d313 consent is not irrelevant the visitation under the standards decision set dispute, forth in the In a the trial court current statute. visitation required relationship is the the child’s to consider between 9:2-7.1(b)(2), “any applicants, and the N.J.S.A. other factor child,” 7.1(b)(8), relevant to the interests of the N.J.S.A. best 9:2— parents’ to wheth- necessarily includes the determination as which appropriate. er visitation is confidentiality provisions the majority finds that the also Act, (requiring N.J.S.A.
Adoption 9:3-51 and all records to 9:3-52 court), only by incompati- sealed and accessible order of the are biological concept permitting with the ble 522). togeth- grandparents. at 748 A.2d at When read Ante however, er, confidentiality provi- the visitation statute and complement Act one another. sions This so are, applicable proceeding in a visitation because standards earlier, “relationships” I noted focused on the between the various by petition Only a members affected for visitation. those relationship cases where the have had a with child, showing they a they can even make come threshold Although confidentiality provi- under visitation statute. may operate prevent sions of the Act such relation- exist, they ships developing, from in those cases where do Here, applicable by very terms. visitation statute is its biological grandparents visiting throughout have been V with years actively continuing sought last five have with her since her birth. of Mimkon to this has applicability
Much
been said about the
Mimkon,
case.
her child
divorced mother and
had resided
years
grandmother
with the maternal
for over two
when the
Supra,
66 N.J.
mother died.
[*] [*] [*] [*] biological grandparents grandchildren It is fact that are bound to their links of It human unbreakable is common the concern heredity. experience grandparents grandchildren and interest welfare of their far take exceeds anything biological 'in terms. A purely often explicable very special relationship grandchildren. grandparents arises and continues between and The tensions and conflicts which mar relations between children and are often commonly parents grandchildren. absent those and their between same Visits with a very parents grandparent a are often a of child’s there are and benefits precious part experience grandchild grandparents which from the his devolve with upon Legislature derive which he cannot from other Neither the nor any relationship. grandchildren this Court is blind human truths which have known. always
[Id.
199.]
at
332A.2d
435-37,
hearing
a
“as to
Court ordered
for
determination
whether
not,
exist,
present
or
at the
time and as circumstances now
it
would be in
child’s best
interests
to enter
order
continued visitation.” Id.
A distinguishing cases in adjudicated which had been unfit and a Id. at 435 n. sought visitation after an had been ordered. time, only applied 199. At that A.2d visitation statute when or both of of a child ... “either minor are deceased, separate living apart or divorced or different habitats.” L. c. surprising § It is therefore not 1. Court, speculating involving parents, about unfit turned eases Act, now-repealed public policy to the of the 1953 which provided: protect then necessary “[i]t is and desirable ... adopting parents relationships ... from later disturbance of their *25 188 1953, 264, § L. 1 by parents.” (repealed natural c.
to the child 1977). replaced language been with provision That has since persons regard” given of “all requiring “due be (effective 53, 31, adoption.” § L. c. 1 Mar. affected 1999). twenty-five years after obligation,
It is Mim- now the Court’s kon, grandparent of to consider visitation in the context a non- statutory adoption substantially modified relative under schemes.
B. Legislative Open Intent: majority application The characterizes adoptive open families as an Visitation Statute non-relative Legislature adoption arrangement,4 and notes has ex 171-72, pressly disapproved arrangements. Ante at 748 such Legislature’s majority A.2d at 522-23. The that the concludes pass open adoption provision, reluctance to broad indicates disapproval adoptions. visitation after non-relative Ante at A.2d at 748 523. original version the 1993 Act had contained an
open provision adoption that read: adopting
With
of the
in the
the consent
court
parent
may provide
adoption
order
for visitation or other
of communication with the child after
type
adoption
biologically
who had a
with or
to the
by any
was
related
person
modified
child. This
the court
to the
adopted
provision may
subsequent
good
for
on
cause shown.
adoption
petition
(N.J.
1992) (above
13(d),
Leg.,
language
§
[A
205th
1st Sess.
was
May 14,
enacted).]
never
ongoing
refers
contact between a child
"Open adoption”
any
adopted
biological
agreement
non-relatives
and his or her
relatives.
a written
Generally,
including
states,
New
for
but
provides
open adoption,
many
Jersey, open
See
arrangement.
informal
can be an
Carol Amadio
Stuart L.
Allowing
Children to
Touch" With
Deutsch,
Open Adoption:
Adopted
“Stay
(1983) (analyzing
L.
Relatives,
Blood
22 J. Fam.
written
court-approved
adoption);
K.H.O.,
also In re
N.J.
see
contracts
Guardianship of
open
(1999)
agreement).
(discussing
337, 361,
This was before in deleted final of the bill the bill, Judiciary Senate. the to the the Statement Committee explained: ‘While it is not the intent the in deleting of committee discourage open language adoptions, this it that was felt the open represents adoption significant policy issue of a which issue separate legislation.” accompa- should in be addressed Statement 1418, (N.J. 18,1993). nying Leg., 205th 2d Mar. A. Sess. apparently pass The Court believes that the decision not to a open adoption provision expression broad an legislative of intent prevent any post-adoption biological relatives —an expression strong enough language to overcome the actual of the is, view, Grandparent my plausible It Statute. more sibling Legisla and visitation was as far as the go providing possible ture wished contact with members biological of a a adoption. child’s after non-relative Most telling, deleting open adoption two months provision, after the the Grandparent passed Senate When Visitation Statute. statute, passed version I Senate the final of the visitation must fully presume that it position open was aware of its on respect and its actions with to the Act. See Brewer v. Porch, (1969). plain language N.J. 249 53 A.2d 388 any grandparent of the Visitation Statute allows apply rights, regardless for visitation status of child’s parents, regardless and of whether the child lives with her natural adoptive parents.5 or Legislative Adoptions Intent: To
C. Facilitate (DYFS), Family Depart- The Division of Youth and Services Services, objected application ment Human has to the 5 agreements permitting This has Court indicated recently post-adoption biological recognized contact and between if parents may counseling are entered into with and are advice, mutual, and they voluntary are in the best interests child. 736 K.H.O., 161 N.J. at A.2d supra, (1999). 1246; DMH, In re 736 1261 N.J. A.2d Guardianship of arrangements judicially K.H.O., are However, such not enforceable. supra, N.J. at A.2d 1246. has when there been involun- Grandparent Visitation Statute rights, adop- tary or when non-relative termination DYFS believes enforcement of Grand- tion has been finalized. chilling parent cases would create Visitation Statute those litigation risk of adoptions future because of the effect on grand- biological is also concerned that child’s relatives. DYFS parent facilitate access between a whose visitation could child, involuntarily her been terminated his or have DYFS, litigation view of thereby endangering the child. In the jeopardize confidentiality mandated about visitation could Act, being or lead to named as the defendant DYFS in such cases.6 *27 agency generally
An administrative is afforded substantial def Mayflower expertise. in its area of Secs. Co. v. Bureau erence of Secs., (1973). 92-93, However, appellate A.2d N.J. 312 497 64 way agency’s interpretation “in no of a courts are bound strictly legal a Id. at statute or its determination of issue.” Trustees, 497; Pub. 312 A.2d see also DiBlasi v. Board Em ployees’ Sys., N.J.Super. A.2d 241 Retirement 315 718 (App.Div.1998). agency’s statutory If interpretation contra intent, plain language Legislature’s dicts undermines the or reject agency’s not to this Court has hesitated view. GE Solid Taxation, 306-07, State, Director, Inc. v. Div. 132 N.J. 625 (1993). A.2d 468 where, here, particularly agency This is the case has only general in concerns and anecdotal evidence advanced Grandparent attempt to that enforcement of the demonstrate fact, a adoptions. will have harmful effect on Statute demonstrating there is evidence visitation can in cases. See Amadio and Stuart L. coexist Carol Deutsch, “Stay Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted to Children 6 agency that its contends further to children out-of-state as ability place (1999), § Act, Safe 671 mandated under the Families U.S.C.A. agency's hindered, will be but claim is subsumed under the other this really claims. Relatives, (1983-84) Touch” with Fam. L. Blood J. (describing Department Family Illinois of Children and Services’ recruiting adoptive parents willing permit grandpar- success in children). unwilling ents continued I contact with am to limit the applicability of the Visitation Statute because DYFS presented examples prospective adoptive parents’ has two objections. DYFS, important, contrary expressed by
Most to the fears statutory Grandparents standards in the Visitation Statute and the power equitable of the prevent courts fashion remedies would “parade up by agency. of horribles” offered Under the statute, paramount best interests of the child are Thus, application. the consideration of a visitation the court could supervised prevent biologi- order visitation to contact with an unfit and, danger despite supervi- cal when there is of access sion, anticipate I that visitation would be denied. currently pending County refers to a case
DYFS Camden Court, Family grandmother brought in which a maternal has naming identity visitation action DYFS as a defendant because the unknown, adoptive parents support of the its concern that the confidentiality provisions compromised by Act are readily can I the visitation statute. These concerns resolved. interpret the standards set out in the visitation statute to limit the right petition for visitation to those eases *28 prior where there has been a with the child to formal adoption. ruling Agency’s Such should both ameliorate the prevent unnecessary adopted concerns and interference in the family child’s life.
V Having application Grandparent determined that Visita- language tion Statute does not conflict with the or intent of the Act, petitioners’ I turn to the claim that the Visitation Statute violates the Due Process Clause of the United 192 Const, XIV, 1, Constitution, applied § amend. as U.S.
States my opinion, it does not. In this case.7 Grandparents presumption that begin I with the may rebutted presumption that is constitutional —a Statute clearly of the Constitution is showing provision that a only on a Caffiero, Educ. v. 86 N.J. by the statute. See Board violated of dismissed, 1025, 799, 308, 318, 454 102 S.Ct. appeal A.2d U.S. 431 (1981). argue Grandpar 560, that the 470 Petitioners 70 L.Ed.2d them, Statute, impermissibly intrudes applied to as ents Visitation autonomy. support of process right of upon their due Supreme cases they rely States Court argument, on United their 747-48,102 1388, Kramer, 745, Santosky v. 455 U.S. S.Ct. such (state (1982) 599, 1391-92, paren terminate 603 cannot 71 L.Ed.2d “permanently protect who has been rights except to child tal Yoder, 205, 233-34, 92 S.Ct. neglected”); v. 406 U.S. Wisconsin (1972) (state 1542, 15, compel cannot 32 L.Ed.2d 35-36 school); Stanley v. public to attend children over sixteen Amish 645, 657-58, 1208, 1216, Illinois, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 S.Ct. 405 U.S. (1972) (state away custody children without cannot take 562 unfit); Society Pierce v. hearing establishing 1070, 1078 534-35, 571, 573, Sisters, 69 L.Ed. 268 U.S. S.Ct. (1925) public attendance law invalid due (compulsory school religious upbring liberty education and parent’s interest child’s 625, 626, Nebraska, 390, 399, ing); Meyer v. 262 U.S. 43 S.Ct. (1923) 1042, 1045 right a home and (parent’s to “establish 67 L.Ed. teacher). up right engage German bring children” includes recognize protection from within the a zone These cases child,” “custody, nurture of [a] interference in the care and state Massachusetts, 438, 442, 64 S.Ct. Prince v. 321 U.S. (1944). L.Ed. however, These cases also rights, are not absolute.
Parental in the acknowledge strong parens patriae interest the states’ claim, state constitutional I do not address As WP and MP do not raise a validity Jersey the statute under the New Constitution.
193
children,
stability
family.
welfare of
and in the
structure
of
See,
766, 102
1401-02,
e.g., Santosky, supra, 455
at
at
71
U.S.
S.Ct.
615; Prince,
166-67,
442,
supra,
L.Ed.2d at
321
at
64 S.Ct. at
U.S.
Thus,
L.Ed. at
range
88
652-53.
the states still retain “a wide
power
limiting parental
authority
things
for
freedom and
affect
and, also,
ing
regard
“regulation
child’s welfare”
[a]
Prince,
166, 167,
public
supra,
interest.”
at
321 U.S.
Because we zone of parents’ concerning when the state intrudes on their decisions children, requires the federal Constitution that this examine Court intrusion, degree importance governmental of the asserted, interest and the extent to which that interest is served Cleveland, challenged regulation. City E. See Moore v. (1977) 52 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (plurality opinion). Application legal framework within which difficult these determined involves careful issues.are competing tough consideration of interests and a call on the question. affecting ultimate Decisions are often contro- *30 question us in this versial, highly charged. The before sometimes strongly about us have held views different. Most of case is no permissible state involvement family autonomy and about obligation precedent, to examine consider matters. The Court’s is statute, weigh the constitutional expressed in the and the values Here, respondents. must deter- right Court invoked violates the federal Constitution mine whether a state statute circumstances, visitation, biological permitting in certain between adopted by non- grandchild who has been relatives.
First,
split
I
courts have
on whether
note that other state
have
statutes are constitutional. Some
impermissible intrusions on
invalidated their states’ statutes as
Parkerson,
189,
See,
parental autonomy.
e.g., Brooks v.
265 Ga.
942,
769,
(Ga.),
denied,
116
cert.
516 U.S.
S.Ct.
454 S.E.2d
773-74
(1995)
377,
(finding
L.
2d
statute unconstitutional
133
Ed.
301
not
federal constitutions because it does
“under both the state and
clearly promote
or welfare of the child and does not
the health
require
showing
of harm before state interference is autho
651,
rized”);
Williams,
778,
Va.App.
v.
24
485 S.E.2d
Williams
(1998)
(1997),
19,
modified,
417
256 Va.
501 S.E.2d
654
aff'd
protect paren
(Virginia statute’s best interests test insufficient to
autonomy
rearing
right
tal
in child
under the Fourteenth
Amendment). Yet,
grandpar
that
other state courts have found
significant
ent visitation is not a
encroachment on
consti
rights.
recognized
parents’ rights
tutional
These courts have
upheld
on a
are not absolute and have
visitation statutes based
See,
630,
e.g., King King,
interests test.
v.
828 S.W.2d
632
best
denied,
378, 121
(Ky.), cert.
L.Ed.2d 289
U.S.
S.Ct.
(1992) (under
test,
impermissibly
rational basis
statute does not
parents’
not
infringe on
fundamental
because visitation
provides adequate safeguards); Herndon v.
automatic and statute
(Mo.1993) (statute
Tuhey,
209-10
constitutional
857 S.W.2d
light
parent-
minimal
under rational basis test
intrusion on
statute);
tailoring of
Michael v.
child
and narrow
(statute
Hertzler,
(Wyo.1995)
900 P.2d
did not violate
test
has best interests
process rights because statute
father’s due
interest,
adequate safe-
compelling
contains
represents
state
tailored).8
narrowly
parents, and is
guards
protect
patriae
Jersey,
equity
parens
their
pursuant
New
custody, visi
jurisdiction, family
routinely decide issues of
courts
tation,
myriad
aspects of
rela
support, and
other
domestic
child
parents’ authority to raise their children without
tions that affect
See,
Beck,
e.g.,
v.
86 N.J.
the state.
Beck
interference from
(courts
(1981)
“authority
joint
have
to decree
New
has
that it is
for children
develop
family
and maintain a connection with
members other
parents.
grandparents
than
Our
has declared
Court
particular
provide
accep
can
children with “unconditional love and
tance,
complements
which
rather than conflicts with the role of
Mimkon,
parents.”
supra,
...
to maintain relationships. [Ibid.] Jersey, 107,287 In percent New six eighteen, of children under children, grandparent-headed live in Jersey households. See New Legislature Assembly State Task Grandparenting, Force on Re (Jan.2000). Recommendations, port Findings and 1 As demo graphics change evolve, configurations legisla and .state tures increasingly larger and courts have concept embraced
197
Moore,
beyond
See
family autonomy extending
nuclear families.
(“[T]he
505,
1938,
2d at 541
52 L.Ed.
supra,
In
of the
of the
I
intrusion,
permits only
any,
would find that the statute
a
if
limited
parents’ constitutionally protected
on
interests. The statute is not
parental rights,
about the termination of
or about who should have
child;
physical custody of the
it is about whether and under what
Fiebert,
circumstances visitation should occur.
v.
Zack
Cf.
N.J.Super.
(App.Div.1989).
Jersey
Like most such the visitation, right only standing petition the provide a does not 9:2-7.1(a). petition When a court visitation. N.J.S.A. See for unfit, visitation, applicant is support as in a case where the cannot has adopted as infant and there or where the child has been grandparents, the court should little or no contact with the been (providing R. for a petition the 5:8-6 dismiss forthwith. Cf. hearing only “genuine that and custody if the court finds there is a issue”). quickly I expect that the courts would substantial petitions and recognize pleadings insubstantial that visitation only merit to claim. petitioner’s be filed when there is would case. dependent in each on the facts in each The result ease is standards, statutory I that If under the believe warranted by grandparent intrusion visitation is constitution- limited effected here, adopted I V was not ally permissible. observe birth, had family shortly child has after that the non-relative years. The Cali- ongoing contact with her five circumstances, Supreme explained Court in such fornia has ignore not in fact that an may law not and cannot adopted person should regard remains off If be cut from his natural affection family. many respects should name of consisten- members of the law not in the family, between natural encouragement feelings those to thwart when undertake cy expression hinder does not relationships. thereof adoptive Zook P.2d [In Zook, re Estate v. Cal.Rptr. 62 Cal.2d banc) (1965) (en ]. findings on trial court for based I remand this case to the would consider, require statutory I would the court standards. factors, unduly interfere visitation among other whether would adoptive have chosen the manner which the with V, objections raise the nature of their (including to visitation their father), concerns about Vs whether parents previous- ly visitation, scope consented to and the sought. I believe that the trial court should decide whether it would be in permit best Vs interests to biological grandpar- visitation with her despite ents the countervailing expressed by concerns her adop- parents. tive
VI For all of the I expressed, reasons have I respectfully dissent majority opinion. from the *35 join PORITZ’s, C.J.,
Justice STEIN opinion. vacating For O’HERN, GARIBALDI, and reversal —Justices COLEMAN, LONG and VERNIERO —5.
For and remandment —Chief Justice PORITZ and affirmance Justice STEIN —2.
Argued April October 1999 Decided 2000.
