In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to B.B., R.B. and R.-B.
COUNSEL
Brieann M., Apache Junction
In Propria Persona
Law Office of Adam James PLLC, Mesa
By Adam James
Counsel for Appellee Robert B.
Presiding Judge Gard authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Eckerstrom and Judge O‘Neil concurred.
G A R D, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Brieann M. appeals the juvenile court‘s October 2025 order denying her petition for termination of the parent-child relationship between her former partner, Robert B., and their daughters, B.B. (born in June 2021) and R.B. and R.-B. (twins born in April 2022). She contends the court erred by finding that termination of Robert‘s parental rights was not in the children‘s best interests. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court‘s findings. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, ¶ 2 (2016). In June 2025, Brieann filed a petition for termination of the parent-child relationship, alleging abandonment as the sole ground. Specifically, she asserted that Robert had not “made contact with the children” in two years and that to force the children to have a relationship with him would be “mentally harmful.” Robert responded, disputing Brieann‘s allegations, and the juvenile court set the matter for a contested severance hearing.
¶3 During that October 2025 hearing, Brieann presented evidence that her fiancé, Robson G., was a “father figure” to the children and that he would like to adopt them. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court determined Brieann had proven the abandonment ground by clear and convincing evidence. However, the court concluded that she had failed to prove termination was in the children‘s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. The court observed that Robson was “the guy that‘s there on the daily, on the regular, showing up and making sure things get done.” But the court explained that if Brieann and Robson did not get married and he did not adopt the children as planned, then they would have “no father.” The court encouraged Brieann “to keep open the doorway to [Robert] to demonstrate that he can be the father he wants to be” but noted that if he does not do so, “then we‘re working our way to a time in the future where [Brieann is] going to be able to do something about it.” This appeal followed.
¶4 Brieann argues the juvenile court erred by concluding that termination of Robert‘s parental rights was not in the children‘s best interests. We will affirm a severance order if reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court‘s factual findings and its legal conclusions are not clearly erroneous. Brionna J. v. Dep‘t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, ¶¶ 30-31 (2023). We defer to the juvenile court‘s factual findings because, as the trier of fact, that court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep‘t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004).
¶5 The juvenile court may terminate a parent‘s rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination exists and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent‘s rights is in the child‘s best interests.
¶6 Brieann maintains, “Arizona law does not require an immediately pending adoption before a court may find severance to be in a child‘s best interests.” She contends the juvenile court‘s finding that the children would be left without a father if Robson “did not ultimately adopt” them or “remain involved in their lives” is based on “speculation.” She further maintains the evidence presented at the hearing shows that Robson “intended to adopt them,” which would provide the children with “stability and permanency.”
¶7 Brieann is correct that an adoption need not be “immediately pending” to support a finding that termination is in a child‘s best interests. However, the alleged benefit that a child might gain from severance based on a prospective adoption must be more than “tentative.” Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. 1, ¶ 19. For example, in Demetrius L., our supreme court affirmed the juvenile court‘s finding that termination of the father‘s rights was in the child‘s best interests because of a prospective adoption by the child‘s
¶8 Here, by contrast, at the time of the contested severance hearing, Brieann and Robson were not married. Although they were engaged and Robson testified that he “would love to adopt” the children, such an adoption was nonetheless tentative. See id. Indeed, Brieann admitted that, based on when she and Robson planned to get married, the children were not “immediately available for adoption.” See
¶9 Moreover, the juvenile court‘s conclusion was not based on “speculation,” as Brieann suggests. Rather, Brieann bore the burden of establishing a benefit to the children from severance of Robert‘s parental rights. See In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 6 (1990). The court‘s conclusion was the result of Brieann‘s failure to meet that burden. Based on the record before us, we cannot say the court‘s conclusion was clearly erroneous. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. 471, ¶¶ 30-31.
Disposition
¶10 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court‘s order denying Brieann‘s petition for termination of the parent-child relationship.