Case Information
*0 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 10/28/2015 1:15:24 PM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk *1 ACCEPTED 06-15-00086-CV SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 10/28/2015 1:15:24 PM DEBBIE AUTREY CLERK N O . 06-15-00086-CV
I N THE S IXTH D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEALS A T T EXARKANA , T EXAS I N RE T ARA B ROOK T YNDELL , R ELATOR
Original Proceeding Arising from the 196th Judicial District Court Hunt County, Texas
No. 76,122 (Hon. J. Andrew Bench, Presiding) R P ETITION F OR RIT O F
Respectfully submitted by, G EORGANNA L. S IMPSON SBN 18400965
G EORGANNA L. S IMPSON , P.C. 1349 Empire Central Drive Woodview Tower, Ste. 600 Dallas, Texas 75247 Phone: 214-905-3739 • Fax: 214-905-3799 georganna@glsimpsonpc.com C OUNSEL FOR R EAL ARTIES IN I NTEREST J OHN N OWELL AND J ENNIFER N OWELL O RAL A RGUMENT EQUESTED AT C OURT ’ S D ISCRETION *2 I DENTITY OF P ARTIES AND C OUNSEL Relator: Tara Brook Tyndell
Petitioner in the underlying suit Represented in the E. Alan Bennett
Appellate Court by: 510 N. Valley Mills Dr., Ste. 500
Waco, Texas 76710
Represented in the Tonya C. Toups
Trial Court by: 2615 Calder Ave., Ste 400
Beaumont, Texas 77702 Philip D. Alexander
P.O. Box 38
Emory, TX 75440
Fredrick C. Shelton
P.O. Box 1335
Greenville, Texas 75403 Deborah Slye-Miller
435 S. Bois D’Arc
Tyler, Texas 75702
Bruce N. Smith
S MITH & S HIPLEY L AW 2750 IH-10 East, Ste. 200 Beaumont, Texas 77703 John C. Ginn
P.O. Box 493
Sulphur Springs, Texas 75483 Page i *3 Respondent: The Honorable J. Andrew Bench
196th Judicial District Court P.O. Box 1097
Greenville, Texas 75401-1097 Real Parties in Interest: John Nowell and Jennifer Nowell
Respondents in the underlying suit; Joint Managing Conservators of the Child Maternal Great Uncle and Aunt of the Child Represented in the Georganna L. Simpson
Appellate Court by: GEORGANNA L. SIMPSON, P.C.
1349 Empire Central Drive Woodview Tower, Ste. 600 Dallas, Texas 75247
Phone: 214-905-3739 • Fax: 214-905-3799
Email: georganna@glsimpsonpc.com Represented in the
Holly H. Gotcher
Trial Court by: L AW O FFICES OF M ORGAN & G OTCHER
2610 Stonewall Street
P.O. Box 556
Greenville, Texas 75403-0556 Tel: (903) 455-3183 (Greenville) Tel: (903) 450-8800 (Metro) Fax: (903) 454-4654
holly@morgan-gotcher.com Shannon M. Estrada
L AW O FFICE OF S HANNON M. E STRADA 2507 Washington Street P.O. Box 765
Greenville, Texas 75401 Real Party in Interest: Zachary Williamson, Pro Se
Respondent in the underlying suit;
Father of the Child Page ii
*4 T ABLE OF C ONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel
....................................................................... i
Index of Authorities ....................................................................................... vi
Abbreviations and Record References ........................................................ viii
Statement of the Case ..................................................................................... ix
R ESPONSE TO P ETITION FOR W RIT OF M ANDAMUS
I. S TATEMENT OF F ACTS .......................................................................... 1
A. T HE SAPCR—H UNT C OUNTY ................................................... 1
B. T HE DIVORCE —J EFFERSON C OUNTY ........................................ 9
II. S UMMARY OF THE A RGUMENT ........................................................... 10
III. A RGUMENT ......................................................................................... 11
A. R ESPONSE TO I SSUE .................................................................. 11
Respondent did not abuse his discretion in denying Mother’s motion to transfer the SAPCR from Hunt County to Jefferson County.
1. Mother was not entitled to a mandatory transfer of continuing exclusive jurisdiction from Hunt County to Jefferson County ........................................... 11 Page iii *5 a. Establishing the existence of a valid mar- riage to be dissolved is a condition precedent to a mandatory transfer under Texas Family Code Section 155.201(a) ........................................ 11 b. Transferring the SAPCR from Hunt County to Jefferson County would not be in the Child’s best interest .............................................. 15 c. Mandatory transfer provisions of the Family Code were not meant as a tool to manipulate venue and to play courts off one against the other through the use of a petition for di- vorce ....................................................................... 18 d. Here, conservatorship of the Child is not an integral part of Mother and Father’s alleged informal marital relationship ............................... 22 2. Mother failed to diligently seek a hearing on her motion to transfer ........................................................... 22 P RAYER ......................................................................................................... 24
C ERTIFICATION OF F ACTS AND V ERIFICATION OF R ECORD ...................... 25
C ERTIFICATE OF C OUNSEL R EGARDING W ORD C OUNT ............................ 26
C ERTIFICATE OF S ERVICE ........................................................................... 26
R EAL P ARTIES IN I NTEREST J OHN AND J ENNIFER N OWELL ’ S A PPENDIX :
Tab 1: Motion for Enforcement of Possession or Access with Tempo-
rary Restraining Order and Extraordinary Relief (03/28/11) Tab 2: Request for Warrant to Take Physical Custody of Child
(03/29/11) Page iv
Tab 3: Order for Issuance of Warrant to Take Physical Custody of
Child (03/29/11)
Tab 4: Motion to Deny Relief in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Rela-
tionship, Motion to Dismiss, and in the Alternative, Motion to Abate Proceedings (06/01/11)
Tab 5: Bridge Temporary Orders (06/02/11)
Tab 6: Subpoena Duces Tecum to Mother (02/10/12)
Tab 7: Citation serving Mother’s Original Petition for Divorce on
Aunt and Uncle (05/27/15) Page v *7 I NDEX OF A UTHORITIES
Case Law :
1. In re Cooper .................................................................................. 16, 17
320 S.W.3d 905
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, orig. proceeding)
2. Fite v. Nelson ...................................................................................... 15
869 S.W.2d 603
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ)
3. Garza v. Texas Dept. of Human Services ............................... 18, 19, 24
757 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, writ denied)
4. In re Hancock ..................................................................................... 13
No. 13-09-00123-CV, 2009 WL 1089481
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.)
5. In re M.A.S. .................................................................. 14, 18, 19, 20, 24
246 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.)
6. In re Marriage of Allen ...................................................................... 22
593 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1979, no writ)
7. Neal v. Avey ......................................................................................... 14
853 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied)
8. In re Powell ................................................................................... 13, 15
79 S.W.3d 814
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, orig. proceeding) Page vi
9.
In re R.E.A. ............................................................................. 18, 20, 24
No. 13–10–00557–CV, 2011 WL 3557427
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)
10. Trader v. Dear ..................................................................................... 16
565 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding)
11. Yates v. Gaithier .................................................................................. 14
725 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ)
Statutes :
1. Tex. Fam. Code § 153.002 ................................................................. 16
2. Tex. Fam. Code § 155.201 .................................... 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
3. Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204 ................................................ 12, 13, 15, 23 Page vii *9 A BBREVIATIONS AND R ECORD R EFERENCES Abbreviations :
1. Tara Brook Tyndell shall be referred to as Mother .
2. Respondent Honorable J. Andrew Bench, Judge Presiding shall be re-
ferred to as Respondent .
3. Real Party in Interest Jennifer Nowell shall be referred to as Aunt ;
4. Real Party in Interest John Aubrey Nowell shall be referred to as Un-
cle .
5. Real Party in Interest Zachary Scott Williamson shall be referred to as
Father .
6. The child, K.T.W., shall be referred be referred to as the Child .
Record References :
1. The appendix and optional appendix attached to Relator Tara Brook
Tyndell’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus shall be referred to as App.
and OA, respectively, and will be cited by tab and page number as ap-
propriate. App.__:__ ; OA.__:__ .
2. The reporter’s records attached to Relator Tara Brook Tyndell’s Peti-
tion for Writ of Mandamus shall be referred to as RR, and will be cited
pursuant to Relator Tara Brook Tyndell’s Record Index and page num-
ber as appropriate. __RR:__ . The two reporter’s records containing
hearing exhibits shall be similarly cited. __RREx:__:REx.__ . Page viii
3. The appendix attached to Real Party in Interest John and Jennifer Now-
ell’s Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus shall be referred to as
RPI.App, and will be cited by tab and page number as appropriate.
__RPI.App.__:__ . S TATEMENT OF THE C ASE
Nature of the Case
: The underlying case involves a modification of
the conservatorship of one Child.
Respondent : Respondent is the Honorable J. Andrew Bench,
presiding judge of the 196th Judicial District Court in Greenville, Hunt County, Texas.
Respondent’s Actions : On November 30, 2010, an agreed final order
appointed Aunt and Uncle joint managing con- servators of the Child and granted Mother visit- ation with the Child as agreed to by the Parties. OA.1 . On March 11, 2011, Mother filed a Pe- tition to Modify the Parent-Child Relationship (“SAPCR”). OA.2 . On August 2, 2011, shortly after temporary orders had been entered in the SAPCR, Mother filed in Jefferson County a Pe- tition for Divorce alleging an informal marriage to Father. OA.12 . On August 15, 2011, Mother filed a motion to transfer continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the Child from Hunt County to Jefferson County. OA.15 . On June 16, 2015, Respondent signed an ordering denying Moth- er’s motion to transfer, and on September 26, 2015, Respondent signed an order denying Mother’s Motion to reconsider.
Apps.1, 3 . Page ix *11 R ESPONSE TO P ETITION FOR W RIT OF M ANDAMUS Real Parties in Interest Jennifer Nowell and John Aubrey Nowell file
this response to Relator Tara Brook Tyndell’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus
and, as grounds therefore, would show the Court as follows:
I.
S TATEMENT OF F ACTS
A. The SAPCR—Hunt County.
1. On July 9, 2008, the Child was born to Tara Brook Tyndell
(“Mother”) and Zachary Scott Williamson (“Father”).
2. On August 12, 2010, the Child began residing with Jennifer and
John Nowell, the Child’s maternal great aunt and uncle (“Aunt” and “Uncle,” respectively). RPI.App.1:5–8 . On November 30,
2010, an agreed order appointed Aunt and Uncle joint managing conservators and Mother possessory conservator, with Mother’s visitation with the Child as agreed to between the parties. OA.1 .
Father was not a party to this suit. OA.1 . Page 1 of 26
3.
On March 11, 2011, less than a year after the agreed order was
signed, Mother filed a Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relation- ship (“SAPCR”) in Hunt County. OA.2 .
4. On March 28, 2011, at the beginning of a scheduled visitation in
Hunt County, Mother and Father kidnapped the Child. RPI.App.1 . That same day, Aunt and Uncle filed a Motion for Enforcement of Possession or Access with Temporary Restrain- ing Order and Extraordinary Relief. RPI.App.1 . On March 29,
2011, Aunt and Uncle requested and obtained a warrant to return
the Child to Hunt County. RPI.Apps.2, 3 .
5. On April 21, 2011, Father filed an answer and counterpetition in
the Hunt County SAPCR requesting in part that the court appoint him and Mother as joint managing conservators. OA.4, 5 . Father did not identify Mother as his Wife. OA.4:2 .
6.
On May 12, 2011, Father filed an Original Petition for Bill of
Review in which he sought to set aside the November 30, 2010 Page 2 of 26 *13 Agreed Order and asserted that he resided in Van Zandt County and that Mother resided in Hunt County. 1 OA.6:1 .
7. On June 1, 2011, Aunt and Uncle sought to dismiss Mother’s
SAPCR because she had filed her modification suit within one year of the prior orders and had not attached a sworn affidavit containing sufficient facts to satisfy the requirements of Texas Family Section 156.102. RPI.App.4 .
8. On June 2, 2011, the Hunt County trial court entered orders
granting Mother and Father limited visitation with the Child, su- pervised by an off-duty Hunt County police officer. RPI.App.5:2–3 .
9. On June 22, 2011, Aunt and Uncle served Father with written
discovery. OA.10 . On June 23, 2011, Aunt and Uncle served Mother with written discovery. OA.11 .
10.
On August 15, 2011, Mother filed a motion to transfer in Hunt
County, seeking to have continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the Child transferred from Hunt County to Jefferson County where she had filed a suit to dissolve an alleged informal mar- 1 The trial court denied Father’s Petition for Bill of Review on October 3, 2011. OA.19 . Page 3 of 26
riage.
OA.15 . Mother had served neither Aunt nor Uncle with the suit to dissolve her alleged informal marriage and did not attach a copy of the petition to her motion to transfer. OA.15 .
11. On September 2, 2011, Aunt and Uncle filed a response and ob-
jections to Mother’s motion to transfer to which was attached Aunt’s controverting affidavit, arguing that Mother and Father’s alleged informal marriage was a sham, that the motion to transfer was filed in bad faith, and that a transfer of continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the Child from Hunt County to Jefferson County would not be in the Child’s best interest. OA.16 .
12. Over the next two years, multiple hearings were set on Mother’s
motion to transfer, including but not limited to: • September 15, 2011, OA.18, 1RR:11 ; • February 28, 2012, OA.21, 1RR:11 ; •
Cancelled by Mother’s attorney, OA.22 ;
• September 13, 2012, OA.24 ;
• November 8, 2012, OA.27 ;
• Continued due to Father’s failure to comply with dis-
covery requests, 4RR ; and Page 4 of 26
•
January 8 or 10, 2013, 4RR:7 ; 5RR:4 .
These hearings were either reset at Mother’s request, see OA.22 , or continued as a result of Mother and Father’s failure to respond to discovery requests relevant to whether they were in fact mar- ried. See 2RR:13–14 ; 6RR ; OA.27:Ex.A ; OA.34:1 ; OA.36 .
13. On February, 10, 2012 , Aunt and Uncle served Mother and Fa-
ther with subpoenas duces tecum requiring them to appear with documentation to establish the existence of a marriage to Father. 2RR:13 ; OA.27:Ex.A ; RPI.App.6 ; 6RR:3-4 . Mother failed to
appear or produce any of the requested documentation. 2RR:13–
14 . Father produced one piece of paper. 6RR:3-4 .
14. On May 2, 2013, Respondent’s predecessor held a hearing on
Aunt and Uncle’s motion to compel discovery. OA.34 . Mother did not appear. OA.34:1 .
15.
On October 1, 2013, Respondent’s predecessor held a hearing
on Aunt and Uncle’s motion to continue the October 29, 2013 hearing on Mother’s motion to transfer. 6RR . Mother’s attorney
failed to appear. 6RR:5 . Page 5 of 26
16.
On October 10, 2013, the Hunt County trial court signed an or-
der finding that Father had failed to completely respond to Aunt and Uncle’s discovery requests and ordered that no hearing on Mother’s motion to transfer would be scheduled until after Father provided complete and sufficient answers to Aunt and Uncle’s discovery requests. OA.36 . Mother has never challenged this or- der.
17. On September 15, 2014, rather than insisting her motion to
transfer be heard, Mother filed a motion for mediation, which the trial court granted, ordering the parties to participate in mediation on December 15, 2014. OA.41, 42 .
18. On March 3, 2015, Mother sent Aunt and Uncle a letter inform-
ing them of a final hearing in the SAPCR set for April 30, 2015. OA.43 . On April 15, 2015 , Mother sent Aunt and Uncle a letter informing them of a hearing on her motion to transfer set for
April 28, 2015—two days before the final hearing. OA.46 .
19. On April 23, 2015, Respondent received a letter from the Jeffer-
son County trial court advising him of the pending cause of ac- tion in Jefferson County. OA.49 . Page 6 of 26
20.
On April 28, 2015, the final hearing was reset until May 29,
2015 because Father had still not complied with the discovery or- ders (signed in October 2013). 7RR .
21. On May 29, 2015, Respondent held a hearing on Mother’s mo-
tion to transfer. 1RR . In addition to the three exhibits entered by Aunt and Uncle, Respondent took judicial notice of its file and of the letter from the Jefferson County court regarding Mother’s pe- tition to dissolve her alleged informal marriage to Father. 1RR:26–27 . At the conclusion of the hearing, Respondent denied
Mother’s motion to transfer venue. 1RR:24–25 .
22. On June 16, 2015, Respondent signed an order denying Moth-
er’s motion to transfer. App.1 . This is the order that is the subject of Mother’s petition for writ of mandamus.
23. On July 15, 2015, Mother filed a motion to reconsider, to which
she attached her Jefferson County petition for divorce.
OA.57 .
24. On September 8, 2015, Respondent conducting a hearing on
Mother’s motion to reconsider, 2RR . At the hearing’s conclu-
sion, Respondent stated: Page 7 of 26
I’m inclined to overrule the Motion for Reconsidera- tion. I do feel like the law is written for a purpose, and it can be perverted. And I think it would be per- verted in this particular case if I grant the Motion for Reconsideration and if I grant the Motion to Transfer. [¶] However, I want to do some research [before I rule.]…[T]he history of this case, the facts of this case, and the alignment of the parties all lead me to believe that there has been gamesmanship…I don’t think the legislators ever considered the possibility that someone would litigate a case almost to the end and then say, [“]no, I changed my mind; I’m going to go somewhere else[”]…I understand there may be different reasons why [the hearing on Mother’s mo- tion to transfer] didn’t get heard this time or that. But some of the time, if not most of the time, it’s been [Mother’s] decision not to do it. And then she’s come this Court and said, [“]do this for me; set me a trial; send me to mediation; let me try to resolve this case. But if I don’t get it resolved, I’m going somewhere else because I don’t like you, Judge.[”]…In no other circumstance does the law allow you to avail yourself of a Court, to rely on its jurisdiction, to order you to do things that you’ve asked for, to avail yourself of the powers of the Court and then come and say [the Court had] no power and [it hasn’t] for four years….I hope that no one has come and lied to the court or misled the Court intentionally to get an ad- vantage…But I do know that [Mother] has asked this Court for relief and has received it since she said this Court lacked jurisdiction to act.
2RR:25–29 .
25. On September 26, 2015, Respondent signed an order denying
Mother’s motion to reconsider. App.3 . Page 8 of 26
B. The divorce—Jefferson County.
1. On August 2, 2011, Mother filed a petition for divorce in Jeffer-
son County alleging an informal marriage between herself and Father. OA.12 . In her petition, Mother identified Aunt and Uncle as persons entitled to service but did not identify them as conser- vators of the Child. OA.12:2 . Additionally, she failed to identify the November 30, 2010 Hunt County final order or the June 2, 2011 Hunt County temporary order in her petition for divorce and instead falsely stated that the Child was “not under the continuing jurisdiction of any other court,” and “[t]here are no court-ordered conservatorships, court-ordered guardianships, or other court- ordered relationships affecting the [Child].” OA.12:2 .
2. On May 7, 2015, almost four years later, Mother and Father filed
in Jefferson County an agreed motion for partial summary judg- ment, asking the Jefferson County trial court to find an informal
marriage between them as a matter of law. OA.54 ; 1RR:18–19 .
3. On May 19, 2015, Aunt and Uncle filed in Jefferson County a
motion to continue the hearing on Mother’s and Father’s motion for partial summary judgment. OA.55 ; 1RR:20 . Aunt and Uncle Page 9 of 26 *20 noted that they had not yet been properly served as necessary par- ties to Mother’s divorce and had not received notice of the sum- mary judgment hearing as required by Texas Rule of Civil Proce- dure 166a(c). OA.55 ; 1RR:20 .
4. On May 27, 2015, Aunt and Uncle were served for the first time
with Mother’s petition for divorce. RPI.App.7 ; 1RR:22 .
II.
S UMMARY OF A RGUMENT The mandatory transfer provisions of the Texas Family Code were not
meant as a tool to manipulate venue and to play courts off one against the
other through the use of a petition for divorce. In order to establish grounds
for a transfer pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 155.201(a), a party
must show that (1) the child is the biological child of both parties to the di-
vorce; and (2) a marriage between the parents subject to dissolution exists.
Because Mother failed to put forth any evidence of a marriage between her-
self and Father and because Mother appears to have pursued a “divorce” and
transfer of the SAPCR to Jefferson County only after she received an unfa-
vorable ruling in Hunt County, Respondent did not abuse his discretion in
denying her motion to transfer. Page 10 of 26
Moreover, transferring the proceedings away from the county where
the Child has lived for the last five years would not be in the Child’s best in-
terest.
III.
A RGUMENT
A. R ESPONSE TO I SSUE
Respondent did not abuse his discretion in denying Mother’s mo-
tion to transfer the SAPCR from Hunt County to Jefferson Coun-
ty.
1. Mother was not entitled to a mandatory transfer of continu-
ing exclusive jurisdiction from Hunt County to Jefferson County.
a. Establishing the existence of a valid marriage to be dis- solved is a condition precedent to a mandatory transfer under Texas Family Code Section 155.201(a).
Mother alleges that she is entitled to a mandatory transfer of the
SAPCR from Hunt County to Jefferson County pursuant to Texas Family
Code Section 155.201(a). Pet.:22–24. 2 Texas Family Code Section 155.201
provides in pertinent part:
(a) On the filing of a motion showing that a suit for dissolution
of the marriage of the child’s parents has been filed in an- other court and requesting a transfer to that court, the court 2 Mother’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus shall be referred to as Pet. and will be cited by page
number where appropriate. Pet.:__ . Page 11 of 26
having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship shall, within the time required by Section 155.204, transfer the proceedings to the court in which the dissolution of the marriage is pending. The mo- tion must comply with the requirements of Section 155.204(a).
(b) If a suit to modify or a motion to enforce an order is filed in
the court having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a suit, on the timely motion of a party the court shall, within the time required by Section 155. 204, transfer the proceeding to another county in this state if the child has resided in the other county for six months or longer.
Tex. Fam. Code § 155.201. While there is no allegation that subsection (b)
would be applicable under the facts of this case, case law interpreting both
subsections (a) and (b) are instructive, as they each provide that under certain
circumstances, the court “ shall , within the time required by Section 155.204,
transfer the proceedings” to the appropriate court. See Tex. Fam. Code §
155.201(a)–(b). 3 Mother claims that because she has filed for dissolution of
her alleged informal marriage to Father, Respondent lacked discretion to de-
ny her motion to transfer, regardless of whether she can actually establish the
existence of an informal marriage. Pet.:22–24.
3 Other than the different conditions precedent, the only notable difference between the two sec-
tions is the time requirement for filing the motion to transfer. Under Subsection (b), the motion
to transfer must be filed “at the time the initial pleadings are filed,” but under Subsection (a), the
motion to transfer may be filed “at any time.” See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 155.201, 155.204. Page 12 of 26
Contrary to Mother’s assertions, a motion to transfer pursuant to Texas
Family Code Section 155.201 does not automatically require a court to grant
such a motion. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 155.201, 155.204. If a party contest-
ing the motion to transfer files a controverting affidavit, a hearing must be
held to determine whether grounds exist to support a transfer. See Tex. Fam.
Code § 155.204(d), (g); cf. In re Hancock , No. 13-09-00123-CV, 2009 WL
1089481, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.) (no hearing re-
quired when no controverting affidavit filed). Here, Mother filed a motion to
transfer, and within the time requirement of Texas Family Code Section
155.204, Aunt and Uncle filed objections to Mother’s motion to transfer, to
which was attached Aunt’s controverting affidavit. OA.15–16 ; see Tex. Fam.
Code 155.204(d). Thus, Respondent was only required to transfer the pro-
ceeding after finding grounds for such a transfer existed. See Tex. Fam. Code
§ 155.204(g); see In re Powell , 79 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2002, orig. proceeding) (trial court had no discretion to transfer under Tex.
Fam. Code § 155.201(b) if child resided in different county six months or
more). Page 13 of 26
Mother argues that because Aunt and Uncle challenged only the validi-
ty of Mother and Father’s alleged marriage and not whether a divorce petition
was filed, Aunt and Uncle did not properly contest whether Mother was enti-
tled to a transfer. Pet.:26. However, a trial court has a duty to transfer a
SAPCR only after a proper showing that a divorce is pending in another
court. See In re M.A.S. , 246 S.W.3d 182, 184 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007,
no pet.); Neal v. Avey , 853 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Yates v. Gaithier, 725 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1987, no writ). The mandatory duty to transfer a case pursuant
to Texas Family Code Section 155.201(a) is triggered only after factual find-
ings that:
• the child is the biological child of both parties to the divorce; and
• a marriage between the parents subject to dissolution exists.
M.A.S. , 246 S.W.3d at 184. By its terms, the statute requires a certain factual
showing before the mandatory duty to transfer is triggered. Id.
Here, there is no dispute that Mother and Father are the biological par-
ents of the Child. However, other than her bare, self-serving assertions,
Mother provided no evidence to Respondent that an informal marriage sub- Page 14 of 26
ject to dissolution exists between herself and Father. 4 Without sufficient
grounds to justify a transfer, Respondent did not abuse his discretion in deny-
ing Mother’s request. See Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(g); see Powell , 79
S.W.3d at 816. Accordingly, this Court should deny Mother mandamus relief.
b. Transferring the SAPCR from Hunt County to Jeffer- son County would not be in the Child’s best interest.
The policy reason behind uniting a SAPCR and divorce proceeding is
to promote judicial economy and prevent re-litigation of previously litigated
issues. Fite v. Nelson , 869 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1994, no writ) (addressing former Tex. Fam. Code § 11.06(c) 5 , subse-
quently recodified as Tex. Fam. Code § 155.201(a)). The legislative scheme
of the Texas Family Code’s treatment of continuing jurisdiction and parent-
child matters creates a system that avoids forum shopping, races to the court-
house, child snatching, and the harassment of conservators by another con-
4 Although Mother was asked via subpoena duces tecum to appear and produce documents to
support her claim of marriage (i.e., marriage license, declarations and registrations of informal
marriages, and diaries, notes, etc.), Mother failed to appear or produce any requested documenta-
tion. RPI.App.6 ; 2RR:13–14 ; 6RR:3-4.
5 Former Texas Family Code Section 11.06(c) provided:
On a showing that a suit for dissolution of the marriage of the child’s parents has been
filed in another court, the court having continuing jurisdiction of a suit affecting the par-
ent-child relationship shall transfer the proceedings to the court where the dissolution of
the marriage is pending.
Tex. Fam. Code § 11.06(c) (Repealed by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 2, eff. April 20,
1995). Page 15 of 26
servator filing suits in random courts.
Trader v. Dear , 565 S.W.2d 233, 235
(Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding). “The best interest of the child shall always be
the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conserva-
torship and possession of and access to the child.” Tex. Fam. Code § 153.002
(emphasis added). “[I]n general, the county of the child’s residence is in the
best position to determine the ‘best interests’ of the child.” In re Cooper , 320
S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, orig. proceeding).
Here, unlike in typical divorce suits, Mother and Father do not have
primary possession of the Child and neither of them reside with the Child.
OA.1 ; RPI.App.5 . In fact, they only have limited, supervised access to the
Child in Hunt County. RPI.App.5:2–3 . Mother did not claim an informal
marriage to Father until almost five months after she filed her SAPCR—
notably two months after temporary orders were issued limiting her to super-
vised visitation with the Child. OA.2, 12 ; RPI.App.5:2–3 .
While in typical situations, uniting a divorce and SAPCR would be in a
child’s best interest, here, the opposite is true. At the time Mother filed her
SAPCR, the Child had already lived with Aunt and Uncle in Hunt County for
over a year and has now resided with Aunt and Uncle for over five years.
RPI.App.1:5–8 ; OA.2 . Aunt and Uncle have established their ability to pro- Page 16 of 26
vide the Child with a stable and loving home and to provide for the emotional
and physical needs of the Child. RPI.App.1:5–8 . Mother, on the other hand,
after kidnapping the Child, has been ordered to only see the Child under su-
pervised conditions in Hunt County. RPI.App.1:5–8 ; RPI.App.5:2–3 . All
the evidence and witnesses most relevant to a conservatorship determination
for the Child are located in Hunt County. See Cooper , 320 S.W.3d at 911.
Contrarily, the Child has no ties to Jefferson County other than Mother’s di-
vorce proceeding involving an alleged informal marriage. 6 See OA.12 . Moth-
er has presented no evidence that hearing the SAPCR in Jefferson County
would be in the Child’s best interest. Therefore, because the Child has lived
with Aunt and Uncle in Hunt County since August 12, 2010, Hunt County is
in the best position to determine the best interests of the Child. See Cooper ,
320 S.W.3d at 911; RPI.App.1:5–8 .
6 Mother also appears to have limited ties to Jefferson County. On May 12, 2011, Father filed a
petition for bill of review, in which he alleged Mother lived in Hunt County, where she had been
exercising her supervised visitation with the Child. OA.6:1 . Less than 90 days later, on August 2,
2011, Mother filed in Jefferson County her petition for dissolution of an alleged informal mar-
riage claiming to have been a resident of that county for at least 90 days. OA.12 . Page 17 of 26
c. Mandatory transfer provisions of the Family Code were not meant as a tool to manipulate venue and to play courts off one against the other through the use of a pe- tition for divorce.
The mandatory transfer provisions of the Texas Family Code should
not be used to manipulate venue to begin a SAPCR anew in an effort to avoid
an undesirable final order. In re R.E.A. , No. 13–10–00557–CV, 2011 WL
3557427, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.);
M.A.S. , 246 S.W.3d at 184; Garza v. Texas Dept. of Human Services , 757
S.W.2d 44, 45 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
In Garza , the State sought to terminate the mother’s parental rights to
four of her five children. 757 S.W.2d at 45. During a hearing, both the mother
and her husband admitted that they were not actively seeking a divorce. Id. at
47. However, after the case had been pending for more than two-and-a-half
years, within minutes of the trial beginning, the mother filed a petition for di-
vorce in a different county. Id. The appellate court stated that the sole effect
of the newly-filed divorce petition was to delay adjudication of the termina-
tion proceeding. Id. The court held that this manipulation could not have been
the intent of the drafters of the Texas Family Code. Id. “To accept [the moth-
er’s] argument under these facts…would be to acquiesce in gross abuse of the Page 18 of 26
judicial system, with incessant delay in a necessary by-product, and to invite
forum-shopping by means of manipulative delays.” Id. at 48.
In M.A.S. , the mother gave a third party custody of the child shortly af-
ter the child’s birth. 246 S.W.3d at 182. The child’s father was not a party to
that suit, which was in Bexar County. Id. at 183. About six months later, the
father filed a SAPCR in Reeves County seeking custody of the child. Id. The
father also filed in Bexar County a motion to transfer continuing exclusive
jurisdiction from Bexar County to Reeves County, but he did not allege that
he and the mother were married. Id. Three days before trial in Bexar County,
the father filed a petition for divorce in Reeves County. Id. The father noti-
fied the Bexar County trial court of the pending divorce, but the Bexar Coun-
ty court declined to transfer the case. Id.
The trial court concluded that the divorce petition was “a sham to
wrongfully divest [the Bexar County] court of jurisdiction,” and evidence
supported that conclusion.
Id. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
refusal to transfer the case, and noted that “mandatory transfer provisions of
the Family Code were not meant as a tool to manipulate venue and to play
courts off one against the other through the use of a petition for divorce.” Id.
(internal quotes omitted). Page 19 of 26
In
R.E.A. , the father filed a SAPCR seeking to modify a prior custody
order. 2011 WL 3557427, at *1. Two days before trial, after the suit had been
pending for about two years, and despite the fact that the mother and the fa-
ther had not cohabitated in at least three years, the mother filed for divorce in
another county alleging an informal marriage to the father. Id. The appellate
court, relying on M.A.S. , held that the trial court was justified in finding that
the divorce was only filed to manipulate the Family Code’s mandatory trans-
fer provisions and properly denied the mother’s request to transfer the case to
a different county. Id. at *3.
Mother argues that the “manipulation findings” in M.A.S. and R.E.A.
were based solely on timing issues. Pet.:37–38. Mother reads these cases too
narrowly.
In both M.A.S. and R.E.A. , the facts before the court indicated that a
transfer was being sought to avoid a final order from one court and to instead
begin the proceedings anew in a different county.
M.A.S. , 246 S.W.3d at 184;
R.E.A. , 2011 WL 3557427, at *3. Similarly, here, Mother did not allege an
informal marriage or seek to transfer the proceedings until after the tempo-
rary orders were signed restricting her to limited visitation with the Child su-
pervised by an off-duty Hunt County police officer. OA.12 ; RPI.App.5:2–3 . Page 20 of 26
Sufficient evidence supported Respondent’s conclusion that Mother’s motion
to transfer was a form of gamesmanship and was filed with the intent to ma-
nipulate the Family Code’s mandatory transfer provisions. Here, Mother:
• kidnapped the child in disregard of the trial court’s possession
order, OA.1 ; RPI.App.1 ;
• relocated to Jefferson County less than 90 days before filing her
suit for dissolution of her alleged informal marriage, see OA.6:1 ;
OA.12 ;
• failed to identify the Hunt County conservatorship orders in her Jefferson County petition for dissolution of her alleged informal marriage, OA.12;
• failed to respond at all to Aunt and Uncle’s discovery requests for
well over a year; 2RR:13 ; 1RREx:2–19:REx2–3 ; and • failed to serve Aunt and Uncle until May 27, 2015, almost four years after filing for suit for dissolution of her alleged informal marriage (August 2, 2011) and after filing her motion for transfer (August 15, 2011). RPI.App.7 . Page 21 of 26
Thus, Respondent did not abuse his discretion in denying Mother’s mo-
tion to transfer. Accordingly, this Court should deny Mother’s mandamus re-
lief.
d. Here, conservatorship of the Child is not an integral part of Mother and Father’s alleged informal marital relationship.
Relying on In re Marriage of Allen , Mother argues that it is undesirable
to permit “different courts to control the various segments of the marital rela-
tionship …” Pet.24 (quoting Allen , 593 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Amarillo 1979, no writ) (emphasis added). However, as discussed above,
Mother and Father—the parties to the divorce involving an alleged informal
marriage—did not have managing conservatorship of the Child, so the con-
servatorship of the Child was not necessarily an integral segment of their al-
leged informal marital relationship. OA.1 .
2. Mother failed to diligently seek a hearing on her motion to
transfer.
Mother argues that actions outside her control prevented her ability to
have a hearing on her motion to transfer. Pet.:31–32. However, multiple hear-
ings were set on her motion to transfer, and she failed to insist that her mo-
tion be heard during the almost four years that her dissolution of the alleged Page 22 of 26
informal marriage and her motion to transfer were pending. Mother never
challenged the trial court’s order that there would be no hearing on her mo-
tion to transfer until after Father complied with the discovery order. See
OA.36 . To the contrary, rather than challenge that order or properly serve
Aunt and Uncle with her petition to dissolve her alleged informal marriage,
Mother sought affirmative action from Respondent and his predecessor. See
OA.41, 43 . Mother requested mediation and a final hearing without reassert-
ing a request for a hearing on her motion to transfer or pursuing her Jefferson
County dissolution proceeding. See OA.41, 43 . Not until the month of final
trial did Mother finally set her motion to transfer for two days before the final
hearing having yet to serve Aunt and Uncle with her Jefferson County disso-
lution proceeding. OA.43, 46 . Thus, Mother’s arguments that Respondent did
not timely hear her motion are disingenuous.
Mother argues that because Texas Family Code Section 155.204(a)
permits a request for a request for a transfer “at any time,” a party cannot
waive the right to transfer. Pet.:29–30. Mother appears to contend that she
could fully participate in the proceedings and then be entitled to transfer the
day before final trial despite her apparent prior intentions to fully litigate the
suit in the initial court. Pet:30. However, as discussed above, the mandatory Page 23 of 26
transfer provisions of the Family Code should not be used to manipulate the
court’s authority in this manner. R.E.A. , 2011 WL 3557427, at *1; M.A.S. ,
246 S.W.3d at 184; Garza , 757 S.W.2d at 45.
Mother also argues that the trial court improperly imposed a condition
precedent on her hearing on her motion to transfer venue by requiring Father
to first comply with the court’s discovery order. Pet.:31. However, Mother
has not challenged the discovery order, which was signed more than two
years before she sought mandamus relief. See OA.36 . Mother also ignores
the relevance of the sought discovery to her motion to transfer. 2RR:13 ;
OA.27:Ex.A; RPI.App.6 ; 6RR:3-4.
Thus, because Mother failed to diligently seek a hearing on her motion
to transfer and instead sought to manipulate venue and to play courts off one
against the other through the use of a petition for divorce, Respondent did not
abuse his discretion in denying Mother’s motion to transfer. Accordingly, this
Court should deny Mother mandamus relief.
PRAYER
W HEREFORE , PREMISES CONSIDERED , for all the foregoing reasons al-
leged and briefed herein, Real Parties in Interest Jennifer Nowell and John
Nowell pray that this Court deny Tara Brook Tyndell’s Petition for Writ of Page 24 of 26
Mandamus. Real Parties in Interest Jennifer Nowell and John Nowell further
request this Court grant them such other relief, both general and special, at
law or in equity, to which they may show themselves to be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted, G EORGANNA L. S IMPSON , P.C.
1349 Empire Central Drive Woodview Tower, Ste. 600 Dallas, Texas 75247 Phone: 214-905-3739 • Fax: 214-905-3799 georganna@glsimpsonpc.com /s/ Georganna L. Simpson G EORGANNA L. S IMPSON Texas Bar Number 18400965 Attorney for Real Parties in Interest, Jennifer and John Nowell C ERTIFICATION OF F ACTS AND V ERIFICATION OF R ECORD Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(j), I certify that I
have thoroughly reviewed the Court’s file in this matter. I have personal
knowledge of the facts stated herein and such matters are true and correct.
Additionally, I have personal knowledge that the items in the appendix and
record are true and correct copies of documents material to Real Parties in In-
terest’s claims and are either pleadings that are on file in the underlying suit,
hearing transcripts and exhibits, or orders signed by the trial court in the un-
derlying suit in this cause No. 76,122 in the 196th Judicial District Court of
Hunt County, Texas.
/s/ Georganna L. Simpson Georganna L. Simpson Page 25 of 26 *36 C ERTIFICATE OF C OUNSEL R EGARDING W ORD C OUNT Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, I certify that the word
count in this Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus, excluding the cap-
tion and introductory matters, signature, proof of service, certification, certif-
icate of compliance, and appendix, totals 5,249 words .
/s/ Georganna L. Simpson Georganna L. Simpson C ERTIFICATE OF S ERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of Real Parties in Interest
Jennifer Nowell and John Nowell Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus
has been served as follows:
Hon. J. Andrew Bench Via E-Service
196th Judicial District Court jdeary@huntcounty.net
P.O. Box 1097
Greenville, Texas 75401-1097
Respondent
E. Alan Bennett Via E-Service
Sheehy, Lovelace & Mayfield, P.C. abennett@slmpc.com
510 N. Valley Mills Dr., Ste. 500
Waco, TX 75710
Relator Tara Brook Tyndell’s Attorney
/s/ Georganna L. Simpson Georganna L. Simpson Page 26 of 26 *37 R EAL P ARTIES IN I NTEREST J OHN AND J ENNIFER N OWELL ’ S A PPENDIX In support of this Petition, Real Parties in Interest submit this
Appendix, in compliance with Rule 53.3(j) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure:
Tab 1: Motion for Enforcement of Possession or Access with
Temporary Restraining Order and Extraordinary Relief (03/28/11)
Tab 2: Request for Warrant to Take Physical Custody of Child
(03/29/11)
Tab 3: Order for Issuance of Warrant to Take Physical Custody of
Child (03/29/11)
Tab 4: Motion to Deny Relief in Suit to Modify Parent-Child
Relationship, Motion to Dismiss, and in the Alternative, Motion to Abate Proceedings (06/01/11) Tab 5: Bridge Temporary Orders (06/02/11)
Tab 6: Subpoena Duces Tecum to Mother (02/10/12)
Tab 7: Citation serving Mother’s Original Petition for Divorce on
Aunt and Uncle (05/27/15)
A PPENDIX *38 NO. 76,122
IN THE INTEREST OF §
§
K T W § -,
§
A CHILD § HUNn::OUNTY, TE~
MOTION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF POSSESSION OR ACCESS WITH TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF Parties
This Motion for Enforcement of Possession or Access is brought by JENNIFER NOWELL and
JOHN NOWELL, Movant, Joint Managing Conservators of
The last three numbers of JENNIFER NOWELL's driver's license number are The last
three numbers of JENNIFER NOWELL's Social Security number are The last three
numbers of JOHN NOWELL's driver's license number are The last three numbers of
JOHN NOWELL's Social Security number are Discovery in this case is intended to be conducted under level 2 of rule 190 of the
I.
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Movants are joint managing conservators. The child the subject of this suit is:
3.
Name:
Sex: Male
Birth date:
4. This Court has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this case as a result of prior
proceedings. Page 1 of 4
Motion for Enforcement of Possession and Access and Order to Appear
Service
5. The parties entitled to notice are as follows:
a. Respondent, T AHA BROOK TYNDELL, who is a possessory conservator.
Process should be served.
Prior Order
6. On November 30, 2010 this COlU1 signed Agreed Order in Suit Affecting the
Parent-Child Relationship tllat states in relevant part as follows:
a. "Possession and Access
1. Possession Order Possession and access by the possessory conservator shall be as agreed between the parties. "
Movants were the Petitioners and Respondent was the respondent in the prior proceedings.
Contempt
7. Respondent has failed to comply with the order described above as follows:
Respondent kidnapped the child on March 28, 2011 at 1:11 p.m. from the McDonald's located in Greenville, Hunt COlUlty, Texas as detailed in the Aftidavit's of Jennifer Nowell and John Nowell attached as Exhibits "1" and "2." 8. Movants request that Respondent be held in contempt, jailed, and fined for each
violation alleged above.
9. Movants believe, based on the conduct of Respondent, that Respondent will
continue to fail to comply with the order. Movants request that Respondent be held in contempt,
jailed, and fined for each failure to comply with the order of the Court from the datc of this filing
to the date of the hearing on this motion.
10. Movants request that Respondent be confined in the county jail for eighteen
months or until Respondent complies with the order of the Court. Page 2 of4
Molion for Enforcement of Possession and ACCess and Order to Appear *40 II. Movants request that Respondent be placed on conununity supervision for ten
years on release from jailor suspension of connnitment.
12. On two or more occasions, Respondent has failed to comply with the order of the
Court by failing to slllTender the child to JENNIFER NOWELL and JOHN NOWELL as ordered.
Movants request that the Court order a bond or security for compliance with the Court's order
granting possession of or access to the child.
13. Movants request that tile Court order additional periods of possession for Movants
to compensate for those periods denied by Respondent.
14. Movants request that, if the Court finds iliat any part of ilie order sought to be
enforced is not specific enough to be enforced by contempt, the Court enter a clarifYing order
more clearly specifYing the duties imposed on Respondent and giving Respondent a reasonable
time wiiliin which to comply.
Request for Extraordinary Relief
As the basis for the extraordinary relief requested below, Petitioners would show that prior to the
filing of this action that Respondent has engaged in the conduct set forth in the Affidavits
attached to this pleading. Based upon the Affidavit's attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference as through fully set forth, Petitioners request the Court to grant the following relief:
a. Issue an ORDER attaching the body of ilie child
and ORDERING that such child be delivered to Petitioners pending hearing ofthe lvIotion for Enforcement in this cause; and
b. Issue an ORDER excluding Respondent from possession of or access to the child, pending hearing of the Motion for Enforcement in this cause.
Attorney's Fees
15. It was necessary to secure the services of Shannon M. Estrada, a licensed attorney,
to enforce and protect the rights of JENNIFER NOWELL and JOHN NOWELL and the child the
subject of iliis suit. Respondent should be ordered to pay reasonable attorney's fees, expenses,
and costs, and a judgment should be rendered in favor of ilie attorney and against Respondent
and be ordered paid directly to the undersigned attorney, who may enforce the judgment in the
attorney's OVl'I1 name. Enforcement of tile order is necessary to ensure the child's physical or
emotional health or welfare. The attorney's fees and costs should be enforced by any means
available for ilie enforcement of child support including contempt but not including income
withholding. Movants request post judgment interest as allowed by law.
Motion for Enforcement of Possession and Access and Order to Appear Page 3 of4
Movants pray that Respondent be held in contempt and punished as requested, that the Court
order community supervision, that the Court order a bond or security, that the Court clarify any
part of its prior order found not to be specific enough to be enforced by contempt, for attomey's
fees, expenses, costs, and interest, anet for all further relief authorized by law.
Respectfully submitted, LAW OFFICE OF SHANNON M. ESTRADA 2507 Washington Street P.O. Box 765
Greenville, Texas 75401 Tel: I 903.455.1876
Fax: 903.455.1710 Shannon M. Estrada State Bar No. 24027370 Attomey for Movants Motion for Enforcement of Possession and Access and Order to Appear Page 4 of 4
*42 NO. 76,122
IN THE INTEREST O:F § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§ §
K T W 196TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
A CHILD § HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS
AFFIDAVIT OF JENNIFER NOWELL JENNIFER NOWELL appeared in person before me today and stated under oath: "My name is JENNIFER NOWELL. I am above the age of eighteen years, and I am fully
competent to make this affidavit. The facts stated in this affidavit are within my personal
knowledge and are true and correct.
I am the Co-Petitioner in this case and a joint managing conservator or with my husband, John Nowell. is my nephew. On November 30, 2010, an Agreed Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship was entered with
this Court wherein my husband, John, and I were named joint managing conservators of
the and his biological mother Tara Brook Tyndell was named as possessory
conservator. Ms. Tyndell has the right to possession and access to as at the
discretion of me and my husband for all times as agreed between the parties.
John and I have had physical possession of age 2, since August 12, 2010. The
Agreed Order entered in November was in best interest providing him a stable,
safe and loving home.
At approximately 1: 11 p.m., Tara Tyndall and her boyfriend, Eddie Augusting, came to
the McDonald's in Greenville, Texas as we had scheduled a visitation for Tara and
from Ip.m.-2 p.m. Shortly after their arrival, the sirel1'alarm sounded in the play-area.
Eddie had exited the emergency door. I then saw Tara running out of the other door with
She then jumped into the passenger seat with and Eddie drove off. We called 911 at 1: 12 p.m., gave the vehicle description and license plate number to the
dispatcher (green Chrysler minivan, (TX), and they were heading East on 1-30.
It took the police 30 minutes to get to the McDonalds. I provided the officer with Tara's
mobile phone numbers, residence in Port Neches, Texas and the officer reviewed the
conservatorship Order. The officer said he will issue a broadcast for this region and the
Beaumont region, but will need a Court Order to obtain physical custody of the child.
Tara did not have permission to remove from McDonalds or from our possession.
Further affiant sayeth not."
IFE NOWELL M()Jch ~g, ~o(1
SIGNED lmder oath before me on I
JAMIE THOMAS
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES March 27, 2012 *44 NO. 76,122 §
IN THE INTEREST OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT § 196TH .nTDICIAL DISTRICT
K T W §
§
A CHILD § HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN NOWELL JOHN NOWELL appeared in person before me today and stated tmder oath: "My name is JOHN NOWELL. I anl above the age of eighteen years, and I am fully
competent to make this affidavit. The facts stated in this affidavit are within my personal
knowledge and are true and correct.
I am the Co-Petitioner in this case and a joint managing conservator or Titus
Williamson with my wife, Jennifer NowelL is my nephew. On November 30,
2010, an Agreed Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship was entered with
this Court wherein my wife, Jellllifer, and I were named joint managing conservators of
the and his biological mother Tara Brook Tyndell was named as possessory
conservator. Ms. Tyndell has the right to possession and access to as at the
discretion of me and my wife for all times as agreed between the parties.
Jennifer and I have had physical possession of age 2, since August 12,2010. The
Agreed Order entered in November was in best interest providing him a stable,
safe and loving home.
At approximately 1:11 p.m., Tara Tyndall and her boyfriend, Eddie Augusting, came to
the McDonald's in Greenville, Texas as we had scheduled a visitation for Tara and
from lp.m.-2 p.m. Shortly after their arrival, the sirenlalanll sounded in the play-area.
Eddie had exited the emergency door. I then saw Tara rumling out of the other door with
She then jumped into the passenger seat with and Eddie drove off. I called 911 at 1: 12 p.m., gave the vehicle description and license plate number to the dispatcher
(green Chrysler minivan, (TX), and they were heading East on 1-30.
It took the police 30 minutes to get to the McDonalds. Jelmifer provided the officer with
Tara's mobile phone numbers, residence in Port Neches, Texas and the officer reviewed
the conservatorship Order. The officer saidhe will issue a broadcast for this region and
the Beaumont region, but will need a Court Order to obtain physical custody of the child.
Tara did not have permission to remove from McDonalds or from our possession.
Further affiant sayeth not"
SIGNED under oath before me on !l114:.rc.h ~ K,d O / 1
Public, State of Texas JAMIE THOMAS MY COMMISSION EXPIRES March 27. 2012 *46 /
NO. 76,122
IN THE INTEREST OF §
§
K T W §
§ §
A CHILD REOUEST FOR WARRANT TO TAKE PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF CHILD
I. Petitioners, JENNIFER NOWELL and JOHN NOWELL, request a warrant to
take physical custody of On March 28, 2011, Petitioners filed
Motion for Enforcement of Possession and Access with Temporary Restraining Order and
Extraordinary Relief in this Court.
2. The child currently is in the possession of Respondent, TARA BROOK
TYNDELL. The present physical address of Respondent is unknown. Respondent should be
served wherever found. The child's present physical address is unknown. An Agreed Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship was entered in
3.
the 196 th District Court on November 30, 2010.
4. The Order for which enforcement is sought has not been vacated, stayed, or
modified by a court whose decision must be enforced under chapter 152 of the Texas Family
Code.
5. The Court should issue a warrant to take physical custody of
because:
a. was abducted by TARA TYNDELL, his
biological mother, at approximately 1:10 p.m. on March 28, 2011 at the McDonald's located in Greenville, Texas where he was scheduled for a I-hour of supervised visitation. TARA TYNDELL and her boyfriend, Eddie Augusting, fled McDonald's in his vehicle. Petitioner's called 911 and Greenville Police Department responded to the scene. Petitioners are joint managing conservators of the child. Respondent is a possessory conservator with the right to possession of the child as agreed by the joint managing conservators. The Petitioners did not consent for the child to be removed from their possession. Respondent also has a history of drug abuse.
6. Based on these facts, Petitioners believe that the child is imminently likely to
suffer serious physical harm and to be removed from Texas.
7. Petitioners ask the Court to direct law enforcement officers to take physical
custody of the child immediately. Petitioner further asks the Court to authorize law enforcement
officials to enter private property to take physical custody of the child because a less intrusive
remedy would not be effective. Petitioner further asks the Court to authorize law enforcement
officials to make a forcible entry at any hour.
8. Petitioners ask the Court to provide for the placement of the child with Petitioners
pending final relief. Petitioners further ask the Court to impose any necessary conditions on the
placement of the child to ensure the appearance of the child.
9. It was necessary to secure the services of Shannon M. Estrada, a licensed attorney,
to protect the lights of JENNIFER NOWELL and JOHN NOWELL and the child the subject of
this suit. Respondent should be ordered to pay reasonable attorney's fees and expenses, and a
judgment should be rendered in favor of the attorney and against Respondent and be ordered paid
directly to the undersigned attorney, who may enforce the judgment in the attorney's own name.
Respondent should be ordered to pay all other costs of this proceeding.
Petitioners pray that the Court grant this Request for Warrant to Take Physical Custody of Child,
for attorney's fees, expenses, and costs, and for all further relief authorized by law.
Respectfully submitted, LAW OFFICE OF SHANNON M. ESTRADA 2507 Washington Street P.O. Box 765
Greenville, Texas 75401 Tel: I 903.455.1876 Fax: 903.455.1710 BY:-:--1L~z-;--=.:.;;l---,--L-=-- Shannon M. Estrada State Bar No. 24027370 Attorney for Petitioners *48 !
Verification
The undersigned states under oath: "I have personal knowledge of the facts and
allegations stated in paragraph 5.a., and they are true and correct."
~ JAMIElliOMAS !- MY COMMISSION EXPIRES Ma!t:h 27, 2012
*49 NO. 76,122
IN T HE I N T E R E ST OF § IN T HE D I S T R I CT C O U RT
§
K T W § 196TH J U D I C I AL D I S T R I CT
§
A C H I LD § H U NT C O U N T Y, T E X AS
O R D ER F OR I S S U A N CE OF W A R R A NT TO T A KE P H Y S I C AL C U S T O DY OF C H I LD On March 29, 2011. Petitioners, JENNIFER N O W E LL and JOHN N O W E L L. presented to this Court a verified request for a warrant to take physical custody of
, a child.
On the basis of the sworn statement in the petition and of the testimony ofPetitioner and
of the evidence and argument of counsel, the Court finds it necessary and proper to issue a
warrant to take physical custody of immediately. The Court
finds the following facts form a justifiable basis on which this Court has concluded a likelihood
of imminent serious physical harm of or of
S removal from Texas: was abducted by TARA TYNDELL, his biological mother, at approximately 1:10 p.m. on March 28 : 2011 at the
McDonald's located in Greenville, Texas where he was scheduled for a 1-hour of supervised
visitation. TARA T Y N D E LL and her boyfriend, Eddie Augusting, fled McDonald's in his
vehicle. Petitioner's called 911 and Greenville Police Department responded to the scene.
Petitioners are joint managing conservators o f t he child. Respondent is a possessory conservator
with the right to possession of the child as agreed by the joint managing conservators. The
Petitioners did not consent for the child to be removed from their possession. Respondent also
has a history of drug abuse.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that a Warrant to Take Physical Custody of Child
immediately be issued commanding any law enforcement officer within Texas to take physical
custody immediately of , a child, and to place the child safely into
the possession of JENNIFER N O W E LL and JOHN N O W E LL at 9 Timberside Drive,
Greenville, Texas, pending final relief.
The person with whom the child is placed is ORDERED to produce the child and
Respondent, T A RA BROOK T Y N D E L L, is ORDERED to appear before this Court in its
courtroom at 2507 Lee Street, Greenville, Hunt County, Texas on the next judicial day after this
warrant is executed, at which time and place a hearing shall be held to determine the right to
possession of the child.
Order for Issuance of Warrant to Take Physical Custody of Child Page 1 of 2
Based on the testimony heard by the Court that a less intrusive remedy would not be
effective. IT IS ORDERED that law enforcement officers executing this warrant may enter
private property to take physical custody of the child.
Due to the exigent circumstances of this case. IT IS ORDERED that law enforcement officers mav make a forcible entry at any hour in order to execute litis warrant.
SIGNED on 2 -f ^ //
J U D GE P R E S I D I NG Order for Issuance of Warrant to Take Physical Custody of Child Page 2 of 2
NO. 76.122
", IN THE DISTRICT CO;tJRT '/ - IN THE INTEREST OF § . , § < : : • K T W 196TH JUDICIALDISTRICr § ~ f " §
ACIDLD §
MOTION TO DENY RELIEF IN SUIT TO MODIFY PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP, MOTION TO DISMISS, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MOTION TO ABATE PROCEEDINGS This Motion to Deny Reliefin Suit to ModifY Parent-Child Relationship, Motion to Dismiss
and In the Alternative, Motion to Abate Proceedings is brought by JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL
and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL, Movants and Respondents to a Motion to ModifY initially filed by
Tara Brook Tyndell.
JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL show in support:
1. The suit to modifY was filed to modifY the designation of the person having the
exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child and was filed within one (1) year after
the date of the rendition and entry of the order to be modified. The order which Tara Brook Tyndell
seeks to modify was rendered on November 30, 2010, Therefore, absent a sworn affidavit
establishing sufficient facts to satisfy Tara Brook Tyndell's statutory requirements pursuant to the
Texas Family Code, Tara Brook Tyndell's suit to modifY must be dismissed, or in the alternative
abated until November 10,2011 or until such time as Tara Brook Tyndell has filed sworn pleadings
sufficient to meet Tara Brook Tyndell's statutory requirements.
2, The petition does not contain any attachments or affidavits to provide the Court with
adequate facts to support (a) an allegation that the child's present environment may endanger his
physical health or significantly impair his emotional development; (b) the allegations that the person
who has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child is seeking the
modification or consents to the modification and that the modification is in the best interest of the
child; or © the allegations that the person who has the exclusive right to designate the primary
residence of the child has voluntarily relinquished the primary care and possession ofthe child to
another person for at least six months and that the modification is in the best interest of the child, JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL request that the
3.
Court deny Petitioner's request to modifY the designation of the person having the exclusive right
to designate the primary residence of the child sought in the Petition to ModifY Parent-Child
Relationship and refuse to schedule a hearing on that issue. JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and
MOTION TO DENY RELIEF, DISMISS, ABATE 1
JOHN AUBRY NOWELL request attorney's fees, expenses, and costs.
4. JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL andJOHN AUBRY NOWELL would also show
this Court that Section 156.102, Texas Family Code provides that if Tara Brook Tyndell intends to
prosecute her suit before November 10, 2011, then Tara Brook Tyndell must attach an affidavit
setting forth at least one of the above-enumerated factors in paragraph 2 above. A copy of Section
156.102, Texas Family Code is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein the same as
if set forth verbatim.
5. JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL would further
show that Tara Brook Tyndell has failed to satisfy her statutory requirements to pursue a Motion to
Modify within one year from November 30, 20 10. Therefore, this Court is without authority to grant
any Temporary Orders in favor of Tara Brook l'yndell. Pleading in the alternative and without
waiving the foregoing, JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL would
show that Tara Brook Tyndell has further failed to set forth any factors whatsoever in her suit to
modify sufficient to meet her statutory burden of proof to change the designation of the persons who
have the right to establish the primary domicile of the child from JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL
and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL to Tara Brook Tyndell as required by Section 156.006, Texas
Family Code, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein the same
as if set forth verbatim.
6. JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL would show that
Tara Brook Tyndell' s motion to modi fy is a frivolously filed suit for modification in that Tara Brook
Tyndell knew or should have known that filing her suit to modify in an untimely marmer and against
the statutory requirements of the Texas Family Code is the very type of lawsuit which the law
abhors. JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL seek sanctions against
Tara Brook Tyndell pursuant to Section 156.005, Texas Family Code, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit "C".
JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL pray the Courtgrantthis
motion.
JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL pray for their attorneys'
fees and court costs.
Respectfully submitted,
The Law Office of Morgan & Gotcher By:"f~~ MOTION TO DENY RELIEF, DISMISS, ABATE 2
Holly H. Gotcher, P.e.
State Bar No. 08738100 2610 Stonewall Street Greenville, Texas 75403-0556 Tel: (903) 455-3183 Fax: (903) 454·4654 ATTORNEY FOR MOV ANTS The above motion is set for hearing on June 2, 2011 aiJr.o'(j a.m. in the 196 th Judicial District Notice of Hearing [1] IO:{tJWI .HI II ,
Court, 2507 Lee Street, Hunt County Courthouse, Greenville, Texas 75401.
SIGNED on June 1, 2011.
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY STEPHEN R. TImE. JR. JUDGE Judge or Clerk
Certificate of Service
I certify that a true copy of the above was served on each attorney of record or party in
accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on June 1,2011.
-.::::--- ... ~~D-o~
HollYRGOtcllei,P.C.
Attorney for JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL MOTION TO DENY RELIEF, DISMISS, ABATE 3
Exhibit "A"
FAMILY CODE-TITLES CHAPTER f 56. MODIFICATION §§156.101 - 156.102 *----------------- home environment supply ground for redesignating o pet.) (re History ofFam, Code § 156,102: Acts 1995, 74th Leg_, ch. 20, § 1, eff. Apr, 20, 1995.Arnended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., th. 1289, §6, eff. SepL t, 2001; Acts 2003, managing conservators, [~I Similarly, a course of con tl v. Camp 78th Leg" th. 1036, §20, eft Sept 1.2003; Acts 2009, 81 ~t Leg., ch. 1113, §29 (efr. duct pursued by the manager which hampers the Sept. 1,2009), ch. 727, §4 (err. Sept. 1,2009). Source: Fonner Pam, Code iIIo 1972, no ;14,08('), (,), ward's opportunities to favorably associate with the See also O'ConntJr':; Texas Family Lo.w ll(1ftd~ook (2010), "Affidavit other parent may also suffice." supporting modification of primary conservalor within one year," th. 8-A, 'ex.App,-EI §4.S.2, p. 841. ,t relocation, FAM §156,10;2., MODIFICATION OF ANNOTATIONS ,lish a mate EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO DETERMINE In re C.S" 264 S'w,3d 864, 870 (Tex.App.-Waco es, Bulif the PRIMARY RESIDENCE OF CHILD 2008, no pet.), " [Wle hold that a party is not entitled to Ice, a finding WITHIN ONE YEAR OF ORDER 21 days' notice to respond to a dismissal motion under riate. Such a (a) If a suit seeking to modify the designation of the §156.\o2(c). At 872: [B]ecause of the unique provi we can glean person having the exclusive right to designate Ihe pri sions of §156.l02(c), we hold that the rule regarding ,h the court mary residence of a child is filed not later than one year special exceptions does not apply. [~] This statute per he quality of after the earlier of the date of the rendition of the order mits a denial of relief (or dismissal) without any ad-. al parent and or the date of the signing of a mediated or collaborative vance notice to the litigants, solely from the trial court's Iild's contacts law settlement agreement on which the order is based, review of the pleadings," , and de facto; the person filing the suit shall execute and attach an af non-custodial In re A,S,M" 172 S.W,3d 710, 716 (Tex.App.-Fort fidavit as provided by Subsection (b). s t r '''e chil Worth 2005, no pet.). "[Wle hold that a suit seeking to (b) The affidavit must contain, along with support 'r and eliminate or modify the terms of a geographical restric Ql ing facts, at least one of the following allegations; he ., :eusto tion on a person having the exclusive right to deter (1) that the child's present environment may en mine a child's primary residence is a 'suit seeking to ne motive for danger the child's physical health or significantly im· reserving the modify the deSignation of the person having the exclu pair the child's emotional development; ,arent and the sive right to deSignate the primary residence of a child'
gements; and for purposes of §156J02(a), [~I Here, [because peti (2) that the person who has the exclusive right to ravel arrange tion was med within a year of the original order, designate the primary residence of the child is the per _ S.W.3d _ mother] was required to file a §156.102 affidavit when son seeking or consenting to the modification and the ~eding) (No, she filed her original and first amended petitions seek mOdification is in the best interest of the child; or lId not force ing to eliminate the geographical restriction," (3) that the person who has the exclusive right to ,d employment Eliason v. Eliason, 162 S'w.3d 883, 886 (Tex, designate the primary residence of the child has volun quirement for App,-Dallas 2005, no peL), "[Bly its clear and un tarily relinquished the primary care and possession of equivocal terms, the affidavit requirement found in the child for at least six months and the modification is § 156.102 is applicable only to suits seeking to modity ,.W.2d 252, 254 in the best interest of the child, the designation of a person with the exclusive right to ough now crea (c) The court shall deny the relief sought and determine the primary residence of a child, [T]he affi ssed in [Fam. refuse to schedule a hearing for modification under davit requirement does not apply when at the time suit 6.103, 156.104, this section unless the court determines, on the basis is med no person possesses this exclusive right. The or by the legisla olthe affidavit, that facts adequate to support an allega der appellee sought to modify in this case stated that I a body of com tion listed in Subsection (b) are stated in the affidavit. both he and appellllOt had a joint right to establish , the)' recognize If the court determines that the facts stated are ad [child's I primary residence. Therefore, , .. appellee 'arrants modifi equate to support an allegation, the court shall set a was not seeking to modify a previously existing exclu may injuriOUSly time and place for the hearing. sive right to determine the child's residence. Because ient to require appellee was not seeking to modify an exclusive right to (d) Subsection (b)(3) does not apply to a person ther things, re determine [child's] residency, §156,102 does not apply .e child's mind Who has the exclusive right to designate the primary ,e, by a par- to appellee's counter-petition." reSidence of the child and who has temporarily relin
thl' )e main· quished the primary care and possession of the child to Mobley v. Mobley, 684 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tex.
g a stable home another person during the conservator's military de App,-Fort Worth 1985, writ dism'd), "It is obvious that *56 the intention of the t.egislature in putting § 14.08( d)
:his interest, ju ployment, military mobilization, or temporary military
s in the child'S duty, as those terms are defined by Section 153.701. [now §156.102(a)] in the Family Code was to assure
O'CONNOR'S FAMILY CODE 487 FAMILY CODE-TITLE
CHAPTER 1S6. MODIFICATION §§IS6.I02 - 156.1045 *--------- stability to the provision for custody of divorced parents (b) A person commits an offense if the person
and to prevent the custody award from being relitigated a suit to modify an order or portion of a decree
within a short period of time, except in cases involving on the grounds permitted under Subsection (a)
the children's physical health and emotional develop the person knows that the person against whOm ment. Therefore, §14.08(e) [now §156.l02(c)] reo motion is filed has not been convicted of an offense, quires that an initial determination be made by the received deferred adjudication for an offense, court as to whether. the facts sworn to in the affidavit Section 21.02, 21.11, 22.011, or 22.021, Penal Code. offense under this subsection is a Class B supporting the motion to modify justify a hearing. [~J To be entitled to have the motion set for a hearing in meanor.
the instant case, [mother) had to state adequate facts liistoryofFam. Code §IS6.104: Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1289, §8, eff.SepL 1,2001, Amended by Acts 2007. 80th Leg., th. 593, *3.29, eff. Sept }, 2007, to support the allegation that the child's physical health History of Former Fam.. Code §156.l04: Ads 1995, 74th Leg., th. 20, §l, eft, mo:y be endangered or his emotional development sig Apr. 20, 1995. Deleted by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch, 1289, §8, eft, Sept. 1,2001. Source: Former Fam. Code §§ 14.021(g), 14.08(c)(5). nificantly impaired. The facts alleged had to be suffi See also O'ConnoT~ kt"as Family l.Q.w Handbook (2010), ~ 'fYpes of rna. cient to show the possibility of harm rather than the ex terial & substantial changes," ch. B·A, §3.J.4(1)(c), p. 832, istence of harm." FAM §156.I045. MODIFICATION OF FAM § 1 56.1 03. INCREASED ORDER ON CONVICTION FOR EXPENSES BECAUSE FAMILY VIOLENCE OF CHANGE OF RESIDENCE (a) The conviction or an order deferring adjudica (a) If a change of residence results in increased tion of a person who is a possessory conservator or a expenses for a party having possession of or access to sole Or joint managing conservator for an offense in a child, the court may render appropriate orders to allo volving family violence is a material and substantial cate those increased expenses on a fair and equitable change of circumstances sufficient to justify a tempo basis, taking into account the cause of the increased rary order and modification of an existing court order expenses and the best interest of the child. or portion of a decree that provides for the appoint (b) The payment of increased expenses by the ment of a conservator or that sets the lerms and condi party whose residence is changed is rebuttably pre tions of conservatorship or for the possession of or sumed to be in the best interest of the child. access to a child to conform the order to the require C c) The court may render an order without regard ments of Section JS3.004(d). to whether another change in the lerms and conditions (b) A person commits an offense if the person. files for the possession of or access to the child is made. a suit to modify an order or portion of a decree based HistnryofFam. Code §156J03: Acts 2001, 77th Leg., tho 1289, §7, eff, Sept. 1,2001. on the grounds permitted under Subsection Ca) and History of Ponner Pam. C(lde §J56.103: Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. the person knows that the person against whom the Apr, 20, 1995. Deleted by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., th. 1289, §1, elf. Sept. 1,2001- motion is filed has not been convicted of an offense, or SOurce~ Former Fam. Code § 14.08(c)(4), received deferred adjudication for an offense, involving FAM §1S6.104. MODIFICATION OF ORDER ON CONVICTION FOR family violence. An offense under this subsection is a CHILD ABUSE; PENALTY Class B misdemeanor. (a) Except as provided by Section 156.1045, the History of Pam, Code §lS6.l64S: Acts 20(11, 77th Leg., ch. 1289, §9, eff. conviction of a conservator for an offense under Sec Sept 1,2001. tion 21.02, Penal Code, or Ihe conviction of a conserva ANNO'T'ATIONS tor or an order deferring adjudication with regard to the conservator, for an offense involving the ahuse of a In re R.ToH., 175 S.W.3d 519, 521-22 (TexApp. child under Section 21.11, 22.011, or 22.021, Penal Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). "[I Jf the trial court had Code, is a material and substantial change of circum named [father] as the parent with the exclusive right stances sufficient to justify a temporary order and to determine [child's J primary residence, evidence that [mother J was placed on deferred adjudication for [as modification of an existing court order or portion of a decree that provides for the appointment of a conserva saulting father) would be sufficient to support the tor or that sets the terms and conditions of conserva modification. But §156.1045 does not compel the trial torship or for the possession of or access to a child. court to modify an existing order in such a circum- [488] O'CONNOR'S FAMILY CODE
Exhibit "B" *58 ~AMILY CODE-7tl'l!'L.
CHAPTER 156. Mor:nFIOATtON §§156.002· 156./)06 *---~-~---
modification." See also In re P.D.M., 117 S.w.3d 453, presented, as well as evidence no! presented. We do 454 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pel. denied) (father's find evidence in the record Iha •• he ,;hlld ,Ud not want suit for custody was considered modification of final di to leave her mother [0 live with the lather. We find no vorce decree after mother, who was managing conser corroborating evidence supporting the comention that vator, died; no parental presumption). the child should live with the father and be taken away from the mother. Also lacking is e'ndence of [father's I In re A,J.L" 108 S.W.3d 414, 419-20 (fex.App. Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). "A 'party affected' by an stable living conditions, that [father] could care for the child on a daily basis, that [father! had plans Or rou· order includes a person mentioned in a previous decree in the context of conservatorship. [~) The order at tines for the child, nor was there evidence of any sup· issue here is ... the custody order rendered in [W's pre port persons available to assist the father in the care of the child. [Father I did take the child to a local psychia· vious divorce) suit affecting lW's ex-H) and [W's I par· ent-child relationship with their children.... I ~ I trist ... but offered no testimony from [doctor). [~I [Stepfather J was not a party to [W's previous I divorce, [Father J has failed to show this Court any abuse of tri~ nor is he named anywhere in the [custody order from court discretion regarding the award of $5,000 attor W's previous divorce J. [The custody order from W's pre neis fees." vious divorce) does not mention [stepfather] nor adju FAM §156.006. TEMPORARY 'ORDERS dicate any of I stepfather's J rights, The facts presented by [stepfather I do not establish that he is a 'party af (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), the court fected' by the [custody order from W's previous di may render a temporary order in a suit for modifica· vorce I he seeks to modify. Accordingly, we hold that tion. [stepfather] lacks standing to seek modification of the (ll) While a suit for modification is pending, the order under §156.002(a) .... " court may not render a temporary order Ihat has the ef· fect of changing the designation of the person who has FAM §1 56.003. NOTICE the exclusive right to desj~nate the primary residence A party whose rights and duties may be affected by a of the child under the final order unless the temporary suit for modification is entitled to receive notice by ser order is in the best interest of the child and: vice of citation. History of Fam. Code § 156.003: Acts 1995, 74th Leg., cb, 20, § 1, eff. Apt. 20, (l) the order is necessary because the child's 1995. Amen~ed by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 178, §9, eff. Aug. 30, 1999. Source: present circumstances would Significantly impair the Former Pam. Code §§lL08(c), 14.08(b). child's physical health or emotional development; FAM §156.004, PROCEDURE (2) the person deSignated in the final order hasvol· The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to the untarily relinquished the primary care and possession filing of an 'lriginal lawsuit apply to a suit for modifica· of the child for more than six months; Or tion under this chapter. Hil\tory of Pam. Code § 156.004: Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch, 20, §1, eft. Apr. 20, (3) the child is 12 years of age or older and has ex 1995, Source: fonner Pam. Code !i 14.08(b). ' pressed to the court in cham hers as provided by Section FAM §1 56.005. FRIVOLOUS FILING 153,009 the name oflhe person who is the child's pref· OF SUIT FOR MODIFICATION erence to have the exclusive right to designate the pri If the court finds that a suit for modification is filed mary residence of the child. frivolously Or is designed to harass a party, the court (c) Subsection (b)(2) does not apply to a conserva· shall tax attorney's fees as costs against the offending tor who has the exclusive right to designate the pri party. History ofFarrL Code * 156.005: Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch, 20, § 1, eft. Apr. 20, mary residence of the child and who has temporarily re 1995. SOllrce: FQrmer Fam. Code § 14.082. linquished the primary care and possession of the child to another person duri!lg the conservator's military de ANNOTATIONS ployment, military mobilization, or temporary military Warchol v. Warchol, 853 S.W2d J 65, 170 (lex. duty, as those terms are defined by Section 153,701. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ). "In determining History ofFam. Code S 156.006: Acts 1995, 74tl1 Leg" ch. 20, n, eff. Apr" 20, whether the trial court abused its discretion in award· 1995. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1390, §lS, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts ing attorney's fees we must look to the evidence 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1289, §3, eft Sept. 1,2001; A,ts 2003, 78th Leg" ch.l036, [484] O'CQNNOR'S FAMU .. Y C;ODE
• • ,
,
FAMILY CODE-TITLE 5
CHAI'TER 156. MODIFICATION §§tS6_006·156.101 *--------- §18, eff. Sept. 1,2003; Acts 2005, 19th Lelh ch. 916, § 17, eff. June 18, 2005~ Acl.ll SUBCHAPTER B. MODIFICATION OF 2009, Sist Leg., th. 1113, §27 (etr. Sept. 1,2009), cb. illS, §2 (efr. Sept. 1, CONSERVATORSHIP, POSSESSION 2009), tho 727, §2 (eff, Sept. I, 2009). Soun:e: Former Fam. Code §§ I 1.11(a), & ACCESS, OR DETERMINATION 14.08(g). OF RESIDENCE ANNOTATIONS FAM §1S6.10t. GROUNDS FOR In re Sanchez, 228 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Tex. MODIFICATION OF ORDER ESTABLISHING CONSERVATORSHIP App.-San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding). "To deter OR POSSESSION & ACCESS mine if temporary orders effectively change the person (a) The court may modify an order that provides with the exclusive right to designate primary resi for the appointment of a conservator of a child, that pro dence, we must examine the temporary orders in rela· vides the terms and conditions of conservatorship, or tion to the final order. This determination does not turn that provides for the possession of or access to a child if on the tri8I court's characterization of its ruling, but on modification would be in the best interest of the child ] the substance of the temporary orders. At 218: Together, and:
II lhe 'substantial reduction in [mother's] overall posses· r- (1) the circumstances of the child, a conservator, sion time, the restrictions placed on her possession or other party affected by the order have materially and rights, and the indefinite duration of the temporary or substantially changed since the earlier of: ders, operate to deprive [her] of any discretion inher (A) the date of the rendition oflhe order; or ent in her right to designate [child's] principal resi rt dence. We conclude that the temporary' orders (B) the date ofthe signing ofa mediated or collabo· a- effectively change the designation of the person with rative law settlement agreement on which the order is the exclusive right to designate-primary residence un based; der the final order." . le (2) the child is at least 12 years of age and has ex ,f Saxton v. Daggett, 864 S.W.2d 729, 736 (fex. pressed to the court in chambers as provided by Section as App.-Houston [lst Dis!.] 1993, orig. proceeding). 153.009 the name of the person who is the child's pref ce ,"Temporary orders under [Fam. Code] §1l.l1(a) [now erence to have the exclusive right to designate the pri lry § 156.006] are not appealable. Mandamus is the appro· mary residence of the child; or priate remedy to attack the issuance of temporary or· (3) the conservator who has the exclusive right to ders .... " i's designate the primary residence of lhe child has vol un· he Bolden v. Clapp, 751 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex.App. tarily relinquished the primary care and possession of lYler 1988, orig. proceeding). "The question of law in the child to another person for at least six months. volved is what constitutes voluntary relinquishment (b) Subsection (a)(3) does not apply to a conserva '01- of actual care, control, and possession so as to satisfy on tor who has the exclusive right to designate the pri the requirement.of [Fam. Code] §14.08(g)(2) [now mary residence of the child and who has temporarily re §156.006(b)(2)] and thus empowering the trial court linquished the primary care and possession of the child
ex to enter temporary orders. [Mother] contends that re to another person during the conservator's military de ion linquishment is the equivalent of abandonment and ployment, military mobilization, or temporary military -ef analogizes the requirements of §14.08(g)(2) to those duty, as those terms are defined by Section 153.701. lri- for involuntary termination of parental rights under Hi~tory of Fam. Code § 156,101: Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch, 20, § 1, efl. Apr. 20, [Fam. Code] §15.02 [now §16l.001]. That analogy 1995, Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., th. 751, §47, eff, Sept. 1,1995; Acts 1999, 76th ~g., ch. 1390, §16, eff. Sepll, 1999;Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1289, is inapt. The statutes differ in their provisions and 'Va §§4, 5, et!. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2003, 78thileg., th. 1036,' §19, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; pri their purposes. At 677: We believe § 14.08(g)(2) Acts 2009, 8Ist Leg., ch. 1113, §28 (eff. Sept. 1,20119), ch. 1118, §3 (eff. Sept. 1, 2009), th. 72Y, §3 (eff. Sept. 1. 2009). Source: FOnTI(,.r Fam. Code §14.08(c)(1), . re requires something less than the showing required (g)(3). by § 15.02. Since the consequences of an action or hild See also O'Connor's Texas Family lAw Handbook (2010), "Modifica· order under Ch. 14 are not as far·reaching, irrevocable lion of custody ~generally," cll. g.A, §3.1, p. 830. de and complete, we conclude that a lesser showing
tary ANNOTATIONS *60 satisfies the voluntary relinquishment requirement of Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex.Z002). "The §14.08(g)(2)." Jr. Zl> Legislature has made clear that '[tJhe best interest of ; Acts lhe child shall always be the primary consideration of Sections 156.007·156.100 reserved for expansion 1036.
O'CONNOR'S FAMILY CODE 486 Exhibit "C"
FAMiLY COJOI;l-"l'O'V'LE 5
!CHAPTER 1156. MODIFICATION §§156.002· 156.0015 modification." See also In re RD.M., 117 S.W.3d 453, presented, as well as evidence not presented. We do
454 (fexApp.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (father's find evidence in the record that the chdd did not want
suit for custody was considered modification of final di· to leave her mother to live with the father. Ne find no
vorce decree after mother, who was managing conser corroborating evidence supporting the contention that
vator, died; no parental presumption). the child should live with the father and be taken away from the mother. Also lacking is evidence of rfather's I In re A.J.L., 108 S.w.3d 414, 419·20 (fex.App.
Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). "A 'party affected' by an stable living conditions, that [father J could care for the
order includes a person mentioned in a previous decree child on a daily baSis, that [father J had plans or rou
in the context of conservatorship. [~] The order at tines for the child, nor was there evidence of any sup
issue here is ... the custody order rendered in [W's pre· port persons available to assist the father in the care of
vious divorce] suit affecting [W's ex-HI and [W's] par the child. [Father] did take the child to a 10caJ psychia trist ... but offered no testimony from [doctor J. [~l ent-child relationship with their children.... [~l
[Stepfather I was not a party to [W's previous] divorce, [Father I has failed to show this Court any abuse of trial
nor is he named anywhere in the [custody order from court discretion regarding the award of $5,000 attor W's previous divorce J. [The custody order from Ws pre ney's fees."
vious divorce) does not mention [stepfather J nor adju· FAM §156.006. TEMPORARY ORDERS dicate any of [stepfather's) rights. The facts presented
by [stepfather] do not establish that he is a 'partyaf Ca) Except as provided by Subsection (b), ihe court
fected' by the [custody order from W's previous di may render a temporary order in a suit for modifica vorce) he seeks to modify. Accordingly, we hold that tion.
[stepfather I lacks standing to seek modification of the (b) While a suit for modification is pending, the order under § 156.002(a) .... " court may not render a temporary order that has the ef· feet of changing the designation of the person who has FAM §ISEi.003. NOTICE the exclusive right to designate the primary residence
A partywhose rights and duties maybe affected by a of the child under the final order unless the temporary suit for modification is entitled to receive notice by ser order is in the best interest of the child and:
vice of citation. History of Pam. Code § 156.003: Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch, 20, § 1, eft. Apr. 20, (1) the order is necessary because the child's 1995. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., eh. 178, ~9, eff. Aug. 30, 1999. Source: present circumstances would Significantly impair the
Former F:nn, Code §§11.08(c), 14.08(1). child's physical health or emotional development; FAM §ISEi.004. PROCEDURE (2) the person designated in the final order has voJ The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to the untarily relinquished the primary care and possession
filing of an original lawsuit apply to a suil for modifica of the child for more than six months; or
tion under this chapter. History ofFam. Code §156,OO4: Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch.20, §l, eff.Apr. 20, (3) the child is 12 years of age or older and has ex
1995. Source: Fonner Faro. Code § 14.08(b). pressed to the court in chambers as provided by Section FAM §156.005. FRIVOL.OUS FIL.ING 153.009 the name of the person who is the child's pref OF SUIT FOR MODIFICATION erence to have the exclusive right to designate the pri If the court finds that a suit for modification is filed mary residence of the child. frivolously or is designed to harass a party, the court (c) Subsection (b) (2) does not apply to a conserva shall tax attorney's fees as costs against the offending tor who has the exclusive right to deSignate the pri party. mary residence of the child and who has temporarily re HistoryofFam. Code § IS6.005: Ads 1995, 74th Leg" eh. 20, § 1, elf. Apr. 20, 1995. Source: Fonner Fam. Code §14.082. linquished the primary care and possession of the child to another person during the conservator's military de ANNOTATIONS ployment, military mobilization, or temporary military Warchol v. Warchol, 853 SW2d 165, 170 (Tex. duty, as those terms are defined by Section 153.701.
App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ). "In determining Hist(l1Y ofFam< Code § 156,005: Acttl1995, 74th ltg., th. 20, ~ 1, elT. Apr. 20, whether the trial court abused Its discretion in award 1995. Amended by Atts 1999, 76th Leg.,ch. 1390. ~15, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts ing attorney's fees we must look to. the evidence 2001, 77th Leg .• ch. 1289, §3, eft. Sept 1, 2001; Acts 2003, 7Bth. il>g., tho )036,
484 O'CONNOR'S FAMILY CODE
NO. 76,122 §
IN THE INTEREST OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§ 196 m JUDICIAL DISTRICT
K T W §
§ § HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS
A CHILD BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERS On June 2, 2011 Court heard Respondents' Motion to Deny Relief in Suit to Modify Parent
Child Relationship, Motion to Dismiss, and in the Alternative, Motion to Abate Proceedings.
1. Appearances
Petitioner, TARA BROOK TYNDALL, appeared in person and through attorney of record,
Frederick C. Shelton and Deborah Slye-Miller, and announced ready.
Respondents, JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL, appeared
in person and through attorney of record, Holly H. Gotcher and Shannon M. Estrada, and announced
ready.
Respondent, ZACH WILLIAMSON, appeared in person and through attorney of reeord,
Frederick C. Shelton and Deborah Slye-Miller, and announced ready.
2. Jurisdiction
The Court, after examining the record, and hearing the evidence and argument of counsel,
finds that all necessary prerequisites of the law have been legally satisfied and that this Court has
jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties.
3. Record
The record of testimony was duly reported by Kelly Bryant, the official Court Reporter in and
for the 196th Judicial District Court of Hunt County, Texas.
4. Child
The following orders are for the safety and welfare and in the best interest of the following
child:
Name:
Sex: Male
Birth date:
Home state: Texas Page I
BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERS127290
5. Temporary Bridge Orders
The Court finds that the provisions in these orders relating to conservatorship, possession of
and access to the child and child support constitute the temporary bridge orders of this Court.
6. Possession and Access
I. Possession Order
IT IS ORDERED that each conservator shall comply with all terms and conditions of this
Possession Order. IT IS ORDERED that this Possession Order is effective immediately and applies
to all periods of possession occurring on and after the date the Court signs this Possession Order or
until further order of this Court. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
(a) Mutual Agreement or Specified Terms for Possession
IT IS ORDERED that the conservators shall have possession of the child at times mutually
agreed to in advance by the parties, and, in the absence of mutual agreement, it is ORDERED that
the conservators shaH have possession of the child under the specified terms set out in this
Possession Order.
(b) Possession for TARA BROOK TYNDALL and ZACH WILLIAMSON:
The Court finds the following orders would be in the best interest of the child at this time.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows:
1. Visitation between TARA BROOK TYNDALL and ZACH WILLIAMSON and
the minor child shall always be under the supervision of an off-duty officer employed by the Hunt
County Sheriffs Department, Greenville, Hunt County, Texas on the following days and times as
follows:
a. Thursday, June 2, 2011- Beginning at 6:00 p.m. and ending on Thursday, June 2, 2011 at 7:00 p.m.
b. Wednesday, June 15, 2011 - Beginning at 6:00 p.m. and ending on Wednesday, June 15,2011 at 7:00 p.m.
c. Wednesday, June 29, 2011 - Beginning at 6:00 p.m. and ending on Wednesday, June 29, 2011 at 7:00 p.m.
d. And every other Wednesday beginning at 6:00 p.m. and ending at 7:00 p.m.
2. All periods of possession of the child shall occur at the west end of the CSRP-Hunt
BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERS/27290 Page 2
County Court, Hunt County Health & Juvenile Detention Center (former Hunt County Criminal
Justice Center), 2500 Johnson Street, Greenville, Texas 75401 or Aunt Char's Kid Zone, Greenville
Sports Complex, #2 Leo Hackney Blvd., Greenville, Texas 75401.
( c) Undesignated Periods of Possession
JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL shall have the right of
periods of possession of the child at all other times not specifically designated in this Possession
Order for the other conservators.
(d) General Terms and Conditions
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Possession Order, the terms and conditions
of possession of the child that apply regardless of the distance between the residence of a parent and
the child are as follows:
I. Surrender of Child by JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY
NOWELL- JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL are ORDERED
to surrender the child to an off-duty Sheriff s deputy with the Hunt County Sheriff s Office at the
beginning of each period ofT ARA BROOK TYNDALL and ZACH WILLIAMSON'S possession
at the west end of the CSRP-Hunt County Court, Hunt County Health & Juvenile Detention Center
(former Hunt County Criminal Justice Center), 2500 Johnson Street, Greenville, Texas 75401 or
Aunt Char's Kid Zone, Greenville Sports Complex, #2 Leo Hackney Blvd., Greenville, Texas 75401.
2. Return of Child by TARA BROOK TYNDALL and ZACH WILLIAMSON -
TARA BROOK TYNDALL and ZACH WILLIAMSON are ORDERED to return the child to
JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL, at the end of each period of
JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL'S possession, at the west end
of the CSRP-Hunt County Court, Hunt County Health & Juvenile Detention Center (former Hunt
County Criminal Justice Center), 2500 Johnson Street, Greenville, Texas 75401 or Aunt Char's Kid
Zone, Greenville Sports Complex, #2 Leo Hackney Blvd., Greenville, Texas 75401.
3. Personal Effects - Each conservator is ORDERED to return with the child the
personal effects that the child brought at the beginning of the period of possession.
4. Inability to Exercise Possession - Each conservator is ORDERED to give notice to
the other conservators on each occasion that the conservator will be unable to exercise that
BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERS/27290 Page 3
conservator's right of possession for any specified period.
5. Written Notice - Written notice shaH be deemed to have been timely made if received
or postmarked before or at the time that notice is due.
6. The Sheriff s deputy has the authority to end the visit ifhe or she feels that continuing
the visit is not in the best interest ofthe child.
7. The Sheriff s deputy has the authority to change the location of the visit.
8. TARA BROOK TYNDALL shall remit the amount ofTWENTY-FIVE AND NO
100THS ($25.00) DOLLARS to the Sheriffs deputy supervising the visit at the beginning time of
each visit.
9. ZACH WILLIAMSON shall remit the amount of TWENTY-FIVE AND NO
100THS ($25.00) DOLLARS to the Sheriffs deputy supervising the visit at the beginning time of
each visit
This concludes the Possession Order.
2. Duration
The periods of possession ordered above apply to the child the subject of this suit while that
child is under the age of eighteen years and not otherwise emancipated or until further order of this
Court.
7. Information Regarding Parties
Information regarding each party is as follows:
GREAT-AUNT. JOINT MANAGING CONSERVATOR:
Name: JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL
Social Security number: xxx-xx-x
Driver's license number: xxxxx
Issuing state: Texas
Current residence address: clo Mr. Tommy Spradling, Sr.
6204 Live Oak Street, Greenville, Texas 75402 Mailing address: clo Mr. Tommy Spradling, Sr.
6204 Live Oak Street, Greenville, Texas 75402 Home telephone number: 903-268-2389
Name of employer: Unknown
Address of employment: Unknown
Work telephone number: Unknown
GREAT-UNCLE, JOINT MANAGING CONSERVATOR: Page 4
BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERS/27290
Name: JOHN AUBRY NOWELL
Social Security number: xxx·xx-x
Driver's license number: xxxxx
Issuing state: Texas
Current residence address: c/o Mr. Tommy Spradling, Sr.
6204 Live Oak Street, Greenville, Texas 75402 Mailing address: c/o Mr. Tommy Spradling, Sr.
6204 Live Oak Street, Greenville, Texas 75402 Home telephone number: 903·268·2389
Name of employer: Unknown
Address of employment: Unknown
Work telephone number: Unknown
MOTHER:
Name: TARA BROOK TYNDALL
Social Security number: xxx-xx-x
Driver's license number: xxxxx
Issuing state: Texas
Current residence address: Unknown
Mailing address: Unknown
Home telephone number: Unknown
Name of employer: Unknown
Address of employment: Unknown
Work telephone number: Unknown
FATHER:
Name: ZACH WILLIAMSON
Social Security number: Unknown
Driver's license number: Unknown
Issuing state: Unknown
Current residence address: Unknown
Mailing address: Unknown
Home telephone number: Unknown
Name of employer: Unknown
Address of employment: Unknown
Work telephone number: Unknown
8. Required Notices
EACH PERSON WHO IS A PARTY TO TmS ORDER IS ORDERED TO NOTIFY
EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY OF ANY
BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERS127290 PageS
CHANGE IN THE PARTY'S CURRENT RESIDENCE ADDRESS, MAILING ADDRESS,
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER, NAME OF EMPLOYER, ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT,
DRIVER'S LICENSE NUMBER, AND WORK TELEPHONE NUMBER. THE PARTY IS
ORDERED TO GIVE NOTICE OF AN INTENDED CHANGE IN ANY OF THE
REQUIRED INFORMATION TO EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT,AND THE STATE
CASE REGISTRY ON OR BEFORE THE 60TH DAY BEFORE THE INTENDED
CHANGE. IF THE PARTY DOES NOT KNOW OR COULD NOT HAVE KNOWN OF THE
CHANGE IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO PROVIDE 60-DAY NOTICE, THE PARTY IS
ORDERED TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE CHANGE ON OR BEFORE THE FIFTH DAY
AFTER THE DATE THAT THE PARTY KNOWS OF THE CHANGE.
THE DUTY TO FURNISH THIS INFORMATION TO EACH OTHER PARTY, THE
COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY CONTINUES AS LONG AS ANY PERSON,
BY VIRTUE OF THIS ORDER, IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT
OR ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD.
FAILURE BY A PARTY TO OBEY THE ORDER OF THIS COURT TO PROVIDE
EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY WITH THE
CHANGE IN THE REQUIRED INFORMATION MAY RESULT IN FURTHER
LITIGATION TO ENFORCE THE ORDER, INCLUDING CONTEMPT OF COURT. A
FINDING OF CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR UP
TO SIX MONTHS, A FINE OF UP TO $500 FOR EACH VIOLATION, AND A MONEY
JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS.
Notice shall be given to the other party by delivering a copy of the notice to the party by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Notice shall be given to the Court by delivering
a copy of the notice either in person to the clerk of the Court or by registered or certified mail
addressed to the clerk at Hunt County District Clerk, P.O. Box 1437, Greenville, Texas 75403-1437.
Notice shall be given to the state case registry by mailing a copy of the notice to State Case Registry,
Contract Services Section, MC046S, P.O. Box 12017, Austin, Texas 78711-2017.
NOTICE TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: YOU MAY USE
REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF CHILD CUSTODY
BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERS/27290 Page 6
SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER. A PEACE OFFICER WHO RELIES ON THE TERMS OF
A COURT ORDER AND THE OFFICER'S AGENCY ARE ENTITLED TO THE
APPLICABLE IMMUNITY AGAINST ANY CLAIM, CIVIL OR OTHERWISE,
REGARDING THE OFFICER'S GOOD FAITH ACTS PERFORMED IN THE SCOPE OF
THE OFFICER'S DUTIES IN ENFORCING THE TERMS OF THE ORDER THAT
RELATE TO CHILD CUSTODY. ANY PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY PRESENTS FOR
ENFORCEMENT AN ORDER THAT IS INVALID OR NO LONGER IN EFFECT
COMMITS AN OFFENSE THAT MAY BE PUNISHABLE BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL
FOR AS LONG AS TWO YEARS AND A FINE OF AS MUCH AS $10,000.
9. Warnings to Parties
WARNINGS TO P ARTIES: FAILURE TO OBEY A COURT ORDER FOR CHILD
SUPPORT OR FOR POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CIDLD MAY RESULT IN
FURTHER LITIGATION TO ENFORCE THE ORDER, INCLUDING CONTEMPT OF
COURT. A FINDING OF CONTEMPT MAYBE PUNISHED BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL
FOR UP TO SIX MONTHS, A FINE OF UP TO $500 FOR EACH VIOLATION, AND A
MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS.
FAILURE OF A PARTY TO MAKE A CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT TO THE
PLACE AND IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY A COURT ORDER MAY RESULT IN
THE PARTY'S NOT RECEIVING CREDIT FOR MAKING THE PAYMENT.
FAILURE OF A PARTY TO PAY CIDLD SUPPORT DOES NOT JUSTIFY
DENYING THAT PARTY COURT-ORDERED POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A
CHILD. REFUSAL BY A PARTY TO ALLOW POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A
CHILD DOES NOT JUSTIFY FAILURE TO PAY COURT -ORDERED CIDLD SUPPORT
TO THAT PARTY.
10. Mutual Temporary Injunction
The Court finds that the entry of the following temporary injunction while this case is
pending is in the best interest of the minor child.
The temporary injunction granted below shall be effective immediately and shall be binding
on the parties; on their agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and on those persons in active
BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERS/27290 Page 7
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or
otherwise. The requirement of a bond is waived.
IT IS ORDERED that TARA BROOK TYNDALL is enjoined from:
I. Disturbing the peace of the child or of another party.
2. Withdrawing the child from enrollment in the school or day-care facility where the
child is presently enrolled.
3. Hiding or secreting the child from another party.
4. Making disparaging remarks regarding JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN
AUBRY NOWELL, or JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL'S,
family in the presence or within the hearing of the child. Removing the minor child from the possession of JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL
5.
and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL.
6. Removing the child beyond a geographical area identified by the Court, acting directly
or in concert with others.
7. Removing the minor child from the supervision and possession of an off-duty Hunt
County Sheriffs Deputy officer.
IT IS ORDERED that ZAeH WILLIAMSON is enjoined from:
1. Disturbing the peace of the child or of another party.
2. Withdrawing the child from enrollment in the school or day-care facility where the
child is presently enrolled.
3. Hiding or secreting the child from another party.
4. Making disparaging remarks regarding JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN
AUBRY NOWELL, or JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL'S,
family in the presence or within the hearing of the child. Removing the minor child from the possession of JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL
5.
and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL.
6. Removing the child beyond a geographical area identified by the Court, acting directly
or in concert with others.
BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERSI27290 Page 8
/
7. Removing the minor child from the supervision and possession of an off·duty Hunt
County Sheriffs Deputy officer. Service of Writ
11.
TARA BROOK TYNDALL and ZACH WILLIAMSON waive issuance and service of
the writ of injunction, by stipulation. IT IS ORDERED that TARA BROOK TYNDALL and
ZACH WILLIAMSON shall be deemed to be duly served with the writ of injunction.
12. Duration
These Bridge Orders shall continue in force until the signing of the final order or until further
order of this Court.
SIGNED on June 2, 2011.
JUDGE PRESIDING APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:
The Law Offices of Morgan and Gotcher
P. O. Box 556
2610 Stonewall Street
Greenville, Texas 75403·0556
Tel: (903) 455·3183
Fax: (903) 454·4654
B>f~~
Holly H. Gotcher, .C.
State Bar No. 08738100
Attorney for JENNIFER ELAINE NOWELL and JOHN AUBRY NOWELL
Frederick C. Shelton
P.O. Box 1335
Greenville, Texas 75403
Tel: (903) 454·1000
Fax: (903) 454·1027
BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERS/27290 Page 9
BY:-M~~~----
Fr derick
State Bar
Attorney for TARA BROOK TYNDALL and ZACH WILLIAMSON
*72 BRIDGE TEMPORARY ORDERS/27290 Page 10
$10,00 CASH TENDER
SUBPOENA DUCES T E C UM C I V IL CAUSE NO. 76.122^/V>>
" '0 i CLERK OF THE COURT ATTORNEY F0fe : 'RESPONDEN4s?- / Q Holly H. Gotcher^ ' j- '.',v y
Ms. Stacey Landrum Attorney at Law * " " \ 00 ' " i - r 'cn District Clerk ,
P.O. Box 1437 P.O. Box 556 " < , ^ '
Greenville, Texas 75403 GreenviUe, Texas 75403-0556 ~'^ u Ty
THE STATE OF TEXAS
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM IN T HE I N T E R E ST OF K T W , M I N OR C H I LD TO A NY SHERIFF. CONSTABLE, OR BY A NY OTHER PERSON W HO IS NOT A PARTY
AND IS NOT LESS T H AN EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, OF T HE STATE OF TEXAS.
GREETING:
YOU ARE HEREBY C O M M A N D ED TO S U M M O N:
Tara Brook Tyndeil
Hunt County Sheriffs Department
2801 Stuart Street
Greenville, Texas 75401;
to be and personally appear Tuesday, February 28, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. before the 196 th Judicial
District Court located at 2507 Lee Street, Hunt County Courthouse, 3 rd Floor, Greenville, Hunt
County, Texas, then and there to testify and the truth to speak on behalf of J E N N I F ER E L A I NE
N O W E LL and J O HN A U B RY N O W E LL concerning the above styled and numbered cause, now
pending in said Court, and there to remain from day to day, and from term to term, until discharged
by said Court.
Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena is issued or a
distnct court in the county in which the subpoena is served, and may be punished by fine or
confinement, or both.
The terms "documents," "writings," and "records" are used in this exhibit in their customary
broad sense and include without limitation the following items, regardless of origin or location,
whether printed, recorded, filmed, or reproduced by any other mechanical process or written or
produced by hand; magazines and sexually explicit materials; whether or not claimed to be
privileged against discovery on any ground; and whether an original, master, or copy, namely:
S U B P O E NA D U C ES T E C UM i
microfilm, microfiche, any letters, correspondence, telegrams, rnailgrams, messages, message forms,
electronic transmissions, e-mails, memorandums, notes, records, purchase orders, change orders,
financial records, log books, diaries, minutes, contracts, change proposals, charts, graphs, invoices,
shipping receipts, time cards, work orders, memorandums of telephone or personal conversations,
negotiations, conferences, interoffice communications, reports, analysis, studies, tape records,
computer runs, and any codes necessary to comprehend such runs, books, pamphlets, indexes,
photographs, drawings, specifications, statements and any writings of any nature, however produced
or reproduced, including all drafts, and non-identical copies of such documents.
You are requested to produce the following documents and information relative to:
A.
Date of Birth: ; and
B. Tara Brook Tyndeil
Date of Birth: October 14, 1984; and
C. Zach Williamson
Date of Birth: September 26, 1974;
including, but not limited to:
1. A ll Income Tax Returns forthe years 2005, 2006,2007, 2008,2009,2010 and 2011,
including all supporting documents and attachments; 2. A ll payroll records showing the gross pay, including commissions, deferred bonus,
and/or severance pay, withholding deductions, and net pay for all compensation paid f r om any and all employers for the period from January 1, 2005 to the date of production of the records;
3. All original or official written health insurance plan and/or medical reimbursement
plans for the period from January 1, 2005 to the date of production o f t he records; 4. W-2's from all employers for the period from January 1, 2005 to the date of
production of the records;
5. A ll diaries, notes, memoranda, journals, calendars, including electronic diaries, notes,
memoranda, journals, documents, calendars, other written logs, letters and correspondence, including electronic writings, all drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, tape or electronic recordings, and audio/video recordings which you contend supports the claim of marriage of Tara Brook Tyndeil and Zach Williamson for the period from January 1, 2005 to the date of production o f t he records; *74 SUBPOENA D U C ES T E C UM
Entire personnel file from your most recent employer including, but not limited to: date of employment;
job title and responsibilities;
working hours per week (including overtime); any absences from work;
dates and hours of sick leave and vacation time; earnings per week/month;
name of supervisor;
name of person having custody of personnel and employment records; A ll applications, diaries, notes, memoranda, journals, calendars, including electronic diaries, notes, memoranda, journals, documents, calendars, other written logs, letters and correspondence, including electronic writings, all drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, tape or electronic recordings, and audio/video recordings that constitute or contain matters relevant to any government benefits received by , Tara Brook Tyndeil. and/or Zach Williamson for the period from January 1, 2005 to the date of production of the records; A ll applications, diaries, notes, memoranda, journals, calendars, including electronic diaries, notes, memoranda, journals, documents, calendars, other written logs, letters and correspondence, including electronic writings, all drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, tape or electronic recordings, audio/video recordings, supporting documentation requested by the Human Service Department to substantiate any request for services and/or benefits, and any other documentation submitted with any request for services or benefits with the Human Service Department to include, but not be limited to, the following benefits:
a. Medicaid;
b. Medicare;
c. SNAP Food Benefits (Food Stamps);
d. TANF;
e. CHIPS;
f. Section 8 Housing;
g. WIC;
h. any other government aide requested by and/or benefits received by , Tara Brook Tyndeil, and/or Zach Williamson; 9. AH marriage licenses for Tara Brook Tyndeil, and/or Zachary Scott Williamson;
10. Proof of all informal marriages, including, but not limited to: any and all Declarations
and Registrations of Informal Marriage pursuant to Section 2.402 of the Texas S U B P O E NA D U C ES T E C UM
Family Code; and, any and all recordings of Certificate or Declaration of Informal Marriage;
11. A copy of your Texas Driver's License,
12. A copy of your Social Security Card- you may redact all but the last 3 characters of the card for privacy purposes;
13. A copy of any and all motor vehicle titles and records;
14. A ll FASFA and other financial aide records with regard to the furthering o f t he
parties' higher education;
5. A copy of all banking institutions [1] signature cards.
HEREIN FAIL NOT, and make due return hereof, showing how you have executed the same.
ISSUED A ND GIVEN UNDER MY H A ND at Greenville, Texas this the 23 rd day January,
BY:
Holly H. Gotcher, P, Attorney of Record for J E N N I F ER E L A I NE N O W E LL and J O HN A U B RY N O W E LL RETURN
Came to hand the 23 rd day of January, 2012 at o'clock p.m., and executed on the
o'clock p.m., in Hunt County, Texas, by delivering to Tara Brook Tyndeil at Hunt County Sheriffs Department, 2801 Stuart Street, GreenviUe, Texas 75401,
Hunt County, Texas, in person, a true copy of this Subpoena, and tendering said witness in Hunt
County, Texas in person, a true copy of this Subpoena, and tendering said witness the sum of $ 10.00.
Sheriff, Constable, Citizen of Hunt Countv, Texas *76 ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE
The undersigned witness named in the Subpoena acknowledges receipt of a copy hereof and
hereby accepts and waives service of such Subpoena.
Date:
(Signature of Witness) See A f f i d a v it *77 S U B P O E NA D U C ES T E C UM
A F F I D A V IT OF S E R V I CE
196 TH J U D I C I AL DISTRICT C O U RT
HUNT COUNTY
STATE OF TEXAS
CAUSE #76,122 - IN T HE INTEREST OF K T W M I N OR C H I LD
I, DEBBIE S M I T H, B E I NG D U LY SWORN DEPOSE A ND S A Y;
T H AT I AM A U T H O R I Z ED BY W R I T T EN ORDER OF T HE SUPREME C O U RT OF T HE STATE OF T E X AS TO
SERVE CITATIONS A ND OTHER NOTICES. I AM A C O M P E T E NT PERSON M O RE T H AN 18 YEARS OF A GE
OR OLDER A ND NOT A PARTY TO NOR INTERESTED IN T HE O U T C O ME OF T HE A B O VE S T Y L ED A ND
N U M B E R ED CAUSE, i R E C E I V ED T HE D O C U M E N TS S T A T ED B E L OW ON J A N U A RY 24,2012 AT 3:30 P.M
INSTRUCTING FOR S A ME TO BE D E L I V E R ED UPON T A RA B R O OK T Y N D E L L.
DELIVERED TO: T A RA B R O OK T Y N D E LL
EXECUTED A T: H U NT C O U N TY S H E R I F F 'S D E P A R T M E N T, 2801 S T U A RT
S T R E E T, G R E E N V I L L E, T E X AS 75401 DOCUMENTS D E L I V E R E D: S U B P O E NA D U C ES T E C UM C I V IL AND $10.00 W I T N E SS F EE
A T T A C H ED ( C H E C K)
D A TE A ND T I ME D E L I V E R E D: F E B R U A RY 8, 2012 AT 5:39 P . M.
M A N N ER OF D E L I V E R Y: P E R S O N A L LY D E L I V E R I NG T HE D O C U M E N T ( S) TO T HE
P E R S ON A B O V E. ( H A ND D E L I V E R E D) FEES: $ I SOLEMNLY A F F I RM U N D ER T HE PENALTIES OF PJ? 'NTENTS OF T HE FOREGOING
PAPER IS TRUE A ND CORRECT E X E C U T ED BY: D f r B B IE S M I TH - SCH#I 139 EXPIRES: 07/31/14
ADDRESS OF PROCESS SERVER: P.O. BOX 9057, G R E E N V I L L E, T X. 75404
V E R I F I C A T I ON
ON THIS D AY D E B B IE S M I TH APPEARED BEFORE ME, A N O T A RY PUBLIC, A ND BEING D U LY SWORN BY
ME STATED T H A T H E / S HE HAS PERSONAL K N O W L E D GE OF T HE FACTS SET FORTH IN T HE FOREGOING
A F F I D A V IT A ND D E C L A R ED T H AT T HE PACTS C O N T A I N ED THEREIN ARE TRUE A ND CORRECT G I V EN
MY H A ND A ND SEAL OF OFFICE T H IS °\ D AY OF F E B R U A R Y, 2012 EPHAN IE fi.STUBBLgflELD PUBLIC F O R fp STATE OF TE T E X AS Notary Public STATE OF TEXAS
My Comm. Exp. G-30-2012 00213033- CiUk
TIE STATE OF TEXAS No. C-0213033
TARA BROOK TYNDELL
VS. ZACHARY WILLIAMSON, ET AL
of JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS To: J O HN N O W E LL
S E R VE W H E R E V ER HE M AY BE ftH'ND
bv -serving at
Respondent in the hereafter styled and nurak ?d cause:
You have been sued. You may employ an attorney. If you or your attorney do not file a written answer with the clerk who
„ ued th,s e,auon h> 10:00 a.m. on the Monday next following the expiration of twenty days after Y OU were served tins ci tat, on and
? X f J n ^ T ^ f? ^ ut [5] * "' ^ ^ ^ ^ B e t ^y m a i l i n g s™ to: District Clerk's Office. 1001
, a n* 2 floui B « u m om IX 7 / /U i, or by bnngmg it to the office. Our office address fe 1! 49 Pearl St. and we are located on
h e ^ o n d t l o or of the ongmal courthouse building. The case is presently pending before the 317th Family District Court of
t e f l on t ounty smmg ,n BeaumonL Texas, is cause number C-0213033 and was filed on the 2nd dav of August, 2011. The style of
T A RA B R O OK T Y N D E LL P L A I N T I FF
VS.
Z A C H A RY W I L L I A M S O N, ET AL
RESPONDENT O R I G I N AL P E T I T I ON FOR D I V O R CE
-KS'sssSkSrA"™'**""""""" '"• ""'*• - »' -
ISSUED and G I V EN under my hand and the ,eai of said court at office, this the 27th day of May, 2015.
JAMIE S M I T H, D I S T R I CT C L E RK JEFFERSON C O U N T Y, T E X AS *79 ... „, Deputy I'OPPS. T O N YA C O N N F I .L
2b 1 s C A L D ER A V E, SUITE 400
BEAT IMONT, TX 77702 0000
m : L m c > r . s . E R y i CH
C-0213033 3 1 7 th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TARA BROOK TYNDELL
ZACHARY WILLIAMSON, ET AL
Executed vvlien etipy was delivered: -
Thiys.a iruc copy ofthe origmal citation, was delivered to defendant _ - H Q i] '^"'i i> 1 , on the £ 2 ? '/ day of
, Officer ADDRESS FOR SERVICE:
JENNIFER NOWELL SERVE WHEREVER SHE MAY Ub FOUND
. 0
O F F I C E R 'S RETURN
wirfi the date of delivery endorsed \ ,\mc}\, \\w-i on tnc 7} ? day of ii ihc j any , luxaj* hv delKi-rmg to each at the within named defendants m perso i hereon, together with th I'l lc [16] accompanying copy of the Citation at the following times, and places, to-w person, true copy of this Citation a and executed in
Place, Course and.Distance from Courthouse And not executed as to the defendants),
The diligence used in finding said defendant!s> being:
and ihc cause or failure lo execute tins process vs: x hc '"formation feeeivtd its to the whercabouis of .said defendants; being:
: md
F E E S;
Serving Petition and Copy $
Total % Officer
County, Texas By; Deputy Affiant
, t C O N S T A B L E. Oft n F P. OP T HF COURT
sjgu^d tinner penally oi perjury and contain the following statement:
' M> n a nW ' — " --- - • m - v d i i ts of b j r t il « , and my address is (First, Middle, Last)
(Street, City, Zip) """ """""
I DECLARE [ IN DER PENALTY OF PERJURY TF y'T THF FORGOING IS TRUE A ND CORRFC
Executed in , County, State of — ~ _ _> on the ^ day of.
DeciaranEAuthoim-d Process Server (Id it expiration of certification) D0213033-00039 CU I U K
THE STATE OF TEXAS No. C-0213033
TARA BROOK TYNDELL
VS. ZACHARY WILLIAMSON, ET AL
C I T A T I ON 317th J U D I C I AL DISTRICT COURT of JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS To: J E N N I F ER N O W E LL
SERVE W H E R E V ER S HE M AY BE F O U ND
bv serving :it
Respondent in the hereafter siykd and numbered cause:
Pearl fcu 2 floor Beaumont, to; District Clerk's Office 001 same pennon, a default judgment may be taken gainst you. Said answer may be filed by mailing S S • ' he second floor ot the Png.mil courthouse building. case is presently pending before the 317th f a m i ly Si Com of The t fcrson County s.tung m Beaumom, Texas, fa cause on the 2nd day filed C-0213033 and was ofL Sl^tyic g number . U Cd ,, U Y ° , A , h ,S " J [11] i ^To'nf' U T y an ° Y ° e m p l * e M n u a ° ',° n V n e xt - - a m I 7 77U1. or by A bringing tt lo the office. Our office address is 1149 Peari St and w e a r j ^d m - °™ y f o l days 8 of twenty were served this citation and i o w i n after you ^ expiration U y 0U or not ftie a written answer with the clerk who >' do o ur a t t 0 P n e > ' on of PLAINTIFF i'ARA BROOK T Y N D E LL
VS.
Z A C H A RY W I L L I A M S O N, ET Ai
R E S P O N D ED O R I G I N AL P E T I T I ON FOR D I V O R CE
division o ^ ~^
with a u t h o r i t y^ consent to l he cbilk t d ^ t S- ! * ^ r m u u a . on of paternity and the appointment of a conservator j M * , a h n w ,
ISSUED and G I V EN under my hand and ihe seal of said court at office, this •27th day of May, 2015.
J A M IE S M I T H, DISTRICT CLERK J E F F E R S ON C O U N T Y, T E X AS *81 BY Deputy TOi.PS, 1 0 N Y A C O N N E I1
2615 CALDER A V E, SUITE 400
B E A U M O N T, TX 77702 0000
'JRN OF SERVrCI
C-0213033 317th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TARA BROOK TYNDELL
ZACHARY WILLIAMSON, ET A l.
Lxecuied when copy was dehvered:
This J § a true copy ot ihc original citation, \*as dchvcied to defendant the czLJ.. day of
Officer , County, Texas .„.„__„,„ , Deputy ADDRESS FDR SERVICE: JENNIFER NOWELL
SERVE WHEREVER SHE MAY BE FOUND OFFICER'S RETURN ?i day of _„ i}j£^ . 20 j £, at Jli^STjj^o'ciock AZm., and executed •» Cttme to hand on the Zf£ft£fJrQ. „ >h ti , t , , , -V o u m >'', l e - x ! "' i ,y J e , | / e n n 8 to « eh of t i ie within named defendants in person, a true copy of ihis Citation
j vntn .he date ot delivery endorsed thereon, together with the accompanying copy ofthe Citation at the foilow.ng times and places, io-w,t:
l| ^ Um ^TA D a t e / Z l m e n _ , _ b r\ x \t Place, Course and Distance from Courthouse \ \\ ^ - ^ ^ I i I J ^ ^ l I L. „ 7 -15 _ _ 3_j7f4\ fio ur f- _
And nut executed as to the deiendantfsj.
The diligence used in finding said defendants) being:
and ihe cause or failure to execute this p i o c e« is
die mfotman'on received .ts to the whereabouts of said dcfendani(s) being;
FEES:
Serving Pennon and Copy S
Tout % _..„ , Officer
., County, Texas „ ^ Deputy AfEani ^ " ^ ^^ — - m n nnr r r r m r 1 I H I .I • cd b v a r * r s o n 1, T ' 7 '° IT"" * e,R «-» **
,=nut reu ,„ re ,1 u> be verified. If the return „ ^ r return. T ic stgnaure
,gncJ under penalty or perjury l l n d e „ „ , a , n ffi^ffl^ " " °' ° f * e « « «• retu ™ * a » b =
"My name is < * ru- ,
~ ( T i ^ i i i i U c; U ^ t J " * - " m > ' d a lC 0t b i r t i! 18 -— — —» my address is
fSticet, City, Zip) ' ~ ~ ~~ ~~ "™——— — —— —— . _ « DECLARE UNDER PENALTY Of PERJURY T H A T T HE FORGOING IS TRUE A ND CORRECT, County, State of t | )c t on yo!
Executed in
Process Serv. (Id ff expiration of certification i 10. Division of Community Property
Petitioner believes Petitioner and Respondent w i ll enter into an agreement for the division ol'their estate. If such an agreement is made, Petitioner requests the Court to approve the agreement
am! divide their estate in a manner consistent with the agreement. If such an agreement is not made,
Petitioner requests the Court to divide their estate in a manner that the Court deems just and right,
as provided by law.
/ /. Prayer
Petitioner prays that citation and notice issue as required by law and that the Court grant a divorce and ult other relief requested in Ihis petition.
Petitioner prays for general relief.
Respectfully submit led, SMITH § S H I P L EY LAW r ^ Attorneys at Law g7 2750 IH-10 East, Sk Beaumont, Texas 77701 Tel; (409) 8994046 Fax; (409) 899-2648 By ; i . y O —-S"-/' : B R U CE N. SMITH State Bar No. 1$543300 Attorney for Petitioner *83 DC213033—00039 THE STATE OF TEXAS No. C-0213033
TARA BROOK TYNDELL
VS. ZACHARY WILLIAMSON, ET AL
CITATION 317th JUDICIAL D I S T R IC T COURT of JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS To: JENNIFER NOWriX
S E R VE W H E R E V ER S HE M AY BE F Ot
by serving at
Respondent in the hereafter styled and numbered cause:
the second floor of the original courthouse builditw ^L17- ,, ° " 1 Ce 7 , $ * & t - a nd wc are located on ,s 1 1 49 p c a rI
T A RA BROOK T Y N D E LL PLAINTIFF VS.
Z A C H A RY W I L L I A M S O N. ET Ai
RESPONDENT ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DIVORCE Tiie court has the authority in this suit to enter any iudemem ofdwrw* H t c c A i H n .. *u
division of p r o p er winch m\\ be binding on you. t he m a m a S e ™* Providing for the J g d , S ! > 0 , V , n8 The court has the authority in this suit to enter any judgment or decree m the child'-, i n f™ wh;,h „,!<i » «•
you, including the termination ofthe parent-child relation/lib the d e t e r m i n a t i o n n f> f u W , !I bt b , n d , n S u P O E > with authonty to consent to the child's adoption. P ' d a u , ' i m a t ] on ofpawrnity and the appointment of a conservator
ISSUED and G I V EN under my hand and the seal of said court at office, this the 27th day of May, 2015.
JAMIE S M I TH DISTRICT (TrRK. JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS *84 BY Deputy TOUPS, T O N YA C O N N E LL
2615 CALDER A V E, SUITE 4< B E A U M O N T, TX 77702 0000
10. Division of Community Property
Pensioner believes Petitioner and Respondent will enter into an agreement for the division of their estate. If such an agreement is made. Petitioner requests the Court to approve the agreement
and divide their estate in a manner consistent with the agreement. If such an agreement is not made,
Petitioner requests the Court io divide their estate in a manner that the Court deems just and right,
as provided by law.
/ /. Prayer
Petitioner prays that citation and notice issue as required by law a id that the Court grant a divorce mid ail other relief requested ia this petition.
Petitioner prays for general relief.
Respectfully submitted, SMITH § SHIPLEY LAW .; : ' _ / Attorneys at Law g." 2750 IH-10 East, Sle. 200 t' Beaumont, Texas 77701 Tel: (409) 899 -1046 ^ Fax: (409) 899-2648 ~ /
B R U CE N. SMITH
Slate Bar No. 18543300 Attorney for Petitioner *85 NO, IN T HE M A T T ER OF IN T HE D I S T R I CT C O U RT
T HE M A R R I A GE OF
T A RA B R O OK T Y N D E LL
AND J D I C I AL D I S T R I CT Z A C H A RY W I L L I A M S ON
AND IN T HE I N T E R E ST OF
K T W A § J E F F E R S ON C O U N T Y, T E X AS
C H I LD O R I G I N AL P E T I T I ON F O R D I V O R C* /. Discovery Level
Discovery in this case is intended to he conducted under level 2 of rule 190 ofthe Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Parties
This suit is brought by TARA BROOK T Y N D E L L, Petitioner. The last three numbers of 1 A RA BROOK T Y N D E L L 's driver's license number are The last three numbers of T A RA
BROOK T Y N D E L L 's Social Security number are
ZACHARY W I L L I A M S ON is Respondent.
JENNIFER A ND JOHN NOWELL. maternal great-aunt and greai- uncle of tiie child subject ofthis suit.
3. Domicile
Petitioner has been a domiciliary of Texas for the preceding 4x-month period and a resident of this county for the preceding ninety-day period.
4. Jurisdiction
The 196 th Judicial District Court of Hunt County, Texas has continuing jurisdiction ofthe ehild the subject ofthis suit. The proper request to transfer this matter is this date being made,
5. Service
Process should be served on Zachary Williamson where ever he maybe found.