In re T.W.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Brooke M. Burns, Assistant State Public Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, OH 43215-9308 (For Defendant-Appellant, Minor).
O P I N I O N
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.
{¶1} Appellant, T.W., timely appeals the decision classifying him as a tier II juvenile sex offender under
{¶3} On approximately January 23, 2014, T.W. was transferred from the Indian River Correctional Facility to the Paint Creek facility for his court-ordered treatment. At this time, James Darnell, Superintendent of the Indian River Correctional facility, wrote to the trial court judge advising him that T.W. was transferred “for programming purposes” to the Paint Creek Youth Center. Darnell states in his letter that “the transfer does not reflect a decrease in security level.”
{¶4} Approximately one year later, T.W. was classified as a tier II sex offender at the January 20, 2015 classification hearing shortly before his scheduled release from the Paint Creek facility.
{¶6} “The Ashtabula County Juvenile Court erred when it classified T.W. as a tier II juvenile sex offender registrant because it did not classify him upon his release from a secure facility. (A-1; T.pp. 13-16).
{¶7} “The Ashtabula County Juvenile Court erred when it classified T.W. as a tier II juvenile sex offender registrant on January 20, 2015, in violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy. State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684. (A-1; T.pp. 13-16).
{¶8} “The Ashtabula County Juvenile Court erred when it classified T.W. as a tier II juvenile sex offender registrant because T.W.’s status as a mandatory registrant under
{¶9} “The Ashtabula County Juvenile Court erred when it classified T.W. as a tier II juvenile sex offender registrant because the imposition of a punitive sanction that extends beyond the age of jurisdiction of the juvenile court violates a child’s right to due process under the United States and Ohio Constitutions. (A-1; T.pp. 13-16).”
{¶10} Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in untimely classifying him upon his release from Paint Creek, which is not a secure facility, and as such, the classification must be vacated. We review this question of law de novo. Aubry v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-509, 2012-Ohio-1313, ¶10.
{¶11}
“The court that adjudicates a child a delinquent child shall issue as part of the dispositional order or, if the court commits the child for the delinquent act to the custody of a secured facility, shall issue at the time of the child’s release from the secure facility, an order that classifies the child a juvenile offender registrant and specifies that the child has a duty to comply with [certain] sections * * * of the Revised Code if all of the following apply: * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶13} Unlike the permissive language set forth in
{¶14}
{¶15} Appellant challenges the timeliness of his classification, not whether the substantive prerequisites for classification were satisfied. The trial court relied entirely on the letter issued by Superintendent Darnell in concluding that T.W. was being released from a “secure facility” at the time of the classification hearing finding T.W. a tier II sex offender registrant. The trial court judge ignored defense counsel’s request to elicit testimony from the Paint Creek facility representatives present at the
{¶16} The state argues that T.W.’s argument, if successful, would preclude it from stipulating to the placement of other juveniles at the Paint Creek facility for rehabilitation purposes and that this result would be contrary to the common goal of juvenile rehabilitation. The trial court agreed and concluded:
{¶17} “I agree with the State of Ohio, that if this Court were to consider its main objective, and that being rehabilitation of a juvenile delinquent, then if the Department of Youth Services chooses to place a juvenile at a facility such as Paint Creek, then if it is defined as not that being secure and, therefore, the hearing has to be held in the beginning, then every prosecutor in the State of Ohio is going to object * * *.
{¶18} “Now, the second reason that I am going to classify [T.W.] at this time is that I don’t think the Supreme Court of Ohio is going to require recourse on the trial level to have a crystal ball. I don’t know whether Paint Creek may have put on a new roof, new gutters, a secure door, bars on the windows, or torn down the fence that was around there if there was one. Point being, I don’t know what Paint Creek is or was. I have to rely on what the agency that has custody of him says it is.
{¶19} “Filed February 12, 2014 in this Case * * * is a letter under the Ohio Department of Youth Services’ letterhead, John R. Kasich, Governor; Harvey J. Reed, Director, and signed by Mr. James Darnell, Superintendent of the Indian River Juvenile
{¶20} “Dear Judge Hague: Youth [T.W.] was transferred from Indian River Correctional Facility to Paint Creek Youth Center on January 23, 2013. [sic] Youth was transferred for programming purposes. Please note that the transfer does not reflect a decrease in security level.”
{¶21} Thereafter, the trial court concluded that based on a plain reading of the letter, T.W. was transferred from one secure facility to another. Thus, the mandatory classification hearing set forth in
{¶22} T.W. argues because the court did not classify him at the time of his release from Indian River Correctional Facility, it was subsequently precluded from doing so upon his release from Paint Creek. He directs our attention to In re Mudrick, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2007CA00038, 2007-Ohio-6800, which deals with nearly the precise issue. In Mudrick, the trial court dismissed the state’s request to schedule a classification hearing under
{¶23} Testimony at Mudrick’s hearing established that “Paint Creek conducts constant staff monitoring of juvenile offenders, and physical restraints are used as
{¶24} We agree with the court in In re Mudrick. Because the governing statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply it as it was written. In re I.A., 140 Ohio St.3d 203, 206, 2014-Ohio-3155, 16 N.E.3d 653. A plain reading of
{¶25} We disagree that our decision will have a detrimental effect on the number of juveniles being referred to the Paint Creek facility for rehabilitation. Instead,
{¶26} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error has merit. We reverse the trial court’s decision classifying T.W. as a tier II sex offender registrant and remand this case to the trial court. On remand, the trial court shall take evidence on this issue and determine if the Paint Creek facility satisfied the definition of a “secure facility” at the time of T.W.’s release. If the facility satisfies the clear statutory definition, then the trial court shall reclassify T.W. as a juvenile offender registrant.
{¶27} T.W. also argues that his classification violates his right to be free from double jeopardy, his right to due process, and his right to equal protection under the law. We disagree. Statutes enacted by the Ohio General Assembly enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. See State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 1998 Ohio 291, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998). Further, legislation will not be declared unconstitutional without a showing of unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The party challenging the legislation has the burden of proving a statute‘s unconstitutionality. State v. Thompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 560, 1996 Ohio 264, 664 N.E.2d 926 (1996).
{¶28} The Seventh District Court of Appeals in In re M.R., 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 13 JE 30, 2014-Ohio-2623, has squarely addressed these issues in an analogous case.2 We agree with its disposition of each. As to the alleged double jeopardy violation, In re M.R. held:
“{¶29} ’
R.C. 2152.83(A) specifically instructs the juvenile court to conduct the classification at release rather than at disposition where the 16 or 17 year old is committed to a secure facility. * * * Because the statute clearly provides for a deferred classification until the time of release from the secure facility, the juvenile had no ‘legitimate expectation of finality’ with regards to classification at the time of the disposition order committing him to a secure facility and thus there is no double jeopardy violation.‘” Id. at ¶22, 29.
{¶30} We likewise agree with the disposition of the appellant’s equal protection violation claim in In re M.R., in which it explains that the differential treatment in the statute, i.e., distinct classification standards for different aged offenders, is rationally related to a legitimate interest. Specifically, the age differentials in
{¶31} As for T.W.’s fourth assigned error, there was no violation of his due process rights. Instead, we have previously held that “there is no per se prohibition against Ohio juvenile courts imposing a registration requirement that extends beyond a person’s attainment of age 21.” In re N.Z., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-100, 2014-Ohio-157, ¶44 citing State ex rel. N.A. v. Cross, 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-Ohio-1471, ¶12-13; In re M.R. at ¶66-68. Accordingly, T.W.’s second, third, and fourth assignments of error lack merit.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
concur.