In re T.W.
Anita B. Staley, Barthol & Staley, L.P.A., 7327 Center Street, Mentor, OH 44060 (For Appellant).
Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Shelley M. Pratt, Assistant Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Courthouse, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047-1092 (For Appellee).
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.
{¶1} T.W. appeals from a judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which accepted his plea of “true” to a violation of probation, and committed him to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS“). After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we conclude that, although the trial court substantially complied with
{¶2} Substantive Facts and Procedural History
{¶4} Ten days after the trial court‘s judgment entry was journalized, a written statement entitled, “Terms of Juvenile Court Probation,” apparently signed by J.W. and his grandmother and apparently witnessed by a probation officer was filed and the following docket entry made, “Placed on Probation.”
{¶5} Three weeks later, T.W.‘s probation officer filed a complaint alleging T.W. violated his probation, in that he received a 3-day out-of-school suspension from his school for “refusing to follow reasonable and repeated request of the school administrators.”
{¶6} A juvenile court magistrate held a hearing to adjudicate the charge of probation violation, as well as a charge of aggravated disorderly conduct brought in a separate case. T.W.‘s maternal grandparents, with whom he has been residing since he was one year old, and his probation officer testified at the hearing.
{¶8} “THE COURT: Mr. [T.W.] you would be admitting to the Violation of Probation; specifically, you were given a three day out of school suspension for refusing to follow reasonable and repeated requests of administrators. Is that correct, sir?
{¶9} “[T.W.]: Yes, ma‘am.
{¶10} “THE COURT: By entering a True plea today to that charge, all the rights we went over with you at the initial hearing, the right to trial, question witnesses during your trial, subpoena witnesses and thе right to remain silent, those rights are gone with this admission. Knowing all that, do you still want to admit, sir?
{¶11} “[T.W.]: Yes, ma‘am.
{¶12} “THE COURT: And you‘re doing this knowingly, willingly and voluntarily?
{¶13} “[T.W.]: Yes, ma‘am.
{¶14} “THE COURT: And you understand you have a suspended six months max age 21 at Ohio Department of Youth Services, that could be imposed today if you admit? Do you understand that, sir, and do you still want to admit?
{¶15} “[T.W.]: Yes, ma‘am.”
{¶16} The magistrate then asked T.W. to describe what happеned. T.W. stated the following:
{¶17} “I -- I, like, I twisted my foot the night before this happened, like, and then I went to school the next day and it still was hurting me really bad and I could barely walk. So I went to the nurse‘s office and they told me just to sit in there. And then they told me to go back to class but I could barely walk and I didn‘t want to go back to class
{¶18} After confirming with T.W.‘s counsel that T.W. did indeed receive a three-day suspension based on this incident, the magistrate immediately accepted his plea of “true.” She found him delinquent by reason of violation of probation, and committed him to ODYS for a minimum period of six months, or until his 21st birthday. The magistrate, in addition, remarked that T.W. was “spoiled” by his grandparents, who failed repeatedly to hold him accountable for his actions and to discipline him for his misbehaviors. As a result, the magistrate ordered that T.W. not return to his grandparents’ home after release from ODYS.
{¶19} T.W.‘s counsel objected to the magistrate‘s decision, and those objections were overruled by the trial court. T.W. now appeals, assigning four errors for our review:
{¶20} “[1.] The trial court failed to ensure that the appellant understood the consequences of admitting that he had violated the terms of his probation and as such the appеllant‘s admission was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in accordance with
{¶21} “[2.] The trial court violated appellant‘s due process rights when it failed to inquire of the appellant whether he had received a written statement regarding his probation violations.
{¶22} “[3.] The trial court abused its discretion in committing appellant to the Ohio Department of Youth Services and further ordered that appellant not be returned to the grandparents[‘] home after release from ODYS because this decision was unreasonable and arbitrary.
{¶24} Whether the Admission was Voluntary Pursuant to Juv.R. 29
{¶25} Under the first assignment of error, T.W. claims the juvenile court failed to comply with the requirements of
{¶26}
{¶27} “The court may refuse to accept an admission and shall not accept an admission without addressing the party personally and determining both of thе following:
{¶28} “(1) The party is making the admission voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the allegations and the consequences of the admission;
{¶29} “(2) The party understands that by entering an admission the party is waiving the right to challenge the witnesses and evidence against the party, to remain silent, and to introduce evidence at the adjudicatory heаring.”
{¶30} “Juvenile delinquency proceedings must comport with the requirements of due process.” In re Jordan, 11th Dist. No. 2001-T-0067, 2002-Ohio-2820, ¶10, citing In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. “Ohio codified the due process requirement in
{¶31} “The analysis employed in determining whether a juvenile‘s admission complies with
{¶32} The courts have also established that the applicable standard for the trial court‘s acceptance of an admission is substantial compliance. “For purposes of juvenile delinquency proceedings, substantial compliance means that in the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile subjectively understood the implications of his plea.” In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, ¶113.
{¶33} The instant appeal involves a juvenile probation revocation hearing. As the Supreme Court of Ohio recently held, in In re L.A.B., 121 Ohio St.3d 112, 2009-Ohio-354, syllabus,
{¶34} Finally, the juvenile court‘s compliance with
{¶35} Our review of the colloquy between the magistrate and T.W. reflects that the magistrate did ensure that T.W. was making the admission voluntarily with an understanding of the charge against him and the consequences of his admission. The
{¶36} Whether the Trial Court Must Inquire of the Juvenile Regarding the Notice of Probation Conditions
{¶37} Although we determine that the trial court substantially complied with
{¶38}
{¶39} “The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the child shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which revocation is proposed. The parties shall have the right to counsel and the right to appоinted counsel where entitled pursuant to
{¶40}
{¶41} “After the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall enter an appropriate judgment within seven days. A copy of the judgment shall be given to any party requesting a copy. In all cases where a child is placed on probation, the child shall receive a written statement of the conditions of probation.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶43} As noted abovе, juvenile delinquency proceedings must comport with the requirements of due process. ”
{¶44} Here, the judgment entry finding T.W. delinquent imposed a commitment to ODYS, “suspended on the condition that “the juvenile follow all terms of intensive probation, court orders, and laws of the State of Ohio.” The trial court‘s judgment entry also stated that “[t]he juvenile is to bе placed on intensive probation as result of his TRUE Plea ***.” The entry then stated, two paragraphs below, “[t]he juvenile [will] attend school as prescribed by the school district with no [un-]excused absences and disciplinary action,” and, in a separate paragraph, “[t]he Juvenile will have NO CONTACT with Alexander Robertson.”
{¶45} It is unclear whether
{¶46} Our review of the hearing transcript shows that the magistrate failed to engage T.W. in any colloquy to ascertain that he had indeed received a written statement, be it the judgment еntry or a separate document or both, notifying him of the precise conditions of his probation. Nor are there any findings to that effect in the magistrate‘s decision or the trial court‘s judgment entry adopting the decision. Because the trial court did not comply with a key component of
{¶47} The Eighth District reached the same conclusion in In re T.B., 8th Dist. Nos. 93422 and 93423, 2010-Ohio-523. There, the trial court similarly did not inquire whether the juvenile had received a written statement of his probation conditions. The Eighth District reversed, stating that the trial court “must comply with
{¶48} While the dissent correctly notes that language employed in
{¶49} This step is not form over substance. The purpose of this requirement is to not only assure that the juvenile was on notice of the conditions so he would know how to comport himself while on probation, but to assure the court before it revokes probation that the child actually received a copy of the terms and conditions of probation. Due process requires nothing less when the child is facing a loss of liberty, and the juvenile rules requirе those specific findings to be made. We may not presume compliance merely from finding a signed document in the court‘s file.
{¶50} T.W.‘s second assignment is well taken, and its resolution renders the third and fourth assignments of error moot.
{¶51} We therefore reverse the judgment and remand this matter to the juvenile court. Upon remand, the juvenile court is to hold a new hearing adjudicating the charge of probation violation against T.W. in compliance with the requirements of
{¶52} The judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is reversed, and case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., concurs,
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J., dissents with Dissenting Opinion.
{¶53} I respectfully dissent.
{¶54} In the second assignment of error, T.W. asserts the trial court had a duty to inquire whether or not he had previously received a written statement of the conditions of probation and, therefore, the trial court failed to comply with
{¶55}
{¶56} The Eighth District Court of Appeals case cited to by the majority is distinguishable from the instant matter. See In re T.B., 8th Dist. Nos. 93422 & 93423, 2010-Ohio-523. The Eighth District found, contrary to the finding here, that the plea was not properly entered. Id. at ¶13. It also found that the juvenile had not been notified of a violation at all with respect to one of the charges. Id. at ¶15. The Eighth District commented that the trial court should inquire whether the juvenile was made
{¶57} I find the instant matter similar to those circumstances presented in In re J.G., 12th Dist. No. CA2007-10-250, 2008-Ohio-2260. Like J.G., T.W. entered an admission to the probation violation, was represented by counsel, and was advised of his rights and the consequences of admitting to the violation. Id. at ¶41-42. Further, like J.G., the record indicates that T.W. had been notified of the rules concerning his probation, as he signed a document outlining his probation terms. The Twelfth District found that, under these circumstances, “the juvenile court complied with
{¶58} I would hold there has been no violation of