delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 D.H. (Mоther), the biological mother of T.H. and C.D.F., appeals from the orders entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, terminating her parental rights and from subsequent orders. The Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) moves to dismiss this appeal as untimely or barred by laches. We deny the motion to dismiss and affirm.
¶2 We address the following restated issues on appeal:
¶3 1. Is Mother’s appeal untimely or barred by laches?
¶4 2. Given the undisputed findings of fact, did the District Court abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment?
¶5 3. Did the proceedings comport with relevant statutory and constitutional due process requirements?
BACKGROUND
¶6 Mother and L.H. are the biological parents of T.H., and Mother and C.F. are the biological parents of C.D.F. On August 2, 2001, the
¶7 On August 7, 2001, the District Court amended its order regarding T.H., including an amended Conclusion #17 that reads, ‘[Mother’s] parental rights should not be terminated, pursuant to §41-3-604(l)(b), MCA, in as much as [the Department] has not provided the services considered necessary for the date return of [T.H.].” The amеndment did not alter any of the court’s findings or Conclusion #3 about the propriety of termination due to abandonment. Also on August 7, the court entered a separate order terminating Mother’s and C.F.’s parental rights to C.D.F. That order included a finding that Mother abandoned C.D.F. and a conclusion that her parental rights should be terminated based on abandonment.
¶8 The Department appealed with regard to issues not involving Mother. We reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in an unpublished opinion, In re T.H. and C.D.F.,
¶9 On November 18, 2003, Mother filed a verified petition to terminate planned permanent living arrangements, in which she requested the District Court to vacate or void its previous orders placing the children away from her, granting the Department
¶10 In May of 2004, Mother filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s orders terminating her parental rights and denying her subsequent petition and motion. The Department moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely or barred by laches, and Mother responded. We took the motion under advisement.
DISCUSSION
¶11 Is Mother’s appeal untimely or barred by laches?
¶12 The Department moves to dismiss Mother’s appeal on grounds that it is untimely pursuant to § 42-2-620, MCA, or, alternatively, barred by the doctrine of laches. Section 42-2-620, MCA, provides that
[s]ubject to the disposition of a timely appeal, upon expiration of 6 months after an order terminating parental rights has been issued, the order may not be questioned by any person, in any manner, or upon any ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any required notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter.
¶13 In the usual situation where the Department serves a parent whose parental rights have been terminated with notice of entry of judgment, a parent’s appeal long after the termination order is issued is untimely. Rule 5(a)(1), M.R.App.P., requires a party to a civil case to file a notice of appeal within 60 days of service of notice of entry of judgment when such service is required by Rule 77(d), M.R.Civ.P., and the State of Montana is a party. Thus, Rule 5(a)(1), M.R.App.P., ordinarily would preclude an appeal such as Mother’s. The Department properly concedes, however, that Rule 77(d), M.R.Civ.P., mandates our conclusion that the.prevailing party in a child abuse and neglect case must serve notice of entry of judgment on other parties. It further concedes it did not serve notice of entry of judgment on Mother at any time.
¶14 The Department maintains, however, that the relationship between § 42-2-620, MCA, and the rules of civil and appellate procedure applicable to child abuse and neglect proceedings is analogous to the postconviction relief context. It urges that our analysis in a case involving a petition for postconviction relief, State v.
¶15 In Garner, ¶¶ 22-25, we determined the 60-day period for appeal from the entry of an order on a petition for postconviction relief, as set forth in §46-21-203, MCA, is a speсific statutory requirement which controls over the general provision in Rule 77(d), M.R.Civ.P., requiring service of notice of entry of the judgment or order. We also noted that, pursuant to § 46-21-201(1)(c), MCA, civil procedure rules apply in postconviction proceedings only if not inconsistent with postconviction statutes. Garner, ¶ 26. On those bases, we concluded Rule 77(d), M.R.Civ.P., does not apply in postconviction proceedings. Garner, ¶ 27.
¶16 [1] Here, unlike in Garner, it is undisputed that Rule 77(d), M.R.Civ.P., applies. Moreover, unlike the statute at issue in Garner, §42-2-620, MCA, does not alter the filing periоd for timely appeals; it merely sets a 6-month time limit for all other challenges to orders terminating parental rights-a time limit, which, by its terms, is “subject to the disposition of a timely appeal.”Pursuant to Rule 5(a)(1), M.R.App.P., Mother’s 60-day time limit for appeal does ‘hot begin to run until service of notice of entry of judgment.” As a result, the §42-2-620, MCA, 6-month limit on other challenges does not apply to Mother’s timely appeal from the District Court’s orders terminating her parental rights and the underlying proceedings.
¶17 As a final matter regarding § 42-2-620, MCA, we address our recent opinion in In re P.D.L.,
¶18 We conclude §42-2-620, MCA, does not bar Mother’s appeal from the District Court’s orders terminating her parental rights. For that reason, we need not address Mother’s appeal from the court’s later orders on her petition and motion.
¶19 The Department also contends, however, that the equitable doctrine of laches bars Mother’s appeal. It relies on In re Marriage of
¶20 Wеre we to consider post-termination matters, however, we observe the Department advances no authority for applying the equitable doctrine of laches in a child abuse and neglect case involving a timely appeal. Moreover, we note laches is an equitable doctrine, and “parties must not expect relief in equity, unless they come into court with clean hands.’” Cowan v. Cowan,
¶21 The Department further argues the best interests of the child are paramount and ^Mother’s] legal right to appeal does not discharge her affirmative duty to act in the best interests of her child.” This argument is wholly without merit.
¶22 Unlike the Department, which had an affirmative duty to serve Mother with notice of entry of judgment, Mother had no “affirmative duty” under the law to file a notice of appeal before receiving service of notice of entry of judgment. Further, a parent’s right to the care and custody of a child is a fundamental liberty interest which must be protected by fundamentally fair procedures. See, e.g., In re V.F.A.,
¶23 Finally, the Department asserts this case is similar to In Interest of E.H. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992),
¶24 We conclude Mother’s appeal from the termination of her parental rights is timely and is not barred by laches.
¶25 2. Given the undisputed findings of fact, did the District Court abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment?
¶26 In reviewing a distriсt court’s termination of parental rights, we determine whether the findings of fact are clearly erroneous, whether the conclusions of law are correct and whether the court abused its discretion in ordering termination. In re J.B.K.,
¶27 As a prehminary matter, the Department asserts this appeal should be dismissed because Mother has not provided an adequate record for review, as required by Rule 9, M.R.App.P. In response, Mother states she is contesting the District Court’s conclusions, not its findings. Consequently, we will address Mother’s issues in that limited context.
¶28 Highlighting Finding #72 of the August 2, 2001 order, Mother asserts she was ‘frustrated” in her attempts to visit her children and contends her difficulties with visitation cannot ‘be used to sustain a finding of‘abandonment.’ ” As just stated, however, Mother does not challenge any findings. In any event, we note Finding #72 does not concern her visitation.
¶29 The District Court found Mother stipulated to the TLC in August of 2000, left Missoula in late November or early December of 2000, had not been located in any out-of-state treatment facility, contacted T.H.
¶30 Section 41-3-102(1), MCA (1999), defines abandonment to include ‘leaving a child under circumstances that make reasonable the belief that the parent does not intend to resume care of thе child in the future.” Section 41-3-609(l)(b), MCA (1999), authorizes a court to terminate parental rights upon finding the parent has abandoned the child. We conclude the District Court’s unchallenged findings support its conclusions that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated based on abandonment and, therefore, those conclusions are not incorrect.
¶31 Mother asserts, however, that the District Court’s conclusions regarding abandonment are inconsistent with its findings and conclusions that her treatment plan was not appropriate, the Department had not made reasonable efforts to address her addiction and the parties did not file an agreement regarding T.H.’s placement. We disagree that such an inconsistency exists.
¶32 A district court may terminate parental rights pursuant to §41-3-609(1)(b), MCA (1999), upon finding the parent has abandoned the child or, pursuant to § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA (1999), upon finding the child is an adjudicated youth in need of care, the parent has not successfully completed an appropriate court-approved treаtment plan and the parent’s conduct or condition rendering him or her unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Here, the District Court’s findings about the treatment plan and the Department’s actions relate to the propriety of terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA (1999). Mother’s parental rights were terminated based on abandonment, pursuant to §41-3-609(1)(b), MCA (1999), a separate and independent basis for termination.
¶33 Having determined the District Court did not err in concluding Mother’s parental rights should be terminatеd based on abandonment, we hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights on that basis.
¶34 3. Did the proceedings comport with relevant statutory and constitutional due process requirements ?
¶35 Mother contends the proceedings did not satisfy relevant statutory requirements and violated her constitutional right to due process. We review a district court’s interpretation and application of
¶36 Mother first asserts the District Court neither properly adjudicated the children as youths in need of care nor found they were abused or neglected. We addressed a similar argument in Matter of M.J.W.,
¶37 In M.J.W., ¶¶ 10-14, we first determined the district court erred in terminating a father’s parental rights pursuant to §41-3-609(1)(c), MCA (1995), the statutory predecessor to §41-3-609(1)(f), MCA (1999), because that statute required the court to find, among other things, that the child had been adjudicated a youth in need of care, and the record reflected no such adjudication. Then, however, we concluded the court properly terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to § 41-3-609(1)(b), MCA (1995), based on abandonment, without a prior adjudication of the child as a youth in need of care. M.J.W., ¶¶ 15-22. In so doing, we determined the father failed to establish error in the district court’s findings or conclusion regarding abandonment. M.J. W., ¶¶ 15-18. Then, after tracing relevant statutes, we concluded the district court’s determination that the father abandоned the child satisfied §41-3-602, MCA (1995), which required a determination that the child is “abused or neglected.” M.J.W., ¶¶ 19-22.
¶38 In M.J.W., ¶¶ 15-18, we implicitly recognized that §41-3-609(1)(b), MCA (1995), did not, by its terms, require a youth in need of care adjudication before termination of parental rights based on abandonment. Section 41-3-609(1)(b), MCA (1999), is identical to §41-3-609(1)(b), MCA (1995), except that the 1995 version cross-referenced a statutory definition of “abandon” and the 1999 version does not. With respect to the “abused or neglected” determination issue, the 1995 statutes traced in M.J.W., ¶ 20, are also substantially similаr to the 1999 statutes applicable here. Given the similarity between the 1995 and 1999 statutes, we conclude our analysis in M.J.W. applies here. Thus, we further conclude the District Court was not required to adjudicate the children as youths in need of care before terminating Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment, and its findings of abandonment in the termination orders constituted the required “abused or neglected” determinations.
¶39 Having concluded an adjudication of the children as youths in
¶40 Mother next argues the District Court violated statutory requirements by awarding TLC to the Department without first holding a hearing and making required findings. Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the District Court held a hearing on the petition for TLC on August 11,2000, with Mother and her counsel in attendance. Further, as stated above, Mother’s counsel expressly did not oppose the grant of TLC and, thus, Mother has waived this issue.
¶41 Mоther also asserts the TLC exceeded the six-month statutory time limit set forth in §41-3-406(5), MCA (1999). We disagree.
¶42 The District Court granted TLC in an order dated August 23, 2000. Section 41-3-406(5), MCA (1999), provides, in part, that
[a]n order for [TLC] may be in effect for no longer than 6 months. Before the expiration of the order for [TLC], the county attorney ... shall petition for one of the following:
(b) termination of the parent-child legal relationship[.]
The Department petitioned for termination of Mother’s parental rights on February 7, 2001, which was within six months of District Court’s TLC order. We conclude the order for TLC did not exceed the time limit in §41-3-406(5), MCA (1999).
¶43 Mother also asserts the guardian ad litem failed to perform certain statutory duties prior to the termination and this failure denied her the ability to present evidence and argument that reunification was in her children’s best interests. However, she does not advance any authority, as required by Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P., for her position that a guardian ad litem’s performance of his or her duties has any bearing on a parent’s ability to present evidence or argument at a hearing. Thus, we need not address this assertion further.
¶44 Next, relying on §41-3-412, MCA (1999), Mother asserts she did not receive proper notice of the April 23, 2001, hearing on the
¶46 Mother also asserts that the April 23,2001 hearing on the petition to terminate did not meet the time requirements set forth in §41-3-412, MCA (1999). She is incorrect.
¶47 Section 41-3-412(1), MCA (1999), authorizes a permanency plan hearing to be combined with another required hearing-in the present case, a hearing on the petition to terminate-and requires that the hearing take place “no later than 12 months after the initial court finding that the child has been subjeсted to abuse or neglect or 12 months after the child’s first 60 days of removal from the home, whichever comes first[.]”Here, the children were removed from Mother in March of 2000. Sixty days later was in May of 2000, and 12 months after that was in May of 2001. Because the hearing occurred in April of 2001, we conclude it was timely under §41-3-412(1), MCA (1999).
¶48 Mother also argues the District Court violated §41-3-412(3), MCA (1999), by terminating her parental rights to T.H. in its 2003 order on remand from this Court without first providing her with notice of a permanency plan hearing at which she could submit an informational report about the children’s placements and best interests. Underlying this argument is Mother’s assertion that the District Court terminated her parental rights to T.H. on August 2, 2001, “unterminated” those rights in the August 7, 2001 amendment to the August 2 order, and then ‘ire-terminated” them in the 2003 order on remand from the Department’s appeal. We observe that the District Court’s 2004 post-termination orders-which, as noted above, are beyond the scope of the record for purposes of this appeal-undoubtedly contributed to Mother’s confusion in this regard.
¶50 In the 2003 order on remand, the District Court properly altered its findings and conclusions relating to the issues raised in the Department’s appeal-namely, L.H.’s parental rights to T.H. and the propriety of T.H.’s placement in Washington. The court retained from the 2001 order the findings regarding Mother’s abandonment of T.H., the conclusion that her parental rights should be terminated based on abandonment and the order terminating her parental rights. As noted above, the court replаced Conclusion #17 from the 2001 order with a conclusion that, ‘but for” the abandonment, her parental rights could not be terminated. This clarification did not constitute a substantive change which would warrant Mother’s participation in a hearing. Thus, we conclude the 2003 order on remand did not violate §41-3-412(3), MCA (1999).
¶51 Mother next argues that certain aspects of the proceedings discussed above violated her constitutional right to due process. She relies on In re D.V.,
¶52 Finally, relying on A.S., Mother asserts her due process rights were violated because she allegedly did not have adequate representation once her retained cоunsel withdrew after the 2001 orders and the District Court appointed a public defender without notifying the defender. In A.S., ¶ 12 (citations omitted), we recognized due process requires that a parent not be placed at an unfair disadvantage during termination proceedings, and fundamental fairness requires that a parent be represented by counsel at proceedings to terminate parental rights. Analogizing to In re Mental Health of K.G.F.,
¶53 As discussed above, the District Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to both T.H. and C.D.F. in 2001, and the order on remand in 2003 did not substantively alter either of the 2001 orders with respect to Mother. Mother had counsel through the time of the termination orders in August of 2001, and she has counsel on direct appeal from those orders. Thus, her contention that she has been denied her right to adequate counsel, resulting in a due process violation, is without merit.
¶54 We hold Mother has not established that the proceedings did not comport with relevant statutory and constitutional due process requirements.
¶55 Affirmed.