33 F. Supp. 504 | D. Or. | 1940
The Summer Lake Irrigation District on January 20, 1938, filed a petition for relief under 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-403. The details of the plan, which has .been consented to by approximately ninety-eight percent of the creditors of petitioner, are not presently material. After preliminary approval of the petition by the court, one J. R. Mason, holder of bonds of the District, filed a motion to dismiss for the reason that “* * * the State of Oregon has not consented to the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction by the Congress of the United States as to the petitioner herein, and for the further reason that the petitioner is not authorized by law to take all or any action necessary to be taken by it to carry out any plan of composition proposed by it, or any plan approved by the court herein.”
The matter was elaborately briefed. The court, after full consideration, was prepared to decide the cause. However, since the court was of the opinion, notwithstanding the statement of the motion above set out, that the keystone of decision would be the constitutionality of the federal bankruptcy law, the issuance of opinion was delayed until the certificate required by 28 U.S.C.A. § 401 could be transmitted to the Attorney General of the United States. The court has now been advised that the government will not intervene.
In other cases, two Special Masters of this court, Honorable Estes Snedecor and Honorable Edward J. Clark, passed directly upon and sustained the constitutionality of the federal statute and upon the validity of the consent of the State of Oregon.
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared valid the act in question,
The Congress has permitted an agency of a state unable to meet its debts as they mature, to compose indebtedness, payable “out of assessments or taxes, or both, levied against and constituting liens upon property” in the agency, by filing a petition in a bankruptcy court. The Supreme Coürt of the United States has held an irrigation district to be an agency which could take advantage of the terms of the Act.
Jurisdiction of this court to receive and determine the petition was founded on the federal bankruptcy law alone. The filing of the petition was a voluntary act upon the part of this irrigation district. No creditor has the right to object to the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or the right to demand the dismissal thereof after filing, if jurisdiction is present.
In any event, then, the consent of the state need only be effectual at the time the court under the federal statute is required to determine whether- the entity is empowered “by law to take all action necessary to be taken by it to carry- out the plan”.
The question of the technical validity of state consent is a question of state law for the determination of state courts. The legislature of Oregon has passed two statutes
The Supreme Court of California has effectually answered all questions of consent raised under the statutes of that state.
The state has by executive and administrative action furthered the rehabilitation plans of several of these districts. I. H. Van Winkle, Attorney General of Oregon, appeared and filed a brief amicus curiae in behalf of appellant in the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Bekins et al., Trustees, et al., No. 772.
The motion to dismiss is denied.
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 58 S.Ct. 811, 82 L.Ed. 1137. The current of opinion sustaining petitions of such bodies in the lower courts since the Bekins case has been overwhelming. See Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle v. City of Belton, Tex., 5 Cir., 100 F.2d 655; Getz v. Edinburg Consol. Independent School Dist., 5 Cir., 101 F.2d 734; Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 8 Cir., 103 F.2d 847; Vallette v. City of Vero Beach, Fla., 5 Cir., 104 F.2d 59; Touchton v. City of Fort Pierce, Fla., 5 Cir., 109 F.2d 370; In re Merced Irr. Dist., D.C., 25 F.Supp. 981, 987; In re Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., D.C., 25 F.Supp. 988; In re Drainage Dist. No. 7, D.C., 25 F.Supp. 372, 374; In re James Irr. Dist., D.C., 25 F.Supp. 974; In re Corcoran Irr. Dist., D.C., 27 F.Supp. 322; In re Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Ada County, Idaho, D.C., 28 F.Supp. 84.
Even if a state classifies certain corporations as types not subject to bankruptcy, if other requisites are present, such corporation may be adjudged bankrupt. The classification is not binding upon the federal courts nor does it operate to oust federal jurisdiction. In re Prudence Co., Inc., D.C., 10 F.Supp. 33, affirmed, 2 Cir., 79 F.2d 77, 78, 79, certiorari denied 296 U.S. 646, 56 S.Ct. 247, 248, 80 L.Ed. 459.
The provision requiring such a petition to be approved by a state agency was included in the former statute, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-303, but omitted in this.
Getz v. Edinburg Consol. Independent School Dist., supra.
These are not strictly trust obligations. The real meaning of trust in this connection is property touched with a public interest. Twin Falls Land & Water Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., D.C., 7 F.Supp. 238, 247.
Proceedings have been sustained in a state which had no consent statute. In re City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., D.C., 23 F.Supp. 229; Vallette v. City of Vero Beach, Fla., supra.
In re Fox West Coast Theatres, D.C., 25 F.Supp. 250, 261, note 29.
11 U.S.C.A. § 403(e) (6).
Chapter 109, p. 252, General Laws of Oregon, 1939; Oregon Code, 1935 Supplement § 48-743.
Peoples State Bank v. Imperial Irrigation District et al., Cal.Sup., 101 P.2d 466, 469, decided April 16, 1940.
United States v. Bekins, supra.