In re Storrs
This disciplinary matter is before this Court on the petition for voluntary discipline filed, prior to the filing of a formal complaint, by Respondent Richard J. Storrs (State Bar No. 685575), pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2), in which he seeks to resolve a disciplinary matter involving his acknowledged misuse of his attorney trust account. In his petition, Storrs admits that his conduct violated Rule 1.15 (II) (b) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, see Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment.
Storrs, who has been a member of the Bar since 1984, unconditionally acknowledges that, in 2012, he was engaged in settling payment bond claims filed by subcontractors against a client of his firm when he received a check from that client for $15,031.32, to be paid to one of the subcontractors. Storrs prepared and forwarded to the subcontractor
In mitigation, Storrs notes that, during the period in question, he was suffering from emotional and mental distress resulting from his separation, and eventual divorce, from his wife of many years, and from the depression suffered by one of his children, which resulted in that child applying for a hardship withdrawal from the university that he was attending. Storrs has sought and continues to seek counseling from his psychologist, as well as his priest. Storrs further notes in mitigation that he has fully and freely cooperated in this disciplinary proceeding, initiating this petition for voluntary discipline and openly and honestly discussing the facts underlying the matter; that he used his personal funds to replace the funds improperly withdrawn from his trust account, such that neither his client nor the other party to the settlement were harmedbyhis actions; that he has a long and substantial record of community service and pro bono work; and that he has had only one prior disciplinary matter, an admonition that he states was received almost 20 years ago. Storrs suggests that punishment ranging from a Review Panel reprimand to a three-month suspension would be appropriate in his case. In response, the State Bar argues that, although a suspension is the appropriate discipline, Storrs’s proposed three-month suspension is not sufficient.
Having reviewed the record as a whole, we disagree with the recommendation of the State Bar and conclude that imposition of a three-month suspension is the appropriate sanction in this matter, and we therefore accept Storrs’s petition for voluntary discipline. See In the Matter of Freeman,
Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Three-month suspension.