18 N.Y.S. 913 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1892
The petitioners, Hugh M. Stanfield and Henry R. Stanfield* are adult sons of Mark M. Stanfield, deceased, who died on May 28, 1890* leaving a last will and testament, in which it was provided: “After the payment of my just debts, I give and devise unto George Otis the income of' twenty-five thousand dollars for his life; to my son Hugh M. Stanfield, the-income of twenty thousand dollars for his life; to Florestine Stanfield, wife-of Henry R. Stanfield, during the life of herself and child, the income of' twenty thousand dollars; to Henry Stanfield the income of ten thousand dollars; and to John C. Parcher the income of ten thousand dollars; and I direct, my executor, hereinafter named, to invest said sums in bond and mortgage- or government bonds, and pay the income to the respective parties named.
We regard the law as settled that, as to general legacies, they are not payable until one year after the issuance of letters on the estate, and that, as to an annuity legacy, it begins to run from the death of the testator. The question here presented is, what is the rule as to the bequests of income? Are -we to follow the one governing the payment of annuities, or of general legacies? In Cooke v. Meeker, 36 N. Y. 15, it is said: “The authorities would seem abundant, therefore, to sustain the doctrine that when a sum is left in trust, with the direction that the interest and income should be applied to the use of a person, such person is entitled to the interest thereof from the date of the testator’s death. Especially is this so where, as in the will under consideration, it clearly appears to have been the intent of the testator that the legacy should be paid by a transfer of bonds and mortgages bearing interest at the time of his death.” Appellants insist that this statement is obiter, and in direct antagonism to the general rule and weight of authority, holding that interest upon legacies commences to run only after the expiration of a year from the granting of letters testamentary; that, as respects legacies, a direction in a will that it be paid with interest, but specifying no time from which interest is to be computed, requires, in the absence of any special circumstance, that interest commence only after the expiration of the year, except in certain cases,—of a testator who is a parent, or stands in loco parentis to the legatee, in which case, if the legatee be not an adult, interest on the legacy should be allowed as a maintenance from the time of the death of the testator. In this case, however, it must be remembered, as already stated, that the question is not as to when interest begins to run upon a legacy, or when an annuity is payable; the question being from what time interest upon bequests is payable. Although some doubt was expressed as to the correctness of the rule stated in Cooke v. Meeker, supra, in two cases which arose and were decided by former surrogates, (In re Lynch's Estate, 52 How. Pr. 367; Nahmens v. Copely, 2 Dem. Sur. 253,) we no longer regard it, so far. as this court is concerned, as an open question. In Barrow v. Barrow, (Sup.) 8 N. Y. Supp. 783, the cases are collated and discussed, and the rule as laid down in Cooke v. Meeker followed. This doctrine was applied by Mr. Justice Daniels in deciding Pierce v. Chamberlain, 41 How. Pr. 501; and the same learned judge, in his opinion in Powers v. Powers, (Sup.) 1 N. Y. Supp. 636, which was a decision of this general term, held that a beneficiary under a will bequeathing a fund to a trustee, in trust to invest the same and pay over the income, is entitled to such income from the time of the testator’s death, where the trust has been invested by the testator, and had yielded in
