44 A.2d 133 | Vt. | 1945
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought directly to this Court, seeking release from confinement in the state prison at Windsor. On August 25, 1943, in Bennington Municipal Court the petitioner was convicted, on a plea of guilty, to violation of the first clause of P.L. 8618 which provides for the punishment of a "person who induces, entices or procures a female person to come into the state or to go from the state for the purpose of prostitution or for any immoral purpose." On the same day sentence was imposed of imprisonment in the states prison for not less than three nor more than seven years and he was forthwith committed. By this proceeding the petitioner has challenged the legality of his conviction and commitment on various grounds, only one of which is for our consideration, since it is the only one that has been briefed and argued. In reEverett's Will,
The appropriateness of a habeas corpus proceeding to determine this contention is not and could not be successfully questioned. The weight of authority is that a court may determine in a habeas corpus proceeding the constitutionality of the statute under which the petitioner is held and, if it proves to be unconstitutional, discharge him irrespective of the stage of the prosecution against him under the statute, irrespective of whether he has been convicted, and likewise irrespective of any other relief which may be available to him. 25 Am Jur Habeas Corpus, § 29. The reason for this rule is thus tersely stated inEx parte Siebold,
This view is supported by our own cases. In re Hook,
In considering the constitutional question every presumption is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the statute, and it is not to be adjudged unconstitutional without clear and irrefragable evidence that it infringes the paramount law. State
v. Clement Nat'l. Bank,
The petitionee contends that the State was not without *288
jurisdiction in this case even though the federal government might also have jurisdiction and the same acts of the respondent might also be punishable under the federal law. It is true that the same act may constitute a crime equally against the United States and the State, subjecting the guilty party to punishment under the laws of each, provided the act is one over which both sovereignties have jurisdiction. State v. O'Brien,
There is, however, an important distinction between such cases where both sovereignties have jurisdiction and cases where Congress has acted under the paramount authority given to it by the Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states. The grant in the Constitution of that power to Congress, it is conceded, is paramount over all legislative powers which, in consequence of not having been granted to Congress, are reserved to the states. It follows that any legislation of a state, although in pursuance of an acknowledged power reserved to it, which conflicts with the actual exercise of the power of Congress over the subject of commerce must give way before the supremacy of the national authority. Smith v. Alabama,
In considering whether there is such conflict it is necessary to consider just what is prohibited by the federal act. It is only the second, third and fourth sections of that act that could be applicable (18 USCA §§ 398, 399 and 400). § 398 reads:
"Any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or in the District of Columbia, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice; or who shall knowingly procure or obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained, or aid or assist in procuring or obtaining, any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or the District of Columbia, in going to any place for the purpose of prositution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent or purpose on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony" etc.
§ 399 is directed against the persuasion, inducement, enticement and coercion of any woman or girl to go from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce, whether with or without her consent, to engage in the practices and for the purposes stated in the preceding section, and provides that anyone "who shall thereby *290 knowingly cause, or aid or assist in causing, such woman or girl to go and to be carried or transported as a passenger upon the line or route of any common carrier or carriers in interstate or foreign commerce, or any Territory or the District of Columbia," shall be punished as therein provided. § 400 is similar to § 399 except that it applies only in a case involving a girl under the age of eighteen years and the penalty is greater. Here also it is an element of the offense that the girl shall be knowingly induced or caused "to go and to be carried or transported as a passenger in interstate commerce upon the line or route of any common carrier or carriers." In the present case the girl involved was fifteen years of age.
An offense under any of these sections is not complete if there is no interstate transportation of the woman. Under § 399 as well as under § 400, such transportation must be by a common carrier,Cottabellota v. United States,
Few cases are found which bear directly on the question here involved. In State v. Harper,
In State v. Wood, supra, it was held that a Louisiana statute penalizing the enticement, abduction, inducement, etc. of a chaste woman from her father's house or any other place where she may be, for the purpose of prostitution, etc. was not in conflict with the federal law, the court saying that it was immaterial that having been so enticed from her home in this state to a place in another state further representations were there made followed by her prostitution.
A state statute which provided that "any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, by any means of conveyance into, through or across this State, any female person for the purpose of prostitution, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice or compel such female person to become a prostitute, shall be deemed guilty of a felony," was held not to be in conflict with the federal act in Sisemore v. State, 135 Ark 179, 204 S.W. 626. This decision is based on what may be thought to be a rather strained interpretation of what is said in Hoke v. United States,
In Hewitt v. State, 74 Tex.Crim. Rep. 46,
The complaint to which the petitioner pleaded guilty does not indicate the means by which the girl may have gone from the state. The questioned clause of our statute does not make criminal the transportation of a person from this state nor in any manner seek to control transportation, but only seeks to prohibit certain acts being done wholly within this state. We hold that the first clause of P.L. 8618 is not in conflict with the federal law and that that clause, together with the penalty imposed by the final clause of that section, are not unconstitutional. We make no holding as to the constitutionality of other parts of P.L. 8618.
Judgment that the petitioner is not illegally deprived of hisliberty and he is remanded to the states prison at Windsor,whence he was taken, and his petition is dismissed.