In Re Smith
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON INVOLUNTARY PETITION
On January 30, 2009, Rhodes Properties filed a Chapter 7 Involuntary Petition against Milton M. Smith, the Alleged Debtor, pursuant to
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
I.Issues Involving Grounds For Dismissal
Mr. Smith asks that the Involuntary Petition be dismissed on four grounds:
1. The state court judgment obtained by Rhodes Properties is on appeal, and therefore subject to bona fide dispute, making Rhodes ineligible to file the Involuntary Petition;
2. Mr. Smith denies that he has fewer than twelve creditors, and therefore11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) requires that the Involuntary Petition be signed by three or more creditors;
3. The Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter; and
4. This is a two party dispute, Rhodes Properties has an adequate remedy at law in the Texas state courts and therefore the Involuntary Petition should be dismissed on equitable abstention grounds.
II. Background Facts
On April 20, 2001, BABS Holding Co. (“BABS”) agreed to purchase certain assets owned by Rhodes for $18,000,000.00, with $14,000,000.00 of the purchase price paid in cash at closing and $4,000,000.00 to be paid pursuant to a promissory note. The transaction closed on May 21, 2001. Rhodes asserts that as part of the May 21, 2001 sale, Mr. Smith, who was the majority owner of BABS and its president, executed a guaranty.
Rhodes sued Mr. Smith on the guaranty after BABS defaulted on the note in a petition against Mr. Smith in the 160th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas on April 20, 2007. The state court granted summary judgment on the guaranty claim against Mr. Smith on December 10, 2007, and amended that order on January 5, 2008.
Mr. Smith filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on March 4, 2008, and later filed an appeal to the Dallas Fifth District Court of Appeals. On March 27, 2008, the state court signed an order severing the claims and counterclaims between the Rhodes and Mr. Smith. On March 24, 2008, three days prior to the severance order, Mr. Smith formed the Milton M. Smith Irrevocable Trust in the Cook Islands (the “Cook Islands Trust”) into which he assigned the bulk of his assets.
III. Analysis
Pursuant to
(1) by three or more entities, each of which is either a holder of a claim against such person that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount ... [that] aggregate at least $13,475 more than the value of any lien on property of the debtor securing such claims held by the holders of such claims;
(2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders, excluding any employee or insider of such person and any transferee of a transfer that is voidable under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, by one or more of such holders that hold in the aggregate at least $13,475 of such claims;
Mr. Smith filed a list under Federal Rule of bankruptcy Procedure 1003(b) naming 12 or more creditors, therefore Rhodes has the burden of showing that Smith actually has less than 12 creditors under
A. Bona Fide Dispute
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “bona fide dispute.” The Fifth Circuit has held that a debt is the subject of a bona fide dispute when “there is an objective basis for either a factual or legal dispute as to the validity of the debt.”
In re Sims,
Rhodes’ claim consists of a final judgment from the state court against Mr. Smith that has not been stayed on appeal.
See Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick,
The majority of decisions analyzing this issue have found that final judgments from
In an unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit has held that final judgment that has not been stayed is not subject to a bona fide dispute for the purposes of
Mr. Smith asserts that there is no per se rule that a final unstayed judgment cannot be subject to bona fide dispute, citing a Fourth Circuit decision, and saying that the bankruptcy court must therefore determine the likelihood of Mr. Smith’s success on appeal.
See In re Byrd,
The inherent difficulty and lack of necessity in engaging in such analysis is borne out by Byrd itself, as the court only made a cursory examination into the pending appeals, finding the alleged debtor presented no evidence to support his likelihood of success on appeal and, thus, “failed to raise any substantial factual or legal questions about the continued viability of those judgments.” The same analysis would have been reached simply by respecting the trial court’s determination of this matter on the merits and the absence of a stay pending appeal.... Byrd renders the entry of a judgment as completely irrelevant in determining the existence of a claim. This cannot be the correct reading of the statute. As the court in Drexler correctly noted, “[o]nce entered, an un-stayed final judgment may be enforced in accordance with its terms and with applicable law or rules, even though an appeal is pending.” The holder of an unstayed final judgment may utilize an array of state court enforcement procedures, including the filing of a judgment lien, as Eugenia did in this case. To hold that an unstayed final judgment is enforceable in state courts and voluntary proceedings in federal bankruptcy court, but not for involuntary cases would “ef-feet a radical alteration of ... the longstanding enforceability of unstayed final judgments.” Drexler, 56 B.R. at 967 .
Id. at 485-86 (internal citations omitted).
After reviewing this line of decisions, this Court finds the analysis in AMC Investors persuasive and in line with the Fifth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Norris, which follows the Drexler line of decisions. Further, under the Fourth Circuit’s own analysis, state court “judgments go a long way toward establishing the absence of a bona fide dispute,” and “it will be the unusual case in which a bona fide dispute exists in the face of claims reduced to state court judgments.” In re Byrd, 357 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir.2004). Based on the facts as presented at trial, the Court will not look behind the state court judgment and finds that it is not the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount.
B. Not Paying Debts As They Come Due
Stated another way by another judge of this Court in
Moss,
the court must look to four factors: “(1) the number of unpaid claims; (2) the amount of such claims; (3) the materiality of the non-payments; and (4) the debtor’s overall conduct in her financial affairs.”
In re Moss,
The facts as presented at trial show that even though Mr. Smith is paying, including post petition, his small recurring debts as they come due, he is not paying ninety-nine percent of his debts in aggregate amount. Further, that failure to pay is due in great part to his own decision to place the majority of his assets into a trust in the Cook Islands. The Court finds that Rhodes has carried its burden to establish that Mr. Smith is not generally paying his debts as they come due.
C. Number of Creditors
In his answer to the Involuntary Petition, Mr. Smith contends that even if Rhodes can show that its claim is not subject to bona fide dispute and that he is generally not paying his debts as they come due, he has twelve or more creditors; and therefore, three or more of them are required to file or join an involuntary petition against him.
See
Undisputed Creditors
Four of the creditors listed by Mr. Smith are not disputed by Rhodes — David Goodhart, Esq. and Frank McNally, CPA, who are owed $1,800.00 and $1,050.00 respectively for prepetition professional fees, the Internal Revenue Service, which is owed an estimated $3,500.00 and Rhodes, which has an estimated $4.5 million judgment.
Small Recurring Creditors
In determining the number of creditors, small recurring creditors are not to be included.
See In re Moss,
Insiders
An insider is an entity or person with “a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than those dealing at arms length with the debtor.”
In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of America, Inc.,
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that due to their relationship with Mr. Smith and the facts surrounding their loans to him, Mr. Kin-caid and Mr. Ebbo should be considered insiders and should be excluded from the count of creditors necessary to file an involuntary petition. They are social friends and have known each other for almost thirty years. The purported loans were made to Mr. Smith without common loan documents, at no interest, without security and without a definite time to repay them. These were not arms-length transactions and were entered into with close personal friends of the debtor, who are relying on Mr. Smith to pay them when is able, and not pursuant to any normal terms or loan agreement.
Rhodes has also objected to the law firms of Korn, Bowdich and Diaz, and Cowles & Thompson, saying that they are insiders who should not be counted. While as a general rule “attorneys are not automatically considered to be insiders under the Code,” In re Lemanski,
Finally, by definition, the term “insider” includes a relative of the debtor, if the debtor is an individual.
See
Voidable Transfers
Rhodes argues that certain creditors Mr. Smith listed should be excluded from the count because they received voidable post-petition transfers in violation of § 549(a). This Section states that:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate—
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and
(2)(A) that is authorized only undersection 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; or
(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.
The Court must first determine whether or not the transfers in question
According to a pretrial stipulation between Rhodes and Smith [Docket # 38], the following transfers were made from the Milton M. Smith Irrevocable Trust in the Cook Islands, into Helen Smith’s PMA Prime Checking Account with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Texas, Account #xxxxxx5447 (the ‘Wells Fargo Account”) in the amounts and credited on the dates set out as follows:
a. $4,975.00 on August 19, 2008.
b. $4,975.00 on September 18, 2008.
c. $4,975.00 on December 1, 2008.
d. $9,975.00 on January 8, 2009.
e. $6,975.00 on February 12, 2009.
f. $19,975.00 on March 5, 2009.
Some of the creditors were paid directly by transfers from the Cook Islands Trust and others were paid out of Ms. Smith’s Wells Fargo Account which was partially funded by transfers from the Cook Islands Trust. Mr. Smith argues that the funds used to make these payments from the Cook Islands Trust were not property of the estate, because he does not own the Trust. Rather, he is the beneficiary of the Trust and he requested that the Trust make disbursements to his wife’s account so that living expenses and creditors could be timely paid.
The evidence presented at trial shows that Mr. Smith is both the settlor and a beneficiary of the Cook Islands Trust. Generally, an interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the estate notwithstanding a provision that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor, which would include the Debt- or’s beneficial interest in a trust.
An exception to this general rule is provided where a spendthrift provision that is valid under applicable nonbankrupt-cy law restricts the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor.
Bankruptcy courts are also courts of equity, where the definition of property of the estate is to be interpreted broadly and substance often trumps form.
See In re Burgess,
To the extent that Mr. Smith argues that the funds paid from the Wells Fargo Account were Ms. Smith’s separate property, and not property of the estate, he has not met his burden. First, as discussed above, the funds from the Cook Islands Trust contained in the account are property of the estate. Second, funds Ms. Smith received from her pay for work during marriage are community, and therefore property of the estate.
See In re Kim,
‘When separate and community funds are commingled in a manner defying segregation, it is presumed that the entire fund consists of community property.”
Hill v. Hill,
Mr. Smith did not meet his burden to trace the funds to Ms. Smith’s separate property. To the extent that payments were made to pre-petition creditors, they were presumed to be from community funds or from property of the estate. Mr. Smith has not overcome this presumption. Therefore, the following creditors were the recipients of voidable transfers, and should not be counted: Citi World MasterCard, Dillards Elite Credit Card, Sam’s Club, Mark Goldstein, AT & T, AT & T Mobile, TXU Electric, Atmos Energy and the City of Dallas-Water Services. Korn, Bowdich and Diaz, and Cowles & Thompson were paid post-petition with funds directly wired from the Cook Islands Trust, and therefore are also recipients of avoidable transfers.
Finally, the Debtor paid his property taxes to the six Dallas-area taxing authorities he has listed as creditors on the
“a county ... a special district or authority ... or any other political unit of this state ... that is authorized to impose and is imposing ad valorem taxes on property even if the governing body of another political unit determines the tax rate for the unit or otherwise governs its affairs.”
The payments made on the petition date with Mr. Smith’s Citi World MasterCard present a different problem. Courts treat credit card payments used to pay creditors as avoidable preferences pursuant to
“These courts reason that the debtor, even if never in actual possession of the loaned proceeds, exercises dominion or control over them as evidenced by an ability to direct their distribution.”
In re Marshall,
Section
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property—
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if—
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.
The credit card payments made by Mr. Smith to the Dallas-area taxing authorities on the Involuntary Petition date allowed each of these creditors to receive preferential payments pursuant to
At trial, in response to Rhodes’ argument that the payment of Mr. Smith’s 2008 property taxes resulted in an avoidable transfer that excluded the Dallas-area taxing authorities from the his list of creditors, Mr. Smith argued that his property taxes for 2009 had become due and owing on January 1, 2009, and should therefore be counted. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive.
First, the Dallas-area taxing authorities’ claims were neither listed on Mr. Smith’s creditor list nor in any of his pretrial briefing. Second, and more importantly, these claims at this point are contingent, and therefore expressly not counted under
Under Texas law, it is not the property taxes that become due and owing on January 1st of each year. Rather, it is a lien that attaches on January 1st of each year “to secure the payment of all taxes, penalties, and interest ultimately imposed for the year on the property, whether or not the taxes are imposed in the year the lien attaches.”
The removal of the Dallas-area taxing authorities from Mr. Smith’s list of qualifying creditors leaves just the four undisputed creditors of Mr. Rhodes, making the one-creditor provision of
Special Circumstances Exception
Rhodes argues that the Court should apply a “special circumstances” exception to the three creditor requirement. A line of cases in this district has established a “special circumstances” exception to the three creditor requirement when the alleged debtor has participated in fraudulent transfers and prepetition payments.
See In re Moss,
However, because the arithmetic from this Court’s analysis leads to the conclusion that there are only four holders of qualifying claims against Mr. Smith under
D. The Court’s Jurisdiction
Mr. Smith asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction over a matter brought by a single disputed creditor where an alleged debtor has more then eleven creditors. Thus, Mr. Smith states that this petition should be dismissed under
E. Two Party Dispute
Mr. Smith argues that the Court should abstain from taking this case. Bankruptcy Code § 305 provides that section provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if—
(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension.
11 U.S.C. § 305 .
“Granting an abstention motion pursuant to
Factors to be considered by the Court include:
(1) the economy and efficiency of administration;
(2) whether another forum is available to protect the interests of both parties or there is already a pending proceeding in state court;
(3) whether federal proceedings are necessary to reach a just and equitable solution;
(4) whether there is an alternative means of achieving an equitable distribution of assets;
(5) whether the debtor and the creditors are able to work out a less expensive out-of-court arrangement which better serves all interests in the case;
(6) whether a non-federal insolvency has proceeded so far in those proceedings that it would be costly and time consuming to start afresh with the federal bankruptcy process; and
(7) the purpose for which bankruptcy jurisdiction has been sought.
Id. Weighing these factors in the present case, the Court finds that Mr. Smith has not met his burden. There are remedies under the Bankruptcy Code that are not available to Rhodes under state law, due to Mr. Smith’s transfer of the majority of his assets to the Cook Island Trust, federal proceedings may be necessary to reach a just and equitable solution, and the bankruptcy court is the most efficient place to administer property of the estate for creditors.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that an order for relief should be entered against Mr. Smith and his counter-claims denied. Counsel for Rhodes shall submit an order consistent with this decision within ten days from the date of entry of this opinion.