58 Misc. 581 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1908
On or about April 15, 1907, the board of water supply of the city of Hew York by its president verified a petition reciting various statutes in relation to providing the said city with an additional supply of pure and wholesome water, for the acquisition of lands or interests therein and for the construction of the necessary reservoirs, aqueducts, etc., for that purpose and the proceedings of various bodies thereunder. Said petition alleges compliance on the part of said city and petitioner with said statutes and a filing on February 19, 1907, in Ulster county clerk’s office, .of a map upon which there are laid out and numbered the parcels of real estate on which it is necessary to construct and maintain the reservoir and which it is necessary to acquire for the prosecution of the work authorized by said act and that all of said parcels are to be acquired in fee. The petition further recites that “ The Board of Water Supply further shows that the real estate to be acquired herein is necessary for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating the reservoir, aqueduct, culverts, sluices, tunnels and the various appurtenances for the purpose of conveying water to the City of Hew York,” and the following is a description of all the real estate to be acquired on behalf of the city of Hew York for the purposes of this act, in this particular proceeding as shown on the map hereinbefore referred to. Each of the parcels is to be acquired in fee, the title to vest in the city of Hew York as prescribed by law. (Then follows a description of the several parcels of real estate desired to be taken by a separate description of each.) The petitioner further alleges that it has taken all the steps and discharged all the duties imposed upon said board of water supply to entitle the petitioner to the relief
Upon said petition on the 20th day of April, 1907, the court appointed three commissioners herein to ascertain and appraise the compensation to be made to the owners of and all persons interested in the real estate laid down on said map in this proceeding, filed in the said clerk’s office as aforesaid, as proposed to be taken or affected for the purposes indicated in said act and to exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred upon them under chapter 724 of the Laws of 1905, and the acts amendatory thereof and relating thereto.
On or about the 23d day of Dovember, 1907, the said commissioners made a first separate report of nineteen parcels of said real estate so referred to them, and the matter came on before this court for a hearing on the motion of the corporation counsel of the city of Dew York for confirmation of the same on the 21st day of December, 1907. On that hearing no objection was made to the confirmation of the report as to five parcels and the report of the commissioners thereon was confirmed. As to the remaining fourteen parcels objections were made and the report as to those parcels is here for confirmation or otherwise on the part of this court.
This real estate described in the petition herein is sought to be obtained by virtue of the right of eminent domain exercised by authority granted by the Legislature by taking a large number of parcels of real estate in this county for the purpose of making a large reservoir thereon for the accumulation and storage of water for the use principally of the inhabitants of the city of Dew York, to be conveyed to said
The right of eminent domain is the right of the State as sovereign to at any time take the private property of any citizen for public use by paying just compensation therefor. As stated by Judge Vann of the Court of Appeals in People v. Adirondack R. Co., 160 N. Y. 225, 237, “ The power of eminent domain is the right of the state, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon making just compensation. The state has all the power of eminent domain there is and all that any sovereign has, subject to the limitations of the Constitution. Although exercised under our first Constitution, it is not mentioned therein, and it is now mentioned only for the purpose of limitation. The language of the Eevised Constitution is as follows: ‘ Mo person * * * shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation;’ and (when private property shall be taken for any public use, the compensation to be made therefor, when such compensation is not made by the state, shall be ascertained by a jury, or by not less than three commissioners appointed' by a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law.’ Const., art. 1, §§ 6, 7. This language, which presupposes the existence of the power outside of the Constitution, simply regulates the right to use it. It does not confer the power, but recognizes its existence, surrounds it with proper limitations.”
The right of eminent domain is older than our Constitution and is inherent in all governments. Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 161; People v. White, 11 Barb. 26.
It is now restricted in this State by constitutional provision (Art. 1, § 6) : “ * * * nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”
The decisions are that this compensation is to be paid the landowner for the fair and reasonable market value of his property at the time of the appropriation by the condemning party, which in this case was on the 9th day of May, 1907, and such property is to be considered for all purposes
“ That right,” said Chief Justice Fuller of the United States Supreme Court, referring to the right of eminent domain, “ is the offspring of political necessity, and is inseparable from sovereignty unless denied to it by its fundamental law. It cannot be exercised except upon condition that just compensation shall be made to the owner, and it is the duty of the State, in the conduct of the inquest by which the compensation is ascertained, to see that it is just, not merely to the individual whose property is taken, but to the public which is to pay for it.” Searl v. School District, 133 U. S. 553, 562.
Justice Field also said in Garrison v. City of New York, 21 Wall. 196, 204: “The proceedings to ascertain the benefits or losses which will accrue to the owner of property when taken for public use, and thus the compensation to be made to him, is in the nature of an inquest on the part of the State, and is necessarily under her control. It is her duty to see that the estimates made are just, not merely to the individual whose property is taken, but to the public which is to pay for it.”
The condemnation of private property for public use is not intended to benefit the individual owner, nor is the condemning party called upon to pay the owner for advantages which may accrue to it by reason of the location of its property. It is not the advantage to Hew York city but the detriment to the landowner that must be paid for. Black River & M. R. R. Co. v. Barnard, 9 Hun, 106 Matter of N. Y., L. & W. R. Co., 33 id. 639.
information (by the commissioners in assessing damages) may be collected in all the ways which a prudent man usually takes to satisfy his own mind, concerning matters of the like kind, where his own interests are involved in the inquiry.
In all cases the value must -be actual, not speculative. Rand. Em. Dom. 228; 15 Cyc. 895.
“And generally remote and speculative inquiries should be excluded.” 2 Lewis Em. Dom. (2d ed.) 1059; Searl v. School District No. 2, 133 U. S. 564.
The damages to the landowners or claimants as they are called in this proceeding are to be fixed for the market value of the real estate taken for its best available uses to claimants and for all the purposes for which it is or reasonably may be used.
Various kinds of objections were filed by attorneys for the different claimants in this proceeding, and I shall proceed to discuss them briefly in a general way, giving reasons for the determination made.
One of the objections is that the commissioners as to certain parcels excluded testimony offered in behalf of the claimants as to the gross receipts of business and net income from business conducted upon the parcels of land condemned in this proceeding. This applies to several parcels. We have seen from the petition and order that this commission was appointed to award compensation to claimants for the real estate taken and this is in accordance with the statute. The statutes also provide under certain conditions therein stated that the owner of an established business on June 1, 1905, directly or indirectly decreased in value by reason of the acquiring of land by the city of Bew York for an additional water supply, his heirs or assigns or personal representatives, shall have a right of damage for such decreased value; that the board of water supply may agree with such person as to the amount of such damages and in case such agreement cannot be made such amount of damages shall be determined in the manner herein provided for the ascertainment of the value of real estate taken. Laws of 1905, chap. 724, § 42, as amended by Laws of 1906, chap. 314.
The same rule applies to the attempt to prove loss to personal property or private property owned by the claimants here on some of these real estate properties condemned in this proceeding’. This personal property is not taken by the city of Mew York and it does not propose to take the same. It is still in the possession of the owner. Personal property is by its nature highly perishable' and it may very .well be that by the time the parties are ready to move to some other place much of the personal property belonging to the claimants will have entirely disappeared, been lost or worn out by use. Manifestly the city should not be required to pay for such property. If parties remove only a short distance and
Considerable argument was had on the submission of the report of the commissioners as to the admissibility of evidence of structural value of the buildings and erections upon the lands condemned. This question is not before me at this time because on the application of the claimants such evidence was admitted by this commission over the objection of the city and undoubtedly was considered by the commissioners as an element of damages to the claimant. The city now moves for confirmation of the report despite such evidence having been admitted against it over its objection. If the commissioners did not give to such evidence the importance claimed for it by the landowner it is difficult to see how the city is blameworthy for that fact. The claimants allege that it was not given sufficient weight because in some cases structural value as testified to by the witnesses for both parties added to the city’s value of the land without any improvements is greater than the amount of the award. The claimants lose sight of the importance of the examination of the premises made by the commissioners. There is no such disparity in the items claimed as to cause the court to set aside the award for the reasons suggested. It is also urged that a separate report should be made as to the structural value of the buildings upon these several properties so that claimants may know just how much weight in each case the commission gave to testimony of that kind. Nothing could be gained by such a report. All these structures are a part of the real estate and a separate report on each structure, as was asked for by one of the claimants, would simply tend to confusion.
^Objection was made that there is no separate report on quarry property contained on or in the land of some of the claimants in this section. There should be no such separate
Mor can there be any claim where a quarry is taken for loss of an established business or decrease in the value or amount of the same, as the quarry is taken by the city of Mew York and paid for as part of the real estate. Working a quan’j simply turns into money a portion of the real estate, hence depreciates the value of the real estate, so that having been awarded damages for the entire real estate, including the quarry, there is no business to be decreased.^;
One of the attorneys, Mr. Buck, alleges unjust discrimination on the part of the commissioners against his client’s properties. A careful examination of the matter leads me to the conclusion that such allegations are entirely unfounded. Two affidavits relating to such allegations were handed up without reading on the hearing before me and I said that I would decide whether they would be received on an examination of them. These affidavits are simply attempts to get before this court the affiant’s idea of the relative values of real estate in this section three. Such evidence was not competent before the commission and is not competent before this court, and will not be considered on this hearing. It has been used by me simply as a brief of the claimant and as setting forth this contention.
Another objection is made to the action of these commissioners in that they have not admitted evidence of what has been referred to in a general way as the availability and adaptability of certain of these properties for reservoir pur
I shall refer first to parcel Ho. 85, Elizabeth Hogan, owner, which is a parcel of land containing something over 109 acres and which has a small stream or rivulet of water on it. A small portion of the lot borders on the Beaverkill, a somewhat large* stream of water, hut still small when compared with the, Esopus, which eventually empties into the Esopus creel, upon which the Ashokan dam is to be constructed, at a point below the said dam. The nearest point of the Esopus creek to lot 85 is over one mile therefrom and many different parcels of land belonging to different owners intervene between painel 85 and the Esopus creek. The place where the main dam is to be built is at a greater distance from the parcel in question up stream. The greater portion of this lot 85 is within the proposed reservoir. The question was presented to the commission on an offer of Mr. Slosson, the attorney for Elizabeth Hogan, as follows:
“ Mr. Slosson.— I offer on behalf of the claimant to prove the following facts:
"Second. The demand for this property by the city of Yew York for water purposes.
“ Third. The character, quality and volume of water furnished by the Ashokan and its tributary reservoirs.
" Fourth. The cost of this supply, its value to the city of Yew York, and the value of this particular piece of property to Yew York city as a part of its reservoir system.
"Fifth. The capacity of this parcel in relation to the whole storage capacity of the Ashokan reservoir.
" Sixth. The fact that this reservoir is the most accessible, cheapest and best obtainable supply of water for the city of Yew York.” '
It was objected to by Mr. Linson on behalf of the city of Yew York as follows:
First. That it is improper.
Second. That it is immaterial.
Third. That it is irrelevant.
Fourth. That it is incompetent.
Fifth. That the evidence is immaterial and irrelevant, specifically in that it appears by the petition forming part of the record upon which this commission was appointed, and of which it must take judicial notice, that the parcel of land in question forms a part of the premises which have been selected by the proper authorities of the city of Yew York for the purpose of gaining a new and additional water supply for the city, and therefore it is conclusively presumed that the same is adapted to the purposes for which it is desired, and that being so presumed it can neither be added to nor subtracted from by proof.
Sixth. That the evidence is improper in that it assumes that the measure of damages in cases like this is the value of the property to the condemning party, and not the value of the property — in the hands of the owner.
Seventh. That the evidence is improper in that it is speculative, because it appears by the record before the commission that the property in question to be acquired is one of a large number of parcels belonging to a large number of different
The commission sustained the objections to the admission of the evidence by the following decision:
“After consultation the commission have determined to deny the claimant’s application to introduce this testimony, on the ground that the only purpose for which it would be admissible would be to show the availability and the desirability of this property for reservoir purposes, and that the petition under which the proceeding has been instituted contains an admission on the part of the city that it is the most available and the most desirable and the best adapted for furnishing an additional supply of pure and wholesome water to the city of Hew York.
“ I might add that the commission holds that it has a right to take that admission into consideration in determining the amount of damages to which the claimant would be entitled.” Both parties excepted to this ruling of the commission.
The commission was right in declining to receive evidence of its value to the city of Hew York. Section 3 of chapter 724 of the Laws of 1905, as amended by chapter 314 of the Laws of 1906, contains this clause: “Provided, however,
that no reservoir, or other structure for the storage or impounding of water, shall at any time be constructed within the drainage area of the Esopus creek in the county of Ulster, other than that designated in the reports of William H. Burr, Rudolph Herring, and John R. Freeman to the Honorable George B. McClellan, mayor, chairman, board of estimate and apportionment of the city of Hew York, as to the Ashokan reservoir, the flow line of which shall not exceed elevation six hundred feet coast and geodetic survey datum.” It was argued by some of the claimants here that this section of t-he statute pre-empted the proposed Ashokan reservoir site for the use of the city of Hew York and hence the claimants should be for that reason permitted to prove the value of the
The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth offers were all properly rejected by the commission for the reason that they all refer to the reservoir that is proposed to be created by the city of Hew York upon the Esopus creek and the value to the city of the parcel 85. That leaves the question, the first offer, the availability and adaptability of this property for reservoir and water supply purposes. In the argument it was stated upon behalf of parcel 85 that “ the purpose of offering this testimony was to show, by contrasting the cost of storing 121,000,000,000 gallons of water in this reservoir with what it would cost to store the same quantity of water under ordinary conditions, on the theory that any advantages that this property was-possessed of by reason of its natural adaptability, and availability, for water supply purposes, should accrue to the owner of the property rather than to the condemning party. If claimant had been permitted to show the cost of this reservoir, and the increased cost of storing this amount of water in a reservoir of the same capacity under ordinary conditions, the difference would amount to a saving in the cost made possible by the peculiar adaptability of this site for the construction of a reservoir of its enormous capacity. This advantage, or this difference in cost, this saving, it would seem must accrue to the owner as part of his property. He should be permitted to reap the benefit thereof, instead of the city of Hew York.” As
An English case has been cited (Matter of Arbitration between the Mayor of Tynemouth and the Duke of Northumberland), where three persons were the owners of separate parcels of land suitable and about to he condemned for reservoir purposes. Heither parcel was suitable for an entire reservoir, but the three together were. The arbitrator in England allowed compensation for the availability of the site of one owner, which award was confirmed by the court,
The principal case cited by the claimants in this State is Matter of Gilroy, 85 Hun, 424, in which-the court held as follows: “ The principal question presented by the appeal from the order confirming the report is whether the commissioners did not adopt an erroneous measure of damages in excluding from consideration, as an element in the market value of the property to be taken, the existence of any demand for such property on the part of the city of New York. The record plainly shows that they proceeded upon the theory that the existence of any such demand could not be considered as an element of market value. So far as the rule which they followed was merely a decision that the desirability of the particular property to the city in view of its necessities was not the legal measure of damages it was correct. The commissioners went much further than this, however, and practically held that the availability of the property for use in connection with the water supply of New York city could not be taken into account by them in determining what was the fair market value of the premises.
“ In so doing it seems to me they disregarded the great weight of authority as to the proper measure of compensation in cases of this kind. * * * Without further citation of authorities, I think it is sufficiently clear that the commissioners in the case at bar erred in excluding from consideration an essential element in the-market value of the prop
Referring back to the suggestion in regard to the cost of storing 127,000,000,000 gallons of water under ordinary conditions. The commission had confronting them the question whether there could be any such immense volume of water stored under the ordinary conditions or what would be the ordinary conditions of storing that amount of water. In the first place there was no such reservoir pointed out to the commission and manifestly there could be no ordinary conditions with the average usual cost of a reservoir of uhat size because the cost of sites of such an immense reservoir would vary as much as the sites would vary and manifestly no two sites for a reservoir of that size would be alike. “Adaptability must not hinge upon the expenditure of money by the owner nor upon the assistance of outside parties.” Rand. Em. Dom., 288; Matter of Mew York, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 33 Hun, 639. Testimony was received in this case, which was an elevator case, with relation to the earnings of other elevators and the probable amount that could be earned on the property sought to be condemned provided the property in question was improved and built upon, and the court says: “ The reference made to the earnings of other
From an examination of these and .all the cases cited to me by the landowners and many others examined, not cited nor referred to by me, I think that the ruling of the commission was correct. It may be suggested that some of the matters that I have referred to here, such as the comparative number of persons who must unite to make the proposed reservoir here, is not before the commissioners. This is true so far as testimony goes. It was not proven but they are matters of common knowledge, easily within the knowledge of all the
In parcels No. 90, 94 and 122 the evidence had all been taken and the case closed when about November 13, 1907, shortly before the commission reported, a motion was made to reopen the cases and to introduce evidence concerning this same availability and adaptability, which motion, after argument, was denied by the commission. I am not disposed to interfere with the action of the commission in this matter. In the first place it was a matter of discretion with them as to whether they were sufficiently impressed by the arguments of the persons making the motions to permit the cases to be reopened. With such discretion courts will not interfere unless the same has been abused. In the second place the commission decided in the light of their previous decision in lot 85 and in the light of the argument submitted. I think the decision is correct. Lot 122 is entirely below the proposed reservoir dam, so that much of the evidence claimed ■to 'be material as to the reservoir site for-storage of water would not apply to it and the greater portion of lot 90 is also below it. On No. 90 a small rivulet has its source. No. 94 is the next lot up stream on the same small stream that flows through No. 85. and No. 122 has no stream. They are all of them some distance from the Esopus^.
In regard to the thirteen parcels, exclusive of 124A, I have decided to conform to the report of the commissioners in ac
In parcel 90 the commission had no jurisdiction to determine the question submitted by the United States Award and Assessment Company.
In regard to parcel ¡No. 124A, Jerome H. Buck owner. This is a parcel of land originally containing about sixty-four acres of wrhick the city takes 52.869 acres, leaving something over eleven acres not taken. Considerable confusion crept into the proceedings during the hearing of this case. Amongst other objections urged .by the claimant is “ That the commissioners erred in receiving evidence of benefits to the portion of the property not taken, by reason of a road, which it is claimed the city means to construct along the property not taken.” The testimony is that the eleven acres that will be left to the owner are without access to any highway. It was suggested during the hearing that under the ,act the public highways were not to be closed until actually necessary for the use of the work of the city, but that would
I think I have now covered in some measure, in an opinion altogether too long, all the various objections that were made to this report.
The commission allowed or recommended no costs as such to the various claimants. An application is made to me to tax to the claimants certain bills of costs. Justice Mills, in the matter of section ¡No. 2 of the Catskill aqueduct, handed down an opinion in July, 1907, in which he refused such costs. I consider his decision and the reason given therefor correct, and I shall follow the same, so no costs are allowed.
■Section 13 of chapter 724 of the Laws of 1905, as amended by chapter 314 of the Laws of 1906, provides that “ They,” the commissioners, “ may also recommend such sums, if any, as shall seem to them proper to be allowed, to parties appearing in the proceeding, as expenses and disbursements, including reasonable compensation for witnesses.” See Laws o-f 1905, chap. 724, § 32. Under these sections the commissioners have recommended allowances as counsel fees to the extent of five per cent., with the exception of three cases, where the amount of the award exceeds $5,000. Without intending to establish the precedent that there may not be cases in which the allowance of five per cent, for counsel fees would be too. great even where it did not meet the prohibition of the statute, still I think in each of the cases examined in
An order may be entered in conformance herewith.
Ordered accordingly.