In Re Silberkraus
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- March
I. Facts
KATHLEEN P. MARCH, Bankruptcy Judge.A. Filing of Chapter 11, State Court Litigation, Conduct in Chapter 11
1. Debtor’s Bankruptcy Petition
On February 8, 2000, Fred Lawrence Silberkraus (“Debtor”), an individual, filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition. As of date of filing Debtor owned two major assets, as shown by his bankruptcy schedules. These were a 75,000 foot industrial building located at 2501 Santa Fe Avenue, Redondo Beach, CA 90278 (the “commercial property”) and Debtor’s personal residence located at 1340 Roscomare Road, Los Angeles, CA 90077 (the “residence”).
The fair market value of the commercial property as of date of filing was between
According to Debtor’s Schedules, the fair market value of the residence as of date of filing was $775,000. Schedule D showed liens on the residence totaling $602,000. Debtor claimed a $75,000 homestead exemption on Schedule C. Consequently, the equity above liens after paying the Debtor the exemption amount would be $98,000, minus costs of sale.
Debtor’s Schedule E showed no unsecured priority claims. Schedule F showed general unsecured claims in the amount of $510,592. Ah but $121,092 of this unsecured debt was listed as disputed. A total of $303,000 of the disputed unsecured debt was allegedly general unsecured debts owed to L.E. Coppersmith, Inc. (hereinafter “Coppersmith”) and The Seeley Company (hereinafter “Seeley”). A total of $131,000 of the scheduled general unsecured debt was incurred in January of 2000 — the month prior to the bankruptcy filing. Debtor’s testimony at the 341(a) meeting revealed that $10,000 of the credit card debt was incurred for the purpose of paying part of Debtor’s attorney’s $50,000 pre-petition retainer. (See L.E. Coppers-mith’s Reply to Opposition to L.E. Cop-persmith Inc. Motion for Relief from Stay, Declaration of Michael Gottfried.)
Because Debtor’s assets — $3,082,796.60 in equity in the commercial property above all hens, $98,000 of equity in the residence above all liens — exceeded Debtor’s remaining liabilities — $510,592 in mainly disputed unsecured claims, Debtor was very solvent on the petition date. In a chapter 7 liquidation, after selling the commercial property and residence for fair market value and paying the claimed homestead exemption in the amount of $75,000, a chapter 7 trustee would be able to pay 100% of all debts owed by Debtor (secured, priority, general unsecured).
As discussed infra, the Debtor — or a chapter 7 trustee if the case was converted to a chapter 7 — may be obligated to sell the Debtor’s commercial property to creditor Coppersmith. Coppersmith claimed it had an option to purchase the building for $3,950,000, and claimed to have properly exercised this option to purchase prepetition. However, even a sale of the commercial building to Coppersmith at $3,950,000, plus sale of the residence at the fair market value of the residence, should have produced enough money to pay all - creditors in this case 100%, or very close thereto, given the Debtor’s liabilities as scheduled.
Throughout this bankruptcy case, Debt- or responded to the creditors’ contention that a sale of the commercial property, even at the $3,950,000 option price, would be sufficient to pay all creditors, by asserting that “enforcing the option to purchase in the manner [Coppersmith and Seeley] ... demand would trigger massive tax liabilities.... [W]hen the tax consequences are considered the alleged ‘one million dollars’ gain on sale to Coppersmith becomes a $151,000 loss.” (See Debtor’s Opposition to L.E. Coppersmith Motion to Lift Stay, page 2, lines 20 - 22.) Debtor contended that the “original cause of the dispute between Silberkraus and Coppersmith was Coppersmith’s inexplicable refusal to hon- or its obligation to cooperate in arranging a tax-free exchange.” (See Debtor’s Opposition to L.E. Coppersmith Motion to Lift Stay, page 3, lines 9 - 11.)
However, Debtor never supported its tax liability contentions with competent evidence. Debtor initially provided a sparse analysis purportedly showing potential future capital gains tax liability; but, Debtor provided “no foundation for the capital gains analysis, including that Debtor did not even identify who authored the ‘pur
2. The State Court Litigation with Coppersmith and Seeley
In 1993 Debtor and Seeley entered into an agreement whereby Seeley became the Debtor’s agent for the sale or lease of the commercial property. In December of 1994, Debtor and Coppersmith entered into a written lease which leased the commercial property to Coppersmith for five years, with an option to purchase at the end of the term. The lease provided that Seeley was to be paid a commission upon Coppersmith’s exercise of the option to purchase. (See Exhibit A to L.E. Cop-persmith’s Motion for Relief from Stay for a copy of the lease/option to buy contract.)
On April 9, 1999 Coppersmith exercised its option to purchase the commercial building at $3,950,000.
3
(See
L.E. Cop-persmith’s Motion for Relief from Stay, Declaration of L.E. Coppersmith, Exhibit B.) Escrow was opened on April 19, 1999.
(See
L.E. Coppersmith’s Motion for Relief from Stay, Declaration of L.E. Coppers-mith, Exhibit C.) Pursuant to the lease, escrow had to close no later than 180 days from the exercise of the option to purchase. Accordingly, escrow was scheduled to close on or before October 18, 1999. (L.E. Coppersmith’s Motion for Relief from Stay, Declaration of L.E. Coppers-mith, Exhibit A.) On October 15, 1999— with the closing of escrow just 3 days away — Debtor’s transactional counsel, Thomas
&
Walton LLP, wrote to the escrow company and stated that escrow would not be closing on October 18, 1999 because of the litigation between Debtor and Jeannie Silberkraus (Debtor’s former
On October 20, 1999, Coppersmith filed a complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court, State of California against Debtor and Jeannie Silberkraus, alleging breach of contract, and seeking specific performance to compel the sale of Debtor’s commercial property to Coppersmith pursuant to the option to purchase. (See L.E. Cop-persmith’s Motion for Relief from Stay, Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit B.) On November 19, 1999, Debtor answered the complaint and filed a cross complaint against Coppersmith and Jeannie Silber-kraus. (See L.E. Coppersmith’s Motion for Relief from Stay, Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit C.)
On December 4, 1998, the Debtor filed a complaint against Seeley in Los Angeles Superior Court. (See The Seeley Company Motion for Relief from Stay, Declaration of William Turner.) The Debtor alleged that Seeley committed a breach of contract and a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Lease and Listing Agreement. (See The Seeley Company Motion for Relief from Stay, Declaration of William Turner.) The Superior Court action was ultimately stayed, and the parties submitted to arbitration. The arbitration hearings were scheduled to be conducted from February 7, 2000 to February 10, 2000. On January 3, 2000, by stipulation of the parties, Seeley filed a complaint in intervention in the Coppersmith v. Debtor Superior Court action. The Superior Court ordered the arbitration stayed pending the resolution of the Superior Court action initiated by Coppersmith. (See The Seeley Company Motion for Relief from Stay, Declaration of William Turner.)
The Superior Court scheduled a status conference for February 10, 2000, for the purpose of scheduling trial dates on Coppersmith’s complaint, Debtor’s cross complaint and Seeley’s complaint in intervention. (See L.E. Coppersmith, Inc.’s Motion for Relief from Stay, Declaration of Abraham Rudy.)
However, on February 8, 2000 — two days before the scheduled state court status conference — Debtor filed the herein bankruptcy, thereby staying the state court action. Throughout the bankruptcy, Debtor has been represented by Dressier Rein Evans & Sestanovich, LLP (hereinafter “the Dressier law firm”). Attorney Thomas Dressier, Esq. (hereinafter “Dressier, Esq.”) of that firm was the attorney who signed the bankruptcy petition, and who signed all other pleadings filed on behalf of Debtor in the bankruptcy, as the attorney from the Dressier law firm.
3. Debtor’s Conduct During the Chapter 11 Case
a. Opposing The Relief from Stay Motions
Coppersmith, and then Seeley, each filed motions for relief from stay in this bankruptcy case, moving the Court to lift the automatic stay of
The Court noted in granting the relief from stay motions that it is inappropriate to allow the Debtor to forum shop — to seek to have the bankruptcy court determine the validity of the option to purchase, instead of the state court — via the mechanism of filing bankruptcy. The state court lawsuit — which would have decided that issue — was already in progress at the time the bankruptcy was filed. Bankruptcy was not necessary to get a determination regarding the validity and enforceability of the option to purchase. If the state court determined that the option to purchase was not enforceable, then the Debtor should be able to propose a chapter 11 plan in the bankruptcy that would sell the commercial property elsewhere, possibly at a higher price than the option price. If the state court granted specific performance to Coppersmith, then the Debtor would not have the commercial property to sell, but Debtor would have the $3,950,000 purchase price (minus paying liens, costs of suit, etc.) to distribute via a chapter 11 plan.
b. Chapter 11 Status Conference and Disclosure Statement Hearing
At a Chapter 11 status conference held by the court on May 10, 2000 the Court set “drop dead dates” for the Debtor to file a plan and disclosure statement (August 8, 2000), for the Debtor to have a disclosure statement approved by the court as containing adequate information pursuant to
On June 7, 2000 Debtor filed a plan and disclosure statement. A hearing was held on the disclosure statement on July 18, 2000. Written objections to the disclosure statement were filed by four parties — the Office of the U.S. Trustee, Coppersmith, Seeley, and Jeannie Silberkraus. Cop-persmith objected to the Plan as being predicated upon the assumption that Debt- or could reject the lease and option to purchase, refinance the commercial property and re-lease the property at the “market rate,” or sell it, thereby ignoring: (1) the fact that the Court had granted relief from stay on the state court specific performance action, and Coppersmith might win that action for specific performance, and (2) the fact that Debtor’s premise that Debtor could use bankruptcy to get rid of Coppersmith’s lease and option to pur
Ex-spouse and creditor Jeannie Silber-kraus objected to the disclosure statement on the ground that the plan’s proposed treatment of Jeannie Silberkraus was unfair and improper because it purportedly delayed the receipt of approximately $420,000 in secured funds owed by Debtor to Jeannie Silberkraus per the prepetition state court property division decree. Jeannie Silberkraus alleged that a family court arbitrator already rejected the proposal set forth by Debtor, and that the proposal would result in Jeannie Silber-kraus never receiving the principal she was owed during her lifetime.
The Office of the U.S. Trustee’s objection pointed out myriad defects in the proposed disclosure statement and plan, including: that Debtor did not disclose the terms of the note awarded to Jeannie Sil-berkraus in the arbitration of their divorce proceedings, and until (and if and when) the property is refinanced, monthly payment terms to Jeannie Silberkraus should be provided; that Debtor failed to state what cash would be available on the Effective Date; that Debtor failed to provide any details regarding the refinancing of the property; and that Debtor completely failed to submit historical or projected financial statements.
After a lengthy hearing the Court denied approval of the disclosure statement for numerous reasons, including that the plan was nonconfirmable on its face because of improper classification, particularly splitting Coppersmith’s and Seeley’s unsecured claims into a separate unsecured class from the other general unsecured claims. The Court ruled, inter alia, that separate classification of Coppersmith and Seeley was improper pursuant to In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 822, 113 S.Ct. 72, 121 L.Ed.2d 37 (1992) as adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Barakat v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. (In re Barakat), 99 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1143, 117 S.Ct. 1312, 137 L.Ed.2d 475 (1997), because the separate classification was done to gerrymander to create an impaired class (the non-Coppers-mith/Seeley general unsecured class) which might vote to accept the plan: The Court ruled it would be a waste of resources to approve any disclosure statement, unless the classification of the underlying plan was corrected, because the improper classification would render the plan nonconfirmable. There are numerous decisions which hold that where a plan is on its face nonconfirmable, as a matter of law, it is appropriate for the court to deny approval of the disclosure statement describing the nonconfirmable plan. In re United States Brass Corp., 194 B.R. 420 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1996); In re Spanish Lake Assoc., 92 B.R. 875, 877 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1988); In re Pecht, 57 B.R. 137, 139 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1986); In re Century Investment Fund VIII Ltd. Partnership, 114 B.R. 1003 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1990).
At the disclosure statement hearing on July 18, 2000, creditors Coppersmith and Seeley urged the court to convert or dismiss this case due to the myriad problems with the plan and disclosure statement. Dressier, Esq. told the Court that the Debtor would amend the plan and disclosure statement to fix these problems, and asked for a continuance to file an amended plan and disclosure statement. The Court overruled the creditors’ objections to the requested continuance. The Court gave Debtor until August 8, 2000 to file a first amended disclosure statement and plan, gave creditors until August 22, 2000 to object to the first amended ’ disclosure statement, and set a hearing on the first amended plan and disclosure statement for September 5, 2000. The Court directed Debtor to amend the plan to fix the classification, with corresponding changes in the amended disclosure statement, and direct
c. The Motion to Convert from Chapter 11 to 7
Creditor Coppersmith moved the Court to convert the case from a chapter 11 to a chapter 7 due to Debtor’s bad faith pursuant to
Coppersmith contended that the timing of the petition (just two days prior to a trial setting status conference in state court) coupled with the fact that the Debt- or was solvent on the petition date, established Debtor’s bad faith. Coppersmith further stated that cause for conversion existed because the Debtor failed to act as a fiduciary to his creditors because: (1) the dispute with Coppersmith caused a conflict of interest (Debtor could pay all creditors even if Coppersmith exercised the option); (2) the Debtor incurred $50,000 of credit card debt just prior to filing for the purpose of paying the bankruptcy retainer; (3) Debtor made selective prepayments for services not yet rendered just prior to filing; (4) Debtor would fail to properly pursue avoidance actions; (5) Debtor used cash collateral to pay personal expenses and without approval of the court; and (6) Debtor used the services of special litigation counsel without prior court approval. Finally, Coppersmith alleged that cause for conversion existed because Debtor proposed an unconfirmable plan of reorganization, which failed to reveal the “insurmountable obstacles which the Debtor face[d] in obtaining any proceeds from refinancing the Redondo Beach Property [the commercial property].” (See L.E. Coppersmith’s Motion to Convert, p. 21, line 7 -10.)
When the Court ruled that it would give Debtor until August 8, 2000 to file an amended plan and disclosure statement, and set a hearing on the adequacy of the first amended disclosure statement for September 5, 2000, the Court continued Coppersmith’s motion to convert to September 5, 2000 also, to see whether or not Debtor could get a disclosure statement approved on the continued date. Also at the hearing on July 18, 2000, the court
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d. No First Amended Plan and Disclosure Statement Filed, and Debtor Concedes It Cannot Reorganize
The deadline for Debtor to file its first amended disclosure statement and first amended plan came and went without Debtor filing either a first amended disclosure statement or a first amended plan. On the September 5, 2000 continued hearing date, Dressier, Esq. confirmed that Debtor had not filed either an amended disclosure statement or an amended plan. Dressier, Esq. also conceded at the September 5, 2000 hearing that Debtor could not reorganize over the objection of creditors Coppersmith and Seeley, and that Debtor did not, as of the September 5, 2000 hearing date, have the consent/cooperation of these objecting creditors.
Dressier, Esq. advised the Court that the Debtor would consent to dismissal with 180 day bar. The Office of the U.S. Trustee requested conversion to a chapter 7, stating there was sufficient available equity to pay all or a substantial portion of the total debt in a chapter 7 liquidation, even if the state court were to rule that Coppers-mith had an enforceable option to purchase at $8,950,000, and because there was $121,092 of undisputed general unsecured debt (in addition to the disputed general unsecured claims of Coppersmith and See-ley), which would be better served by payment in chapter 7 than by dismissal with no condition of payment. ■ Seeley ■ stated that it preferred having the court dismiss the case and impose sanctions pursuant to F.R.B.P. Rule 9011.. Coppersmith said its first choice was dismissal with sanctions rather than conversion. Jeannie Silber-kraus requested conversion of the case to a chapter 7.
The Court converted the case to chapter .7, because there was ^sufficient equity to pay all or substantially all debt in a chapter 7 liquidation, even if the Coppers-mith option to purchase was enforceable. Furthermore, even though Seeley and Coppersmith would be protected by proceeding in the state court suit if the bankruptcy case was dismissed with a bar, the general unsecured credit card debt and the debt owed to ex-spouse Jeannie Sil-berkraus would, not be protected; and would be unlikely to be paid if the bankruptcy case was dismissed rather than converted.
By the date of the conversion, Debtor had had the protection of the bankruptcy court for seven months, successfully delaying his creditors for that period of time. Converting the case to chapter 7 would give the creditors some benefit from the bankruptcy case, because a chapter 7 trustee would be, appointed and could be expected to liquidate both the commercial property and the residence, whereas the Debtor, as a Debtor-in-Possession, never proposed selling his own residence. Additionally, a neutral party such as a chapter 7 trustee might settle the Coppers-mith/Seeley átate court litigation for an amount sufficient to pay the creditors, whereas the Debtor had no incentive to settle unless the price was high enough to pay all creditors plus return funds to the Debtor.
e. L.E. Coppersmith’s Motion for Sanctions and Seeley’s Motion for Sanctions
After the deadline for the Debtor to file an amended plan and disclosure statement
Coppersmith and Seeley also each applied to have these motions heard on shortened time — so that the sanctions motions could be heard at the same time as the continued disclosure statement hearing, the motion to convert, and the Court’s order to show cause why Debtor’s case should not be dismissed with a 180 day bar against refiling. In light of the fact that Debtor failed to file an amended plan and disclosure statement, and that Dressier, Esq. responded to the Court’s Order to Show Cause by stating that the Debtor would not be opposing a dismissal, the Court granted the applications to have the sanctions motions heard at the September 5, 2000 hearing, so that the issue of sanctions would not be mooted by dismissal of the case, in the event that the Court granted dismissal of the case. As discussed in detail infra in Section II.B, the Court granted the motions for sanctions at the hearing on September 5, 2000, but only in one half of the amounts moved for by Coppersmith and Seeley.
II. Applicable Law
A. Pursuant to the “Totality of Facts and Circumstances” Case Law Test for Bad Faith, Debtor Filed and Prosecuted its Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in Bad Faith
Findings of lack of good faith in proceedings depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case, or as stated in
In re Little Creek Dev’t Co.,
779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir.1986), “on a conglomerate of factors rather than on any single datum.”
Accord, In re Can-Alta Properties, Ltd.,
87 B.R. 89, 91 (9th Cir. BAP 1988).
See also, Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch),
36 F.3d 825 (9th Cir.1994);
In re Arnold,
806 F.2d 937 (9th Cir.1986);
Chu v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc. (In re Chu),
253 B.R. 92 (S.D.Cal.2000);
In re Albany Partners, Ltd.,
749 F.2d 670, 674 (11th Cir.1984). All the facts and circumstances leading up to the filing of the case, and the conduct of the Debtor during the case, can properly be considered by the Court in determining whether the chapter 11 case was subject to dismissal or conversion “for cause” for bad faith/lack of the “good faith” by the debtor that is required pursuant to
In light of the facts and circumstances detailed in Part I supra herein, Debtor’s filing and prosecution of this chapter 11 case was in bad faith. These facts include: (1) Debtor’s welching on closing escrow to sell the commercial property to Coppersmith pursuant to the Coppersmith option to purchase, a mere three days before scheduled closing; (2) Debt- or’s fifing bankruptcy — though Debtor was solvent — to obstruct, delay and stay the ongoing pending state court specific performance litigation; (3) Debtor’s forum
It is inappropriate to allow a bad faith chapter 11 to continue. Therefore, on September 5, 2000 the Court was required to convert the case to a chapter 7 or dismiss the chapter 11 case, “whichever is in the best interests of the creditors and the estate, for cause,” pursuant to
The Bankruptcy Code provides certain protections and benefits to creditors, as a counterbalance to the rights and protections which the Bankruptcy Code provides debtors. See e.g., Richard I. Aaron, Bankruptcy Law Fundamentals, § 8.03 (2000) (“Distribution to the creditors based upon their allowed claims is the fundamental purpose of bankruptcy. The theory is that the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court are used to fairly distribute the inadequate assets of the insolvent debtor among the general creditors. The equitable theory is that fair sharing is much more desirable than leaving the creditors to the hustle and aggression of the ‘race to the courthouse’ remedy which award all to the first in time.”)
Chapter 11 bankruptcy is not supposed to be like a “7-11” convenience store, where the debtor merely drops in and picks up that which the debtor wants (here, obstruction and delay of the state court litigation), and then, after having the protection of the bankruptcy court, leaves bankruptcy, at will, as soon as the debtor has obtained its goal (obstruction and delay) but without the creditors obtaining any of the protections and benefits (reorganization or liquidation) which the Bankruptcy Code gives to creditors. Chapter 13 debtors have the light to dismiss their chapter 13 cases at will, pursuant to
Debtor was not eligible for a Chapter 13 because Debtor was far over the debt limit imposed by
Debtor filed chapter 11 to remain “in possession” because Debtor wanted to use bankruptcy to stall creditors as long as possible while avoiding selling his personal residence, and while refusing to settle with Coppersmith, in the hope that Coppers-mith would lose the specific performance suit, so that there would be value left for the Debtor above the amounts owed to creditors. Debtor’s incentive for the litigation with Coppersmith was that, in a surplus case, the debtor retains all equity above amount necessary to pay creditors 100%, and if Silberkraus’ case was not a surplus case, the creditors, not Debtor, were harmed, because Debtor was spending the creditors’ money to litigate with Coppersmith. This way, Debtor either received value, or only lost the creditors’ money.
2. Applicable Ninth Circuit Case Law Does Not Allow a Debtor to File Bankruptcy Solely to Obstruct Pending State Court Specific Performance Litigation
In In re Chinichian, 784 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.1986), the Ninth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision to reject a chapter 13 plan of reorganization as not being filed in good faith when the reorganization plan was filed for the purpose of preventing consummation of a state court specific performance judgment which would have required debtors to honor a contract for the sale of their home. In Chinichian the Court noted that the record showed that the debtors were not having difficulty meeting their financial obligations, that there was essentially a lack of unsecured debt, that there was no meaningful provision in the plan to sell certain properties, that there was a strategic timing of the bankruptcy which frustrated enforcement of the contract in state court, and that the bankruptcy case was filed for the purpose defeating the specific performance action. In re Chinichian, 784 F.2d at 1445.
The facts in the herein case are strikingly similar to those in
Chinichian.
In this case, the Debtor Silberkraus had millions of dollars of equity in his properties. As detailed in Part I supra, Debtor had a total of $1,130,579.60 in equity in the commercial property and residence above all liens, even assuming that Coppersmith’s option to purchase was enforceable by Coppersmith. Therefore, Debtor Silberkraus was very solvent on the petition date. Debtor’s income and expenses on the petition date — Schedule I showed income of $30,500/month, Schedule J showed expenses of $28,556/month — show that the Debtor Silberkraus was not having difficulty meeting his financial obligations as they came due. Other than the disputed unsecured claims of Coppersmith and Seeley, and the unsecured claims Debtor incurred in the month prior to filing (including the amounts to pay his bankruptcy attorneys’ retainer), there was essentially a lack of unsecured debt. Debtor’s plan and disclosure statement did not contain any meaningful mechanism for refinancing or selling of the commercial property (though it claimed to be trying to achieve these ends). Debtor’s timing in the filing of this case was strategic — Silberkraus filed just days before a status conference in state court-where the state court was to
3. Filing Bankruptcy to Impede Litigation Pending in a Nonbankrupt-cy Forum is Bad Faith
In re Chinichian, discussed supra, is merely one of numerous cases holding that it constitutes bad faith to file bankruptcy to impede, delay, forum shop, or obtain a tactical advantage regarding litigation ongoing in nonbankruptcy forum — whether ’that nonbankruptcy forum is a state court or a federal district court. In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.1999) (bad faith for debtor to file bankruptcy to seek to gain a tactical litigation advantage in pending antitrust litigation); In re Start the Engines, Inc., 219 B.R. 264 (bankruptcy filed in bad faith because petition filed for the improper purpose of delaying a state court action; court sanctioned debtor’s president and debtor’s attorney for bad faith); St. Paul Self Storage Ltd. Partnership v. Port Authority of the City of St. Paul (In re St. Paul Self Storage Ltd. Partnership), 185 B.R. 580 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) (bad faith for debtor to file bankruptcy one day prior to a hearing on a creditor’s discovery motion in state court litigation revolving around a lease that was allegedly owned by debtor); Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia (In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd.), 849 F.2d 1393 (11th Cir.1988) (bad faith for debtor to file bankruptcy the day before the state court was to hold a hearing on the appointment of a receiver, thereby delaying and frustrating the enforcement efforts of secured creditors); Albany Partners, Ltd v. W.P. Westbrook, Jr. (In re Albany Partners Ltd.), 749 F.2d 670 (11th Cir.1984) (bad faith for debtor to file bankruptcy to frustrate the legitimate enforcement efforts of the secured creditors when the bankruptcy was filed after the state court granted a writ of possession and appointed a receiver, and on the eve of foreclosure); see also, Little Creek Dev’t Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In Matter of Little Creek Dev’t Co.), 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir.1986) (the seminal bad faith case, which opined, inter alia, that it is bad faith to file bankruptcy as a follow on to state court litigation).
Filing the bankruptcy to delay state court litigation was also the problem in In re Walter, 108 B.R. 244 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1989), where this Court dismissed the Walters’ chapter 11 case as being filed in bad faith, on facts rather similar to the facts in the instant Silberkraus chapter 11 case. In In re Walter, the debtors had sufficient assets to pay all their creditors in full, and were engaged in state court litigation with debtors’ only secured creditor. The Walters were using the bankruptcy automatic stay as a substitute for getting a preliminary injunction enjoining the secured creditor from foreclosing on the Walters’ real property, because the state superior court and state court of appeal had denied giving the Walters such a preliminary injunction.
Also relevant by analogy are the numerous cases holding that it is bad faith to file bankruptcy as a substitute for posting an appeal bond after losing state court litigation.
Chu v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc. (In re Chu),
253 B.R. 92 (S.D.Cal.2000) (debtor filed bankruptcy to collaterally attack a state court judgment, to avoid posting a bond, and to prevent the creditor from recovering on the judgment);
In re Erkins,
253 B.R. 470 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2000)
The overall teaching of this whole collection of cases is that two party disputes in state court (or federal district court) should be resolved through the normal litigation process in those forums, and that it is bad faith to file bankruptcy instead of continuing with the normal litigation process in the nonbankruptcy forums. Debtor Silberkraus and his bankruptcy attorneys ignored this whole body of case-law.
4. Filing Bankruptcy Solely to Attempt to Reject an Executory Contract or Lease is Bad Faith
A number of bankruptcy and Circuit level decisions have held that filing bankruptcy with the sole purpose of trying to reject an executory contract or lease is bad faith, and the rejection will be precluded. As stated by the Ninth Circuit BAP, “it is not true that solvent debtors may petition for bankruptcy and then obtain a windfall by rejecting their executory contracts-”
In re Chi-Feng Huang,
23 B.R. 798, 803 (9th Cir. BAP 1982).
See also, In re Carrere,
64 B.R. 156 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1986) (finding that there is not “cause” to reject a contract if the major motivation of the debtor in filing the case is to be able to perform under a more lucrative contract);
In re Southern California Sound Systems, Inc.,
69 B.R. 893 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987) (debtor, whose sole reason for filing for Chapter 11 relief was to reject exclusive licensing contract, would not be allowed to reject contract);
In re Waldron,
785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir.1986);
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.,
756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir.1985),
cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 1285, 89 L.Ed.2d 592 (1986) (the debtor’s decision to reject an executory contract should be accepted by the court unless it is shown to be “so manifestly unreasonable that, it could not be based on sound business judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice.”) Debtor’s proposed plan called for leasing or selling the commercial property in the open market, which was supposed to be achieved by rejecting Coppersmith’s lease and option to purchase. Yet
5.Section 365 Rejection of the Cop-persmith Option to Purchase, Even if Allowed, Would Not Accomplish the Goals Debtor Sought
a. If Debtor usedSection 365 to Reject Coppersmith’s Option to Purchase,Section 365(i) Would Give Coppers-mith the Right to Remain in Possession and Get Title to the Property, Despite the Rejection
11 U.S.C. § 365(i) states:
(1)(l) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the debtor for the sale of real property or for the sale of a timeshare interest under a timeshare plan, under which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such contract as terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession of such real . property or timeshare interest.
(2) If such purchaser remains in possession-—
(A) such purchaser shall continue to make all payments due under such contract, but may, offset against such payments any damages occurring after the date of the rejection of such contract caused by the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor after such date, but such purchaser does not have any rights against the estate on account of any damages arising after such datefrom such rejection, other than such offset; and
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to such purchaser in accordance with the provisions of such contract, but is relieved of all other obligations to perform under such contract.
Under California law, when an option to buy contained in a lease is properly accepted, the option becomes a binding contract of purchase.
See Claremont Terrace Homeowners’ Ass’n v. United States,
146 Cal.App.3d 398, 406, 194 Cal.Rptr. 216 (1983) (stating “[a]n option is transformed into a contract of purchase and sale when there is an unconditional, unqualified acceptance by the optionee of the offer in harmony with the terms of the option and within the time span of the option contract”). In this case, it is undisputed that Coppersmith exercised the option to purchase in accordance with the terms contained therein. Upon doing so, the option to purchase transformed into a contract of purchase and sale. Accordingly, if Debtor was able to use
Coppersmith testified that it would choose to remain in possession pursuant to
b.
If Debtor Rejected Coppersmith’s Option to Purchase, Pursuant to
Assuming arguendo that the Court allowed Debtor to use
Even if Debtor could have used
6. Even if All Silberkraus had was a Lease, With No Enforceable Option to Purchase,
a.
Per
If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which the debtor is the lessor and — if the term of the lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights under such lease (including rights such as those relating to the amount and timing of payment of rent and other amounts payable by the lessee and any right of use, possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting, assignment, or hypothecation) that are in or appurtenant to the real property for the balance of the term of such lease and for any renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
This provision of the Bankruptcy Code gives the lessee the option of either considering the lease terminated or‘staying in possession of the property for the balance of the current term and exercise any right to extension or renewal.
In re Arden & Howe Assoc., Ltd.,
152 B.R. 971 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.1993). The purpose of
In the instant case, the Debtor is the lessor of the commercial property, and Coppersmith is the lessee. As stated in Part I supra Coppersmith took the precaution of renewing the term of the lease on June.28, 1999 from 3/2000 to 3/2005. Therefore, if Debtor attempted to reject the lease,
Debtor’s Opposition to the motions for sanctions contends that the effect of
b.
A
Even if one assumes arguendo that Coppersmith’s option to purchase was invalid, that Debtor used
Due to the law discussed in this Section, bankruptcy could not be used to obtain substantially more benefit from the commercial building than whatever result completing the pending state court litigation would have produced. In light of this fact, Debtor filing bankruptcy, though he was very solvent, was purely to delay and forum shop. The chapter 11 case was filed for the improper purpose of impeding the state court action, when bankruptcy (controlling Ninth Circuit case law such as
Chinichian,
and Bankruptcy Code
B. Applicable Law Mandates Granting Creditors’ Motions for Monetary Sanctions Against Debtor and Debtor’s Counsel, for Bad Faith, Per Both F.R.B.P. Rule 9011 and
As detailed supra in Part I, Coppers-mith and Seeley each filed motions moving the Court to sanction the Debtor, Dressier, Esq. and the Dressier law firm, pursuant to F.R.B.P. Rule 9011 and
The Coppersmith and Seeley sanctions motions clearly identified Dressier, Esq. and the Dressier law firm as being co-respondents against whom an award of sanctions was sought. Debtor’s attorneys filed an Opposition’ on behalf of Debtor to these two sanctions motions, but none on behalf of themselves. The Opposition (captioned as “Consolidated Opposition” because it opposed both the Coppersmith Sanction Motion and the1 Seeley Sanction Motion) filed by Debtor’s attorneys is not captioned as being on behalf of any respondent except Debtor. Nor does the Opposition argue on behalf of any party except Debtor. (See Debtor’s Consolidated Opposition to (1) L.E. Coppersmith, Inc., for an Award of Sanctions; and (2) Motion of The Seeley Company for Attorney’s Fees.) Pursuant to Central District of California Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-l(k), “[p]apers not timely filed and served may be deemed by the Court to be consent to the granting or denial of the motion, as the case may be.” The failure of Dressier, Esq. and the Dressier law firm to file any written Opposition to the two sanctions motions on their own behalf, as respondents, is a waiver of these attorneys’ right to object to the Court granting sanctions against the attorneys.
After hearing an additional three hours of oral .argument on the sanctions motions on September 5, 2000, the Court granted both the Coppersmith and Seeley motions for sanctions, pursuant to the alternative separate grounds of F.R.B.P. Rule 9011 and
As announced at the hearing, the Court’s reasoning for the sanction award was that, for all reasons stated above, the filing and-prosecution of’ the. chapter 11 case was in bad faith. However, the Court’s converting the bankruptcy case from chapter 11 to chapter 7, as opposed to -merely-’ dismissing the bankruptcy case, constituted mitigation of the damage the creditors would otherwise have suffered. Conversion to- chapter 7 would mitigate the creditors’ damages because whatever chapter 7 trustee was appointed would have a duty to promptly liquidate the estate property, which would result in payment of all or substantially all of the amounts owed to all creditors. It was because of -the mitigating effect of the conversion from chapter 11 to chapter 7 that the Court only awarded one-half of the dollar amount of sanctions sought by Coppersmith and See-ley. If the Court had dismissed the case, the Court would have awarded the full dollar amount of sanctions sought.
By stipulation of the parties, the parties agreed that Debtor, and/or Debtor’s attorneys could obtain a stay pending‘áppeal by posting a supersedeas bond in the amount statutorily required to bond a money judgment pending appeal (i.e., money bond of 150% of sanctions amount).
1. Case Law Test for Applying F.R.B.P. Rule 9011
In re Marsch,
36 F.3d 825 (9th Cir.1994) is the controlling Ninth Circuit- case addressing the award of F.R.B.P. Rule 9011
F.R.B.P. Rule 9011 provides that by signing a pleading (here, a bankruptcy petition), the party and the attorney who sign are warranting that the pleading is not for an improper purpose, is warranted by existing law, and has evidentiary support. Pursuant to Marsch and cases following it, a bankruptcy court is required to use a sliding scale test to determine whether a bankruptcy petition is filed in bad faith, and therefore is sanctionable pursuant to F.R.B.P. Rule 9011. As stated in Marsch, “bankruptcy courts must consider both frivolousness and improper purpose on a sliding scale, where the more compelling the showing as to one element, the less decisive need be the showing as to the other.” In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 830.
Applying the
Marsch
test here compels sanctioning the filing of the petition under F.R.B.P. Rule 9011, as having been filed for both a frivolous and an improper purpose. Looking at the first prong — improper purpose — the evidence is extremely strong. Debtor — who was clearly solvent on the petition date — admitted that the bankruptcy was filed to try to impede the pending state court specific performance suit, and opposed Coppersmith’s and Seeley’s motions seeking relief from stay to proceed with the state court specific performance action. Debtor never brought an
Looking at second issue — frivolousness — the evidence is also strong. As briefed supra herein, applicable Ninth Circuit case law — particularly
In re Chinichi-an
— and the relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions — particularly
With strong evidence on both prongs, Rule 9011 required the court to sanction the filing of the chapter 11 petition. Rule 9011 directs the Court to limit the sanctions to an amount necessary to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The Court awarded minimum sanctions necessary to avoid comparable conduct by other debtors and debtors’ attorneys similarly situated. The Court would have awarded the full amount sought by each creditor, but for conversion to chapter 7. The Court cut the dollar amount of sanctions to one-half of the dollar amount Coppersmith and Seeley moved for, because, by virtue of the Court’s converting the
Many of the things Coppersmith and Seeley had to expend money on in the chapter 11 case — such as objecting the Debtor’s chapter 11 disclosure statement and plan — would not have been necessary if the case had been filed as a chapter 7. Moreover, had the case been filed as a chapter 7, the creditors very likely could have negotiated with the chapter 7 trustee to get stipulated relief from stay to proceed with the state court action, and/or could have settled the state court action with the trustee. Finally, the motion to convert would have been unnecessary, and the trustee may not have moved to use cash collateral.
F.R.B.P. Rule 9011 has a “safe harbor.” For most pleadings, Rule 9011 gives the party who filed the allegedly improper pleading 21 days after service of the 9011 motion to withdraw the pleading before the movant can actually file the 9011 motion with the court. However, the filing of bankruptcy petition is exempted from the “safe harbor.” See The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1997 Amendment: “This rule is amended to conform to the 1993 changes to F.R.Civ.P. 11. For an explanation of these amendments, see the advisory committee note to the 1993 amendments to F.R.Civ.P. 11. The “safe harbor” provision contained in subdivision (c)(1)(A), which prohibits the filing óf a motion for sanctions unless the challenged paper is not withdrawn or corrected within a prescribed time after service of the motion, does not apply if the challenged paper is a petition.”
2.
As a separate, alternative ground, the Court awarded these same sanctions using its inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct, pursuant to
The only effective way to deter filing and prosecuting bankruptcy cases in bad faith is to impose monetary sanctions against
both
the debtor and debtor’s counsel who do this. Dismissal is not effective
In this case creditors Coppersmith and Seeley were forced to expend $115,393.67 in attorney fees in seven months, to protect their positions in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case that was filed and prosecuted in bad faith. In determining whether to assess monetary sanctions the Court has two choices: (1) the Court can punish the guilty — by levying monetary sanctions against the Debtor and Debtor’s attorneys who filed and prosecuted the chapter 11 case in bad faith, thereby forcing creditors Coppersmith and Seeley to expend attorney fees to defend their positions in a chapter 11 case which should not have been filed; or (2) the Court can punish the innocent, by refusing to order Debtor and Debtor’s attorneys to pay monetary sanctions to reimburse these creditors for the attorney fees these creditors were forced to expend due to Debtor and Debtor’s attorneys fifing and prosecuting of the chapter 11 bankruptcy in bad faith. Awarding sanctions to pay some or even all the attorney fees a creditor expends defending its position in a bankruptcy filed in bad faith does not get the creditor ahead. In fact, such an attorney fee award does not even get the creditor even, because the creditor is not compensated for the time value of the delay caused by the bankruptcy case, even if all of the creditor’s attorneys fees are paid via ordering the debtor or debtor’s counsel to pay monetary sanctions to the creditor in the amount of the attorney fees expended by the creditor.
Until monetary sanctions are awarded against attorneys who file and prosecute bankruptcy cases in bad faith, attorneys have every incentive to continue fifing and prosecuting petitions in bad faith, because debtors pay these attorneys legal fees for doing so. Here, Debtor’s attorneys received a $50,000 retainer for representing Debtor in this case, and doubtless would have requested fees exceeding the retainer. When choosing between punishing the guilty for bad faith, improper fifing and prosecution of a frivolous chapter 11 case (by requiring Debtor/Debtor’s attorneys to pay monetary sanctions to the creditors to reimburse the creditors’ attorney fees), and punishing the innocent (by refusing to order the Debtor/Debtor’s counsel to pay the creditors’ attorney fees caused by the Debtor’s/Debtor’s attorneys’ improper filing and prosecution of a chapter 11 case in bad faith), both F.R.B.P. Rule 9011 and
3. Standard of Proof
Debtor cites
Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,
62 F.3d 1469 (D.C.Cir.l995) for the contention that inherent power findings must be based on clear and convincing evidence.
(See
Objections of (1) Debtor; (2) Thomas W. Dressier; and (3) Dressier Rein Evans and Sestanovich, LLP to Form of Order Re Sanctions Lodged by (a) Coppersmith, Inc. and (b) The Seeley Company.) Although
Shepherd,
and one additional district court decision,
Samuel v. Michaud,
980 F.Supp. 1381 (D.Idaho 1996), enunciate the clear and convincing standard, the Court can find no wording in
III. Conclusion
This opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law regarding the three motions here in issue — the motion to convert filed by Coppersmith, and joined in by Seeley, and the two motions for monetary sanctions — one filed by Coppersmith and one filed by Seeley. The Court’s Order on the motion to convert was entered on September 11, 2000, and the Court’s Orders on the two motions for sanctions were both entered on September 25, 2000.
Notes
. The Declaration of Fred Silberkraus contended that this analysis was prepared in consultation with tax advisers. The Declaration provided no other detail regarding this analysis.
. Debtor’s Disclosure Statement proposed two alternatives: (1) reject the Coppersmith lease and refinance the property; or (2) if Coppersmith‘s damage claim was too high, sell the property on the open market.
.The lease between Debtor and Coppersmith also contained an option to extend the term of the lease an additional 60 months (from 3/2000 - 3/2005). (L.E. Coppersmith’s Motion for Relief from Stay, Declaration of L.E. Coppersmith, Exhibit A.) Out of caution, Coppersmith exercised the renewal option on June 28, 1999. (L.E. Coppersmith‘s Motion for Relief from Stay, Declaration of L.E. Cop-persmith, Exhibit D.)
. Debtor argues that Coppersmith was not a purchaser in possession because Coppersmith sublet the premises to TRW, Inc. (See Debtor’s Consolidated Opposition to (I) L.E. Coppersmith, Inc., for an Award of Sanctions; and (2) Motion of The Seeley Company for Attorney‘s Fees.) However, the test under whether a purchaser is “in possession” appears to revolve around a “concern for buyers whose connection with the land is more permanent than ephemeral, more continuous than intermittent, more exclusive than shared....” In re Summit Land Co., 13 B.R. 310, 318 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). Here, there does not appear to be any evidence which would suggest that Coppersmith does not have a permanent connection with the commercial property.