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In Re Shannon
876 P.2d 548
Ariz.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 1986). Where the modification is detrimental employee, may it applied not be absent employee’s express acceptance of the

modification because it interferes with the Yeazell,

employee’s rights. contractual Ariz. at 402 P.2d at 546. Because the amendment in this case was beneficial to the survivor,

employee and part it became of the contract. death,

At Judge Thurston’s his contract provided surviving that his spouse was enti-

tled to equaling benefits two-thirds of his

monthly benefits. Because Mrs. Thurston

qualifies Judge surviving Thurston’s spouse, she is entitled to receive those bene- fits.

DISPOSITION The trial correctly granted court Mrs. Thurston’s summary motion for judgment. Accordingly, we affirm judgment

trial court and opinion vacate the of the court appeals.

FELDMAN, C.J., CORCORAN, MARTONE, JJ., ZLAKET and concur.

876 P.2d 548 In the Matter of a Member of the Arizona,

State Bar of John Adair SHANNON, Jr., Respondent. SB-92-0001-D,

No. 88-1932, Disc. Comm. Nos. 89-0710. Supreme Arizona, Court of

In Division. June Reconsideration Denied Oct.

54 *3 by Margaret D. of Arizona

State Bar White, Phoenix, Counsel, for State Bar Sr. Bar of AZ. Robert P.C. W. Kenney,

Browder & Browder, Phoenix, respondent Shannon.

OPINION

CORCORAN, Justice. Bar of February the State

On complaint a Hear- filed a formal Arizona (Committee) charging Re- ing Committee *4 Shánnon, with two Jr. spondent John Adair Respon- conduct which counts of unethical ethical allegedly violated numerous dent 42, Arizona Rules of rules enumerated in rule vote, By a 2-1 Supreme Court. recommended that Committee practice of law for a suspended from the year. The 8-member Disci- period of one (Commission) unani- plinary Commission mously recommen- adopted the Committee’s further recommended Re- dation and make the amount spondent restitution $2,258.60.1 appeal cross-appeal a This is an order filed Oc- Disciplinary Commission’s urges The State Bar tober argues additional violations and court to find disbarment, rather than the recom- one-year suspension, appropri- mended is the Respondent’s violations. Re- ate sanction challenges the Commission’s find- spondent sanctions, ings, and the the recommended Respon- expenses. imposition of costs and (1) argues evidence basically that: dent a sustain find- presented is sufficient rule; (2) ing any ethical that he violated one-year inappropriate both suspension is an (3) sanction; some of disproportionate duplica- against him are charges assessed (4) tive; power to this court lacks the expenditures. types of assess certain 53(e), Ari- jurisdiction pursuant rule have Supreme zona Court. Rules AND PROCEDURAL FACTUAL HISTORY One, serious of two the more Count joint counts, Respondent’s repre- out arose case, represents figure their 1. This the amount that paid over dent's clients who took co-defendants, judgment. allegations,

sentatíon of Fairfield Re- Sunrise Based these (Fairfield) Village violating and Client A.2 Count spondent charged One ERs with (1) 1.15, 1.2(d), 8.4(d). alleged 3.2, that: Fairfield’s interests hearing were After a interests, adverse to Client A’s and alterna- before the Committee and a review Commission, tively Respondent’s representation of concluded that the Commission A may Client materially have been limited 3.2. Respondent violated ER 1.15 and Fairfield, responsibilities to parties, third (2) A. Violations own interests: materially altered certain Client A’s hand- Respondent challenges both the Commis- interrogatories written answers without findings sion’s sanc- its recommended consulting A providing Client and without argues tions. He that there was insufficient copy Client A interroga- of the altered finding support evidence that he violated (3) tories; submitted altered ethical rule. further interrogatories, along with the verification that, assuming even he violated ethical signed that Client A original for their hand- rule, inap- the recommended sanctions are support written answers to the court in of a propriate because the Committee Com- (4) summary judgment; motion for Re- inappropriately his failure mission considered spondent adequately failed to communicate “directly acknowledge wrongful nature *5 respond

with Client A or to to reasonable aggravating of his conduct” as an factor. requests during represen- information Moreover, the rec- tation Client A. allega- Based these ommended sanction does not take into ac- tions, Respondent charged violating with voluntary practice count his cessation of the 1.2(a) (ER) 1.7, (d), 1.4, Ethical Rules disproportionate of law and is to the sanc- 3.3(a)(1) 3.4(a) 3.1, (4), (b), 4.1(a), imposed tions in similar cases. 8.4(c) (d) 42, of rule Arizona Rules of Supreme hearing, Court. After a 1. Standard Review Committee concluded that violat- matters, disciplinary this court 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.7(a), ed ERs Despite and 3.3. acts an independent as arbiter both having adopted the Committee’s factual find- Neville, facts and the In re 147 Ariz. law. ings, the Commission concluded Respon- (1985). 106, 108, 1297, 708 P.2d 1299 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.7(b), 3.3, dent ERs violated facts, acting give as we an arbiter of the 8.4(d). 8.4(c), and deference and serious consideration to the Count Two arose rep- findings out of both the Committee and Commis 518, 516, resentation in personal injury of Client B a sion. In re 159 Ariz. 768 Pappas, 1161, (1988), Neville, judg- citing matter which obtained a 147 P.2d 1163 108, complaint alleged ment. The Ariz. at 708 P.2d at 1299. Before we (1) however, specific dent: impose discipline, per failed follow instructions we must be opposing cashing from counsel convincing check clear and evidence that suaded opposing alleged counsel sent to him.in committed satisfac- violations. judgment Kersting, tion executing E.g., without first In re 151 Ariz. (2) 587, (1986); 54(c), judgment; ignored

satisfaction of oppos- P.2d see also rule ing subsequent requests sign Supreme counsel’s Simi the Arizona Rules of Court. law, forcing opposing larly, acting satisfaction to file we counsel arbiter (3) compel; give motion to great weight and waited another full to the recommendations of after granted week the court the motion to the Committee and the Commission. In re Lincoln, 233, 235-36, 371, compel signing before satisfaction of Ariz. recognize 2. We who Mr. and A were Fair- clients seek counsel Mrs. co-defendants with lawyers often do so confidence. We underlying litigation. purposes field For believe that such confidences should not be readability will describe Mr. and Mrs. A merely lawyer breached because the involved is together singularly or either as "Client A.” subject disciplinary procedure. of a their, using pronouns, they, When his, we will use therefore use Client A and Client B instead of the applicable. her as clients’ actual names. Neville, (1990), could neither citing ployees representatives 147 Ariz. at or sales 373-74 Yet, program any priority-rent-back 708 P.2d at 1306. this court ultimate- discuss such ly responsible determining directly op- the appropri- prospective purchasers with nor Lincoln, believed, ate sanction. program. erate such Fairfield P.2d at however, the Con- that it would violate entity such as separate sent Decree if a

2. Count One pri- about representations A made Client testimony The Committee belief led ority-rent-back heard concern- This program. ing Findings A Count One and of Fact and Client made its between Fairfield the contract report provide in its filed Com- rent- June in which Client A contracted mission, arguments pur- hearing management parties after on this who al services count, adopted Findings Client Committee’s from Fairfield. chased condominiums record, reviewing Fact. After this court effective from A’s contract with Fairfield was adopts Findings likewise the Committee’s 1983. Be- 1982 to October November Fact, are against summarized below. Fair- Decree cause Consent field, that Client to Fairfield important it was 1986, attorney In December Gerald W. entity separate viewed as a operations A’s Nabours sued Fairfield and Client A on be- acting A on their own without with Client plaintiffs purchased of multiple half had who knowledge or consent. Fairfield’s The complaint condominiums from Fairfield. alleged that Fairfield its breached contract position on this matter was con- Fairfield’s plaintiffs had On committed fraud. very beginning. from the Nabours sistent counts, these the complaint sought two re- been in contact with testified that he had scission, compensatory damages, puni- filing Fairfield before representatives of damages. alleged tive The complaint also testified that Fairfield complaint. He *6 (defendants) that both Fairfield A and Client it position be that had taking seemed to violated Arizona’s RICO statutes. For this representations pur- to prospective made no count, complaint sought damages, treble concerning pro- priority-rent-back chasers a costs, attorneys’ and fees. gram, any representations and that were complaint The essence of the was that others, specifically A or their made Client priority-rent-back pro- defendants used a representatives. gram plaintiffs purchase to induce to January Fairfield retained Re- arbitrarily condominiums and then discontin- to it in the lawsuit. spondent’s brother defend the program. ued claimed that Plaintiffs thereafter, Shortly Respondent pri- assumed represented plaintiffs’ defendants that condo- litigation. mary responsibility for the Re- priority-rent- miniums be in a would included spondent filed Fairfield’s answer. Fairfield’s program. back program, Under this Fair- was consistent with Nabours’s initial answer plaintiffs’ field would rent to condominiums denying any impression that Fairfield was purchasers prospective house of Fairfield knowledge program. priority-rent-back property, guests According to visitors. allegations it a Fairfield denied had complaint, represented defendants pro- A to contract with Client handle the units to be priority were rented with a gram, A’s office in the that Client was Fair- upon purchase, based the date of their and building, A field sales office that Client was the priority-rent-back program was to with Fairfield in continuous contact sales long as program continue as the rental was agents agent, and that Fairfield sales and/or alleged Plaintiffs effect. Fairfield representations pri- A made about Client arbitrarily program discontinued the without plaintiffs to ority-rent-back program induce notice to plaintiffs. or consent of purchase their condominiums. Under Decree a Consent with priority-rent- discuss Exchange United States Com- Nabours tried to Securities (SEC), filing A before prohibited program mission from with Client Fairfield was back conjunction plaintiffs’ Client A refused dis- marketing with lawsuit. condominiums contacted any Nabours and priority-rent-back program, its em- the matter with cuss Fairfield. position. allegations Fairfield told Client A that Fair- denied field’s Fairfield field would them if defend Nabours filed suit. it had a Client A to handle contract with served, After being priority-rent-back Client A again program, contacted that Client Fairfield and was reassured that Fairfield A’s office was in Fairfield sales office would defend the action. building, As the time to file and that A was in continuous Client however, approached, agent. answer Client A sales Client contact the Fairfield however, retained Montijo. allega- Tucson each of these Marc admitted A Moreover, agreed repre- he tions. when Montijo Respondent, following contacted Client did not know Respondent sent A up on expectation Client A’s that Fairfield indemnify A Client whether Fairfield would provide would a January defense. In a joint judgment in the event of a or sole letter, Respondent Montijo’s answered this, Respon- Client A all of against Despite inquiry indicating “objective that Fairfield’s did not raise that a con- possibility dent appears to one indemnify protect exist, might of interest much less flict discuss promising get [Client A]” and back to implications joint representation. Montijo awith final answer soon as as he could. Because answer due and July Respondent agreed was On after A yet Client A had not represent received final notifica- Client Fairfield informed Re- Fairfield, tion Montijo spondent filed an answer it not would “undertake appears pay against behalf of duty judgment Client A The [Client A] answer January against have been filed on judgment A] 1987. Be- the event of a [Client Montijo anticipated cause both A Client not did in- Fairfield.” suit, defending development Fairfield would be form Client A of until Montijo spent meeting A September Client little time formu- 10—more than lating the Accordingly, learning answer. Client after in- A’s months first Fairfield’s response substantially “general deni- tentions.

al.” confirming a letter his representation, plaintiffs’ waited more than 5 months interroga- sent a set of advising Montijo before complete. that Fairfield would to Client tories A to long defend A as pencil Client A’s A in the Client told Client answers and aligned. put Fairfield’s interests were Even them advised that he would their an- then, Respondent responded after hav- swers final form. also re- *7 ing following the inquiries quested signed, received from that A return a Client nota- (1) 1987; (2) 2, Montijo: completed letter dated the page March rized verification with 20, follow-up dated interrogatories. letter March which con- answer; (3) copy tained a Client of A’s letter was, position always A’s Client has (4) 11; 20, May dated May letter dated been, they prospective that offered condo- Stipulation which contained a and Order of purchasers priority-rent-back minium the Montijo Substitution Counsel of to Re- program upon purchase based date at the spondent copies of interrogatories general manager, Bob direction Fairfield’s complete. Client A Respondent finally they According Childs. to Client did not A Stipulation executed the and Order Substi- following that not know Fairfield was 26, tution of on Counsel June the trial until after priority-rent-baek program their judge signed July on it 1. contract with Fairfield had been terminated. Respondent they did not A’s A assumed pro- discuss Client un- Client testified that derstanding of the facts underlying gram working case was because Fairfield was Montijo with agree- renting issuing either or Client A before units and Client A was checks ing represent Client A Respondent, how- to individual condominium owners. Client ever, copy interrogato- had a to the Client A’s answer for A’s draft answers written approximately position. three months before under- were consistent with this ries taking representation. interroga- A’s A Client Some of mailed the to the Client answers Client responses allegations completed A’s and a verification form to tories complaint directly contrary Respondent July were on Fair- typewrit- the handwritten answers interrogatories submit Client A’s answers to was, however, not the case. ten form. This answers were inconsistent with Fairfield’s Respondent same admitted questions. 11, Respondent submitted September On true, if a con- Client A’s answers were interrogatory an- typewritten to Nabours positions flict of Fair- existed between the page that along with the verification swers Accordingly, Respondent field and A. Client had July Respondent signed A on Client meeting September held a on discuss inter- to various changed A’s answers Client Attending Client A’s draft answers. answers were so Client A’s rogatories A, meeting Norm Respondent, were Client position. with Fairfield’s consistent (Fairfield’s time), manager Johnson in-house he and Fairfield’s dent testified that (another employ- and Lon Franklin Fairfield Flora, counsel, the answers Terry crafted ee). During meeting, Respondent on behalf of Respondent submitted length disagreed Client A as to the of time According Respondent, he dis- A. Client priority-rent-back program was to run. interrogato- Client A’s answers to the cussed reviewing After A’s with Client contract and after Flora both before ries with Fairfield, Respondent Client told A that 10, 1987. meeting September one-year contract’s term limited the priority- changes making substantial Despite one-year program rent-back duration. interrogatories, A’s to various Client answers Respondent A disagreed Client told changes discuss the did not Respondent priority-rent-baek program supposed A, copy A a nor he send Client Client did to be continuous until Fairfield discontinued interrogatories that he submitted promotional program. fact, not Client A was aware behalf. their changed answers on Respondent had meeting, During made his September until interrogatories their potential to a inter- reference conflict of after had sub- year 1988—over est. A that informed Client mitted them. possibility there was a that a conflict would arose, arise if a conflict he would Respondent notified On June A representing

have to withdraw from Client set November 15. A that trial was Client and Client A would have to seek other coun- posi- their A became concerned about Client explain concept did sel. they because had not had tion in the lawsuit interest, specific type conflict of what Sep- their Respondent since any contact with arise, advantages might conflict Accordingly, meeting. tember joint or risks that existed because of Tucson attor- sought A the advice Client Moreover, representation. Respondent did hearing Eikleberry. After Client ney Jane might not advise Client A that he have a case, Eikleberry deter- version of the A’s Fairfield, indemnity against cross-claim for representation mined that did A that nor inform Client a con- presented Client A both Fairfield and *8 Respondent might be rais- constrained from interest, attempted to contact and she flict of ing certain defenses on Client A’s behalf problem. discuss the Respondent joint representation. because of the Respon- Eikleberry eventually spoke with 4, 1988, August but During September meeting, by telephone Re- dent A, Respondent phone mes- having left spondent, represen- Fairfield’s after Client and sending him a letter dated through sages A’s and after tatives went Client answers expressed her concerns. Ostensibly July in which she interrogatories. to save interest, conflict violating Respondent Client A from the Consent Decree denied Client A’s and although he that the SEC thus admitted between Fairfield and and RICO, were some- of the facts liability violating Fairfield’s versions avoid automatic continuing con- Because of urged A to at the what dissimilar. Respondent Client look of in- regarding potential conflict differently changing consider cerns situation and terest, to discuss Eikleberry called Nabours pressure Despite their answers. answers, agreed that a conflict Both change by their her concerns. their A stood Client day, discussing The next after Respondent existed. assumed would answers and Eikleberry, situation with co-parties, agree Client A decided to with the Commission’s discharge Respondent. Eikleberry finding 1.7(b), called Respondent violated ER Respondent and informed of his termination. provides: A, On September lawyer Client Eikle- A if represent shall a client berry, and Nabours met to discuss Client A’s may representation that client mate- version of During the facts. meeting, rially by lawyer’s responsibili- limited Client A discovered Respondent had ties to to a person, another client or third changed interrogatories. the answers their interests, by lawyer’s or own unless: Nabours believed Client A’s version of the (1) lawyer reasonably believes the facts and executed a written settlement representation adversely not be will af- agreement A dismissing with Client them fected; and from the suit. (2) the client after consents consultation. On October after Client A terminated representation When of multiple clients Respondent’s representation and before the undertaken, single in a matter date, Respondent scheduled trial reply filed a explanation consultation shall include support in partial summary of motion for implications repre- of the common A, judgment on behalf of Fairfield and Client advantages sentation and the and risks for whom he was still of record. involved. Despite having had a conversation with Eik- The first in step analyzing whether Re- leberry on October in which she confront- 1.7(b) spondent violated ER is to determine Respondent ed about interroga- the doctored representation whether answers, tory Respondent relied the an- materially Client A by limited swers in support reply. Respondent’s responsibilities dent’s If Re- Fairfield. motion was denied. After Nabours dis- spondent’s representation of Client A was suit, missed Client A from the Fairfield Fairfield, not limited his responsibility to adopted position all attributed If, hand, there is no conflict. on the other responsibility for priority-rent-back pro- limited, representation was gram to Client A requires then the rule rea- facts, Based on these the Commission con- sonably representation believe that his will 1.4(a) cluded that violated ERs affected, adversely not be (b) (Communication), 1.7(b) (Conflict must obtain his client’s consent after consul- (Candor Interest), Tribunal), 3.3 Toward provide tation. The ER comments to 1.7 8.4(c) (d) (Misconduct). Despite Respon- guidance determining in some whether an arguments contrary, dent’s we find impermissible conflict exists. The comments convincing clear supports evidence provide that: find, findings. the Commission’s further impermissible may An conflict exist evidence, by clear convincing that Re- discrepancy reason substantial 8.4(c) (d). spondent violated ERs testimony, parties’ incompatibility posi- opposing party tions relation to an or 1.7(b)—Conflict a. Ethical Rule of Interest substantially fact differ- that there are The Committee concluded Fair- possibilities of ent settlement the claims adverse, field’s and Client A’s interests were question. liabilities 1.7(a). and thus violated ER facts, however, Based on urges analyze the same set of the court *9 Respondent Commission found that violated conflict of rules in terms of the interest 1.7(b). brief, Respondent applicable ER As his to underlying notes in substantive law 1.7(a) Respondent against comments to ER 1.7 that A state claim asserted Client applies arising great similarity to pains conflicts of interest from takes to be- show representation opposing parties, while tween Client and Fairfield’s interests A’s 1.7(b) applies to showing possible conflicts of interests for the resolu- arising outcomes representation Respondent’s from the co-parties. Be tion of RICO claim. basic expo- the representation argument cause case involved is Client A faced no real that claim, between discrepancy other. substantial which was found- from the RICO sure evident racketeering co-parties’ of events was and actual fraud claims. versions ed complaint Fair- claims that under either answers to from both the underlying interrogatories or A’s that each field’s Client version to the answers events, A was not at risk because the Client further not warrant party filed and does against claims asserted both Client A were discussion. jointly Fair- severally, and Fairfield yet basis another provide The comments indemnify A agreed field had to Client for in this case. a of interest finding for conflict any joint judgment. argument This fails for may a exist state that conflict The comments a number of reasons. different possibilities “substantially when conveniently forgets that or liabilities” exist. of the claims settlement A, he Fair- agreed represent to Client when (comments). made no ER 1.7 A; only had agreed field to defend Client no from this A released effort to have Client concerning made mention was indemnifica- Yet, the ease suit. as was evident from Respondent obviously tion. understood the to A’s was able which Client new promise a to defend and difference between a suit, from Client get Client A released indemnify. promise day to theOn same that substantially potential A’s for settlement was A, began representing he Client rep- greater than Fairfield’s. asking about wrote Fairfield its intentions Fairfield, A resentation of both Client letter, regarding indemnification. In that substantially positions light of different their stated, have undertaken a “we settlement, yet is another basis in terms of A], duty I [Client but believe such defend finding a conflict of interest. obviously duty duty independent from a difficulty Why Respondent has such added.) pay judgment.” (Emphasis a representation both accepting that his nothing prohibited Nab- importantly, More impermissi Client created an A and Fairfield amending complaint ours and as- beyond this court’s ble conflict of interest serting racketeering against a claim Client A only understanding. Respondent need recall individually. thought Nabours that there general to Fairfield’s the letter he wrote strong possibility get a he could how he ran afoul of counsel to understand individually. judgment against A Client day agreed he rule. On the ethical And, complaint from its answer its A, Respondent represent wrote the Client interrogatories, answers to the Fairfield’s counsel, following general Ter to Fairfield’s strategy respon- appears lay to have been to ry Flora: sibility representations pri- for the about respect representation our With ority-rent-back program doorstep at the A], phone I indicated [Client party. Considering some other third agreed previously would we had representations A making Client admitted it our obvious defend since is to [Client A] priority-rent-back program about the while A] is as advantage [Client assure program Fairfield claimed that no such exist- friendly possible to us. ed, any representations the con- added.) loyalty is trary (Emphasis knowl- Client were done without Fairfield’s consent, rules. ER edge likely heart our conflict of interest Client A was the third (comments) (“Loyalty is essential ele- 1.7 party. relationship lawyer’s to a ment in the position adopted is the Fairfield Not client.”). clearly This letter demonstrates interests, contrary it to Client A’s but loyalties lay: Respon- where contrary Client the facts. A’s version.of being aligned with Fair- dent himself as saw state, And, ER as the comments to 1.7 And, represen- paying field—the client. parties’ testi- discrepancy substantial bias Client A reflected his toward tation of finding that mony is another basis loyalty to Client A and his lack Fairfield of interest exists. As discussed conflict *10 above, replete with evidence show- The record A’s and Fairfield’s versions of Client joint representation ing contrary to that underlying events were each an impermissible

created conflict interest. a arose Because conflict of interest from Repeating every piece of supporting Respondent’s joint representation evidence of Client A would be say redundant. Suffice it to Respondent and Fairfield and failed because based on the findings, Committee’s factual to obtain Client A’s informed consent to Re- adopted by court, spondent’s Commission and this representation, we find continued 1.7(b). no finding Respondent have trouble impermis- that an violated ER sible conflict of interest arose from 1.4(a) b. Ethical Rules joint dent’s representation of Client A and (b)—Communication Fairfield. Both the Committee Commis Having existed, found that a conflict Respondent sion concluded that violated ERs question Respondent becomes whether rea- 1.4(a) (b), provide: sonably believed that the conflict would not (a) lawyer keep reasonably A shall a client adversely representation affect his informed about the status of a matter and Respondent whether obtained Client A’s con- promptly comply requests with reasonable sent joint representation after full for information. 1.7(b). consultation. See ER This court (b) lawyer explain A shall a matter to the need not decide Respondent whether reason- reasonably necessary permit extent ably believed representation that his regard- client to make informed decisions adversely Client A would be not affected ing representation. Respondent because comply failed to brief, Respon- In the issue statement of his requirement necessary consent repre- dent questions whether there is “clear and party sent a a when conflict of interest convincing legal support evidence to conclu- present. 1.4(a).” respondent

sion E.R. violated only The arguments Respondent presents, The specifically provides rule however, are that had Commission not when representa the conflict arises from the Respondent found that information concealed multiple matter, tion of single clients in a A, A, from Client that he abandoned Client attorney must explain implications, ad or A keep that he failed to Client informed vantages, and of the represen risks common any because “ulterior reason.” None of 1.7(b). tation. ER Client A testified that arguments any bearing these has on whether only time Respondent mentioned a con 1.4(a). Respondent or not violated ER flict of during meeting interest was on 1.4(a) merely issue under ER whether or September According to Client A not Respondent kept reasonably Client A Respondent informed Client A that there informed about the status of the case. possibility was a conflict would arise that, arose, court, if a conflict independently reviewing he would have to This after record, withdraw from representing Client A Respondent concludes violat- Client A would have to seek Respondent represented other counsel. ed this ethical rule. explain 26,1987 did concept A from approximately Client June interest, specific conflict of type what of con October According his time arise, sheets, might flict or advantages had minimal contact with risks joint that existed because of repre during repre- Client A he 16 months that Moreover, sentation. neither sented Client A. met with time, Client might advised A that he have a cross- Client A on September one against indemnity claim during persuade Fairfield nor in he which time tried formed Client A might position Client their A “rethink” their raising interrogatories constrained certain defenses on draft answers to that conflict- joint Client A’s behalf repre position. because of the ed with Fairfield’s A possibility billing sentation. mere mention of the for a reflects calls Client A total interest, more, of a conflict of phone without is not of 3 with Re- hours conversation requirements regular sufficient to meet spondent. Despite sending Fairfield topics discovery, ethical rules. status letters such *11 research, infor- A with sufficient negotiations, provide did not Client legal and settlement to them make informed Respondent sent no such information mation to enable to fact, he when whether regarding representation. Client A. asked decisions passed any regarding the sta- information Moreover, again Respondent once Septem- A tus the case Client after requirement ER into 1.4. misreads a scienter meeting, Respondent ber admitted unintentionality of an intentionality or The indirectly “only through he did so Fairfield.” irrelevant in determin attorney’s conduct is finding Respon- have little that trouble question The ing a ER 1.4. violation of in- keep reasonably dent faded to Client A attorney provided or not the simply whether 1.4(a). formed, required by as ER to en information the client with sufficient found Commission that informed decision client to make an able the 1.4(b) by failing explain ER violated case, In this regarding representation. necessary litigation to Client A to the extent did not. we find that permit them to make informed decisions regarding represen- continued Rule c. Ethical 3.3—Candor Respondent challenges tation of Client A Toward Tribunal finding ER the Commission’s that he violated challenges Respondent also the find 1.4(b), arguing supporting that the evidence for ings he ER 3.3. The basis violated finding “anything this clear con- but conclusion, was later the Committee’s vincing.” According Respondent, Commission, Respon adopted by must his referring Commission have been using his own revision of dent’s conduct in representation meeting continued after the inter to Nabours’ Client A’s draft answers And, September Re- as far as A’s rogatories, along with Client verification concerned, spondent is the evidence shows answers, support as for their handwritten fully explained he implications Respondent’s Reply Opposition to Motion thought Client A’s answers and Summary Judgment. using these in conflicts about Client A’s re- answers were terrogatories, that the Respondent intended rule, Any solved. violation of this repre court his revised answers as consider argues, unwittingly. dent was committed position on the issues senting Client A’s Respondent’s argument fails for a number Yet, Respon interrogatories. raised in the arguments his Despite of reasons. had seen the dent knew that Client A not contrary, nothing legal in the Commission’s interrogatories, some answers to revised suggests Findings conclusion were its contrary to directly Client A’s of which were limited to disclosure efforts And, importantly, more Re draft answers. And, September meeting. even interrogatories spondent submitted these legal if this were conclusion that A learning that claim even Client was after intended, court, inde- Commission “an changed their an ing had pendent arbiter of both the facts and law” interrogatories their without swers to matters, disciplinary is not bound either knowledge or consent. legal the Committee’s or the Commission’s part: provides in Ethical Rule 3.3 See, e.g., Kersting, In re conclusions. (a) lawyer knowingly: A shall Ariz. at 726 P.2d at 588. (1) of material fact make a false statement record, Based on our review tribunal; to a law easily ER find violated 1.4(b). clearly The record shows that from (4) law, required by applicable except as Respondent agreed to represent the time lawyer knows offer evidence that A, kept singularly A was un- Client Client false____ about the lawsuit. All the deci- informed 3.3, interpretation of ER Re- regarding sions the lawsuit were made Based on requires the rule spondent Respondent. Fairfield and Because Client A analyze truth of the evi- little about law- court first received so information suit, to the court—in this he submitted necessarily it follows that dence that *12 interrogatories—and analyzing

case the in necessarily applicable answers is not 3.4(a), Respondent then Respondent determine whether knew violated ERs whether 3.4(b), that the he answers submitted were false. and 4.1. Respondent arguing, way, in convoluted in question—3.3, A1 of the ethical rules that Client A’s handwritten draft answers 3.4(a), 3.4(b), 4.1—expressly impliedly or true,

were not or Respondent at least that part require knowledge sort of on the some true, they believed were not and that the attorney. development the factual Respondent answers to submitted the court in the of ER 3.3 that resulted violation was were, to the best of knowledge, his time. interrogato- Respondent that submitted the Thus, according to Respondent, because learning ries to Client A the court that after evidence he submitted to the court either was disclaiming was At the time answers. true, thought or true he it was he did not Respondent interrogato- that submitted violate ER 3.3. counsel, however, opposing ries to

Athough argument, a novel Respondent Client A dent had not received notice that grasp fails to nature the misconduct claiming was that the revised were answers gave that rise this violation. The false untrue. statement or false Respondent evidence that Respondent Athough A that Client claims offered to the court was that the answers he they knew that never in their claim wavered represented submitted Client position. A’s they of the represented the existence Respondent well aware that the “re- priority-rent-back program at Fairfield’s di- vised” he answers submitted as A’s Client rection, vehemently Respondent claims that not represent position. did Client A’s Based he submitted reflected the answers actions, Respondent’s on our review we during agreement parties reached unquestionably Respondent find that violated sup- To September meeting.- their 3.3; ER fails to understand claim, port his introduced affida- simple proposition troubling. indeed representa- vits from a number of Fairfield’s September tives who 10 meet- attended d. Ethical Rules 3.4 and 4.1—Fairness ing. support Respon- A1 affidavits Party to Opposing and Truthfulness change dent’s claim he that was authorized in Statements Others he did. Client A’s answers as Given urges The State Bar the court to conflicting testimony cannot presented, we that Respondent’s changing find conduct in say convincing that there is clear and evi- interrogato Client A’s draft answers to Respondent knew that the an- dence that submitting signed ries and them with the represent Client swers he submitted did not 3.4(a), 3.4(b), verification also ERs violated position opposing them A’s when he sent Athough 4.1. these violations al were Accordingly, find no violation of counsel. leged complaint, neither the Commit 3.4(a), 3.4(b), or ERs 4.1. tee nor the Commission concluded that Re spondent violated these ethical rules. We e. Ethical Rule 8.4—Misconduct agree with the Committee and the Commis objects finding that he presented sion that the evidence is insuffi 8.4(c) (d). objec- His sole violated ERs Respondent’s cient find that conduct Athough procedural tion nature. interrogatories connection violated alleged Bar conduct State 3.4(b), 3.4(a), ERs or 4.1. 8.4(c) litigation violated ERs in the Fairfield (d), recognize that con- it seems anomalous that the Committee reached no such Commission, interrogatories report, in its how- use clusion. The ever, Commission, signed by unani- duty verification his “[t]he violated stated: court, 3.3, eight adopted Commits duty aye, candor ER but not his mous vote of fairly and Conclusions of opposing party Findings deal with the tee’s Fact 1.4(a), duty or ERs counsel to be truthful in state- Law that violated But, 3.3, 8.4(d), 1.4(b), 1.7(b), 8.4(c), alleged develop- ments others. the factual Re- complaint against ment resulted the violation of ER 3.3 in Count One NARRA- IN CASE OF not OF JUDGMENT did Because Committee spondent.” MONTE, CV 87-13534.” DEL Respondent violat- MORE VS specifically conclude 8.4(c) judg- (d), a satisfaction The letter enclosed Respondent argues ed ER that the and advised that re- ment form could not conclude the Commission *13 (d). 8.4(c) return only upon the Respon- check be cashed or should spondent violated ER judgment. of of executed satisfaction acknowledges that the Commission has the dent letter, satisfaction Respondent authority modify received the Committee’s about the check on or judgment, and Findings of Conclusions of Law. Fact and 21, 31, however, Miller 53(d)(3), On November 1988.' argues, rule Ari- October He Court, reiterat- follow-up letter requires Respondent a Supreme sent zona Rules Respondent not cash ing should conclusory statement con- more than and returned report. check until he executed tained in the Commission’s indicat- Miller also judgment. satisfaction Although prefers the court some dis stop he letter that would follow-up ed in this of the reasons for the Commission’s cussion the satisfaction of payment on the check if modifications, the failure to Commission’s by returned December judgment was not way provide this discussion in no limits this to Miller’s No- Respondent respond did not Respon ability court’s to find this violation. however, did, deposit 21 He vember letter. matters, in forgets disciplinary dent in on December the check his trust account independent of both court acts as an arbiter 11,1989, January Miller unsuccessful- 1. On Neville, Ariz. the facts and the law. at on the ly place stop payment order tried to 108, reviewing P.2d After on Janu- Respondent check. Miller wrote record, convincing by find clear and evi 17,1989, stating had been ary that the check 8.4(c) Respondent dence ERs violated Respondent must return cashed and that (d). and judgment. satisfaction receiving response after no February On 3. Count Two filed a motion to Respondent, from Miller Because the in count undis- facts were Respondent sign and return the compel puted, disposed the Committee of this issue granted judgment. The court satisfaction by summary judgment, filed on which was compel on March and the motion to September 1990. The Commission attorneys’ client in awarded Miller’s $250.00 Fact, Findings adopted the Committee’s finally signed satisfac- Respondent fees. adopt which we also and are summa- he ulti- judgment on March tion of rized below. mately paid $250.00 Miller’s clients The sued Narramores Pic-N-Save Del his funds. own Corp. personal injuries Monte that Mrs. facts, both Committee on these Based exploding Narramore sustained from an can Respon- concluded that Commission Respondent represented of enchilada sauce. Despite and 3.2. dent violated ERs 1.15 Narramores, Miller Michael Owen contrary, we Respondent’s arguments to the represented the defendants the action. convincing evidence that find clear and trial, 13, 1988, September jury On after these two rules. violated judgment was entered favor of the Narra- against 1.15—Safekeeping mores Del Monte for the sum of Rule a. Ethical $2,977.64. Property On October after the filing appeal expired, had Re- time for an con- and the Commission The Committee advising he spondent wrote to Miller did acting nature was in the cluded asking appeal Miller for intend Miller’s fiduciary both his own and of a payment judgment. tort check Respondent cashed the client when Accordingly, sent him. because that Miller On October Miller sent $2,977.64. without execut- the check cashed dent a letter with a check for judg- returning the satisfaction of ing company and check was from an insurance directed, both the Committee and ment as “FULL SATISFACTION stated on its face: ing Commission concluded that capacity. escrow See Black’s Law (5th 1979) fiduciary his obligation Dictionary (defining violated Miller’s ed. es- clients, delivery crow as of money party in violation of ER 1.15. one person sup- hands a third who is Respondent essentially argues that posed to money happening hold the until the Miller’s ownership clients had no interest performance contingency of a condi- the check that Miller sent tion, person after which the third to deliver judgment because the in the case final property yet party.) Trusting another and Miller’s clearly clients Respon owed Respondent, Respondent money Miller sent money dent’s clients the tendered. Accord specifically satisfy that was to be used ingly, Respondent argues that Mil because judgment against clients. *14 ler’s clients money had no in interest $2,997.64 arguments contrary, to the was tendered, ER 1.15 is inapplicable. the “property of others” until complied with the conditions to agrees The court attached with the Committee’s cashing of analysis of the check. the violation. Ethical rule 1.15 requirements. has three basic re- The rule above, $2,997.64 As discussed (a) quires lawyer a property to: “hold property check was the of Miller’s clients persons clients lawyer’s or third a in until executed and returned the possession representa- in connection with a judgment.3 satisfaction of The rules re separate tion lawyer’s from the proper- own quired Respondent property sep to hold that (b) ty,” “promptly deliver to or the client property. Respondent arate from his own person any third property funds or other Instead, Respondent did not do this. violat person the client or third entitled ed that Miller and the trust Miller’s clients receive,” (c) keep property in which both placed in cashing him check and dis lawyer person and another claim inter- tributing proceeds after Miller told Re separated ests accounting until there is an spondent going stop pay was that Miller added). (emphasis severance. ER 1.15 ment on the check because had to satisfy failed the condition attached its The comments to ER specifically 1.15 state Accordingly, agrees tender. this court with lawyer property “[a] should hold of oth- both the Committee and Commission that ers with the required professional care of a $2,997.64 Respondent’s handling of the check fiduciary.” Fiduciary is defined as: violated ER 1.15. person holding [A] the character of a trust- ee, or a analogous character to that of a Litigation 3.2—Expediting b. Ethical Rule trustee, respect in to the trust and confi- Both the Committee and the Com dence scrupulous involved in it and the Respondent’s delay mission found that in ex good requires. faith and candor which it ecuting judgment the satisfaction of violated 3.2, requires lawyer

ER a “make (5th 1979). Blade’s Law Dictionary 563 ed. expedite litigation reasonable efforts to con It capacity was in this that Miller sent Re- with sistent the interests the client.” Re spondent check, spondent settlement specifically argues that there no violation conditioning cashing upon any delay of the check executing judgment because executing any the satisfaction of was “neither inconsistent with nor had judgment. sense, thing a was act- to do with the interests of his client.” Respondent appears arguing cashing requirements necessary extinguish to be a technical a check JUDGMENT OF marked "FULL SATISFACTION judgment previously debt. As court has stat- " ed, term, IN CASE OF NARRAMORE VS '[sjatisfaction’ a technical its MONTE, DEL CV 87-13534” constituted satis- application judgment payment to a it means the underlying judgment. Respondent faction judgment, money of the due on the which must appears confusing concepts of Accord record, nothing be entered of but this is a judgment. Satisfaction with satisfaction of legal judgment." Rager v. Su- satisfaction of Although marking may a check "full satisfaction” Serv., perior Coach Sales & disputed arising serve as release claim added). (1973) (emphasis tort, either contract it does not meet trouble We have little litigation find such a violation. further that the check; thus, doing so. he was over before received delay Respondent argues his actions did not handling of court finds This litigation. judgment cheek satisfaction administra- prejudicial offensive but again Respondent missed the Once has behavior justice. Respondent’s tion adopts definition of

mark. He too narrow a executing the sat- cashing the check without “litigation.” Litigation is as a “[Ile- defined inexcus- requested is judgment as isfaction action, gal inciting proceedings all there- Miller advised Respondent specifically able. (5th Dictionary Law ed. in.” Black’s appeal and did not intend clients 1979) added). (emphasis interest A client’s judg- for the send the check asked Miller to judgment entry does not end with the complied ment debt. Miller completion legal but ends with the remitting the foil amount request, dent’s legal complete action. This action was when only that Re- asked judgment; Miller judgment the satisfaction of was filed. judgment. spondent execute a satisfaction Moreover, Respondent misreads ER 3.2. Instead, Respondent forced Miller file imposes duty That rule affirmative delayed unnecessarily compel motion *15 lawyers to to expe- make reasonable efforts by approximately 5 months. process litigation. dite The caveat—consistent with time but the only wasted not Miller’s This the interests of the client—insures that a ultimately to issue had of the court that time lawyer’s expedite litigation efforts to do not Respondent to execute the directing an order legitimate with the client’s interests. conflict fact Particularly galling is the satisfaction. comments, however, The make it clear that Respondent’s no for that there was reason “delaying discouraged. In tactics” are ana- judg- of the satisfaction refusal to execute 3.2, respondent lyzing whether a violated ER ment. question competent is whether a law- “[t]he unnecessarily Not did yer acting good in regard faith would case, judicial system but in this burden course of as having action some substantial unchecked, behavior, ad- this of if can kind (com- purpose delay.” other than ER 3.2 judicial system versely as a whole. affect the ments). by As was evident the trial court’s encourages voluntary The settlement court costs, imposition purpose no substantial Re- type The behavior judgment debts. forcing was served in Miller to file a motion judg- spondent engaged only encourages in compel the satis- execute judgment creditors to ment debtors to force court, therefore, judgment. faction This to recover a judicial proceedings resort Respondent’s unjustifiable delay finds in will not condone this judgment. This court executing judgment the satisfaction of violat- conduct, type egregious which unnecessar- ed ER 3.2. judicial already ily overburdened burdens an system. Accordingly, we find 8.4(d)—Conduct Prejudicial c. Ethical Rule to the admin- prejudicial actions were dent’s to the Administration of Justice pro- justice thus constituted istration of misconduct, of ER in violation fessional alleged The State Bar in its com Gresham, 162, 8.4(d). 864 Or. In re 318 plaint conduct in connec Cf (1993) disciplined for (attorney 363 P.2d handling tion with his of the Narramores’ deadlines, neglecting imposed court meet judgment satisfaction check violated ER unnecessary placed an additional and which 8.4(d), provides profes is a “[i]t system). judicial burden on lawyer to: ... en sional misconduct for gage prejudicial conduct that Sanctions justice.” administration of Neither the Com and the Commission Both the Committee mittee nor the Commission concluded that suspended be conduct connection with the recommended further rec- year. The Commission judgment violated ER for one satisfaction check 8.4(d). Respondent pay restitution urges The Bar this ommended State court $2,258.60, Committee, Commission,

to Client A in the amount of which The but not the represents they paid the amount to the attor- also considered the effect of sanctions on ney who took over their case. Respondent Respondent’s practice mitigating as a factor. recommendations, challenges these urging a Respondent challenges the Commission’s Bar, lesser sanction. The State on the other aggravating consideration of the 3 additional hand, urges the Respondent. court to disbar Committee, ap- by factors not found plicability aggravating fac- responsibility ultimate of each individual for decid factor, ing appropriate attorney except multiple tor for discipline violations rests with Neville, urges and he also the court to consider court. 147 Ariz. at 708 P.2d (citation omitted). practice as a effect the sanctions carrying out responsibility, mitigating factor. We each turn. guided prin we are address ciple purpose discipline that “the of bar is not punish lawyer Aggravating Propriety Considering but to deter others and

protect public.” Kersting, Factors Not Found 151 Ariz. at 595; 726 P.2d at Coffey, re 171 Ariz. Committee 544, 546, (1992). 832 P.2d lookWe ap challenges first to the American Bar Association’s Standards plication aggravating of the 3 additional fac (1991) Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Commission, tors that the not but the Com (Standards) guidance determining the mittee, be found. seems to ar appropriate impose. sanction to In re Tar that, guing did because the Committee letz, factors, aggravating find these 3 the Com (1990). The Standards set forth factors precluded making mission is such a determining should considered in finding. Respondent fails to consider rule *16 (1) violated, appropriate duty sanction: the Court, Supreme Arizona Rules of the (2) (3) lawyer’s state, the mental the actual or affirm, re enables the Commission to potential injury lawyer’s caused the mis Fact, or modify Findings verse of Con (4) conduct, aggravating of existence of clusions Law or Recommendations before or mitigating factors. See Standard 3.0. 53(d)(3), it. of See rule Arizona Rules Supreme Court.

a. Aggravating Mitigating Factors Respondent’s Because the bulk of chal- Experience 2. Substantial lenges involve findings the Commission’s of Respondent challenges propriety factors, aggravating mitigating different applying experience of in his substantial adopt, begin analysis which we we our here. practice aggravating of law as an factor. following The Committee aggra- found the specifically provide The Standards that sub (1) vating multiple factors: violations of the experience practice may in law stantial of (2) Conduct, Rules of Professional substantial be aggravating considered an factor. See (3) experience law, in practice of 9.22(i). Standard Both the Commission and directly acknowledge failure wrongful this court have this routinely considered as nature of his conduct. Commission factor, according prop an it aggravating only aggravating found not these 3 factors weight determining appropriate er when (4) aggravating but 3 additional a factors: Respondent’s light sanction. of unblem (5) motive, or vulnerability dishonest selfish during disciplinary same ished record those victim, (6) of making indifference 9.32(a), past years, we find see Standard restitution. any aggravating of his effect substantial Both the experience practice Committee and the in Commission law is offset Respondent’s found prior mitigating prior, discipline- absence of disci- effect his plinary record and cooperation Accordingly, with the disci- free record. we conclude plinary proceedings mitigating weight.4 factors. this factor is entitled to no Despite frequency, practice aggravating its this is the time that in as an first ence law” practice considering experi- questioned. Respondent ap- "substantial factor has been alert him edge experience that would or 3. Selfish or Dishonest Motive instead, A de- possibilities; Client was these challenges Respondent the Commis was Respondent. Respondent pendent upon finding “a selfish mo sion’s dishonest or responsible recognizing that conflict Respondent tive” an aggravating as factor. might A’s that Client interests existed and be argues applicable factor is not by obtaining sepa- served have been better cause nor the Com neither the Committee a different pursuing representation rate 8.4(c) by mission found that he violated ER fact, difficulty considering the strategy. dishonesty, engaging involving in conduct recognizing has had fraud, deceit, misrepresentation. Not existed, is ludicrous it conflict interest only Respondent’s argument moot because argue essentially ER this court concluded that he violated edu- because his A was not vulnerable Client 8.4(c), analysis ag Respondent’s but have alerted experience should cation and gravating factor is flawed. problems inherent him to the “motive,” speaks in This factor terms A and joint representation of Client dent’s repre- not conduct. Income from Fairfield circumstances, this Fairfield. Under these Respondent’s gross 20% of sented revenue. finding that Client be remiss court would Fair- protecting interest merely because Client A was not vulnerable his position, large field’s and thus a source of college licensed real educated and a A was revenue, beginning of from the obvious Accordingly, agree with estate broker. Client A. We need representation of vulnerability of vic- the Commission Respondent’s letter to Fair- remember aggravating factor. tim is an day agreed represent field that he A to Client see where interests Making Restitution Indifference lay.5 agree We therefore with the Commis- challenges also represented sion that both findings his indifference about Commission’s Fairfield, notwithstanding Client A and making restitution. interest, obvious conflict for selfish rea- Committee did recom that because the sons. sanction, the record mend restitution obviously con *17 that Commission reviewed Vulnerability of Victim to relating an indifference tained no evidence Respondent argues expe that as an find disagree and making to restitution. We rienced, licensed real estate broker with Respondent is clear that that the evidence college degree, Client A was a vulnerable making to restitution. was indifferent disagree. victim. We A victim’s vulnerabili they fees A testified that incurred Client ty person’s turns not back educational $2,258.60 as they Eikleberry when hired ground experience, work but rather on attorney. also testified Client A their new situation. pay to their they that did not have the funds paying the balance repeatedly attorney As has noted in full but were brief, very Respondent did not contribute throughout this over time. his case involved And, to costs. His failure complex litigation. previously anything as toward these we contin- noted, substantially is consistent with his parties make restitution had different Furthermore, of misconduct. possibilities settling the or liabili uous denial claims impo- challenge to the Respondent’s special knowl- current ties issue. Client A had no at be considered peared challenge or how this factor should to the whether to "hint” an overall factor, disciplinary process. questioning why in the his of this continued use practice aggravating years 10 is an considered not, however, develop fully letter, He an respect factor. did "With wrote: In this And, A], challenge we representation overall to this factor. because I indicated on [Client to our by agreed previously is phone that the effect of this factor offset we had that concluded that disciplinary since to obvious A] unblemished record it is our [Client would defend friendly advantage years, [Client A] to is as his assure over the same 10 we need not address added.) however, (Emphasis position, possible as us.” challenge. to We take no 70 1, 8, Hogan, 84 argu- Malloy

sition restitution makes his entire ment. v. 378 U.S. brief, 1489, 1493-94, (1964). opening ment 12 moot. his S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 653 argues requiring § dent pay him to the Article 10 of the Constitution Arizona attorney costs substantially provision. incurred Client A’s new contains a identical inappropriate attorney because the new Supreme has de- United States Court did,” “would never have done she what “had the sole of the self- termined that concern she not reached [an] [of erroneous conclusion incrimination clause whether a witness is argument law].” current give testimony forced to that will lead past his actions exhibit a clear indifference imposition penalties to criminal affixed making adopt restitution. therefore States, U.S. acts. Ullmann v. United 350 Commission’s conclusion 422, 438-39, 497, 506-07, L.Ed. 76 S.Ct. 100 making was indifferent to restitution. States, (1956); Kastigar 511 accord v. United 1653, 1661, 32 406 U.S. 92 S.Ct. Acknowledge 6. Refusal (1972). Thus, case, 212 L.Ed.2d Wrongfulness only possible penalty disciplin- where the His Actions sanctions,6 ary in- the salient constitutional argues further quiry are disciplinary is whether sanctions privilege against his self-incrimination was “penalties affixed to acts.” Courts criminal using violated our failure acknowl question considered this have have edge wrongful nature of his as conduct unanimously responded negatively. See aggravating an factor. asserts (7th n. Daley, re F.2d Cir. principles, reject criminal law 1977) omitted). (citations admit, guilt use a defendant’s refusal to stated, repeatedly As court “the has punishment, enhance the defendant’s should objective of is to disciplinary proceedings apply disciplinary proceedings. He public, the protect profession penalize unsuccessfully him for de justice punish not to administration fending himself coerces him either “con Kastensmith, Ariz. the offender.” In re fess” or run the risk of an increased sanction (1966). The func- this, Respondent argues, violates his proceedings is not deter- tion of state bar right against self-incrimination. specific mine of an whether conduct Although Respondent failed to cite law, violates the criminal but whether the discussing cases the extent and determina- necessary attorney retains the attributes attorney’s right tion of against self-incrim- attorney’s responsibilities fulfill an to the disciplinary proceedings, ination in this issue him, well court that licensed as extensively litigated has been and has been E.g., Daley, 549 at 475. Be- public. F.2d See, subject of numerous commentaries. disci- primary cause the function of state bar *18 Annot., e.g., Extent and Determination remedial, right is plinary sanctions the Attorney’s Right Against Privilege or against not attach Self- self-incrimination does Inarimination in or Dis- Disbarment Other only pen- disciplinary when sanctions are Cases, ciplinary Proceedings—Postr-Spevack, See, exposed. respondent alties to which a is (1984). And, 4th AL.R. our research e.g., Accordingly, Daley, 549 F.2d at 476. Respondent’s arguments shows that are mer- against Respondent’s right self-incrimination itless. using our his proscribe does not failure to acknowledge wrongful of his con- nature The Fifth Amendment of United aggravating duct as an factor. provides: States person Constitution “No compelled ... shall in any criminal case 7. his Effect Sanctions on Practice (Em- himself,—” be a against witness added.) Ockrassa, phasis provision appli- Respondent, citing This is In re made (1990), also cable the states amend- 165 Ariz. 799 P.2d 1350 fourteenth find, allege, proceeding. did did other not nor we criminal testimony might that his him some incriminate rehabilitated attorneys who could be wrongfully failed of those Commission justifying a short- upon less the effect sanctions than months. to consider Ockrassa, on focused we mitigating suspension er for practice and livelihood as a factor. Be- lawyer’s practice. public of a Ockrassa much too broad- the nature reads we practice, of Ockrassa’s ly. Were we to read in the manner cause of the nature Ockrassa motivating the suggested by Respondent, we the concerns would have concluded sus- minimum a ABA’s recommended 6-month upon find that the effects of sanctions Ockrassa, applicable. See practice were not respondent’s pension and livelihood were at Accord- virtually mitigating every factors case. 90-day rec- adopted suspension ingly, we Respondent correctly noted the effect both the Committee ommended upon attorney’s an practice sanctions did intend This court not Commission. mitigating listed livelihood as a factor implying read Ockrassa to be Standards, in the nor does court this believe attorney’s livelihood effect sanctions an mitigat- that this factor should be considered mitigat- a practice be considered should Granted, ing. the ef- court considered ing factor. disciplined fect of when we Oekras- sanctions case, agrees Respondent’s court however, sa; impos- we did so to avoid Commis- the Committee and the with both ing the ABA minimum recommended sanc- one-year suspension sion a minimum tion. attorney goals of required to effectuate the that, suggest The Standards when sus- inappro- discipline. Accordingly, it would be warranted, pension is 6-month minimum of the sanctions priate consider effect suspension generally necessary protect mitigating livelihood as a public. Commentary. See Standard 2.3 factor. Although acknowledging that in some eases rejected chal- Having all of attorney an could show rehabilitation in less lenges findings aggra- to the Commission’s months, than 6 the Standards state that it is factors, vating adopt the mitigating we preferable suspend for at least findings. Accordingly, find Commission’s 6 months to ensure effective demonstration following aggravating factors are of rehabilitation. The reason for the 6- (1) multiple applicable this case: violations suspension month minimum has do with (2) Conduct; of the Rules of Professional protecting the public. suspen- A short-term experience practice in the substantial sion works somewhat in the manner of a fine. law—however, de mini- we find factor Accordingly, every suspension it carries with (3) mus; directly acknowledge failure “pain” suspended attorney. for the This (4) conduct; wrongful of his dishon- nature “pain” necessary any suspen- is a element of motive, (5) vulnerability est selfish general sion it because serves as both a (6) making victim; an indifference specific deterrent to future misconduct. following also restitution. find that primary justification 6- minimum (1) absence mitigating applicable: are factors suspension month is that shorter “[w]hen (2) record, disciplinary coopera- prior suspensions imposed, lawyers merely are can disciplinary proceedings. tion with delay performing requested services.” Thus, Commentary. 2.3 the effect Standard b. ABA Standards—Recommended *19 merely of a shorter sanction is to inconve- Sanctions disciplined nience client the law- because look the sanctions recom ultimately now yer collects the fees. Ockrassa We Standards, they em attorney. because suspension public of a mended involved body remaining three factors that should reviewing After Ockrassa’s violations and appropriate determining considering applicable aggravating and be considered (2) (1) violated, factors, law duty mitigating that a sanctions: court concluded state, (3) Ockrassa, or yer’s the actual suspension 165 mental and was warranted. 580, lawyer’s mis by the potential injury caused Ariz. at 799 P.2d at 1354. We also concluded, however, Commentary 3.0 Ockrassa one conduct. See Standard that

72 (recommended 526, duty sanctions for breaches Ariz. at at (discussing P.2d 1.3). owed to clients are tailored to lawyer’s men- preface Standards and Standard injury tal state potential injury and or however, long recognized, have that “[t]he client); Levine, 146, see also In re 174 Ariz. discipline in each situation must be tailored 170, (1993) (Standards 847 P.2d case; perfection the individual neither are in determining useful tool proper sanc- uniformity nor absolute can be achieved.” In tion). violations, Respondent’s Based Wines, re 135 Ariz. following apply: Standards Levine, (1983); see, e.g., Ariz. (1) Respondent’s 1.7, as to violation of ER 847 P.2d at 1121. 4.32;7 Standard Respondent’s argument one-year that a (2) Respondent’s as to 1.4, violation of ER suspension disproportionately long fails for 4.43; Standard First, two reasons. of Respondent’s one (3) Respondent’s 3.3, as to violation ERof supporting argument claims his that 6.12; Standard recommended sanction is based on various (4) erroneous conclusions Commission Respondent’s as to violations ERs 8.4(c) concerning reached (d), the Ethical Rules Re- 6.12; and Standard and spondent the aggravating violated and (5) as to violation of ER mitigating disposed factors that existed. We 1.15, Standard 4.14. arguments adopted of these above when we exception With violation Findings regarding the Commission’s the vi- 1.4, of ER reprimand, calls for a aggravating mitigating olations and the 1.15, violation ER which calls for an Second, factors. Respondent the cases cites admonition, the bulk of his violations call for the alleged disproportionality demonstrate suspension. Suspension clearly warranted are factually distinguishable from his case. in this case. Respondent cites involving numerous cases In determining length suspen- multiple violations in which lesser sanctions to impose, sion the Committee and the Com- noted, imposed. Respondent were As how- applicable mission aggrava- considered the ever, none cases cited involved conflict ting mitigating Despite factors. the dif- Thus, of interest violations. we find these ferences in appli- their conclusions as to the analysis. cases of no use in this The cases aggravating factors, cable mitigating cited which a conflict of both the Committee and the Commission interest violation occurred and sanc- lesser agreed one-year suspension a was war- imposed tions were also distinguishable. are noted, ranted. previously adopt As we findings Commission’s toas the applicable instance, For Respondent cites In re Ne aggravating mitigating factors. We also ville, (1985), 147 Ariz. 708 P.2d 1297 agree one-year suspension a is warrant- Petrie, In re 742 P.2d 796 ed. challenges suspension (1987), conflict of interest cases in which we long, as disproportionately while the State cases, imposed only censure. Both of these Bar that it is too short. however, relatively were characterized lawyer’s guided “by relationship are principle Because we undefined nature of the client, case, that an system professional effective lawyer sanc- with and in each consistency,” tions must have apparently good Respon internal acted in faith. case, examine imposed sanctions factually unquestionably cases A dent’s Client was Re Respondent’s. similar Moreover, Pappas, See 159 spondent’s client. neither Neville Respondent challenges the Commission’s reli- cumstances of the but conduct without the con- 4.32, arguing applica- ance objective Standard purpose accomplish par- scious Standards, depends tion this standard on a factual deter- ticular result.” Definitions. Whether mination knew of a conflict of knew or did know the actual interest. speaks is correct the rule conflict existed is he was irrelevant because *20 knowledge, requisite in terms men- aware of the nature of the circum- attendant particular Accordingly, applies tal state for this standard. Stan- See stances. Respondent’s Standard 4.32 Knowledge dard 4.32. is defined as con- violation "the conflict of interest scious awareness of the nature or cir- rules. attendant

73 524, violations, self-dealing. Ariz. 768 Pappas, 159 at nor Petrie involved the number of violations, types aggrava- house of cards col- or the same at 1169. When his P.2d financial ting mitigating present Respon- misrepresented in lapsed, Pappas factors he dent’s case. continued picture his clients while 159 Ariz. Pappas, pockets. line his own See Respondent also in support cites Ockrassa 528, (misrepresenting 768 at 1173 at P.2d 576, position. of his 165 P.2d 1350. Ariz. 799 liquidation extent of assets available case, imposed suspen- In that a 3-month liquidation selling remaining assets then attorney represented sion when an the state interest). Re- had companies in which he prosecution against in a criminal his former from that spondent’s cry far was a behavior Ockrassa, 576-77, client. See 165 Ariz. at Although by Pappas. exhibited 799 P.2d at 1350-51. Ockrassa distin- A and joint representation Client dent’s case, because, guishable unlike rule, the conflict interest Fairfield violated only Ockrassa committed one violation and not at Client A was Respondent believed that aggravating one factor applied. 165 Moreover, imposed risk. sanctions 579-80, Ariz. at 799 P.2d at 1353-54. Final- aggravating important fac- Pappas reflect an Miranda, ly, Respondent In re cites 170 missing cooperate tor in this case—failure to 270, (1992), Ariz. P.2d 823 1278 which we disciplinary Pappas, 159 with authorities. imposed suspension a 3-month on an attor- (“[fjailure 527, P.2d at 1172 Ariz. at 768 ney who violated conflict of interest rules. disciplinary authorities cooperate with violations, Although Miranda involved factor”); In re significant aggravating see conflict interest violation occurred when (1991) 412, Wade, 168 Ariz. 814 P.2d 753 Miranda entered a business transaction with 4-year suspension for conflict (imposing giving his client the oppor- without client attorney willfully when ob- interest violation tunity and notice that the client should seek process). disciplinary structed independent legal counsel and without ob- taining proceed his client’s written consent cases that Because the conflict of interest 271-73, with transaction. 170 Ariz. at factually far the court has decided thus are finding 823 P.2d at 1279-80. There was no bar, distinguishable at we are from the case that Miranda’s interest the transaction determining a that will faced with sanction than, was other fair or reasonable discipline. goals effectuate the client. This is a much different conflict of agree the Committee’s and the with both interest violation from that committed one-year conclusions that a Commission’s Moreover, Respondent. mitigating factors in sanction for Re- suspension appropriate is an Miranda, case, present in Respondent’s spondent’s misconduct. supported the also lesser sanction. 170 Ariz. 273,

at 823 P.2d at 1281. Self-Imposed for Time of c. Credit Withdrawal From Practice of Having Respondent’s dispro- considered Law portionality arguments, we now to the turn arguments calling State Bar’s for disbar- urges the court support argument, ment. In of its State him the time that he has volun credit with 516, cites re Pappas, Bar In Ariz. citing from tarily practice, sup withdrawn imposed P.2d in which this 5- court Murray, port re Ariz. 767 P.2d 1 year suspension. State Bar claims that Rivkind, (1988), and re egregious behavior more (1990). According Respondent, P.2d 1037 Pappas. than that of We do not find this to August he office on 1991 after closed his be true. learning the Committee recommended year. Respon Pappas engaged one suspended transactions he be business voluntary disadvantageous his withdrawal with clients were dent sanc practice of is a sufficient being advantageous his clients while to him- from the law protected public has been Pappas, 159 Ariz. at tion in that self. period dealings during the voluntari Throughout his business clients, ly practice. Pappas engaged blatant withdrew various *21 74

As the supplemental State Bar noted in its quire Respondent successfully a complete brief, Respondent argument raised this for college in course ethics at an accredited appeal first time on his this court. pass law and Professional Re- Multistate Although Respondent And, submitted an affidavit sponsibility Examination. to further in his reply averring brief that he closed his protect public repeat from 1, 1991, office August no in evidence conduct, re- unprofessional we also dent’s appeal supports fact, record on his claim. In quire Respondent complete the Profes- argues State Bar that Respondent had Bar of by sionalism Course offered the State from practice withdrawn of law. Arizona. Notwithstanding that it too is outside the record, the copy State Bar included a Expenses B. Costs and advertisement April that was run in the 1992 Respondent’s objections nowWe address edition of the Maricopa Lawyer in which expenses to the costs and assessment for advertising was his services. Respondent’s incurred Bar. State Regardless parties’ claims, our review First, objections objects are he twofold. is limited to the record on appeal. See rule expenses the assessment for various that the 53(e), Court; Arizona Rules the Supreme during Bar disciplinary State incurred this Killeen, 126, 134, Gold v. 50 Ariz. 69 P.2d cf. Specifically, Respondent objects action. (1937) (citations omitted) (limiting screening ex- assessment for costs and record). appellate in review civil case to Be costs, penses, staff investigator bar counsel cause no in supports evidence the record his binders, expenses, photocopies, legal pads, claims, reject Respondent’s argument supplies. and office that he should be credited with the time that costs, power the court’s are to assess which he voluntarily withdrew from the practice of defined as “all sums as such in civil taxable law.8 action,” expenses, which are defined as d. Additional Sanctions costs, obligations money, “all other than necessarily incurred the state bar in the The court particularly is with concerned performance of complete its duties under acknowledge failure to rules,” may these to costs that limited wrongfulness his conduct. 46(g)(7) taxed a civil action. See rules has charges every contested step these (9), Supreme Arizona Rules of Court. process and still fails to understand how Alternatively, Respondent argues conduct ran afoul of the ethical rules. expenses assessment outside those recov- comprehend failure to what was in a apparent erable civil action is a form of people9 punish- disturbs this ment, court which contrary because to the likely repeat purpose stated Second, lawyer which he discipline. fails There- ob- understand. fore, reinstatement, as a condition of jects requested we re- specific amounts Having rejected Respondent’s arguments attorney suspended practice by time procedural grounds, unnecessary order). it is to discuss court attorney the merits of his contention that an attorney An who credit for of a seeks the time during should be credited with the time "voluntary practice withdrawal” from the lawof attorney voluntarily prac- withdrew from the against period suspension of enforced should against tice of law. The court cautions others only pursuant stipulation to a withdraw with interpreting implying our decision as that the way, Bar or an voluntarily State order of court. time an withdraws from practice against any suspen- appropriate should be credited the State Bar and this can set court imposed. Murray sion The facts in both supervise conditions for the or at withdrawal unique, warranting Rivkind were this otherwise observe the least withdrawal. Murray, unusual treatment. See In re 159 Ariz. (1988) (crediting attorney P.2d One, Committee, the 9. On Count the 3-member year suspension imposed one toward based Commission, pan- 8-member and this 3-member two-year, self-imposed suspension, on his unanimously Respondent's el concluded that due, length part, which was to State Bar’s rules, conduct violated the conflict of interest delay instituting proceedings); formal In re rules, governing the rules communication Rivkind, candor the court. (1990) (imposing suspension covering retroactive

75 Hunt, 262, (1961); 127 P.2d categories expenses. Respon- see Ariz. at 619 of costs and jurisdic- argues requested (listing that the amount at cases from numerous dent 1039 authority reg- to hearing transcripts recognizing judiciary’s and is unreasonable tions law); gener- practice are of see charges duplicative. certain and control ulate Lee, Power Blewett The ally Constitutional Bar.; 18 Admission the Courts Over Objection Expenses 1. to Assessment of of (1899); M. Al- Thomas Harv.L.Rev. 233-55 that Would Not be Recoverable in a to the Courts pert, Power The Inherent Civil Action of An Historical Regulate the Practice Law: of objection In his initial to the State Bar’s (1983). Be- 525 Analysis, 32 Buff.L.Rev. expenses, Respondent statement of costs and the judiciary’s authority regulate to the cause challenged regulate authority the court’s to accepted premise, practice widely of is a law “[tjhere legal profession, stating the is we, recent along other that have courts provision no granting constitutional the Su- issue, ly merely have tended addressed this power the preme regulate legal Court to the authority regulate the pronounce our any profession, longer and there are no stat- source practice explaining of the law without utory provisions giving power.” it such Re- Lewkowitz, See, e.g., power. re 70 of spondent appears to have retreated from this (1950). 229, 325, 329, 220 231 Ariz. P.2d memorandum, position reply conceding in his Thus, the of our explanation a brief of source power regulate court has the authority power and of our is the extent legal profession. Respondent now appropriate. (1) scope that: the court exceeded tlie of its 52(a)(8), authority promulgated it when rule Hunt, deter As we stated in “[t]he requires to impose money court practice of shall in Arizona mination who law judgment State Bar’s and ex- costs placed and under what condition is function (2) penses disciplined attorney; on a state in this court.” 127 constitution expenses assessment of not otherwise collect- 261-62, at 619 P.2d at 1038-39. Our Ariz. in a ible civil action form constitutes a of authority regulate practice of law is punishment, contrary purpose which is 3 6 of the Arizona found articles attorney discipline. of 6, “judicial § 1 Article vests Constitution. power” integrated judicial depart in “an a. Court’s Power to Assess ment____” 3 provides: Article Expenses Costs and powers government of the State The Despite acknowledging sepa- into three of Arizona shall divided power regulate legal court has the departments, Legislative, the Ex- rate profession, appreciate fails to Judicial; ecutive, and, except as and the scope power court’s in this area. Constitution, depart- provided in this such have repeatedly prac declared “that the distinct, separate ments shall be exclusively tice law is a matter within the departments exercise no one such shall authority Judiciary.” of the v. Marico Hunt belonging powers properly to either of Comm’n, pa County Employees Sys. Merit the others. 259, 261, (1980) 1036, 1038 127 Ariz. 619 P.2d added); see, 3, (emphasis e.g., government each Bailey, re 30 Under article branch (1926).10 411-12, 29, 407, may independent, department Ariz. and no exer 248 P. 30-31 judiciary’s authority belonging to the others. Ahearn regulate powers con cise 250, 252, practice universally accept Bailey, v. 104 Ariz. 451 P.2d trol law (1969). Thus, judicial year department alone ed and back to the dates State “judicial power.” See Bar Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & able exercise Ahearn, Co., at 32. 104 Ariz. P.2d Trust How.) Secombe, (19 qualified become one its parte who is See U.S. determine officers, also Ex ("[I]t counsellor, (1856) and for 15 L.Ed. 565 has been well as an settled, removed.”). practice rules of common-law ought cause he to be what courts, exclusively it rests with the court to expressly grant naturally Our constitution does not belonged, the court noted that departments government three primary duty proper of courts is the “[t]he *23 power regulate the practice to define and the justice.” efficient of Ne- administration However, of interpret Bar, law. courts that have at braska State 275 N.W. 268. provisions ed constitutional or identical simi practice law is “[t]he of court concluded that consistently lar to ours have found the with intimately up so connected bound power regulate practice to the belongs of law judicial power of in the adminis- the exercise judicial department. See, e.g., re In to justice right tration of define 73, (1899); Day, 646, 181 Ill. 54 N.E. 651-52 practice naturally logically regulate its In Integration re Nebraska State Bar of belongs judicial department____” to Ne- Ass’n, 283, 265, 133 Neb. 275 N.W. 266-68 also, 268; Bar, at see braska State 275 N.W. (1937); Cannon, 374, State v. 206 Wis. 240 (4 Wall.) Garland, 333, e.g., parte Ex 71 U.S. 441, 445, (1932); Integration N.W. 448-50 (1866) of 379, (attorneys 18 366 offi- L.Ed. are Case, 604, 8, Bar 244 Wis. 11 N.W.2d 619 of cers court “whose duties relate almost (1943). judicial exclusively proceedings na- to of ture”). Supreme provided The Nebraska Court thoughtful discussion of its constitutional analysis applies equally This to Arizona’s power regulate practice to of law when Thus, Constitution. of arti- the combination integrating court’s rules the State Bar 3, cle which separate govern- creates three challenged were as unconstitutional. Ne- 6, 1,§ departments, ment article which Bar, braska State 275 N.W. at 265. Nebras- judicial power judicial departi vests with provisions ka’s very constitutional are similar ment, upon power confers this court the provisions. Arizona’s Compare Neb. discipline members of the bar. 5, l,11 l,12 2, § § Const. Art. Art. Const, 6, 1,§ Ariz. art. and art. As the Constitution, however, Arizona’s Supreme explained, Nebraska “[i]t Court is a provides an even clearer directive in this principle fundamental of constitutional law 6, 3, provides § “[t]he area. Article department government, that each wheth- Supreme Court shall have administrative su state, has, er any federal or express without pervision all over the courts of the State.” grant, right the inherent accomplish all Administrative is defined as: objects naturally within the orbit administration, pertains or Connotes of department, by expressly limited fact especially management, by managing as of the of a power existence similar elsewhere conducting, directing, superintend- or or or express limitations in the constitu- execution, ing, application or conduct Bar, tion.” Nebraska State 275 N.W. at 266 persons or things. Particularly, having (citations (emphasis original) omitted); the character of executive or ministerial see, Washburn, e.g., State Hadley ex v. inf. sense, In action. administrative func- 680, 592, (1902). 167 Mo. 67 S.W. 594-95 distinguished or are such tions acts concluded, therefore, The court “[i]n judicial. are as express grant power absence of [the (5th 1979) Dictionary regulate Black’s Law 42 practice one ed. any law] added) (citations omitted). departments, three Ad- power] (emphasis [the must be ex- department supervision contemplates ercised to which it ministrative man- natu- rally belongs____” Bar, court aging personnel. Nebraska State 275 conduct of See 561, N.W. at 266. deciding department Maricopa County, Mann v. 931, (1969). the power regulate practice 565, Attorneys 456 law P.2d 935 are provision part: judicial legislative, departments, 11. This reads in "The tínct executive power supreme of the state shall be vested in judicial, person persons or and no collection of court, courts, courts, county justices district being departments, shall one of these exercise peace, and such other courts inferior to the power belonging properly to either of the law____” supreme may court as be created expressly except as others hereinafter directed permitted.” provision powers gov- This reads: "The ernment are state divided into three dis- necessary to fulfill their universally recognized “officers of the the attributes have Wall.) 378-79; (4 See, Garland, e.g., at Kas- court.” 71 U.S. the court. responsibilities to see, 650-51; 78; e.g., Day, re 54 N.E. at 419 P.2d at 101 Ariz. at tensmith Law, Application regard, Practice 67 W.Va. In this Daley, 549 F.2d at 475-76. (1910); Wren, S.E. Ariz. process In re discipline entire admission and (1955). And, as Accordingly, procedural. can be viewed as court, attorneys officers of 5(5) are “amenable constitutional § is another article superior.” [the as their court] Nebraska and disci- power admission source of our over Bar, 267; Garland, State 275 N.W. see 71 plinary matters. *24 (4 Wall.) Through U.S. 378-79. the disci- Power Limitations on Court’s b. process, exercising are our plinary we consti- tutionally granted power manage con- to source of the court’s Having explored the duct of court officers. attorneys, turn to the discipline power to ability of power 6, scope of court’s

Similarly, 5(5), § con- article is another to limit courts government of other branches provision empowering stitutional this court to power. in this the exercise of discipline attorneys. admit and provi- This 12-109, that, § argues when it enacted provides sion that this the “[p]ower court has to recover- legislature limited the State Bar to procedural to make rules relative all mat- in a only civil ing those costs that are taxable any in The ters court.” admission and sub- argument. reject Respondent’s action. We sequent discipline of are some of terms, statute, inapplicable to by The its is procedural any the most basic matters before Moreover, any attempt disciplinary actions. court. § disciplin- interpret encompass 12-109 occasions, On court numerous this has had ques- ary actions would raise constitutional procedural. to determine a is whether matter tions. See, Fletcher, 187, 191, e.g., Ariz. State v. 149 (1986). so, P.2d doing 717 870 this on § of AR.S. 12-109 1. Effect distinguished has procedural court from sub (cid:127) Power Assess Court’s law, stating: stantive Expenses Costs and Procedural, adjective or remedial law is argues § 12-109 portion prescribes of the law which power to costs and limits the court’s assess enforcing right the method a or obtain- of proceeding only a expenses disciplinary in ing right. redress for the invasion may costs be taxed in civil those law, hand, Substantive the other is that part; provides Section 12-109 in action. creates, portion of the law which defines court, supreme by promulgated rules regulates rights. time, regulate pleading, from time shall Fletcher, 149 Ariz. at 717 P.2d at 870 practice procedure judicial pro (emphasis original); Daou Har- see also v. ceedings in all courts the state for the ris, P.2d 939 678 purpose simplifying pleading, prac such (1984); (5th Dictionary Black’s Law ed. procedure promoting speedy tice 1979). promulgating prescribing the rules litigation upon its determination of merits. enforcing obtaining right “method of or enlarge abridge, The rules shall not or right,” this redress the invasion of modify rights litigant. substantive of a necessarily court must determine is first who added.) Citing Griswold, qualified (Emphasis come before court to perform State v. courts, 361, 364, 446 (1968), ours, 467, 470 including Ariz.App. task. this As have P.2d another, repeatedly in one maintains costs can be im stated form posed only by He purpose process the State Bar’s admission when authorized statute.13 argues that the court is limited subsequent disciplinary action is therefore only may be by insuring attorneys assessing those costs that taxed protect public costs, Although respondent party recover specify in a civil action to fails to successful 12-331, § what costs applies, presumes to A.R.S. which defines statute referring the court that he 12-341, supreme § court. in the to A.R.S. which enables are recoverable § a civil action. that the 12-109 does not limit us in the exercise 52(a)(8), “taxing expenses” jurisdiction disciplinary rule Ari- under our over matters. Court, merely Supreme zona Rules of the interpretation comport does Not taxing expanded of costs under an defini- meaning the statute’s lan- plain Thus, tion of according costs. to Respon- guage, impli- it avoids the constitutional but dent, expand because the scope rules interpretation that Re- cations raised costs that the State Bar can recover in a civil spondent urges on court. action, modify Respondent’s the rules sub- rights, § stantive 12-109. We violation Legislative Limitations reject 12-109, argument § its because Assess Court’s Power to terms, does not limit attempt to courts in the Expenses Costs and power regulate their prac- exercise of statutory basic construc A tenet of tice of law. so be construed tion that statutes should Supreme The United States Court dis- possible. whenever to be constitutional § cussed the effect of 12-109 on Arizona Marston, Ariz. Stillman v. *25 Supreme Court regulating rules the conduct omitted). (1971) (citations 628, The P.2d 629 attorneys. Ronwin, of See Hoover v. 466 § interpretation 12-109 558, 1989, U.S. 104 80 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 590 urges legislature the adopt us to would allow (1984). ofOne the issues addressed in Hoo- determining range to limit court in the this ver was the effective of an date amendment disciplining in impose sanctions that we could to rules regarding various admission to the attorney. interpretation an unnec Such an State Bar Arizona. U.S. at n. 466 561-62 implicates essarily constitutional concerns. 3, 104 S.Ct. at 1991-92 3. The n. Court rejected Respondent’s argument Hoover grants The Arizona Constitution legislature, through its enactment power court shall to determine “who 12-109, § ability limited the to court’s make practice under what con law Arizona and concerning its amendments to admission Hunt, 261-62, Ariz. dition.” 127 at 619 P.2d immediately the Bar effective. 466 U.S. at Necessarily at 1038-39. included within this 3, 561-62 n. 104 1991-92 S.Ct. at n. 3. As discipline power power is the to those admit stated, Supreme States United Court practice E.g., Riley, ted to In re 142 law. statute, terms, by its not juris- does limit the (1984). 607, 695, 604, Ariz. 691 698 As P.2d Supreme diction Arizona to Court explained one previously, we have is admits establish practice the terms of to admission having bar ted to the after met law; instead, only applie[s] to “[this] section See, e.g., 30 requisite qualifications. Bailey, regulate[ pleading, practice, Rules that ] 411, 30, Garland, discussing Ariz. 248 P. at at procedure judicial proceedings in state Wall.) (4 Corresponding 71 U.S. at 378-79. Hoover, 3,104 courts.” 466 U.S. at 561-62 n. ly, power to the court has the remove from S.Ct. at 1991-93 n. 3. Greer, practice longer those no fit. In re agree interpretation with the Court’s (1938). 385, 390, 96, 52 Ariz. 81 98 It P.2d §of is as inapplicable 12-109 find that it follows, then, necessarily that the court has to promulgated concerning the rules we at- power impose to sanctions that fall short torney discipline as it was the rules that of disbarment. promulgated governing we admission to the law, of the practice Bar. One sanctions this court regulating Rules requires imposition admitting from an costs and ex disciplining an attorney, penses disciplined attorneys.14 nothing regulating have to do with on See rule 52(a)(8), “pleading, practice judicial of the procedure Supreme Arizona Rules proceedings.” Accordingly imposing we find court that Court. This finds Bar, 503, (Miss. adopted position Mississippi 506 Other courts have a similar State 361 So.2d 161, 776, Zinn, imposing 1978); expenses part costs and as a 42 P.2d re 39 N.M. 778 In See, Lutz, process. disciplinary e.g., 676, Randall, In re 100 (1935); 435 P.2d In re 72 Wash.2d 1362, (1979); Idaho 592 P.2d 1366 re (1967). 29 Dawson, (Fla. 1961); 131 So.2d re Levine, 176 n. expenses proceeding. incurred the State Bar See at costs and n. 21. disciplinary disciplined attor- in a action effectively out our neys necessary carry § limits 12-109 Recovering costs and constitutional duties. ability costs and fees impose the court’s expenses disciplined attorneys from assists Athough have attorney. we a sanctioned duty protect public us in our from enact legislature’s power to recognized attorneys guilty those are of misconduct who area, consistently have in this legislation ways. in a number of not have legislature does held that it would make power enact “to laws discipline process costly is a endeavor. unreasonably difficult” impossible, or even According to the State Bar’s audited financial perform its judicial department for the statements, single largest category the Bar’s Miller, re E.g., In function. constitutional expenditures attorney discipline. (1926). Be- 244 P. Ariz. Disciplinary large per- costs account of costs and imposition find that the cause we centage membership dues.15 court As one necessary important expenses plays authorizing noted when State Bar we would disciplinary process, in our function impose special annual on its assessment unnecessarily implicating constitutional be activities, disciplinary members to finance § questions interpret 12-109 as if we were to “[cjourt’s itself, duty protect judi- disciplinary actions. And this we applying to ciary, and the citizens of [the] State § find 12-109 will not do. We therefore persons unfit to law not practice ... should apply disciplinary actions. does hampered by adequate the absence of *26 financing job____” Mississippi to do the Imposition of Costs: the c. Bar, 361 State So.2d at 506. Purpose Discipline of

By shifting the of alternative, some of financial burden In the ar disciplinary procedures to those di- who are gues expenses that assessment of outside costs, rectly responsible the for we insure the in action is form of those recoverable a civil ability of the State Bar to continue its efforts punishment, contrary purpose to the stated having in area this without ask the State lawyer discipline. agree Respon with of We lawyer Bar’s members Bar’s purpose discipline to further subsidize the the of dent that disciplinary protect punish lawyer, efforts.16 Not is the assess- but to the not to costs against public by ment of com- and deter similar conduct other who Rivkind, 157, equitable lawyers. E.g., mitted misconduct a more means of 164 Ariz. at 791 however, financing disciplinary process, disagree, 1040. with but P.2d at We imposition expenses imposi of of costs and serves the characterization deterring lawyers punish additional function of other of costs and fees as a form of tion above, engaging unprofessional we from in conduct. ment. As discussed view Moreover, restitution, public, as protecting consider sanction as a means of in imposition deterring lawyers engaging fees part of costs and to be of other conduct, rehabilitating process disciplinary unprofessional of our rehabilitative 1992, approximately Disciplinary approximate- 15. costs accounted for the State Bar recovered incurred, ly membership of all in disciplinary dues collected it see 35.8% costs that of 4.9% 1992; approximately Arizona, of the collected 37.4% dues of 1992 Financial Statement State Bar (1993); 1991; approximately col- 1991, in of the dues 42.12% approximately recovered in it 1990; approximately lected in of the 38.98% Arizona, 3.4%, State Bar of 1991 Financial see 1989; approximately in 36.- dues collected 1990, (1992); approxi- in it recovered Statement of the in dues collected 1988. 65% Arizona, 5.9%, 1990 mately see State Bar of 1989, (1991); in it recov- Financial Statement specifically We that our of note assessment Arizona, 5.6%, approximately Bar State ered begin does not to cover of the costs the cost State- 1989 Financial see State Bar Arizona states, because, proceedings unlike some other (1990); 1988, approxi- and in it recovered ment currently we ney’s do not assess the State Bar's attor- 7.6%, Arizona, mately see State Bar against disciplined attorneys. fees (1989). Statement Financial fact, disciplinary percentage costs consistently that are recovered has been low. disciplined attorney. recognize No Arizona cases address how costs should imposition expenses may disciplinary costs and be calculated in action. Cases appear punitive, Washington as the discussing attorney’s but Su- calculation fees however, preme Court attorneys, noted when faced public with similar awarded to sector challenge, though punishment even is not are instructional. Arizona have had courts goal attorney discipline, proper determining it decide the method for is the “inevit- Vetter, sequela attorney’s able employ of the fees cases in sanction.” In re (1985). 104 Wash.2d were public attorneys 711 P.2d ers sector entitled to specifically recover their limit fees. Unless Objection Requested To Amounts for by paid,” ed “the Arizona statute to amount Specific Categories Expenses public sector courts have concluded that a attorney’s by fee should be measured Respondent objects to the amount hourly prevailing reasonable rate the com requested State Bar hearing for transcripts munity for State v. similar work. See Mec objects unreasonable. also hara, 474, 485-86, 173 Ariz. P.2d request State Bar’s for reimbursement (App.1992) (awarding 652-53 market rates for Bar State counsel’s routine in-state travel distinguishing Navajo County, Lacer v. expenses, supplies, office and the staff inves- (App.1984), 141 Ariz. 687 P.2d 400 be tigator’s time. He these ex- cause fees statutorily awarded Lacer were penses are contemplated by the charged $450 paid agreed limited to “amount to be screening and administration costs. paid”); Schweiger see also China v. Doll Restaurant, Inc., a. Requested Amount (App.1983) (stating in dicta that fees Hearing Transcripts public attorneys awarded to sector should be The State Bar requested $4-per-page, for prevail measured rate hourly reasonable $3,680, a total of for the costs associated with work). community ing for similar preparation its hearing transcripts. Bar State arrived at per-page rate public attorneys, As with sector determin- by reviewing per-page charged rates ing the by public costs incurred sector em- *27 independent reporters court in different dis- ployees presents special challenge. a Public ciplinary proceedings. Respondent argues do employees sector not bill for their work in that $4-per-page charge the requested is private the same as employ- manner sector unreasonable, claiming that the State Bar is public Consequently, employees ees. sector limited to recovering actually those costs compute by do not the cost of work their the Thus, Respondent argues, incurred. the cor- byor project, determining hour the and the rect determining method for of the cost the agencies actually that costs these incur is hearing transcript for the State Bar to difficult at best. When market for the typist’s hourly calculate State Bar wage by provided public employees services sector overhead, percentage exists, include for and public we see reason to no treat sector apply figure that to the amount of time that employees differently way from the we treat the typist actually spent project. on this public attorneys. sector' expenses The costs and disciplinary of a Although recognize we that State proceeding against are assessed a sanctioned employees technically public Bar are sec pursuant Supreme Court rule employees, tor their approximates status that 52(a)(8), which language does not contain public employees. of sector Accordingly, we that recovery limits the to actual costs or rate, per-page prevailing find in the expenses Although incurred. we have de- work, community an appropri for similar types expenditures may fined the transcription ate measure of cost for as expenses, recovered either costs or these provided Bar employees services of the State limiting only definitional terms are in the hearing. in connection with types expenditures that are recoverable. case, 46(g)(7), charged by See rule $4-per-page Arizona Rules of the Su- In this preme Court. services its transcription State" Bar for 8.4(c), 1.7(b), 3.3, 1.4(a), 1.4(b), and ed ERs employees provided based on an infor- 8.4(d), Two, Respondent and as to Count survey per-page charges mal that in- find 3.2. further 1.15 and dependent reporters charged court the State violated ERs that, as to convincing evidence Bar cases. The clear disciplinary in different 8.4(d). Two, violated ER charges range per page $5.47 Count $3.91 find- agree the Commission’s per less also page. reporters charged Court than We mitigating ings aggravating as to the per page only 2 of the 7 cases $4.00 Fi- case. applicable surveyed. $4-per-page State factors were one-year nally. approve requesting per-page although Bar within the we falls by Commis- prevailing community suspension in the for recommended rate similar sion, Respondent’s continued work thus is both we reasonable recov- find by of his acts the State to understand nature erable Bar. failure protect

compels steps further us to take Duplicative Expenses public. Accordingly, pre-condition b. as a reinstatement, require charge's also claims that at an successfully complete a course in ethics for travel Bar counsel’s routine in-state ex- law, pass Multi- college accredited penses, supplies, office and the staff investi- Responsibility Examina- state Professional gator’s are duplicative time $450 tion, complete Professionalism for charged screening and administration. State Bar. by Course offered the Arizona claim, however, sup- is not ported by According evidence. DISPOSITION Expenses Statement of Costs Rosemary State Bar submitted and to B. suspended period of Respondent is for a affidavit, charged Martin’s the amount year. applying for reinstate- one Before screening solely and administration reflects ment, Respondent successfully must com- screening investigat- costs associated with plete a in ethics an accredited course ing disciplinary “general” claims and admin- law, Profes- college pass Multistate istrative costs the State Bar incurred Examination, com- Responsibility sional assignment hearing from the of a case to a Course offered plete the Professionalism through committee the conclusion Bar. shall the Arizona State “general” case. These administrative costs $8,060.52 for the pay also to the State Bar charges things include such adminis- proceedings, and costs and of these expenses counsel, expended by trative time staff bar A in pay to Client the amount restitution assistants, legal secretaries, typists, file $2,258.60. Respondent’s reinstatement after messengers, postage charges, clerks and *28 for in Arizona suspension provided is rule costs, supplies, telephone normal office Supreme Court. Rules normally other factors attributed office specifically overhead. Ms. Martin averred MOELLER, V.C.J., concurs. investigator’s expenses that travel and staff Justice, ZLAKET, dissenting. times were not included in the amount charged screening for and administration. majority’s I am to concur unable Expenses Statement of The Costs sub- Moreover, matter. because resolution of this supplies charges pur- mitted reflects for significant extend I am reluctant specifically chased for this case. there- We my will be length opinion, of this remarks fore find that claim that he is brief. expenses being charged twice for the same is acknowledge” Respondent’s “failure unfounded. conduct, finding wrongful his a nature of aggravating by majority as an affirmed

CONCLUSION factor, large originated in appears to have aggressive defense advanced part from the agree with Commission clear today’s opinion I fear that by attorneys. convincing supports evidence find- facing message One, to those ings sends an erroneous that as to Count violat- the disciplinary process—that they if altogether, dare to which is what I believe should challenge them, charges against the con- have been done. sequences may be they more severe than if The method here appear does not to be simply confess wrongdoing pray for mer- different from that utilized the com- cy. There something demoralizing and committee, mission and the both of which message, destructive in such a something presumably weighed aggra- found and these very violates the spirit upon which our vating mitigating against factors one an- legal system Here, premised. although other. Perhaps explains why, despite respondent’s weak, some of arguments are I its having claim of weight eliminated the do not find them to be spurious or contemp- given particular factor, aggravating

tuous. Neither Ido believe he should be majority finds no cause to consider a penalized taking aggressive an stance modification discipline. of the recommended committee, commission, before the or this court. Respondent had a conflict of interest recognize he either failed to or chose to

Respondent’s failure to return the execut- ignore. His conduct improper, ed and I do judgment, satisfaction of exceeding- while ly dispute poor practice, disciplined. that he should be hardly the heinous offense my however, judgment, portrayed by suspension a majority. of six The finding that day,18 months and one “prejudicial super- conduct was followed to the adminis- justice” probationary period tration vised mandatory strikes me as a considera- participation ble in the overstatement. state bar’s law office significant It is also management (LOMAP), program neither the assistance hearing committee nor the disci- ought plinary to be I commission sufficient. would also remand made such finding. this matter to the State Bar for a determina- agree I that the respondent’s use of “sub- did, fact, tion respondent as to whether experience stantial practice in the of law” as voluntarily remove himself practice from the aggravating inappropriate factor was so, of law as he If claims. I would be here.17 I respectfully however, disagree, give inclined to him credit for that time majority’s with the gives claim that it no against any sanction imposed. purpose weight factor, to this and submit instead that of discipline, or so say, protect we like to is to its analysis has quite the opposite effect. public rather than to punish lawyer.19 prior had no disciplinary record Nothing in the suggests respon- record many years over practice, which should presents continuing dent threat to the wel- Mulhall, In re weigh in his favor. clients, justice fare of his system, (1989). 768 P.2d using But in public Thus, general. voluntary credit mitigating effect of discipline-free those appropriate removal would be here. years to “offset” the practice” “substantial aggravating factor, majority effectively note, On a majority final I believe the equal weight accords to both. ap- Such an respondent’s legal argument misunderstands proach makes little sense to me. regarding The net authority. this court’s IAs read effect is to cancel mitigation briefs, out whatever questions right he our to assess respondent’s “unblemished” disciplinary expenses rec- costs and disciplinary proceed- *29 might ord otherwise provided, have leaving ings. He does challenge general our him with no credit for it at all. power This is govern the practice of law or to clearly not the same eliminating as regulate the “sub- legal profession in this state. experience” stantial Thus, factor from equation agree while I majority’s with the reso- application "aggravator” 544, 17. The always Coffey, 19. In re 171 Ariz. 832 P.2d 197 but, opinion sug- somewhat troublesome (1992); Rivkind, 154, In re 164 Ariz. 791 P.2d gests, any detailed discussion of its use must (1990); re Nulle, 299, 127 Ariz. day. await supra. another See fn. (1980). require 18. Such respondent a term would reapply practice. for admission to See Rules 72, Sup.Ct.R. issue, expansive find discus- I its

lution “power” sion of our unwarranted. reasons, foregoing respectfully I For the dissent. Woods, Atty. by Paul J. Gen.

Grant McMurdie, Counsel, Appeals Criminal Chief Golden, Atty. S. Asst. Section and Robert 876 P.2d 579 Phoenix, Gen., appellee. Arizona, Appellee, STATE Trebesch, County Maricopa Pub- W. Dean Deputy Rummage, lic Defender James R. v. Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. Public SHEPPARD, Appellant. Marvin Gene OPINION No. CR-93-0504-PR. CORCORAN, Justice. Arizona,

Supreme Court of determine whether defendant’s We must En Banc. prior felony for theft and two convictions property be treat- trafficking in stolen should June purposes of sentence

ed as one conviction Specifically, we must decide enhancement. occurred on whether these offenses 13-604(H). § “same occasion” under AR.S. Const, jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. We have 5(3), 12-120.24, § rule § art. AR.S. 31.19, of Criminal Procedure. Arizona Rules History Procedural Facts and (defendant) was Sheppard Gene Marvin felony, kidnapping, class convicted assault, felony. a class 3 attempted sexual leading the con- The factual circumstances Sheppard, v. forth in State victions are set (App.1993). P.2d 1120 convictions, had defendant Before these trafficking in of theft and been convicted 3 felonies. The property, stolen both class trafficking resulted theft convictions an incident undercover particular model of police officer “ordered” a Defen- from defendant. Lincoln Continental vehicle and requested dant stole the then police officer later delivered it day. *30 judge objections, the trial

Over defendant’s both the sentences for enhanced defendant’s con- attempted assault kidnapping and sexual 13-604(D), an en- § Under AR.S. victions.

Case Details

Case Name: In Re Shannon
Court Name: Arizona Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 21, 1994
Citation: 876 P.2d 548
Docket Number: SB-92-0001-D. Disc. Comm. Nos. 88-1932, 89-0710
Court Abbreviation: Ariz.
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