39 N.Y.2d 676 | NY | 1976
We conclude that the several Appellate Divisions do not have authority to deny an applicant admission to the Bar on the basis of their independent determination that
Recognition that ultimate responsibility for regulating admission to practice law is vested in the Court of Appeals is to be found in subdivision 1 of section 53 of the Judiciary Law: "The court of appeals may from time to time adopt, amend, or rescind rules not inconsistent with the constitution or statutes of the state, regulating the admission of attorneys and counsellors at law, to practice in all the courts of record of the state.” Provision has been made for admission to practice law in New York State, other than pro hac vice, by progress along either of two routes: by passing the State Bar examination (Rules of the Court of Appeals for the Admission of Attorneys and Counselors at Law [hereafter "Rules”], 22 NYCRR 520.2-520.6; cf. Judiciary Law, § 53, subd 3); or on motion without examination by proof of admission and five years’ actual practice in a sister State or in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of English common law (Rules, § 520.8; cf. Judiciary Law, § 53, subd 2).
Whichever route be selected, actual admission is only on order of the appropriate Appellate Division (Rules, § 520.1 [a]; cf. Judiciary Law, § 90, subd 1). On proof of compliance with other provisions of the Rules of the Court of Appeals and on submission either of a certificate that the Bar examination has been passed or of proof of admission and requisite practice in another qualifying jurisdiction, an applicant is entitled to an order admitting him to practice if the appropriate Appellate Division is "satisfied that such person possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law” (Rules, § 520.9; cf. Judiciary Law, § 90, subd 1; CPLR art 94).
The issue tendered on this appeal is whether in the exercise of its responsibility for screening for "character and fitness”, the Appellate Division may exclude an applicant for admission on motion who is otherwise qualified on the ground that he does not have "sufficient grounding in the legal profession as practiced in the State”—in effect that he lacks the necessary legal educational preparation and qualification. We hold that the Appellate Divisions have no authority to deny admission on this ground (cf. Matter of Brennan, 230 App Div 218).
Appellant was admitted to practice in the courts of Pakistan on September 28, 1954 and thereafter actively practiced in the courts of that Country for more than five years. Since October,
In the design of the procedures for admission to practice law in our State, the determination of general and legal educational qualification has traditionally been kept separate and apart from the co-ordinate determination as to character and general fitness. Responsibility for the former has been retained by the Court of Appeals while responsibility for the latter has been delegated by the Court of Appeals and by statute to the several Appellate Divisions.
The authority which has been delegated to the Appellate Divisions is limited to the area of moral character and individual integrity. Whatever the depth of the entirely understandable concern and conviction of the members of the several Appellate Divisions that unqualified persons should not be admitted to practice in our State, the delegated jurisdiction of these courts is nonetheless limited.
The argument for recognition of the authority of the Appellate Division to deny the application for admission in the present case is made on the basis of a single-sentence dictum in Matter of Harvey (309 NY 46). The outcome in that case turned on whether the applicant for admission in New York had been a resident of the State of Georgia (to whose Bar he had been admitted) during the claimed five years of actual practice there. We upheld the determination of the Appellate Division that the residence requirement was not met where the record disclosed that the applicant had spent at least half of his time in each year working and living in southern States other than Georgia. The opinion of the court ended with the following sentence, on the last clause of which the Attorney-General relies for support for his argument that the Appellate Division had authority to deny the application here on the ground which it did: "Just how much or what kind of 'practice’ such an applicant must show is for the broad, inclusive discretion of the Appellate Divisions, which in the end must determine professional 'fitness’ as well as good character.” (309 NY 46, 48.) Reliance on this over-broad and inaccurate statement is not warranted.
Not only do the provisions and design of the Rules of the Court of Appeals and traditional practice dictate the determination we now make; sound considerations of policy point in the same direction. The individualized aspects of any inquiry
For the reasons discussed the orders of the Appellate Division should be reversed and vacated and appellant’s application for admission to practice remitted to the Appellate Division, Third Department, for further consideration in the light of this opinion.
Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur in Per Curiam opinion.
Orders reversed and vacated, without costs, and appellant’s application for admission to practice remitted to the Appellate Division, Third Department, for further consideration in the light of the opinion herein.
Admission to the Bar may not be denied because the applicant is not a United States citizen (Matter of Griffiths, 413 US 717).