In Re Shaieb
The parents of William, born July 11, 1946, appeal from a judgment in favor of the County of San Diego (County) for the cost of care, support and maintenance of William while a ward of the juvenile court; and while awaiting hearing of a petition for wardship.
The judgment is based upon findings, one of which is that the parents (Shaieb) have sufficient moneys and assets to enable them to reimburse in full the cost to County for care, support and maintenance.
Factual Background
On July 18, 1963, a petition was filed to have William declared a ward under
On August 14 an order was made for his detention in Juvenile Hall based upon a finding that such detention was
On August 15 a second petition was filed under
On August 30 William was declared a ward and ordered in custody of the probation officer, to be placed in the home of Shaieb pending other placement.
At the hearing of August 30, the probation department recommended commitment to the Youth Authority, Shaieb opposed this with a request that William be placed in a military academy in Riverside County, of which Shaieb would pay the expense.
On September 13 an order was made that custody be taken from Shaieb, under
On June 4, 1964, a petition was filed in Riverside County Juvenile Court, alleging a violation of
On June 19 the San Diego County Juvenile Court made an order that William be detained in Juvenile Hall upon a finding that he was likely to flee the jurisdiction.
On July 2, 1964, the San Diego Juvenile Court ordered that William be referred and committed to the Youth Authority, County to be reimbursed for his care while in the Youth Authority at not more than $25 per month.
Again Shaieb opposed the Youth Authоrity referral and suggested as an alternate solution that he take William on a cruise around the world.
The judgment covers reimbursement of the Youth Authority care at the rate of $25 per month from July 23, 1964 through February 18, 1965; care at Juvenile Hall from August 14 through August 29, 1963 at $17.24 per day; care at Juvenile Hall from June 19 through July 1, 1964, pending hearing, and from July 2 through July 22, 1964, pending acceptance by the Youth Authority, all at $17 per day.
The cost per day for the boy‘s stay at Juvenile Hall from August 14 to August 29, 1963 was derived from the total cost of maintaining the Juvenile Hall divided by population of the six months period last computed by the county auditor. It included salaries and wages of Juvenile Hall staff: superintendent, counselors, cooks, etc.; maintenance and operation; food; and probation departmеnt administrative and accounting charges.
Contentions on Appeal
Shaieb states his contentions thus:
1. The state (or County) may not compel the parents of a 17-year-old minor child to reimburse the County for the cost of the child‘s care, support or maintenance in the County institution in which he is detained or cоmmitted pursuant to an order of the juvenile court, for the protection of society.
2.
Reliance is placed mainly upon Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal.2d 247 [28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22], and Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal.2d 586 [43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321]; 60 Cal.2d 716 [36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720].
Hawley dealt with the attempt of the state to charge the father of a 19-year-old defendant in a criminal action, charged with murder, for the care of the defendant in a hospital to which he had been committed under
The rationale of the decision that the father might not be charged is found in this language: “We deem it fundamental that only one who has been charged with or convicted of a crime may be made to suffer deprivation of his liberty, or be subjected to other penal sanction, for that crime. In the case at bench the person so charged and so committed is defendant‘s son--not defendant.” (Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, supra, 59 Cal.2d 247, 256.)
Kirchner held that a daughter, under the circumstances of that case, could not be held liable for the support of her mother while the mother was confined in a state mental hospital withоut there having been any recourse to the $11,000 cash estate of the mother. The just indignation of the court found expression in this language: “... former concepts
Neither Hawley nor Kirchner has been held to exempt a parent in all сases from liability for care of a minor child in a state or county institution. The application of the principles stated in those cases seems to have been restricted to the factual situations dealt with in the two decisions.
Where there еxists, apart from the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code, a legal obligation to support, that obligation may be enforced on behalf of the state or county that has furnished the needed support in a variety of situations: Against a husband under
The cases last cited all arose after Hawley and Kirchner had been decided. Earlier, it had been held that a mother might be required to contribute to the cost of care of her daughter, a ward of the juvenile court, although the mother did not have, and under a divorce decree was not entitled to, custody (In re Carboni, 46 Cal.App.2d 605 [116 P.2d 453]); and that a father in similar circumstance could be required to reimburse the county for payments made by it under the statute from which
Concerning the Juvenile Hall,
In Espinoza, supra, 243 Cal.App.2d 543, the facts in certain particulars resemble those in the case at bench. The boy was made a ward under
The boy later was sent to the Youth Authority, but the question of the county‘s right to reimbursement for that cost was not before the court and was not considered.
[1] In Espinoza, the court said, in dealing with certain of the contentions also made in the present case by Shaieb: “It is concluded that a parent is not deprived of his property without due process of law, nor is he denied equal protection of the law by being arbitrarily charged for the cost of maintaining a county institution, when he is required to contribute, accоrding to his ability, to the cost of the care, support and maintenance furnished to his child at such institution when the child is confined for the dual purpose of the protection of the public at large and his reformation and rehabilitation to the end that he may return to his family.” (County of Alameda v. Espinoza, supra, 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 548.)
[2] Espinoza, therefore, supplies an answer to the question of the liability of Shaieb for care, support and maintenance in the Juvenile Hall of a child made a ward of the court under
Under the authorities cited, absent the conditions existing in Hawley or related cases (People v. Brock, 57 Cal.2d 644 [21 Cal.Rptr. 560, 371 P.2d 296]), the question of the liability of the parent responsible for support is not affected by the question whether the institution is conducted by the state or by the county, and in the case оf a parent responsible for the support of a minor whether the child has been made a ward of the juvenile court and taken from the custody of the parent against the will of the latter.
The reasoning and the rule of St. Vincent‘s Institution for the Insane v. Davis, 129 Cal. 17 [61 P. 476], are inapplicable to the situation in the case at bench.
There seems no valid reason why the rule should be different with regard to reimbursement of the County for $25 per month paid to the Youth Authority. It is true that in the facilities of the Youth Authority are found many persons who have been committed following a conviction of serious crime.
The commitment to the Youth Authority was by virtue of
But wards of the juvenile court committed to the Youth Authority are on a different footing from persons committed thеre following conviction of crime. As to the latter, the committing court has no power to suspend execution (
If profession of the philosophy of the Juvenile Court Law is anything more than self-deception or hypocrisy, there is no difference in the ends sought to be attained for wards of the juvenile court committed as such to the Youth Authority and those cared for and maintained in other institutions or in foster homes. That philosphy is expressed in
We have cited Svoboda v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal. 727, in which a father was held liable for support of his son in the Preston School of Industry. We notice judicially that that school is now one of the facilities of the Youth Authority. Unless, therefore, Kirchner or Hawley compel a different ruling, Svoboda is dеcisive of the question.
To relieve even the parents of a delinquent child of the obligation to support the child while in a correctional institution would create an exception to long-established law in California.
We conclude that William‘s parents were properly held responsible for his care, support and maintenance.
Judgment affirmed.
Brown (Gerald), P. J., and Coughlin, J., concurred.