In re Sealed Case
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Rogers, Kavanaugh, Williams
Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), the Supreme Court held that
In affirming we are cognizant of the unfairness of denying relief to appellant in this sealed case where none of the usual means of learning the status of its case were available and, as the parties agree and we will assume, appellant made diligent efforts through counsel to discover the status of its case. A sealed case generally presents special circumstances. Neither the federal rules of civil procedure nor the district court‘s local rules specifically address how parties shall be notified in sealed cases. Not only is there no public docket in a sealed case, but the parties and their counsel also may not be able to access the sealed docket or receive electronic notification. The ad hoc procedures in appellant‘s case were inadequate to ensure notice. The sealed docket stated electronic notice would not be given and listed participants to be notified by other means. No other means were employed. Although counsel for the parties were also listed on page 1 of the sealed docket as “ATTORNEY[S] TO BE NOTICED,” neither parties’ counsel received notice of the October 26, 2006 dismissal of the case. These circumstances explaining the parties’ failure to receive timely notice of the dismissal of the case are unique, not to be found in precedent addressing reopening of the time to appeal. This may be because the district court and the parties have made special arrangements for receiving notice in other sealed cases and those arrangements have worked. When they do not, through no fault of the parties and despite the best efforts of the parties to obtain information about the status of the proceedings, the civil justice system has failed in light of the implicit assumption underlying the federal rule on notice,
I.
On May 11, 2005 appellant filed an application under the
Meanwhile, on June 21, 2005, the district court sealed the case upon joint consent motion of the parties. Thereafter neither the district court‘s sealed docket nor electronic notification were available to inform the parties of the status of pending and later filed motions. As it turns out, despite the filing by appellant‘s counsel of a Notice of Inquiry on February 28, 2007, shortly after new counsel entered his appearance, inquiring about the pending motions, the parties represent that neither party or their counsel received notice of the district court‘s October 26, 2006 dismissal of the case until May 30, 2007. See Appellant‘s Br. 7-9, 15-16; Appellee‘s Br. 5 n.5, 13. On May 30, upon a call to the district court judge‘s chambers, a law clerk advised appellant‘s counsel of the dismissal on the merits.
Appellant moved on June 8, 2007, within 7 days of receiving notice of the dismissal, to reopen the time to appeal pursuant to
II.
Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), a party may seek relief from a judgment or order for “any other reason that justifies relief,”
In Bowles, a prisoner filed a motion pursuant to
Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement. Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the “unique circumstances” doctrine is illegitimate.
Id. at 214. The Court proceeded to “overrule Harris Truck Lines[, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962)] and Thompson [v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964)] to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule.” Id.
Read as narrowly as possible, Bowles did not reach the issue of when “unique circumstances” might apply on a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b). To support its application, appellant depicts Rule 60(b) as a “court promulgated rule,” in which time limitations are not jurisdictional because it is a “claim processing” rather than statutory rule. Appellant‘s Br. 14, 17. Because Rule 60(b)‘s time requirements are not jurisdictional and may be extended for good cause, appellant suggests that the Harris Truck line of cases overruled in Bowles with respect to an
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged “the jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress,” Bowles, 551 U.S. at 211-212, the Court has never held that a party could use a court-promulgated rule to circumvent the jurisdictional bar on limits for reopening the time to appeal enacted by Congress. The effect of appellant‘s requested relief — that a court could vacate and reinstate a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) because of “unique circumstances” in order to allow a party to appeal where
Reading Bowles as foreclosing Rule 60(b) as an alternative to
Notably, even before Bowles and the 1991 amendment to
What makes this case unique is that it is a sealed case. The usual mechanisms under the federal rules of civil procedure for the parties and their counsel to obtain information about the status of court proceedings were unavailable. Although providing for notice by the clerk pursuant to
A system of procedural rules employing temporal deadlines implicitly assumes there will be an easy way for the parties to learn the status of their case. The reference to
Accordingly, we hold in light of Bowles that the district court lacks power to adopt a unique circumstances exception pursuant to Rule 60(b) to circumvent the 180-day deadline of
Notes
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, order or decree.
(b) In any such action, suit or proceeding in which the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the time as to all parties shall be sixty days from such entry.
(c) The district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. In addition, if the district court finds--
(1) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and
(2) that no party would be prejudiced,
the district court may, upon motion filed within 180 days after entry of the judgment or order or within 7 days after receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal.
(d) This section shall not apply to bankruptcy matters or other proceedings under Title 11.
(6) Reopening the Time to File an Appeal. The district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only if all the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) the court finds that the moving party did not receive notice under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment or order sought to be appealed within 21 days after entry;(B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 7 days after the moving party receives notice under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is earlier; and(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.
(1) Service. Immediately after entering an order or judgment, the clerk must serve notice of the entry, as provided in Rule 5(b), on each party who is not in default for failing to appear. The clerk must record the service on the docket. A party also may serve notice of the entry as provided in Rule 5(b).
(2) Time to Appeal Not Affected by Lack of Notice. Lack of notice of the entry does not affect the time for appeal or relieve--or authorize the court to relieve--a party for failing to appeal within the time allowed, except as allowed by