Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
The defendant in this case pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. He now seeks to vacate his sentence on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to accurately advise him of his sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Assuming without deciding that counsel’s representation was deficient, we conclude that the defendant was not prejudiced by that deficiency. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate his sentence.
I
On November 24, 1997, the defendant sold a buyer 11.6 grams of cocaine base (“crack”). The sale took place in a grocery store parking lot, inside the buyer’s car. Unbeknownst to the defendant, the buyer was an undercover law enforcement officer, and the transaction was caught on tape.
On March 5, 1998, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the defendant with two counts of unlawful use of a telephone to facilitate the distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (Counts 1 and 2), and one count of distributing five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(l)(B)(iii) (Count 3). On March 10, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency and officers of the United States Park Police arrested the defendant on the indictment and executed a search warrant at his apartment. In the course of the search, the police found two semi-automatic pistols and approximately 100 grams of crack. On March 19, the grand jury issued a superseding indictment charging the defendant with the three above-mentioned counts, as well as two additional counts: possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(l)(A)(iii) (Count 4); and possession of a *1013 firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 5).
On July 21, 1998, with the advice of counsel, the defendant entered into a plea agreement with the government. The defendant agreed to plead guilty to Count 4 of the indictment, possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, which was based on the drugs found in the defendant’s apartment. He also agreed to cooperate with law enforcement authorities “in any matter as to which the Government deem[ed] the cooperation relevant.” Plea Agreement ¶ 6(a). For its part, the government agreed, inter alia, to: (i) dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment; (ii) consent to a three-level decrease in the defendant’s offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (1998) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]; and (iii) file a motion, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, for a downward departure from the defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range if it “determine[d] that [the defendant] has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense,” Plea Agreement ¶20. The plea agreement noted that the defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence for the crime to which he was pleading guilty was ten years’ imprisonment, that the maximum possible sentence was life, and that the ultimate sentence would be imposed in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines. The agreement further stated that the defendant understood that the sentence was within the sole discretion of the court, and that he would not be allowed to withdraw from the guilty plea due to the harshness of the sentence.
On July 24, 1998, the district court held a plea hearing pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Among other things, the court asked the defendant whether he understood that he faced a mandatory minimum term of ten years in prison and a maximum term of life. The defendant stated that he understood. The court then discussed the Sentencing Guidelines, telling the defendant that the court would not “actually be able to determine the guideline range in your case until after a presentence report has been completed,” and that the court had “authority in some circumstances to impose a sentence that is more severe or less severe than the sentence called for by the guidelines.” Plea Hr’g Tr. 7 (July 24, 1998). The court asked the defendant whether he understood that “the sentence will be up to the Court,” and asked whether anyone had “made any prediction or promise as to what sentence” the court would impose. Id. at 9. The defendant stated that he understood and that no one had made any predictions about his sentence. The court again warned that the defendant could not rely on any predictions because “I don’t know myself right now until I get the presentence report.” Id. The defendant confirmed his understanding.
Next, the court asked the government for a proffer of the evidence that it would have presented at trial. The government stated that its evidence would have established, among other things, that the defendant sold approximately 11 grams of crack to an undercover officer, and that a later search of the defendant’s residence turned up approximately 100 more grams of crack, as well as two semi-automatic pistols. The court asked whether the defendant was “essentially in agreement with” the government’s version of events, and the defendant stated that he was. Id. at 10. Finally, the court asked whether the defendant was guilty of the crime charged in Count 4 of the indictment. After the *1014 defendant stated that he was, the court accepted his plea of guilty.
The United States Probation Office prepared its first Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) on November 5, 1998. The report calculated the defendant’s base offense level as 32, because the offense involved 50 to 150 grams of crack. See U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(e)(4). After adjusting upward two levels because of the pistols, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(1), and downward three levels because the defendant accepted responsibility for the offense, see id. § 3E1.1, the PSR settled upon a final offense level of 31. The PSR also calculated the defendant’s criminal history, which included two prior felony convictions, as Category IV. The resulting sentencing range was 151 to 188 months’ incarceration. Id. ch. 5, Pt. A (sentencing table).
Upon receipt of the initial PSR, the government advised the Probation Office that the report failed to account for the defendant’s status as a career offender, which derived from the fact that his two prior convictions were for “controlled substance offenses.” Id. § 4B1.1. In 1990, the defendant had been convicted of attempted distribution of cocaine in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. In 1993, he was convicted in the same court of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
The Probation Office revised the PSR accordingly. Under the career offender guideline, § 4B1.1, the defendant’s base offense level was 37, because the statutory maximum sentence for the offense to which he pled guilty was life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. After adjusting downward three points for acceptance of responsibility, the revised PSR fixed the defendant’s final offense level at 34. The defendant’s criminal history category under the career offender provision was VI. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. In contrast to the initial PSR’s sentencing range of 151 to 188 months, the sentencing range generated by the revised offense level and criminal history category was 262 to 327 months. Id. ch. 5, Pt. A (sentencing table).
At a status hearing held by the court on November 23, 1998, defense counsel requested a continuance so that the defendant could “get his head together” in light of the “major change in the time he may get.” Status Hr’g Tr. 2, 3 (Nov. 23, 1998). The court delayed sentencing two more times so that the defendant could research the issues surrounding his sentencing. At some point, the prosecutor also advised defense counsel that, although the defendant had attempted to cooperate with the government, he did not have enough information to provide substantial assistance, and that the government would therefore be unable to file a motion supporting a downward departure from the Guidelines.
The sentencing hearing was finally conducted on February 5, 1999. The hearing began with the defense asking the court to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial. The defendant told the court that his “understanding was that the plea bargain would afford [him] the time of about 10 years, not knowing what the presentence report would reveal,” but that “about 10 years is a far cry different from more than twice as much, which is what my guidelines call for from the pre-sentence report.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 5 (Feb. 5, 1999). The defendant concluded: *1015 Id. at 6. The court, however, denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw the plea, finding that the defendant had “understood the plea bargain” and “voluntarily accepted it.” Id. It then sentenced the defendant to 262 months in prison, the bottom of the Guidelines range. Id. 1
*1014 All the counts I’m not guilty of. There are counts that I am guilty of, but not all of them. I have remorse for that because I did time on that before.... So I do have to own up to my responsibility [for] the counts that I know that I did commit that were wrong, but I did not commit all of the counts.
*1015
On direct appeal to this court, with the assistance of new counsel, the defendant argued that a provision in the plea agreement waiving his right to seek a downward departure from the Guidelines was unenforceable because he had not knowingly waived that right. A panel of this court rejected the appeal, noting that the defendant did not challenge the provision in the district court, and that even on appeal he did not identify any ground for a downward departure.
See In re Sealed Case,
No. 99-3028,
On November 12, 2001, the defendant filed a motion in the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, seeking to vacate his sentence on the ground that his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance when he entered into the plea agreement. The defendant asserted that counsel did not advise him that he qualified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, or that his Guidelines range would be 262 to 327 months. Indeed, the defendant charged that his lawyer failed to give him any estimate of his Guidelines exposure at all, telling him that until the Probation Office prepares a PSR, “no one else has any idea” what the Guidelines range will be. Defendant’s Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant further contended that when he “pressed,” his counsel told him to ask the prosecutor, and that when the defendant did ask the prosecutor, he “understood her to say that he would likely receive about 10 years.” Id. at 12, 13. If his counsel had correctly informed him of his sentencing exposure, the defendant stated, he would have elected to go to trial rather than plead guilty. And he affirmatively declared his innocence of the crime “charged in Count Four.” Id. at 14.
On December 7, 2004, the district court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate his sentence. Relying on this circuit’s opinion in
United States v. Hanson,
II
It is well-established that the validity of a guilty plea depends on “ ‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice,’ ” and that “the volun-tariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice” satisfies the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance.
Hill v. Lockhart,
In
Strickland v. Washington,
the Supreme Court established the now-familiar two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient .... Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
To satisfy the prejudice requirement in the context of an attack on a guilty plea, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Hill,
The first factor in
Hanson
was “the district court’s admonition at the plea hearing that Hanson should not rely on sentencing predictions.”
Id.
at 990. Based on circuit precedent, we found that admonition to “weaken[] the defendant’s claim that those predictions were at the root of his decision to plead guilty.”
Id.
(citing
Horne,
The defendant contends that it was not accurate for the court to tell a defendant that his Guidelines range was unknowable and that there was a risk he would be sentenced to the statutory maximum. But even if the court’s admonition was inaccurate, it nonetheless weakens the defendant’s claim of reliance on a sentencing prediction.
2
We agree with the defendant, however, that even if his claim of reliance on an inaccurate sentencing prediction “is ‘weakened’ by the warning he was given that no one could predict his sentence, it is not defeated” by that warning. Defendant’s Br. 31 (quoting
Hanson,
Second, in
Hanson
as in this case, “even if counsel had told” the defendant the correct Guidelines range — 262 to 327 months in each case — the defendant “would nonetheless have had reason to expect a sentence below that.”
Hanson,
Third, as in
Hanson,
had the defendant proceeded to trial and been convicted, he would have confronted a substantially higher Sentencing Guidelines range than that applicable to his plea (and a substantially greater sentence than that which the district court ultimately imposed).
See Hanson,
Focusing on the two most significant counts of the indictment, we note that a conviction on Count 3 — for distributing five grams or more of cocaine base to the undercover officer in the grocery store parking lot — would have yielded a Guidelines range of 360 months to life, rather than the 262 to 327 months range applicable to his plea.
3
Moreover, had the defen
*1018
dant been convicted on the count to which he ultimately pled guilty (Count 4) — possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base discovered during the search of his apartment — he would have received a mandatory sentence of life in prison.
4
As in
Hanson,
“there is no question but that a competent attorney would have advised [the defendant] of the mandatory minimum sentence he faced” if he decided not to plead.
The final factor in analyzing the defendant’s claim of prejudice is the strength of the defenses he would have had against these charges had he gone to trial. As we explained in
Hanson,
a defendant “does not need to show that he would have
prevailed
at trial, only that there was a reasonable probability that he ‘would have
gone
to trial.’ ”
Hanson,
The fact is that the defendant did not proffer
any
defense at all to Count 3 in the briefs he filed in either this court or the district court. That is not surprising, given that the defendant’s sale of 11.6 grams of crack was to an undercover officer and was caught on tape. At the time of his plea, the defendant expressly admitted selling crack to the officer.
See
Plea Hr’g Tr. 10 (July 24, 1998). And even when he subsequently sought to withdraw his plea to Count 4, the defendant never suggested that he was innocent of Count 3. To the contrary, he conceded that “[t]here are counts that I am guilty of,” and by the context indicated that these included the charge of distributing crack to the officer. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 6 (Feb. 5,1999).
5
Under these circumstances, any knowledgeable attorney would “have advised [the defendant] that he stood little chance of obtaining an acquittal at trial” on the distribution count,
Hanson,
Moreover, the defendant would also have faced the prospect of conviction on Count 4, which carried a mandatory minimum statutory sentence of life in prison. As the defendant correctly points out, there was less certainty of conviction on
*1019
this charge than there was on Count 3; and there was likewise less certainty that he would face a mandatory life sentence than was true for the defendant in
Hanson.
Count 4 was based on the discovery of 100 grams of crack during the execution of a search warrant at the defendant’s residence. Because the defendant did not have physical possession of the drugs at the time they were seized, the government’s case would have had to rest on a theory of constructive possession, requiring proof that he “knew of, and was in a position to exercise dominion and control over them.”
United States v. Cassell,
Nevertheless, the chances of conviction were substantial. In addition to the 100 grams of crack found in the defendant’s home, uncontested evidence supported the charge that he had sold the same drug to an undercover officer less than four months earlier. That evidence would have been admissible not only as direct evidence to prove Count 3, but also — under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) — to prove the defendant’s knowledge and intent regarding the 100 grams at issue in Count 4.
See, e.g., United States v. Douglas,
In sum, if the defendant had been represented by knowledgeable counsel at the time he was presented with the opportunity to plead guilty, counsel would have told him that he faced the following choice: On the one hand, he could accept the proffered plea agreement and receive a sentence in the range of 262 to 327 months, with the possibility of a lower sentence if he were able to provide substantial assistance to the government. On the other hand, he could go to trial and face the overwhelming likelihood that he would serve at least 360 months in prison (more than eight years longer than the sentence he actually received), coupled with the substantial possibility that he would face a mandatory life sentence. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Hill,
*1020 III
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court, denying the defendant’s section 2255 motion, is
Affirmed.
Notes
. The defendant was sentenced under the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines regime that was in effect prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Booker,
a decision that rendered the Guidelines "effectively advisory.”
. We note that in this case the sentencing prediction at issue was allegedly made by the prosecutor rather than defense counsel, albeit on a "referral” from defense counsel. See supra Part 1.
. The 360 to life range results from a criminal history category of VI and an offense level of 37, with no reduction in the latter for acceptance of responsibility as in the case of a plea, *1018 see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 2. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, Pt. A (sentencing table). The defendant’s status as a career offender mandates the criminal history category. See id. § 4B1.1. The offense level of 37 results from a combination of the career offender guideline, which assigns level 37 when the maximum statutory sentence is life, id. § 4B1.1, and the relevant statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), which authorizes a maximum sentence of life for anyone who distributes five grams or more of cocaine base and who has a prior felony drug conviction. The defendant correctly points out that the statutory maximum life sentence applies only if, before trial, the government files "an information with the court ... stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon.” Id. § 851(a)(1). But there is no reason to expect that the prosecutor would have failed to file the neces-saiy information in the absence of a negotiated plea agreement.
. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (requiring a mandatory life sentence if the defendant committed the offense after two prior convictions for felony drug offenses). The mandatory life provision applies only if the government files an information regarding a defendant's prior convictions, id. § 851(a)(1), but again we see no reason why the prosecutor would have failed to do so here. See supra note 3.
. The defendant, who had a prior conviction for attempted distribution of cocaine, told the court that he had "remorse for” the counts he was guilty of "because I did time on that before... [, s]o I do have to own up to my responsibility of the counts that I know I did commit that were wrong, but I did not commit all of the counts.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 6.
. In support of his claim of prejudice, the defendant cites two cases in which, on direct appeal, we reversed district courts that had refused to permit the withdrawal of guilty pleas where defendants received higher-than-predicted sentences. Those cases are readily distinguishable. In
United States v. McCoy,
unlike here, the defendant asserted his innocence both to the charge to which he pled and to another as to which he had also been indicted, and we found that he had defenses to both.