South Dakota Disposal Systems, Inc. (SDDS) moved the district court to enjoin the State of South Dakota and various state officials in their official capacities, including Mark W. Barnett, Attorney General of the State of South Dakota, Walter D. Miller, Governor of the State of South Dakota, and Joyce Hazeltine, Secretary of the State of South Dakota (Defendants) from relitigating in the South Dakota state courts certain issues previously decided by this Court. The district court denied this motion, and SDDS now petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus, directing the district court to issue the injunction. Defendants object, arguing that this relief is improper under both the Eleventh Amendment and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. We disagree, and conclude that injunctive relief is proper in the circumstances of this case. Construing SDDS’s petition as an appeal of the district court’s denial of injunctive relief, we reverse.
I.
On the last occasion dining which these parties were before us, we stated that it was “the latest in a seemingly never-ending series of cases arising from SDDS’s six-yearlong struggle to develop a large-scale [multi-state solid waste disposal, or MSWD] facility near Edgemont, South Dakota.”
SDDS, Inc. v. State of S.D.,
The facts of this case have been stated and restated by a variety of courts;
see SDDS VI,
During the course of the litigation over the Board’s initial grant of permits to SDDS, the South Dakota electorate decided two ballot initiatives. The first, Initiative Measure No. 1. was approved in 1990, and required legislative approval of large-scale solid waste disposal sites. SDDS unsuccessfully challenged Initiative Measure No. 1 in the South Dakota trial court,
see SDDS, Inc. v. State of S.D.,
Civil Case No. 90-412 (S.D. 6th Cir.Ct. Oct. 31, 1991), and did not appeal to the South Dakota Supreme Court. The South Dakota legislature approved SDDS’s MSWD site by passing 1991 Senate Bill 169. This bill was signed by the South Dakota governor, and was to take effect on July 1, 1991.
See SDDS II,
The other ballot initiative decided by the South Dakota electorate was a referendum on Senate Bill 169, requiring voter approval of SDDS’s MSWD site.
See SDDS VI,
During the course of this wide ranging litigation, SDDS never opened its proposed MSWD site. In 1994, it sold the land planned for the development of the MSWD and went out of business. SDDS brought suit against the Defendants in South Dakota state court to recover just compensation for an alleged uncompensated “taking” of its property by the Defendants through the un *1034 constitutional referendum, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The South Dakota state trial court granted summary judgment to the' Defendants, holding that SDDS had no property right in operating an MSWD site, and that the referendum was not a proximate cause of SDDS’s losses. See SDDS VII, Mem. Op. at 11, 18, 24-25. The appeal of SDDS VII is pending before the South Dakota Supreme Court.
Contending that the Defendants were attempting to relitigate issues decided by this Court in SDDS VI, SDDS sought an injunction in the federal district court against the Defendants. The district court summarily denied injunctive relief, 5 and SDDS now petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus. SDDS requests that we require the district court to issue an injunction against the Defendants, forbidding them from relitigating in the South Dakota state courts the issues of (1) whether SDDS had a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permit to operate an MSWD, and (2) whether the referendum was the proximate cause of SDDS’s dissolution. The Defendants object to the issuance of the writ, arguing that the standards for a writ of mandamus have not been satisfied, that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits this suit, that the Anti-Injunction Act forbids issuance of the writ, and that injunctive relief is not warranted by the facts of the case. We address each of these arguments in turn.
II.
The issuance of a writ of mandamus “is a drastic remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary situations,”
Melahn v. Pennock Ins., Inc.,
We need not reach the question of whether a writ of mandamus may issue to correct a district court’s abuse of discretion in denying injunctive relief. A denial of an injunction is an immediately appealable interlocutory order,
see
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Where the liberal standards for notice of appeal have been met in a ease, a petition for a writ of mandamus may be construed as a notice of appeal from an immediately appeal-able order by a district court.
See United States v. Gundersen,
*1035 III.
The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits brought against the states in federal courts. While the specific language of the Eleventh Amendment refers only to “any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State,” U.S. Const. amend. XI,
we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition which it confirms. That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana,134 U.S. 1 ,10 S.Ct. 504 ,33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
— U.S. -,-,
In
Ex parte Young,
Ex parte Young recognized that suits may be brought in federal court against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief to prevent future violations of federal law. The doctrine of Ex parte Young is based on the idea that the power of federal courts to enjoin continuing violations of federal law is necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.
Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians v. Carlson,
Defendants did not contend that
SDDS VI
was improperly heard by this Court in violation of the Eleventh Amendment, and we do not believe that any such argument could have been successful. As a suit for prospective declaratory relief from South Dakota’s ongoing violation of the dormant commerce clause, the Defendants could not have enjoyed immunity under the Eleventh Amendment in
SDDS VI. See Ex parte Young,
The question presented is therefore whether the Defendants, who had been properly sued for declaratory relief in a prior suit, can now assert Eleventh Amendment immunity from this suit for prospective injunctive relief which seeks only to effectuate our earlier judgment. An affirmative answer would allow these Defendants, and all future state defendants, to effectively ignore judgments rendered in the federal courts, generating needless relitigation in the state courts, and rendering our judgments largely nugatory *1036 and advisory. 6 This is an intolerable result, and one which is not, we believe, mandated by the Eleventh Amendment. We therefore hold that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit in the federal court for injunctive relief to prohibit a state defendant from relit-igating in a state court issues previously decided in a federal court. 7
IY.
Embodying fundamental precepts of federalism and comity between federal and state courts, the Anti-Injunction Act provides that:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 2283.
8
The Supreme Court has “expressly rejected the view that the anti-injunction statute merely states a flexible
*1037
doctrine of comity, and [has] made clear that the statute imposes an absolute ban upon the issuance of a federal injunction against a pending state court proceeding, in the absence of one of the recognized excep-tions_”
Mitchum v. Foster,
Included in the Anti-Injunction Act are specific, enumerated exceptions. These exceptions, which “are designed to ensure the effectiveness and supremacy of federal law,”
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,
was designed to permit a federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and decided by the federal court. It is founded in the well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Id.
at 147,
We review de novo the applicability of the relitigation exception.
See NBA,
In an extended discussion, the district court in SDDS V held that SDDS had no protected property interest in operating an MSWD facility, and that the referendum had no effect on SDDS’s ability to operate an MSWD. The district court stated:
Under South Dakota law, SDDS needs two things in order to operate its Lonetree facility: (1) a valid permit and (2) legislative approval from the South Dakota Legislature. See SDCL 34A-6-1.4 to 34A-6-1.13 (solid waste disposal facilities must obtain permits); and SDCL 34A-6-53 to 34A-6-56 (solid waste disposal facilities handling in excess of 200,000 tons of waste annually must get legislative approval for their operations).
At the time of the Referendum in November 1992, SDDS’s one-year permit had expired. In any event, that one-year permit was void because the [Board], in issuing the permit, failed to make specific findings of fact that the Lonetree facility was in the public interest and that the facility met five specified environmental prerequisites.
Although the [Board] had issued SDDS a five-year renewal permit and the Legislature had passed S.B. 169 approving the operation of the Lonetree facility, the five- *1038 year permit was invalid because it was based upon an invalid one-year permit. The five-year renewal permit was void ab initio. In other words, SDDS has never had a valid permit to operate the Lonetree facility. Without a valid permit, SDDS has no constitutionally protected property interest in operating the facility. Both of SDDS’s due process claims fail.
The Court notes that SDDS’s remaining commerce clause and, equal protection claims rest solely on the effect of the Referendum, the validity of the Initiated Measure having already been decided by [the South Dakota state court]. Furthermore, because SDDS has never had a valid permit to operate its Lonetree facility, S.B. 169 and the subsequent Referendum “vetoing” that bill have no practical effect. By the very unambiguous terms of the Initiated Measure, legislative approval may only be granted to a facility that is operational “pursuant to solid waste permit.” SDCL 34A-6-53. SDDS has never had a valid permit. The legislature cannot have granted approval of the Lonetree facility if the facility had no permit to operate. It logically follows that if the legislature was not in a position to grant approval to the Lonetree facility, then the enabling legislation (S.B.169) was of no effect. The Referendum would also be of no effect. If the Referendum had no effect, the commerce clause and the equal protection clause are not implicated.
SDDS V,
The Defendants, in their brief to this Court in SDDS VI, argued strenuously that we affirm these holdings. See Appellee’s Br. in No. 94-1688, at 10-17, 41, reprinted in part in I Appellant’s App. at Tab 2. 9 SDDS, of course, strongly urged that we reverse the district court on these points. See Appellant’s Reply Br. in No. 94-1688, at 2-10, reprinted in I Appellant’s App. at Tab 3. 10
In
SDDS VI,
we reversed the district court’s judgment.
See
In 1991, S.D.Codified Laws § 34A-6-1.13 was amended and the implementing regulations were rewritten. Although the ultimate question of whether the facility was environmentally safe and in the public interest remained the same, several factors weighing into the agency’s decision changed. On remand after SDDS I, the agency made the specific findings required by its revised regulations. The agency found the Lonetree facility to be environmentally safe, using language that parallels the applicable regulation. Appellant’s App. at 117 (Finding # 52, paralleling S.DAdmin.R. 74:27:17:01). The agency *1039 found, the facility to be in the public interest. Appellant’s App. at 121 (Finding #72). Both findings were preceded by numerous supporting factual findings. The revised [Board] findings also contain a specific legal conclusion that all requirements for the permit had been met. Appellant’s App. at 122 (Conclusions of law # 3 & # 4).
SDDS VI,
Regarding the effect of the referendum on SDDS, we stated in SDDS VI that:
Despite the fact that it has previously conceded that “[t]he practical effect of the referendum was to prohibit the construction” of the Lonetree facility, Appellant’s App. at 39, South Dakota now argues that because the [Board] permit had been revoked, the referendum had no impact, discriminatory or otherwise, on Lonetree. However, if this court were to ignore South Dakota’s intermediary actions and look only to the result, it would reward South Dakota for acting unconstitutionally. Moreover, the administrative permit was voided due to a procedural defect, not because of any finding that the Lonetree facility was environmentally dangerous. Thus, Lonetree could reapply for the administrative permit, and the referendum at the very least made the Lonetree project more difficult and expensive to accomplish.
Id. at 270 n. 10 (citations and quotations omitted). 13
The issues which the Defendants now wish to relitigate in the state courts were, therefore, actually and finally decided by this Court in
SDDS VI.
Under South Dakota’s rules of claim preclusion or collateral estoppel, we conclude that this Court’s decision in
SDDS VI
bars the Defendants from relitigating these settled issues in subsequent litigation in the state courts.
See, e.g., Moe v. Moe,
[I]f the prior final judgment or order had been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, it is conclusive as to all rights, questions, or facts directly involved and actually, or by necessary implication, de *1040 termined therein, whether the court was correct at the time or not.
We apply four factors to determine whether the doctrine of [claim preclusion] bars this appeal: (1) whether the issue decided in the former adjudication is identical with the present issue; (2) whether there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) whether the parties are identical; and (4) whether there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior adjudication.
(citations and quotations omitted).
See also Black Hills Novelty Co. v. South Dakota Comm’n,
V.
We recognize, however, that “[t]he fact that an injunction may issue under the Anti-Injunction Act does not mean that it must issue. The injunction must be an otherwise proper exercise of the [court’s] equitable power.”
Daewoo Elecs. v. Western Auto Supply Co.,
In analyzing SDDS’s motion for in-junctive relief, the district court stated that:
Essentially, SDDS’s claim for injunctive relief seeks to have this Court enjoin a proceeding before the South Dakota Supreme Court. This Court declines to take such action.
SDDS, Inc. v. State of S.D.,
Civil No. 91-5121 (D.S.D. May 28, 1996),
reprinted in
I Appellant’s App. at Tab 12. While this description overstates the degree of relief requested by SDDS — which sought to enjoin the relitigation of specific issues, rather than a blanket injunction of all consideration of its dispute with the Defendants by the South Dakota Supreme Court — it does represent a proper concern by the district court for a core element of federalism, embodied by the Anti-Injunction Act, that the federal courts should not interfere with the state courts’ operation.
See, e.g., Southwest Airlines Co.
*1041
v. Texas Int’l Airlines,
The district court’s analysis fails, however, to consider the factors which support the issuance of injunctive relief in this case. In
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc.,
Whether a preliminary injunction should issue involves consideration of (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.
Applying the
Dataphase
factors to the case before us, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying injunctive relief. Requiring SDDS to relitigate in the state court issues previously decided by this Court constitutes an irreparable harm.
See, e.g., Daewoo,
While issuing the injunction in this case will foreclose the opportunity for the Defendants to relitigate issues in the state court, we do not believe that this is a legitimate harm which must be balanced. As noted above, the Defendants had one full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in the federal forum, and the rules of equity do not require that they be given a second bite at the apple in the state forum in order to obtain a more favorable result.
See, e.g., Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co.,
The third and fourth
Dataphase
elements also support issuance of an injunction in this case. As discussed above, SDDS successfully litigated in
SDDS VI
the issues currently contested by the Defendants; SDDS’s success on the merits of the underlying issue is therefore already secured. In addition, the public policy concerns of finality and repose informing our res judicata jurisprudence strongly supports the protection of our previous judgment. While the interference with a state court proceeding is generally opposed by public policy, this “injunction will promote judicial economy and protection of parties from harassing, duplicative litigation, interests which the federal and state courts share.”
Daewoo,
We find no merit in the Defendants’ remaining arguments opposing the granting of injunctive relief. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of injunctive relief in this case, and remand to the district court for *1042 an order enjoining the Defendants from relit-igating in the South Dakota state courts the issues of (1) whether SDDS had a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permit to operate an MSWD, and (2) whether the referendum was the proximate cause of SDDS’s dissolution.
Notes
. This is, of course, not a complete list of prior judicial recitations of the facts of this case.
. Under South Dakota law, an aggrieved party may appeal an adverse administrative decision to the state courts.
See
SDCL 1-26-30. " 'A final determination of an agency decision is reached when the reviewing court, after deciding the correctness of the matter on review, affirms the decision or remands it to the agency for reconsideration and a decision in accord with that court's directive.’ "
Matter of Exploration Permit Renewal, Etc.,
. It does not appear that any South Dakota state court has addressed the merits of the Board’s 1991 findings that the MSWD facility was environmentally safe and in the public interest. Rather, upon judicial review, the case was remanded to the Board "for the opportunity to reissue Original Permit” because the original permits had been invalidated. See Br. in Support of Resp’t’s Answer at 4. SDDS never received reissued permits.
.At the time the referendum was decided by the South Dakota voters, SDDS was still operating under its five-year renewal permit. It was several years after the referendum placed “Senate Bill 169 in limbo,"
SDDS TV,
. The district court stated:
On April 11, 1996, SDDS filed a motion for the issuance of an order to show cause, for a speedy hearing, and for a preliminary and a permanent injunction pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act and the All Writs Act. The state defendants responded on May 6, 1996. SDDS filed a reply on May 23, 1996. Essentially, SDDS’s claim for injunctive relief seeks to have this Court enjoin a proceeding before the South Dakota Supreme Court. This Court declines to take such action. Accordingly, having considered the matter, it is hereby ORDERED that SDDS’s motion for an order to show cause and for injunctive relief (Docket # 133) is denied.
SDDS, Inc. v. State of S.D., Civil No. 91-5121 (D.S.D. May 28, 1996), reprinted in I Appellant's App. at Tab 12.
.Indeed, it is clear that this is precisely what the Defendants in this case have attempted to do to our judgment in SDDS VI almost from the moment the decision was filed. Upon our remand of the case to the district court for a determination of attorney's fees, the Defendants stated:
All that has been obtained for the Plaintiff! in SDDS VI ], however, is a declaratory judgment that the referendum was unconstitutional. The court of appeals let stand this court’s important rulings on the due process and equal protection issues raised by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiff has, in essence, obtained a judgment which can do it no good. [FN2 In its response to Defendants' submission on the "prevailing party” issue, Plaintiff claims in a footnote that the ruling of the court of appeals may have some application in the state "inverse condemnation” case, but Plaintiff does not explain how the court of appeals ruling on the commerce clause issue can have any application to the inverse condemnation case. Additionally, it is important to note that the state courts could agree with this court[']s ruling (which the court of appeals let stand) that Plaintiff had no property interest which could be unlawfully taken.] Plaintiff has in fact accomplished nothing more than obtaining “the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded [its] rights had been violated_” Farrar vs. Hobbey [Hobby,506 U.S. 103 , 114,113 S.Ct. 566 , 574,121 L.Ed.2d 494 ] (1992), quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 [U.S.] 755, 762 [107 S.Ct. 2672 , 2676,96 L.Ed.2d 654 ] (1987). In these circumstances, a substantial reduction in the amount awarded, or [no] award at all, see Farrar,506 U.S. at 115 [113 S.Ct. at 575 ], is appropriate.
Resp. to Mot. to Determine Award of Att’ys’ Fees & Costs & Req. for Hr'g at 13-14,
reprinted in
I Appellant's App. at Tab 7 (ellipses in original). Contrary to the Defendants' mischaracterizations of
SDDS VI,
we did not "let stand” any portion of the district court decision in
SDDS V;
rather, we reversed the district court, and remanded the case to the district court “with instructions to enter judgment in favor of SDDS.”
SDDS VI,
Similarly, in opposing SDDS's requested in-junctive relief in the district court, the Defendants urged the district court to disregard our decision in SDDS VI by stating that:
SDDS also argues that the Eighth Circuit decision is binding precedent on the state courts. While the United States Supreme Court has the authority to enter decisions binding on the South Dakota Supreme Court, the lower federal courts do not have such power.
State Defs.’ Br. In Supp. of Resistance to Pl.’s Mot. for Order to Show Cause' & for Speedy Hr’g & for Prelim. & Permanent Inj. at 14,
reprinted in
I Appellant's App. at Tab 10. Contrary to the Defendants’ rather unique interpretation of federalism, the judgments of this Court are, in fact, entitled to the same res judicata and collateral estoppel effect in the South Dakota state courts as judgments rendered by those courts.
See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Tacoma Taxpayers,
. The Defendants, citing
Green v. Mansour,
. In
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,
The Act, which has existed in some form since 1793, see Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 *1037 Stat. 335, is a necessary concomitant of the Framers’ decision to authorize, and Congress’ decision to implement, a dual system of federal and state courts. It represents Congress’ considered judgment as to how to balance the tensions inherent in such a system. Prevention of frequent federal court intervention is important to make the dual system work effectively. By generally barring such intervention, the Act forestalls the inevitable friction between the state and federal courts that ensues from the injunction of state judicial proceedings by a federal court. Due in no small part to the fundamental constitutional independence of the States, Congress adopted a general policy under which state proceedings should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately [the United States Supreme Court].
(quotations and citations omitted).
. For example, the Defendants previously argued that South Dakota’s
laws regulating solid waste facilities have changed since SDDS obtained its original 1989 permit. South Dakota’s solid waste regulations were entirely rewritten in July of 1990, and have been amended once before the November 1992 Referendum and once after. Ap-pellee's Appendix G. Since the September 1991 findings issued by the Board were based on the original 1989 record, the September 1991 findings do not address or consider these regulatory changes. The Board must determine compliance with these new regulatory requirements before a solid waste permit can issue; this determination was never made and SDDS is therefore not entitled to a permit.
Appellee's Br. in No. 94-1688, at 14-15, reprinted in I Appellant's App. at Tab 2. See also id. at 41 ("More importantly the Referendum's disapproval of Senate Bill 169 did not impact SDDS's ability to accept out of state waste because SDDS could not accept any waste, regardless of the source, until it obtained new state solid waste permits.” (emphasis in original)).
. For example, SDDS previously argued that
the procedural defect in the [Board’s] original decision — the lack of findings that resulted in the remand in SDDS I — had been cured by the time of the Referendum.... [0]n remand the [Board] entered extensive findings responsive to the [South Dakota] Supreme Court’s mandate and concluded that SDDS had met "all requirements" for the issuance of a solid waste permit under the relevant laws and regulations of South Dakota.
Appellant’s Reply Br. in No. 94-1688, at 7, reprinted in Appellant’s App. at Tab 3 (note omitted). See also id. at 3 ("[t]he State attempts to avoid the consequence of its admission concerning the Referendum’s 'practical effect,’ by engaging in an inventive but, unfortunately, distorted analysis of the state court litigation”).
. We note that these factual determinations by an administrative agency must be given “great weight” by South Dakota courts. See SDCL 1-26-36.
. In adopting the factual findings of the Board in
SDDS VI,
we did not then — and need not now — address the issue of whether those findings were entitled to claim preclusive effect.
See Astoria Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino,
.Indeed, our ruling echoed that of the South Dakota Supreme Court in
SDDS IV,
. Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, we are bound by a state court’s application of its res judicata rules to our judgments.
See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank,
We believe that the Anti-Injunction Act and the Full Faith and Credit Act can be construed consistently, simply by limiting the relitigation exception of the Anti-Injunction Act to those situations in which the state court has not yet ruled on the merits of the res judicata issue. Once the state court has finally rejected a claim of res judicata, then the Full Faith and Credit Act becomes applicable and federal courts must turn to state law to determine the preclusive effect of the state court’s decision.
Because the South Dakota trial court did not rule on the claim preclusive effect of
SDDS VI, see SDDS VII,
Mem. Op. at 2 n. 3, 5, 20-21, we are not precluded from protecting our judgment in
SDDS VI
under the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
See Daewoo Elecs. v. Western Auto Supply Co.,
. A petitioner seeking to enjoin a criminal or quasi-criminal state court proceeding must demonstrate a threat of “great and immediate irreparable injury that cannot be eliminated by his defense to the state proceeding.”
Goodrich v. Supreme Court of S.D.,