MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on CNH Capital America, LLC and Sumter Bank & Trust’s objections to confirmation. This is a core matter within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L). After considering the pleadings, the evidence, and the applicable authorities, the Court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in conformance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.
Findings of Fact
Debtor James Saunders filed a Chapter 12 petition on May 9, 2007. CNH Capital America, LLC and Sumter Bank & Trust objected to confirmation of his plan, alleging, among other things, Debtor is not eligible for Chapter 12 because the majority of his debt cannot be characterized as farm-related debt. The Court held a hearing on the objections on September 13, 2007.
During the hearing the parties stipulated to the relevant facts. Debtor pledged his farm as collateral for business debts unrelated to his farming operation, primarily for debts arising from his ownership of an automobile dealership. Based on Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules, he has total debt of $3,248,286. Of that, $1,331,686 was incurred for farming purposes and $1,916,500 was incurred for non-farming purposes, including non-farm business.
The schedules include some disputed and unliquidated claims and some minor errors and omissions. For example, they do not reflect a potential offset Debtor has against a $175,000 debt that was incurred for non-farm purposes. However, even if all the discrepancies and questions are resolved in Debtor’s favor, less than 50 percent of his debt can be characterized as farm-related unless all debt secured by the farmland — regardless of the debt’s purpose — is deemed farm-related debt.
After considering the fact and the arguments of the parties, the Court finds Debt- or ineligible for Chapter 12 for the reasons that follow.
Conclusions of Law
Pursuant to § 109(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, “[o]nly a family farmer or family fisherman with regular annual income may be a debtor under chapter 12....” 11 U.S.C. § 109(f). The Bankruptcy Code defines a “family farmer,” in part, as an
individual or individual and spouse engaged in a farming operation whose aggregate debts do not exceed $3,237,000 and not less than 50 percent of whose aggregate noncontingent, liquidated debts (excluding a debt for the principal residence of such individual or such individual and spouse unless such debt arises out of a farming operation), on the date the case is filed, arise out of a *774 farming operation owned or operated by such individual or such individual and spouse....
11 U.S.C. § 101(18)(A) (emphasis added).
The key question in this case is whether loans secured by farmland used to operate a car dealership constitute debt “aris[ing] out of a farming operation.” A small number of courts have considered the issue of when debt is farm-related. The majority have focused on the purpose of the debt— whether it was incurred and the proceeds used for the farming operation.
The court in
In re Kan Corp.,
The court held the insurance company loan “did not ‘arise out of farming operations.’ ” Id. at 727. It set forth a test for farm-related debt as follows: “Whether a debt incurred from a loan ‘arises out of farming operations’ is determined by the use made of the loan proceeds.” Id. In this case, the original loan was use to purchase a beer distributorship and the second loan was used to pay off the first loan. The farmland was only implicated because the debtor used it as collateral. Id. The court refused to “characterize loans by the nature of the collateral or the motive of the debtor, rather than the more objective criteria of the use made of the loan proceeds.” Id. To qualify as farm debt, “the proceeds of the loan must in some way be directly applied to or utilized in the farming operation.” Id.
The court in
Otoe County National Bank v. Easton (In re Easton),
In
In re Marlatt,
The court in
In re Douglass,
Faced with somewhat different circumstances, the court in
In re Rinker,
To determine whether the debt to his sisters arose from a farming operation, the court had to “examine the nature of the questioned activity, here the settlements, and their relation to the [debtor’s] farming operation.” Id. at 68. The mere fact that the debt resulted from a settlement did not preclude it from arising from a farm operation. Id. The court found a direct link between the basis of the lawsuit and subsequent settlement and the farming operation. The siblings were fighting over the farmland, which was necessary to the debtor’s farming operation, and the debtor settled the suit to preserve his farming operation. Id. “In such circumstances, the relationship between the subject of the settlement and the ‘farming operation’ ... is clear and direct.” Id. Thus, the debt owed to the sisters was farm debt. Id.
In re Roberts,
In
In re Reak,
Based on the reasoning of other courts to consider this issue, the Court concludes that to “arise out of a farming operation” the purpose of a debt must have some connection to the debtor’s farming activity. Merely using farmland as collateral for a debt that has no other relation to the farming activity will not suffice. In this case, Debtor used the proceeds of the loans at issue for business reasons, primarily operating a car dealership — an enterprise wholly unrelated to farming. Therefore, the debt cannot be said to “arise out of a farming operation” and cannot count towards the 50 percent farm-related debt requirement for Chapter 12 eligibility.
Because the business debt secured by the farm cannot be treated as farm-related debt, Debtor’s farm-related debt consists of less than half of his total debt. Consequently his is not eligible for Chapter 12. CNH Capital and Sumter Bank’s objections as to Debtor’s eligibility will be sustained.
An order dismissing this case will be entered not sooner than seven calendar days from the date of entry of this opinion. This delay will afford Debtor a brief time to consider whether to attempt to convert this case to a case under another chapter. By providing a period of time for consideration of such a possibility, the Court does not intend to opine that such a conversion would be permissible as a matter of law.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The court also referred to
In re Armstrong,
