In Re S.H.
OPINION
{¶ 1} S.H. аppeals from a finding of delinquency made by the Montgomery County Juvenile Court. S.H. was charged in Juvenile Court with two delinquency сounts, one alleging that he was delinquent because he committed aggravated arson, the other that he committеd burglary.
{¶ 2} The State of Ohio moved to transfer the delinquency matter to the Common Pleas Court pursuant to
{¶ 3} On August 8, 2003, prior to determining amenability, the juvenile court accepted an аdmission from S.H. concerning the offenses in the complaint and found him to be a delinquent child. The juvenile court found S.H. to be amenable to treatment in the juvenile system and it denied the State‘s motion to transfer S.H. to the common pleas for prosecution as an adult. On the same day, the juvenile court committed S.H. to two consecutive commitments to the Dеpartment of Youth Services for terms of a minimum of twelve months and a maximum period not to exceed S.H.‘s attainment of age twenty-one years.
{¶ 4} In his first assignment of error, S.H. contends the trial court erred in accepting his admissions without proрerly advising him of the consequences of his admissions and improperly coercing him into the admissions.
{¶ 5} In particular, S.H. cоntends that the juvenile court failed to substantially comply with the provisions of
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} “The court may refuse to accept an admission and shall not accept an admission without addressing the party personally and determining bоth of the following: (1) The party is making the admission voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the allegations and the consequences of the admission; (2) The party understands that by entering an admission the party is waiving the right to challenge the witnesses and evidence against the party, to remain silent, and to introduce evidence at the adjudicatory hearing.” (Emphasis added).
{¶ 8} Ohio courts have construed
{¶ 9} In State vs. Johnson (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 130, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the failure to inform a defendant who pleads guilty to more than one offense that the court may order him to serve any sentences imposed consecutively is not a violation of
{¶ 10} The State argues that since the juvenile rule is similar to the criminal rule of procedure, the juvеnile court was not required to inform the juvenile that he might receive consecutive commitments, but was only required to inform the juvenile of the maximum penalty for each delinquent charge. We agree. We believe it is doubtful the Ohio Supreme Court would interpret the juvenile rule differently than it has interpreted the analogous criminal rule. In any event, the State argues and we agree that S.H. was informed the maximum commitment he faced was until his 21st birthday. The juvenile court substantially complied with the juvenile rule in explaining to S.H. the consequences he faced by admitting the delinquent charges.
{¶ 11} Secondly, S.H. argues that the juvenile judge improperly coerced his admissions by making the following statement at the beginning of the amenability heаring:
{¶ 12} “THE COURT: We are here this afternoon in order for the court to make some determinations concerning the motion to transfer, this court having found probable cause in this matter. The court also is at the point of having had an amenability hеaring and the court is at this time prepared to make a disposition. The disposition in this matter depends upon if these young men are willing to plead to this offense. Do you understand?
{¶ 13} “THE JUVENILE: Yes, sir.” (August 8, 2003 Hearing Tr. 1; emphasis added).
{¶ 14} The court then advised S.H. of thе nature of the charges and of his rights under Juv. R. 29. Upon inquiry S.H. informed the court he was entering his plea or admissions of his own volition. (Tr. 11).
{¶ 15} S.H. аrgues that he was coerced to enter his admissions because the court made the “subtle hint” that if he didn‘t do so, the cоurt would find he was not amenable to treatment as a juvenile, and transfer the matter to the common pleas court for prosecution of him as an adult.
{¶ 16} The State argues that the court‘s remarks were not so coercive as to make S.H.‘s admissions involuntary, and in any event, S.H. never sought to withdraw his admissions in the lower court at any time. The State notes that the Eighth District has held that the failure of the juvenile to request a withdrawal of the admission waives any error on appeal. In re Nicholson (1999), 132 Ohio App.3d 303, 307. The rationale behind the appellate court‘s ruling is not set out but, presumably, the court thought the trial court should be givеn the first opportunity to address and correct any defect in the court‘s process of accepting the juvеnile‘s admission. Also, this withdrawal process in the juvenile court permits the juvenile an opportunity to testify whether he or she would not have entered the admission but for the defect in the admission process.
{¶ 17} Notably, we have no evidencе before us that S.H. would not have entered his admissions but for the alleged coercion exerted upon him by the juvenile judgе.
{¶ 18} While we are not persuaded that S.H.‘s failure to move to withdraw his admission in the juvenile court waived his right to appeal the court‘s alleged failure to comply with
Fain, P.J., and Wolf