In re S.G.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) detained minor S.G. from mother. At the time, mother was 17 years old and a dependent of the juvenile court. DCFS filed a dependency petition alleging S.G. was a person described by
In November 2021, the court found true the petition‘s allegations that mother‘s marijuana abuse and unaddressed mental health issues placed S.G. at substantial risk of serious physical harm.2 The court continued the disposition hearing, expressly taking into account that “the statutory scheme tells courts . . . to make special provisions for the barriers facing minor parents.” The court noted, for example, that mother “wasn‘t able to test on a voluntary basis because she‘s a minor,” and that “[s]he is herself a minor who has not had the appropriate family support that she probably should have had.”
In January 2022, the juvenile court held a contested disposition hearing. The court acknowledged that mother “is a young parent who is growing up really fast because . . . she‘s already a parent,” and that mother had been forced “to take on more responsibility to take care of not only her baby but also her minor sibling.” Nonetheless, the court found DCFS met its burden to show S.G. would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and ordered him removed from mother‘s custody. The court ordered DCFS to provide mother family reunification
In March 2022, DCFS filed a
In July 2022, the court held a six-month review hearing under
However, the court recognized the “multiple challenges” mother faced, such as homelessness, a brief period of incarceration, and the lack of family support. The court further acknowledged mother was a young parent and expressed its belief that mother “has what it takes to reunify with her child.” The court therefore extended family reunification services for another six months, again expressly considering “the particular barriers to accessing court-ordered services and maintaining contact with the child faced by minor parents,” and that mother had “only recently turned 18.”
In January 2023, the court held a combined 12- and 18-month review hearing under
In May 2023, mother filed a petition pursuant to
DCFS opposed the request for further reunification services and continued to recommend termination of mother‘s parental rights. Although mother was “attempting to reengage in her services and cares about her child,” she failed to consistently visit S.G. She had not submitted to drug and alcohol testing and was discharged from her drug treatment program in February 2023 for failing to attend for more than 30 consecutive days. DCFS also reported mother continued “to struggle with following through with mental health services and to address mental health treatment, unresolved trauma and/or current, medication
The juvenile court considered mother‘s
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the application of
The federal and state Constitutions prohibit states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (
As one court has recognized, “[t]he concept of ‘substantive due process’ is slippery in its application,” and “[w]ith no definite test to determine whether a statute satisfies the ‘notions of fairness’ which populate the concept of ‘substantive due process,’ and no definite test to determine whether a statute is ‘unreasonable’ or ‘arbitrary,’ courts must proceed cautiously so as not to overstep the boundaries of separation of powers. . . . ’ ” . . . [A] legislature does not violate due process so long as an enactment is . . . reasonably related to a proper legislative goal. The wisdom of the legislation is not at issue in analyzing its constitutionality, and neither the availability of less drastic remedial alternatives nor the legislative failure to solve all
We need not break new ground in this case. As we explain below, the California Supreme Court has already largely addressed the fundamental due process issues mother raises in this appeal.
I. The California Supreme Court Has Rejected Due Process Challenges to the Post-Reunification Dependency Scheme
In 1993, the California Supreme Court decided a pair of cases that raised both procedural and substantive due process challenges to the dependency scheme and, in particular,
In Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242 (Cynthia D.), the California Supreme Court addressed a procedural due process challenge to the dependency scheme. The mother argued the statutory framework, including
The new process still resulted in “lengthy delays, especially when adoption was selected as the permanent plan.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 247.) Thus, the Legislature, on the recommendations of a task force, revised the statutory scheme to eliminate the separate adoption proceeding “and brought termination of parental rights for dependent children within the dependency process through a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26.” (Ibid.) This hearing required juvenile courts to “only make two findings: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated.” (Id. at pp. 249–250, quoting Sen. Select Com. on Children & Youth, SB 1195 Task Force Rep. on Child Abuse Reporting Laws, Juvenile Court Dependency Statutes, and Child Welfare Services (Jan. 1988) p. 11 (Task Force Report).) The task force intended ” ‘to
Considering this context, our high court rejected the mother‘s due process challenge to the preponderance of evidence standard at section .26 hearings. With respect to the parent‘s fundamental liberty interests, the court reasoned that “the purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is not to accumulate further evidence of parental unfitness and danger to the child, but to begin the task of finding the child a permanent alternative family placement. By the time dependency proceedings have reached the stage of a section 366.26 hearing, there have been multiple specific findings of parental unfitness.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 253.) As a result, “[a] parent whose conduct has already and on numerous occasions been found to grievously endanger his or her child is no longer in the same position as a parent whose neglect or abuse has not so clearly been established. At this point the interests of the parent and child have diverged, and the child‘s interest must be given more weight. Because section 366.26 contemplates termination of parental rights only when there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted, the child‘s fundamental interest in the opportunity to experience a stable parent-child relationship is very much at stake at the section 366.26 hearing. In this setting, a burden of proof standard that tilted the evidentiary scales in favor of the parent . . . would have the
The court further reasoned: “Considered in the context of the entire process for terminating parental rights under the dependency statutes, the procedure specified in section 366.26 for terminating parental rights comports with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the precise and demanding substantive and procedural requirements the petitioning agency must have satisfied before it can propose termination are carefully calculated to constrain judicial discretion, diminish the risk of erroneous findings of parental inadequacy and detriment to the child, and otherwise protect the legitimate interests of the parents. At this late stage in the process the evidence of detriment is already so clear and convincing that more cannot be required without prejudice to the interests of the adoptable child, with which the state must now align itself.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 256.)
Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th 295, addressed a substantive due process challenge to
The California Supreme Court held
With respect to mother‘s substantive due process claim, the Marilyn H. court held: “A parent‘s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights. [Citation.] Likewise, natural children have a fundamental independent interest in belonging to a family unit [citation], and they have compelling rights to be protected from abuse and neglect and to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that [which] allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the
“Substantive due process prohibits governmental interference with a person‘s fundamental right to life, liberty or property by unreasonable or arbitrary legislation. [Citation.] In substantive due process law, deprivation of a right is supportable only if the conduct from which the deprivation flows is prescribed by reasonable legislation that is reasonably applied; that is, the law must have a reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. [Citation.]
“The objective of the dependency scheme is to protect abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within a prescribed period of time. [Citations.] Although a parent‘s interest in the care, custody and companionship of a child is a liberty interest that may not be interfered with in the absence of a compelling state interest, the welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a state has not only a right, but a duty, to protect. [Citations.] The Legislature has declared that California has an interest in providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been removed from parental custody and for whom reunification efforts with their parents have been unsuccessful. [Citations.] This interest is a compelling one. [Citation.] The state‘s interest requires the court to concentrate its efforts, once reunification services have been terminated, on the child‘s placement and well-being, rather than on a parent‘s challenge to a custody order. Requiring the parent to petition the court to hear a challenge to a custody order after reunification services have been terminated
The court further found that
Since our high court‘s decisions in Cynthia D. and Marilyn H., courts have applied their analysis to due process challenges to the dependency statutes arising in different contexts, including when a parent challenges a juvenile court‘s decision to terminate reunification services. (See, e.g., In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415–422 (Jasmon O.); Daria D. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 606, 611–613 (Daria D.); In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 566; Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 117–118.)
II. Section 366.26 Did Not Violate Mother‘s Substantive Due Process Rights
A. Marilyn H. applies to this case
Mother fails to meaningfully distinguish Marilyn H. She argues that teenage parents need more time to reunify with their children, but she does not challenge the statutory time limits on reunification services available to her as a minor and teenage
Mother asserts Marilyn H. is inapplicable because the relevant scientific and psychological research about juvenile brain development was not available when the case was decided, and, further, the issue of teenage parents was not presented to the court. She contends that since teenagers’ ongoing neurological development gives them a greater capacity to change than older adults, due process requires that a teenage parent‘s fundamental interest in the care and custody of a child must remain paramount.
We disagree. Mother‘s argument ignores the fundamental holding of Marilyn H., which is that once reunification efforts have been exhausted, turning the court‘s focus to the compelling state interest of achieving permanence and stability for the dependent child does not violate a parent‘s due process rights. Notwithstanding the parent‘s circumstances, the post-reunification dependency scheme‘s shift of focus is substantially and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of dependent children.
As the Cynthia D. court explained, once reunification services are terminated, subsequent hearings are not concerned with finding a parent unfit. The shift of focus from reunification to permanence is a recognition that reunification efforts have not been successful, and the state must now prioritize its duty to protect abused and neglected children by expediently facilitating a permanent and stable placement. Mother fails to articulate why or how a teenage parent‘s developmental immaturity or greater capacity for change renders it constitutionally impermissible for the law to take steps to meet the state‘s
B. Under the Marilyn H. analytical framework, there was no substantive due process violation
Moreover, even if mother‘s status as a teenage parent undermined the applicability of the Marilyn H. court‘s ultimate conclusion, the case still models the analysis we must follow to evaluate mother‘s arguments. (Daria D., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) That analysis indicates that the
Marilyn H. explained that the deprivation of a fundamental right “is supportable only if the conduct from which the deprivation flows is prescribed by reasonable legislation that is reasonably applied; that is, the law must have a reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.” (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 306–307.)6 The Marilyn H. court
At various points before a section .26 hearing, the law requires juvenile courts to give special consideration to teenage parents, who, like mother, are themselves under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.7 That consideration begins with attempts to prevent the child of a minor parent from ever becoming a juvenile dependent.
Foster care placements for minor parents and their children “shall demonstrate a willingness and ability to provide support and assistance to minor parents . . . and their children, shall support the preservation of the family unit, and shall refer a minor parent . . . to preventive services to address any concerns regarding the safety, health, or well-being of the child, and to help prevent, whenever possible, the filing of a petition to declare the child a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 300.” (
The statutory scheme further imposes stricter standards on courts and agencies before making findings or taking actions adverse to minor parents. Social workers must employ “a strengths-based approach” to support minor parents, even when they are investigating whether a minor parent‘s child is at risk of abuse or neglect. (
At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court may continue reunification services for another six months for a parent who was a minor parent at the time of the initial hearing and who has demonstrated “significant and consistent progress in establishing a safe home for the child‘s return . . . .” (
If the child welfare agency seeks termination of parental rights over a child born to a minor parent, it must show reasonable efforts were made to provide remedial services to prevent the removal of the child from the minor parent, including resources available to the child and minor parent‘s “extended family,” and that those efforts were unsuccessful. (
Thus, for mother, who was a minor and a juvenile dependent when S.G.‘s dependency case began, the dependency scheme expressly took into account factors related to her youth at
We disagree with mother that these youth-focused efforts are irrelevant because “the brain science considerations are too fundamental and the termination of parental rights too serious and permanent to conclude that omission of those considerations at the section 388 and permanency hearing is constitutional because other aspects of the scheme provide some protections.” The Marilyn H. court determined
Irrespective of mother‘s youth, we find no basis to depart from the Marilyn H. court‘s conclusion that “[s]ections 366.26 and
III. Neither the Legislative Preference for Adoption Nor Section 388‘s Changed Circumstances Requirement Violated Mother‘s Due Process Rights
Mother also argues the legislative preference for adoption violated her due process rights as a teenage parent. Yet, the statutory preference also bears a reasonable and substantial relation to the legislative objectives of balancing each party‘s competing interests at the permanency planning stage. “The Legislature has . . . determined that, where possible, adoption is the first choice. ‘Adoption is the Legislature‘s first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.’ [Citation.]” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) The preference itself has a clear reasonable and substantial relation to the proper legislative objective of providing abused or neglected children with permanence and stability when they cannot be reunified with a parent. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573;
Moreover, “[i]t is critical to secure stable placement for a dependent child as soon as possible, consistent with the parents’ rights. [Citation.] Conversely, a child‘s need for permanency and stability cannot be delayed for an extended time without significant detriment.” (Daria D., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.) Mother suggests that teenagers’ parental rights should not be terminated until they reach an age of relative maturity, such as over 21. However, this proposal would result in children potentially lingering in foster care without a permanent plan for several years. In Marilyn H., the court explained that “[c]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate,” and legislative changes were made specifically to prevent adoptable minors from having to ” ‘wait months and often years for the opportunity to be placed with an appropriate family on a permanent basis.’ ” (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 310, 303.) Mother fails to establish that the legislative preference for adoption or the requirement that the permanent plan be selected and implemented expeditiously lacks a substantial relation to a proper legislative objective. (Heather B., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 558–559.)
The same is true of
The absence of a requirement that the court also consider a teenage parent‘s potential for future change does not render the law arbitrary, discriminatory, or lacking a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose. The
IV. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Regarding Juvenile Offenders Does Not Apply to the Dependency Context
To support her arguments, mother relies on several United States and California Supreme Court decisions finding severe criminal penalties unconstitutional when imposed on juvenile offenders. She asserts the reasoning of these decisions “applies with equal force to teen parents seeking to reopen services or seeking to retain their parental rights.” We disagree. While the underlying scientific and psychological research may describe youth irrespective of the context, mother‘s argument ignores that the objectives and interests of the criminal justice system are vastly different from those of the juvenile dependency system.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. ” ‘[E]mbodied in the Constitution‘s ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
The Eighth Amendment analysis thus requires consideration of the penological justifications for imposing a harsh sentence. These typically include the defendant‘s moral culpability; the defendant‘s prospects for reform; retribution, which is related to blameworthiness; deterrence; incapacitation of an incorrigible defendant; and rehabilitation. (See, e.g., Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 472–473; Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at pp. 571–573.) The Supreme Court concluded in a series of cases that attributes of the juvenile brain such as “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences” are relevant to determining the proportionality of punishment because they “diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” (Miller, at p. 472.)
In contrast, the state‘s objective in the juvenile dependency system is not to punish parents for their conduct. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 991.) Instead, it is to protect children from abuse and neglect and, after efforts to reunify the family have been unsuccessful, to ensure children have stable and permanent placements. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 307.) After the juvenile court asserts dependency jurisdiction over a child, the court‘s decision at each review hearing is based on its assessment of harm or risk of harm to the child, not on the moral culpability of the parent. Once reunification services are terminated, the
While in criminal matters the system of punishment focuses on the offender, in juvenile dependency cases, a single system must protect and address the fundamental rights of individual parents and individual children. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 307.) Mother contends criminal courts must still balance a juvenile offender‘s dangerousness to “others” with its decision to impose mitigated punishments in recognition of an offender‘s youth. Yet, the decisions mother cites do not stand for this proposition and did not engage in any balancing of individual, competing rights. The courts limiting the criminal penalties children may face categorically held that because of the unique attributes of youth, severe punishments did not serve legitimate penological goals and were grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed. (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 571; Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 72–73; Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 476–477; Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 266–268.)
Shifting the focus from reunification to permanency, requiring that a parent demonstrate changed circumstances to disrupt that shift of focus, and preferring adoption as a permanent plan, are all legislative choices that significantly impact a teenage parent‘s rights, but their goal is not to punish the parent. They instead reflect a policy decision to focus on children‘s rights in proceedings where expediency is critical to the protection of their interests. (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 674 [“In deciding what services or placement are best for the child, time is of the essence“].) There is no basis to conclude that a child‘s need for permanence and stability becomes less compelling when the child‘s parent is still experiencing
Finally, we note that mother fails to even make a pretense of arguing that any of the changes to the dependency scheme she proposes would promote the welfare of dependent children. She does not mention that prolonged dependency proceedings are detrimental to dependent children. She asserts that her rights as a teenage parent should have remained “paramount” after reunification efforts failed, without acknowledging S.G.‘s fundamental rights as a dependent child. We are not free to disregard the dual interests at stake. “Children are not simply chattels belonging to the parent, but have fundamental interests of their own that may diverge from the interests of the parent.” (Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 419.) Certainly, the Legislature could weigh the competing interests differently and prescribe further differential treatment for minor and young adult parents in the dependency scheme. But there is no basis for us to conclude that the balance it has currently drawn as reflected in
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.