{¶ 2} On August 20, 2003, Keyonia D. invited appellant, her daughter's cousin, to spend the night at her home. Keyonia slept on her couch that evening, and permitted appellant to sleep in her bedroom. That night, Keyonia's five-year-old son, D.D., went into the bathroom, and noticed there was no toilet paper after he had already pulled his pants down. D.D. went into his mother's bedroom, where appellant was sleeping, in search of toilet paper. While D.D. was in the bedroom, with his pants still pulled down, appellant looked at him, touched his penis, and then manipulated it. Keyonia walked into the bedroom while appellant was still manipulating D.D.'s penis, screamed at her, and asked her what she was doing. Appellant stated that she had done nothing. Keyonia then took her son to the police department.
{¶ 3} On September 19, 2003, the juvenile court held a delinquency hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found appellant to be delinquent for committing an act that would constitute gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C.
{¶ 4} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 5} "Appellant's adjudication and sentence must be reversed as the court entry fails to reflect adjudication."
{¶ 6} Appellant argues that her adjudication and sentence are in error because there has been no journalized adjudication of delinquency by the court. Appellant maintains that her adjudication must be reversed because of the juvenile court's error. We
{¶ 7} Appellant is correct in her assertion that "* * * courts speak only through journalized entries." State ex rel. Nelson v. Griffin,
{¶ 8} The record indicates that on September 19, 2003, the juvenile court found orally on the record that based on the evidence presented, "* * * the court would have to make a finding of delinquency based on the charge Gross Sexual Imposition." While the court's judgment entry on that date does not reflect an adjudication of delinquency, the court issued an "Amended Judge's Final Appealable Order" on March 24, 2004 which states, "[appellant] was adjudicated a delinquent child on September 19, 2003 by reason of having committed an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a Felony III, to wit: a violation of 2907.05 (Gross Sexual Imposition) of the Ohio Revised Code."
{¶ 9} While the trial court captioned its March 24, 2004 entry an "Amended Judge's Final Appealable Order," it would have been proper for the court to caption it as a nunc pro tunc entry. However, we will treat the trial court's amended order as a nunc pro tunc entry, as the effect of the order is to correct an omission to reflect the finding of delinquency the trial court actually made on September 19, 2003. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 10} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 11} "Appellant's delinquency adjudication must be vacated as it was entered upon insufficient evidence and is against the mani-fest weight of the evidence."
{¶ 12} Appellant argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support her adjudication of delinquency based on the charge of gross sexual imposition. Specifically, appellant maintains that the evidence presented is insufficient to support the finding that appellant touched D.D. for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.
{¶ 13} In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, an appellate court examines the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Goodwin,
{¶ 14} Appellant was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that would constitute gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C.
{¶ 15} "(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender; [or] cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; * * * when any of the following applies:
{¶ 16} "* * *
{¶ 17} "(4) The other person * * * is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person."
{¶ 18} According to R.C.
{¶ 19} While the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification is an essential element of the offense of gross sexual imposition, there is no requirement that there be direct testimony regarding sexual arousal or gratification. See In re D.S., Warren App. Nos. CA2004-04-036 and 046,
{¶ 20} Appellant maintains that the record is devoid of any circumstantial or direct evidence to show that appellant touched D.D. for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of either person. After reviewing the record, we disagree.
{¶ 21} At the hearing, D.D. testified that appellant was awake and looking at him when she touched and then "twisted" his penis. Keyonia corroborated D.D.'s testimony by stating that when she entered the room, appellant was awake and "squeezing" D.D.'s penis. Also, it is undisputed that the touching occurred while appellant and D.D. were alone in a bedroom. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we conclude that the trial court could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that appellant touched D.D. for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of either person. Accordingly, we find that the state presented sufficient evidence to prove the required element of purpose.
{¶ 22} Also, appellant argues that her adjudication is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant argues that the weight of the evidence supports the finding that appellant did not touch D.D. for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of either person. Again, we disagree.
{¶ 23} In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must weigh all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.Thompkins,
{¶ 24} After weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom and considering the credibility of the witnesses, we determine that the trier of fact did not lose its way in adjudicating appellant delinquent for committing gross sexual imposition. The juvenile court was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve conflicts in their testimony. A trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness. Drayer at 196, citing State v. Long (1998),
{¶ 25} Appellant's adjudication is supported by the sufficiency of the evidence, and her adjudication is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 26} Judgment affirmed.
Walsh, P.J., and Young, J., concur.