*3 Argued BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, Before RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, JJ.
BATTAGLIA, Judge. questions with which presented we are in this case involve, again, once practice that existed in Montgomery County when the part court was Court, District whereby adjudicatory hearings were com- menced -within requisite period pursuant time to Rule 11- 114 but were continued on trial non-consecutive dates over a period of months. Today, we must determine whether the Court of Special Appeals in holding erred that the petitioner, *4 S., Ryan waived right his to challenge the untimeliness of his adjudication; found, if error is we shall also consider whether petitioner’s dismissal, motion for alternative, or in the mistrial, should granted have been due violations of Rule 11-114b. Finally, we must determine whether the Court of Special Appeals erred affirming juvenile court’s Ryan mother, order that and his S., Linda pay insurer, restitution to the victim’s Permanente, Kaiser in $10,000.00. amount of
I. of Facts Statement the petitioner, from an This arises altercation between ease S., victim, Dent, home Ronnie at the Ryan and the Dent, Rockville, a 48- Maryland, February on father, Ryan’s began natural year-old man and cousin of mother, S., shortly Linda after relationship Ryan’s with sexual relationship greatly upset This Ryan’s father. the death of altercation, at and Ryan, was the time who seventeen relationship to both Ryan disapproval expressed Dent, According mother on several occasions. Dent and his prior couple to kill Dent a of times to their Ryan threatened physical altercation. evening February concerning the 1998 were
The facts however, agree, that at some disputed. parties’ versions Both Ryan began arguing. evening, Dent and point during and Ryan arrived at the home of Dent claimed when he began evening February Ryan Linda S. on Dent, “coming want yelling exclaiming that he did not Dent Ryan here, seeing Mom.” testified that my around Dent and toward To a knife moved Dent. immediately grabbed himself, a vacuum cleaner and raised protect grabbed Dent them, jumped Linda S. between to his shoulder. When was vacuum down. As he put Dent turned to cleaner so, in the back. doing Ryan stabbed Dent and Dent Ryan alleged arguing, that when he Dent were Ryan testified that Dent to “crush him.” further threatened ground appeared reaching to be him to the and threw himself, Ryan protect got up To and something pocket. in his a knife. then after grab ran to kitchen Dent came falling top into the Ryan again ground, threw him until, violently on floor at some struggled him. two knife. that he had been stuck with the point, Dent exclaimed unintentional, that Dent Ryan “probably that this was claimed on it knife].” fell [the injuries hospitalized as' serious
Dent sustained altercation. result
31 History II. Procedural Ryan 11, 1998, police May turned himself into the on later, days 14, 1998, May three on appeared he before the District of Maryland, Montgomery Court County, sitting as a juvenile court.1 The District Court that Ryan ordered be at Noyes detained the Alfred D. (“Noyes”) Children’s Center pending a “reverse waiver” hearing to determine whether his in juvenile case would be heard a or “adult” court. 5, 1998, petitioner
On June in indicted the Circuit for Montgomery County degree for first assault and carrying a weapon openly 10, with injure. intent to On June 1998, a filed motion to charges transfer his juvenile pursuant 27, to Article Section 594A.2 The Circuit Montgomery Court for County held waiv- the “reverse 10, 1998, August 1998, er” on 14, and on August ultimately granted the motion and charges ordered juvenile transferred to court.
The State petition filed the District Maryland, Court of Montgomery County, sitting juvenile 20, as a court on August 1998, charging Ryan with delinquency on degree based first assault, endangerment, reckless and carrying weapon openly with to injure. intent sought The State also statutory maximum restitution, $10,000.00, amount of Ryan and his mother for expenses.3 Dent’s medical 1. As of March Montgomery County Circuit Court for had jurisdiction juvenile over causes. See 2001 Md. Laws 414. (1957, Maryland 27, 594A(a) Repl.Vol.), Code 1996 Art. Section 2. provided: (a) case, any except provided court.—In Transfer (b), involving subsection years age child who has reached 14 but years age has not reached any alleged the lime of offense 3-804(e)(l) (4) provisions § excluded under the of the Courts court, Article, Proceedings and Judicial exercising jurisdiction may transfer the case to the court if a waiver is believed to be society. the interest of the child or portion Maryland 2001, This repealed by Code was the Acts of ch. (effective 1, 2001), § 1 October and is now located at. Section 4-202 of the Criminal Procedure Article. (1957, Maryland Repl.Vol., Code Cum.Supp.) Article 3. relevant, 807(a)(3)(ii)provided, Section part: began 10 and adjudicatory hearing September on Ryan’s September motions were continued Pre-trial and three of testified.4 The heard the State’s witnesses *6 however, complete; was adjudicatory hearing, far from the hearing to on juvenile court scheduled the resume December 13, Ryan continuing both his detention at 1998. contested delay hearings. and the duration of the between the Noyes5 Ryan and to move cohrt refused to release refused the The result, Ryan a adjudicatory hearing to an earlier date. As corpus for a petition a writ of habeas the Circuit filed hearing, Montgomery County. corpus for At the habeas the Court, formally ruling, verbally directed that without Circuit and that court Ryan Noyes juvenile from the re be released days hearing thirty date the of the within schedule 10, 1998.6 court honor September The refused-to the regarding scheduling, but Circuit Court’s instruction ultimate release, Ryan Upon ly Noyes. Ryan’s did release petition that the for writ of Court determined habeas Circuit moot and was corpus petition was withdrawn. 15, 14 and adjudicatory hearing resumed December
The again, trial apparent, When became that the would 1998.7 child, both, against parent, absolute limit one the child's a As an may judgment of issued under not exceed restitution section $10,000 single arising for all acts of a out incident. 2001, repealed by portion Maryland of the Code was the Acts of ch. This (effective 1, 2001), § and is located at Section 11- October now 604(b) the Criminal Article. Procedure emergency physician, police first 4. The room officer who arrived at scene, Dent, victim, adjudi- during September and the testified hearings. catory nearly September Ryan 5. had been detained for four As of Noyes. months propriety of the Court’s verbal at the habeas The Circuit directive hearing not case. corpus before us in this resumed, December, Ryan day hearings 14th of the first 7. On the requires a of Rule which moved for mistrial for violation 16-504 copies report hearings. verbatim all trials and Portions of court hearings September adjudicatory 11th were inaudible 10th and completed dates, during not these court and scheduled scheduling again. discussed issues was counsel to January Ryan objection. and continued made no Ryan of January, alleging On 13th for a moved mistrial right that he had been denied to a fair trial due lengthy disjointed adjudicatory hearing nature of his and and hearings recordings prior unintelligi- because the were ble, alleged which he was violation 504.8 The denied, mistrial motion for and the court resumed completed adjudicatory hearing. assault, degree found involved first degree assault, but involved second endangerment, reckless carrying weapon openly injure. with intent necessary, To the extent more description detailed procedural history pertinent portions and the of the tran- *7 scripts provided of this will be discussing case when the issues presented below.
III. Discussion A. Waiver Special Appeals
The Court of held that while the complaint concerning “protracted disjointed nature of valid, proceedings in this case” itself, was the complaint,
which, Ryan argued, hardship caused preparation tremendous in his hearings, for particularly respect the resumed testimony with to the of court, listening Dent. The copy after to the tapes, master of the found quality range clarity to being from "almost lifelike to somewhat fuzzy, particularly during parts of cross [of examination conduct- Dent] Therefore, by ed [defense counsel].” the court denied the motion for permitted Ryan opportunity mistrial but to copy review the master testimony prior resumption of testimony. Dent's to of his Ryan 8. The actually record indicates that renewed his earlier motion hearing, for supra mistrial the December 1998 see 7. The note petitioner expanded arguments upon proffered at the December hear- ing, itself, alleging disjointed grounds, that the nature of the trial was mistrial, for a but also recordings nature of the trial made the adequate of the even more for preparation representa- trial critical recordings tion in a fair hearings trial. The audio of the failed to capture significant portions petitioner's cross-examination witnesses. S., Ryan In Re was waived. See Md.App. (2001). appellate court The intermediate
A.2d
timely
petitioner
objection
did not make a
asserted that the
any objec
and further claimed that
the court’s continuances
Rule
petitioner did make was
violation of
tion the
based
upon
11-114b. which was
basis
11-114b.2 and
Rule
Id. at
111-12,
argued.9
the motion for dismissal
which
disagree
Special
the Court of
Contrary to review, party for preserve appellate an issue necessary is not, circumstance, every specific litany recite need action. objection ruling to a trial or course of constitute an 4-323(c), cases, applicable provides to criminal Maryland Rule part: in relevant appeal the trial court or on purposes
For review order, it that a at the any ruling party, or is sufficient other ruling sought, is made or makes known time the order Maryland scheduling adjudicatory provides 11-114 9. hearings, part, in relevant as follows: Scheduling hearing. b. hearing Adjudicatory hearing. adjudicatory held An shall be days juvenile petition respon- sixty within after the is served on the filed, petition adjudicatory waiver in which case an dent unless a thirty days be held within after the court's decision shall However, jurisdiction hearing. waiver retain the conclusion *8 by the upon made on the record within these time limits motion judge county respondent, or the the administrative him, shown, designated by extraordinary may judge cause or adjudicatory hearing may within which the be held. extend the time judge requires record an shall state on the the cause which specify days number of extension and the extension. Prehearing respondent or shelter care. If the is detention care, adjudicatory hearing shelter be held detention or shall days thirty within date on which the court ordered contin- adjudicatory hearing If an not held ued detention or shelter care. thirty days, on respondent within shall be released the conditions hearing, imposed by pending adjudicatory the court which shall be held within the time limits set forth subsection 1 of this section. party the court the action that court desires the to take objection or the action of the court. State, 339,
As we
in Lattisaw v.
stated
329 Md.
For of review appeal the trial court or on order, any ruling other or it is that a party, sufficient at the time or ruling order is sought, made or makes known to the court the action that party desires the court to take objection or the to the action of the court. Theiss, & Mayor City 234, Council Baltimore v. 354 Md. (1999),
Thus, long party, as the whether a civil or case, clearly criminal makes judge aware of the course of action he or she desires the court to take and the reasons for action, such party course adequately shall have pre served that for appellate State, issue review. See Everhart v.
36 Benton, (1975); 100, Fowler v. 107 337 A.2d 274 Md. (1962), 344, 575, cert. denied 571, A.2d 229 Md. (1963). 98, 11 While the 845, L.Ed.2d 72 84 S.Ct. U.S. determining matter, standard for on this the are silent rules holds true civil cases in criminal and other preservation cases as well. hand, question, without petitioner, the case at the continuity lack of concerns about the court to his alerted the hearings. When delays between duration of and the scheduled, petitioner initially hearing was adjudicatory only allowed judge that the the fact concern over expressed that petitioner court assured half-day, but the the heari necessary if to accommodate cases” would “move ng.10 from testimony argued and motions were pre-trial
After the September 10 and September taken three State witnesses hearing adjudicatory apparent it became parties informed the The court completed. not be would continued December hearing would be adjudicatory petitioner delay, counsel for the length of the Given Noyes. from petitioner that the court release requested motion based on seriousness court denied the three-month and the upon inflicted Dent injury authorities. himself into the delay turning motion to release judge denied the Immediately after the protested petitioner’s counsel custody, from regarding counsel and the court colloquy between the defense 10. The setting adjudication date was as follows: So, day Noyes, set a half detained at we'll ... he’ll be Court] [The thirty days. And we should have hearing, adjudication really get together assess way, we’ll pre-trial before it. That Yes? many witnesses and so forth. how talking my say, just going I was Counsel] [Defense works, mean, pretty way I'm sure colleagues I about the adjudication ... going be an that this is setting it for a I have to. I’m going to move cases I’m [The Court] if day. half added). (emphasis hearings. ensuing the amount time between was, colloquy part, as follows: relevant *10 Judge, you’ve your ruling that [Defense now made Counsel] detention, about his I I like to revisit the guess would mean, my issue when we’re to hear this case. I going that, is have understanding of the statute he’s entitled to adjudication He, hearing days. mthin we’re thirty mean, Monday. available But I I think that either he’s released, hearing entitled to be or ... entitled have days, completed thirty within so that he can have a determination about involved or not in- whether he’s volved. that, mean, if I Well if that
[Court] were case [defense counsel], any went, that a into then time case went would, day, thirty-first day, second if it was the he he would be entitled be released and the case couldn’t be concluded. And what if was a that it would take a case . try? month to ..
[Defense That’s Counsel] not the situation that have in we
this case. not, lead, I know that it’s it [Court] but could it could lead to point. very that I’m distressed that this case can’t be sooner, could, me, heard I wish that it it’s difficult for But, the trier unfortunately ... we been have of fad. given statutory authority to handle termination of paren- rights cases, out, tal which long, drawn protracted are proceedings that all of our calendars are getting up filled with those kinds of cases. added).
(emphasis Thus, expressed counsel concern for both length delay hearings between the and the fact that the would at Noyes detention for three more months. The suggested then that the petitioner file a motion to advance the trial rescheduling date because “would have to a be matter that would ... be addressed to [judge charge]. my Because if going calendar’s to be re- earlier, put shuffled to this case that would have to come counsel, charge].” again, ... judge Petitioner’s [the being requirements of Rule 11-114 were stated that violated: Honor, say And Your I would like to just
[Defense Counsel] I, 11-11], rule looking my reading [Rule] days. shall be held within says thirty ... thirty days not to be held within [t]hen And is if waiving. We shall be released. are not Respondent ... My the Court Counsel] [b]elief [Defense just say beginning, that if the trial was like Appeals would day eighty ruling, begins if trial a one hundred eighty hundred and first and hun- and continues *11 If day, you’ve complied with the rule. eighty second dred begins the trial on the the Court were confronted where I day, and day, thirtieth continues ninetieth [un]til say that say Appeals of would would just And I’m Your Honor complying. asking is not trial ... on rule and either continue this follow today. Monday, or him release complied has with. Okay, I feel that the rule been [Court] advance, a motion to because it would you If wish to file the, calendar, that of of the Court’s re-shuffling involve do, authority I it should be I don’t feel that have the certainly I’ll judge charge], addressed to [the ruling. happy abide his added).
(emphasis ruling, its court’s lieu of response to for counsel filed a writ habeas suggestion, petitioner’s writ petition corpus of habeas corpus. petitioner’s date, only trial but also to advancing was directed It petitioner Noyes.11 from is clear securing release hearing September explained, at the 11. The defense counsel charge, why judge petition filed: habeas before concerns delay about the between his hearings presented in were the context of the corpus habeas petition because verbally the Circuit Court instructed the juvenile court to set a trial date within thirty days Septem- ber 10th and Noyes. release the
The judge charge refused, however, to accept the Circuit Court’s verbal directive stem ming from corpus the habeas petition: Honor, Your
[State] we had response to a [in corpus petition] habeas just a ago few minutes in front of [the judge administrative of the Circuit Court for Mont- gomery County]. ... [He] ordered that the Juvenile a, Court is to set trial date within thirty days Septem- ber 10th ... Tell something. [Court] me How does this Circuit Court order me to do that? Honor, Your
[State] I was trying ... jurisdiction
[Court] What they do have? I trying [State] was to select that carefully word ... but do, [Court] Because I don’t think they and I’m not going to with comply an order the Circuit Court.
[Court] Let him [act corpus]. habeas Because
frankly, Court, he’s not running my I object him trying to do so. I gave Clerk, with you on phone, why reasons we weren’t able set this within thirty days. *12 Judge Weinstein should understand that this Court is the Court, same level as the Circuit unfortunately, it still has position simply Ryan['s] [O]ur is rights ... arc to have ... an adjudication And, completed thirty days within ... requires if that cases, Your Honor to move then we Ryan believe that’s what is not, entitled to. And if then remedy there is a under the rule. And say it’s not. to that the Court’s disrupted. docket has to be There is a rule, remedy says under the ... the rule he needs be released. We juvenile asked judge] [the court to do one or the other of those rule, requirements in the and he chose to do neither and that’s where today why we are and that's we filed the habeas. 40 do, I’m But, going am not District name Court. I administrative be the Judge Weinstein going
not to let I’m when going to tell me He’s Judge for this Court. in. to set cases going Okay.
[State] ... I with the law believe try comply going I’m [Court] to order permit I will not the Circuit I have. And somebody If wants to release a trial date. he me to set him. corpus, it’s on on habeas . in added). judge of the Notwithstanding the views
(emphasis his court, clearly made petitioner charge of the hearings adjudicatory of the to the untimeliness objection specifically That failed court. known to the petition is irrelevant. The b.l of Rule 11-114 subsection cite filing a ruling by court’s object to the chose to er objec his and further voiced corpus relief for habeas petition it was juncture, At this hearings thereafter. at the tions correct the error juvenile court to power within the stated, whether As we have often advancing trial date. factor significant is a ability to correct error had the court review of appellate waived determining party whether Bell, 178, 189, 638 A.2d 334 Md. See v. complaint. or her State of fairness are 107, (1994)(asserting that interests “[t]he 113 position their bring counsel to by ‘requiring furthered trial so that the court at the of the lower client to the attention any errors possibly correct pass upon, trial can George’s Prince Coun Clayman ”)(quoting proceedings’ v. State, (1972)); 409, 416, A.2d 693 Md. ty, 266 Basoff v. that a (1956)(stating 119 A.2d 208 Md. object] while it is still option [to to exercise the party’s “failure court to correct the error of the trial power within the obtaining estopping him from a waiver of regarded as question appeal”). point review would not reconsid- that it juvenile court declared After the can adjudicatory hearing, we scheduling er to concede to the determination fault counsel’s find no yield fact, no choice but arguably had ruling; he court’s 36-37, F., Md. Emileigh In re court. See to the
41
639,
(1999)(stating
A.2d
642
“it
apparent
that when
ruling
objection
on further
would
[the court’s]
be unfavorable
...
of
objection
the defense
.the absence
a further
did
State,
511,
waiver”)(quoting
constitute a
v.
Johnson
325 Md.
515,
1093,
(1992)).
Special
601 A.2d
1094
Ap
of
for,
peals glossed
significance of,
over
basis
petition for
of
corpus by
writ
improperly qualifying
habeas
petitioner’s
objection “solely
ground
motion as an
on the
detained,”
being
he was
is
when it
clear from the record that
length
hearings
time between
was also a crucial
S.,
argument.
element
In re Ryan
See
139
at
Md.App.
111,
Furthermore,
B. Rule 11-114. 11-114b.1, court, only permit Rule
A under may adjudicato time within which it hold ted to extend the “extraordinary part, for cause shown.” In relevant ry hearing provides: 11-114b.1 Rule
However,
record within these time
motion made
upon
respondent,
the administra-
by
petitioner or
limits
him,
designated by
county
judge
or
judge
tive
for
shown,
time within
may
cause
extend the
extraordinary
hearing may
judge
be held. The
adjudicatory
which
requires an
the cause which
state on the record
shall
extension,
days
number of
specify
extension
added).
scheduling
hearing pursuant
of a
(emphasis
restrictions;
expressly
has
b.2 also
similar time
subsection
“shall be held within the
adjudicatory hearing
states
of this section.” See Rule
limits set forth
subsection
time
Thus,
extraordinary
provision
cause
would be
11-114b.2.
juveniles,
who at
hearings
scheduled
also
applicable
process,
detained.
discussed
point during the
were
We
some
Hicks,
“extraordinary
State v.
criterion of
cause”
(1979),
respect
scheduling
with
sen and with purpose. The subcommittee on domestic and presented report rules to the Rules proposed Committee on the changes to Rule 914b which highlights the basis for the stricter standard. The subcommit- report tee stated: *15 opinion subcommittee, the the standard which
would
good
be set
provision
cause
would not be
preserve
sufficient to
strong
the
public policy which calls for
relatively
speedy hearing
juvenile
of
matters. Accord-
27,
13. Article
Section 591 was later
"extraordinary
amended and the
provision
"good
cause”
became
cause.” See 1980 Md. Laws Ch. 378.
change
part
This
occurred in
leeway
to “oiler the courts some
in the
disposition
Frazier,
extremely heavy
of an
case load.” See State v.
1269,
Md.
(1984)(quoting
470 A.2d
testimony
before the
Committee,
12,
Thus,
Judiciary
1980).
February
House
respect
with
to
newly
27,
591,
“good
amended
cause” standard of Article
Section
stated, "particularly
light
Committee,
we
testimony
before the
clearly
legislative
indicated a
intent
may
that crowded court dockets
constitute
trying
sufficient cause for
beyond
180-day
a case
dead-
461,
line.” Id. at
Interestingly, initially Rules Committee itself declined standard, to accept extraordinary the subcommittee’s cause good and instead selected a cause standard with the caveat matters expressly that the Rule would state that certain do stated, good proposed Rule not constitute cause. “[f]or rule, purposes general of this court’s congestion part calendar or failure to obtain available witnesses Maryland good shall constitute cause.” Notes, Domestic and Subcommittee Rules Juvenile Committee (October 1981). Ultimately, 16 and October standard, extraordinary cause adopted yet with an we find standard, significant good that even under a cause the Com- unwilling to be the congestion mittee was to allow basis adjudicatory limits for a juvenile’s for an extension the time *16 prescribed by as Rule. hearing reason, compelling overcrowded dock
Without more constituted, constitute, have “extraordi ets do not and never Frazier, 458, 298 470 nary cause.” See Md. at A.2d e.g. cause,” (stating contrary “extraordinary 1288 when postponement was for of a criminal “good required cause” case, that, law, arguable “it as a matter was overcrowded postpone sufficient for a dockets did constitute cause ment”). Today, proble not only are we tasked to review the practices untimely disjointed adjudicatory hearings matic or case, apparent in this must as witnessed but we address the County this practice Montgomery adherence to system. justice
Commencing hearings
technically
beat
clock
then
hearings
beyond
far
continuing those
to dates
that which was
by
appears
envisioned
Rule 11-114
to have been
chronic
problem
Montgomery County juvenile
in the
court. The
pointedly
of Special Appeals
Montgomery
Court
cautioned the
County juvenile system to
re
practice
avoid
In Vanessa
C.,
(1995).
Md.App.
A.2d
The intermediate
court,
case,
appellate
in that
provi-
considered whether the
sions of
Proceedings
Section 3-815
the Courts and Judicial
914, regarding
length
Article and Rule
that a
may
child
in custody
to a
In
prior
held
Child
Need of Assistance
(“CINA”)
mandatory
hearing,
directory.
Id. at
were
Special Appeals interpreted
It is the failed incontrovertible 11-114; troubling, more howev- the requirements with er, regard that manifests the court’s low plainly the record provide Rule. scheduling requirements for the We the judice to this from the case sub demonstrate excerpts some point. was postponements for the court’s over-
The sole basis occasions where dockets. On the several crowded court scheduling among litigants the and the was discussed court, apparent unwillingness on an to delays were based requirements the of Rule cases to accommodate move other First, despite parties both that case proffers 11-114. (an to adjudicate, take amount of time would a considerable disagree the court did not on the with which assessment record),, half-day hearing set the originally the court case to day subsequent (although, an additional added hearing concerning corpus peti- hearing). At the the habeas 16,1998, September juvenile court on State tion before the testimony was sched- presented adjudicatory hearing that September 10th and 11th of half-days uled for on both the us, on, fairly felt that early the fact that from despite “[a]ll significant take a amount of going case was to time.”15 cases, if it parties court assured the would move necessary, length hearing, but this to accommodate the flexibility pledge of never came fruition.
Second, adjudica- resumption court scheduled hearing. Despite initial tory hearings three months after the objection continuing detention the court to release length hearings, of time between refused adjudicato- Noyes refused to move the petitioner immediately ry hearing earlier date. which, pursuant corpus, of habeas filed for writ earlier, Circuit indicated that would mentioned judge necessarily maintain that a 15. We should not be understood accept long party requires put party’s of how must assessment case, however, present parties agreed both on the on its case. length dispute and the did not for the trial estimate record. estimate *18 in if hearing decide the favor the were not re- court, petitioner scheduled and the released. juvenile The however, to adjudicatory hearing refused re-schedule the to an earlier date.
The court seemed with unimpressed respect compliance to with in Rule 11-114 conformance with the concerns ex- pressed C., In re: supra. discussing Vanessa When the trial, asserted, additional days needed for defense counsel the agreed, State that at two be days least more would needed to complete juvenile the trial. in judge charge responded: court I ...
“Just assume that in of a to start just were mind dockets, clearing generate which going huge upheavals, But, among people. just focusing other for a time on this particular that, If already case. I do ... past we’re the thirty days, way so there’s to rectify no it.... There’s no point in my trying to do it.” added).
(emphasis judge charge court continued,
the truth is ...
I
any
authority
don’t have
more
than
anybody
...
[tjhey’ve just
me,
else
thrown
title at
this
So,
Judge
charge.
I get
So,
to make
those kind
calls.
...
accept
I’ll
Court,
the criticism
I
for the
because
some-
got
job
how
try manage
things.
I’m saying
What
is,
if I
even
were to toss out whole bunch of other cases
tomorrow,
you
again
start
have
...
there’s no
what’s
missed,
point,
already
because we’ve
thirty days.
added).
(emphasis
disagreed
The State
with the court’s inter-
pretation of the
argued
Rule and
the decision
Special Appeals
Court of
re
supported
in In
Vanessa C.
position
adjudicatory hearings
should
completed
be
within
a reasonable time from commencement.
re
See In
Vanessa
C.,
104 Md.App. point,
exigencies competing triage cases in the court’s a accept we will a court docket as necessary before crowded juvenile right timely adjudication. a denying basis-for his to a consequences apparently adverse result Several systemic specifically in this violations which were witnessed juveniles position case. and other have scheduling every postponement, problems, 16. Not even because of "Extraordinary necessarily constitutes a violation of Rule 11-114. merelythat policy of is the test. We hold a deliberate circumstances” long repeated fragmenting through postpone- device of case objection specific itself will ments over no reason case suffice to constitute a violation.
49 right timely adjudication to have and continuous so that made, can determination as quickly possible, as juvenile whether the or not alleged involved involved in the delinquent right act. This is of highest priority because explicit guarantee 11-114, in Rule and in order ensure juveniles given that are of all benefit the rehabilitation and options R., In treatment available. See re 362 Anthony Md. at 68, 763 at (stating A.2d 146 that overriding goal “the Maryland’s statutory scheme is rehabilitate and delinquent juveniles treat so that they become useful and productive W., members of In society”)(quoting re Keith 310 38). Md. A.2d at fact, Legislature’s it is particular because interests rehabilitating juveniles they produc ensure that become of society
tive members that previously this Court has held mandatory dismissal is an inappropriate sanction for all 11-114 Keith, Rule violations. See In re atMd. (“We
A.2d at 39
decline to
legislature’s
undermine the
efforts
hastily
applying
a rule to
cases
was formulat
problems
ed to address
inherent
the adult criminal system.
Accordingly, we conclude that
inap
the Hicks solution is an
914.”)
propriate answer to violations of Rule
noted in In
We
Keith,
(the
re
contrary
Rule 746
rule at issue
State
Hicks,
(now
v.
(1979)),
285 Md.
circuit court: Thus, mandatory. seemingly based on the directory, not response Young purposeful enactment Rule decision, mandatory Rule 746 dismissal for we determined required both the intended and solution. violations was goals had and Legislature different Again, because Act, see of the Juvenile Causes purposes behind enactment Article, 3-802(a) Proceedings we § of the Courts Judicial juvenile petitions was mandatory dismissal of determined mandatory dis- That we declared required not the solution. however, not mean that inappropriate, to be does missal fact, dismissal, itself, In in all circumstances. inappropriate is Keith, re we stated that: in In sanc- appropriate whether dismissal determining
[I]n 11-114], a judge violation of Rule 914 Rule [now tion for a juvenile totality a cause should examine over presiding by doing 1-201. required the circumstances overriding so, keep purpose in mind the judge must fact along purpose with the will juvenile statute pro- ordinarily not served dismissal society should be denied ceeding. nor Neither of a juvenile’s because rehabilitation the benefits scheduling requirements. of Rule 914’s technical violation Nevertheless, possibility that under we do not foreclose proper will be a sanction. circumstances dismissal some added). 109-110, (emphasis 527 A.2d 310 Md. at judice sub failed consider the juvenile court the case rendering its decision totality of the circumstances (1) days within 30 after the earlier of: Shall be set counsel; (1) appearance of court, (ii) appearance the defendant before circuit The first Rules; Maryland provided in as (2) days May than 180 after the earlier of those events. not be later (b) party Changing of a or on the court's the date.—On motion shown, county judge or good for cause administrative initiative and grant change designee judge may of the circuit court trial of that date. (c) may Appeals adopt Court of additional rules Court rules.—The procedure implementation of this section in practice and circuit courts. *21 dismiss; simply motion it that the structure of concluded juvenile County system Montgomery permit did not “willy nilly” of moving previously cases scheduled. Subse- on quently, January when the motion dismiss was renewed consider, fully, prejudice the court did more allegedly delays as petitioner befell the a result of the between hearings ultimately prejudice but that the was not determined great extraordinary rescheduling and that exist- cause ed because “the Court’s calendar could not simply possibly petitioner’s accommodate [the case].” Upon considering totality circumstances case, appropriate we believe dismissal is the sanction First, for the 11-114 11-114 clearly violation. Rule was violated; hearings thirty while the were commenced within days, to complete hearings the courts with a failed reason degree continuity able month postponement three —a hardly interruption this case is reasonable in the Second, discussed, adjudicatory process. supra, as we no extraordinary delay. cause was established for the
Third, continuity length lack delay and the inherently actually prejudiced petitioner. The com- detention, actual monitoring, bined both and home electronic from the time he himself in turned to the final adjudication eight monitoring, months. Home electronic sense, not while deemed “detention” the institutional re- a significant liberty mains a juvenile, restriction employment, school attendance and other freedom of move- may ment still be denied the Restrictions on restrictee. liberty of a particularly are troublesome when rehabil- programs itative juvenile during are afforded the deten- goal tion home restriction.18 The swift providing adjudi- September, requested when the counsel to resume the December, hearings petitioner sooner than counsel noted that had deficit, disorder, learning hyperactive disabilities and attention and that books, Noyes agreed provide petitioner while GED with would Thus, program. not allow him GED into the was "not being provided any .. putting services . [and was] his life on hold because of a calendar." Court’s *22 exists, in juveniles to to that the State part, cations ensure quickly type the of rehabilitative assistance most determines Md.Code, § See for 3- offending juvenile. suitable 802(a)(4) Article. Proceedings and Judicial the Courts adju- petitioner’s personal prejudices,
In addition to the ways in dicatory adversely affected several a hearing was during A delays. of the defense witness died result hearings. argues this interval between the State the deceased prejudice cannot be because a statement of and into stipulated was entered evidence.19 Because witness no for the without other admissible basis statement there witness, oc- presence stipulation only the actual peti- discussing prejudice in the when the curred context to his motion dismiss at the scheduled tioner renewed verdict; admit- for rendition of the all evidence had been Therefore, point. arguments and heard at this closing ted case-was of this wit- petitioner’s fact remains that the void cannot, itself, a the death of testimony. ness’s While witness dismissal, grounds a mistrial it is evidence be for by the court. prejudice should considered adju- Furthermore, continuity petitioner’s lack of dicatory proceedings inherently prejudiced ability obtain pass fact adjudication fair in that the finder of was forced half-day facts judgment based on established evidence juvenile hearings Despite held months four before. kept scrupulous that it notes and reviewed court’s assurances and not- recordings prior judgment, portions some withstanding ability court’s to recall such our confidence evidence, inherently ills unpersuaded we that the of an are process entirely thereby. disjointed were remedied for be hesitant to dismiss cases While courts should provi- applicable juvenile 11-114 and other violations Rule sions, present find case to be a we the circumstances of ... extraordinary egregious eircumstance[ ] [which] “most by prior witness his death and 19. The statement was written police. given to the ” dismissal as sanction this violation.... dictate[s] for W., Therefore, Keith 310 Md. at re A.2d we appropriate hold dismissal of is an case remedy flagrant for the violations of 11-114 the- Montgomery County juvenile court.
C. Restitution petitioner and court ordered the his moth pay $10,000.00
er to restitution Kaiser Permanente company’s of the victim’s payment pursuant medical bills Proceedings 3-829 of Courts and Section Judicial (1973, Repl. Vol), § Article.20 See Md.Code. 3-829 of the *23 (“The Proceedings may Courts Judicial Article court enter judgment against parent child, a of a restitution of child, provided 27, § or as both under Article 807 of the Code.”). (1) argues they do not have (2) ability pay judgment; to inappropriate restitution is circumstances; (3) extenuating this case because of may only directly insurer restitution awarded when victim, compensates the which not did occur this case. Because we hold that statute a to permit does court award an directly insurer restitution when that insurer did not victim, compensate the have no we reason address the other portions of petitioner’s argument. provides, § part:
Article § 807. Restitution for crimes.
(a) conviction, upon Restitution acceptance plea nolo contendere, etc.; priority payment; reasons not or- (1) A dering may judgment court issue a restitution. — directing restitution a defendant restitution in make (his argued party appeal 20. The State that Linda S. is not a because separate appeal Special had she counsel for the Appeals, to the Court of being represented jointly but before this she is with her son disagree the Office of pre- the Public Defender. We with the State's sumption. petition for writ of certiorari was submitted on her behalf, petitioner’s. as well The Office of the Public Defender represent parties appeal elected both S. and Linda has not representation indicated that of her its is unauthorized. crime, for the of a any penalty commission addition to other if: medical, dental, hospital,
(ii) The victim suffered actual funeral, out-of- expenses, any other direct burial counseling, losses, as a direct earnings or loss of result pocket crime;
[*] [*] [*] (4) of restitution under judgment A need not issue a if this section the court finds:
(i) parent or does not have the That defendant liable restitution; ability pay judgment (ii) as to extenuating cause to circumstances Good establish inappropriate case. why judgment of restitution (5) may be made to: The court order restitution v v [*]
(iii)
insurer,
including an
which has
third-party payor,
A
compensate
victim to
victim for
payment
made
under this
pecuniary
loss or
loss
subsection.
property
(1957,
Repl.Vol., 1999
Art.
Supp.),
Ann.
See Md.Code
*24
statute,
to
principle goal
our
is
interpreting
§ 807.
Fister v.
identify
legislative
intent. See
and effectuate
194,
Co.,
201, 211, 783 A.2d
200
Ins.
366 Md.
Allstate Life
Co.,
419, 434,
(2001); Tipton v. Partner’s
364 Md.
773
Mgmt.
(2001)
Bell,
709, 717,
488,
v.
351 Md.
(quoting
A.2d
497
State
35,
Connors,
24,
311,
(1998);
339
660
A.2d
315
Oaks v.
Md.
720
(1995)).
423,
language
to
actual
look first
A.2d
429
We
ordinary
meaning
plain
statute and where the
implement
we
the statute
unambiguous,
language
clear
State,
364,
354,
Md.
772
it is
See Holbrook v.
364
written.
R.,
57,
1240,
(2001);
Anthony
In re
payors was in 198221 in response, part, added to our State, 155, decision in v. Montgomery Md. A.2d 490 (1981), 640, 27, which held that Article Section restitution statute at that permit time of the did not Montgomery opinion, for private companies.22 court-ordered restitution insurance id. at See A.2d at 493. provision permits now restitution third-party payor, including insurer, “[a] which has payment made the victim to compensate the for a property pecuniary victim loss or under loss this subsec Md.Code, 807(a)(5)(iii) added). § tion.” (emphasis Art. loss, While as a pecuniary expenses, result of certainly medical clear, falls under provision, this it is examining when this provision section, the context others in the Legislature compensate for intended the victim direct out- of-pocket Md.Code, 27, 807(a)(l)(ii)(provid- § losses. See Art.
ing compensation medical, dental, to the victim for “actual funeral, hospital, counseling, burial expenses, any other direct added). out-of-pocket ”)(emphasis .... Payments losses made by an company pursuant hospital, insurance to an contract, insurance coverage are not a victim’s direct out-of- pocket losses compensated. for which he she can be
Furthermore, restitution in this situation could not payment for be to the compensate made victim to the victim because, quite simply, the insurance never company made payment to to compensate the victim pecuni the victim his ary Restitution, case, loss. only could be said to be for Laws, See 1982 Md. ch. 477. decision, Montgomery 22. At the time of the Article Section 640 provided, pertinent part: (b) may upon Restitution ordered certain crimes.— conviction of Upon property conviction for crime where of another has been stolen, converted, obtained, unlawfully substantially value or its de- crime, creased as a direct result or where victim suffered losses, actual expenses, pocket earning medical direct out of or loss of crime, as a direct may result of the order the defendant make any provided restitution penalty in addition other for the commission of the crime. *25 (1957, Repl.Vol., Md.Code Cum.Supp.), § 1976 1980 Art. company legiti pecuniary loss of the insurance under with the terms contract into which entered mate any language broader the insured. refuse to read We carefully avoid such Legislature, apparently so constructed to stated, in a the Legislature situations. As we have “where action certain expressly particular statute authorizes under circumstances, ordinarily statute should construed allowing Moss not the action under other circumstances.” County, v. Md. 620 A.2d burg Montgomery (1993). Thus, authorizes expressly where this statute third-party payoi-s, companies, such as insurance restitution victim for payments compensate for made to the victim to loss, construe statute as property pecuniary we shall allowing not other circumstances. restitution
IV. Conclusion above, discussed shall
For the reasons we reverse Special with judgment Appeals the Court of instructions Maryland, that court the District Mont- to reverse County, sitting petitioner as a court. The did gomery object 11-114 right not waive his to the Rule violation in this case dis- the circumstances the violation warrants Furthermore, ordering court erred in missal. pay company restitution victim’s insurance company directly hospital payments made expressly permitted by such because restitution language Article Section 807. THE
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT THE WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE JUDGMENT THE COURT AND OF DISTRICT OF MARYLAND TRANSFER THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT FOR COURT COUNTY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO MONTGOMERY THIS DISMISS THE JUVENILE PETITION. COSTS IN AND IN THE COURT SPECIAL APPEALS TO COURT OF BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.
RAKER, Judge, concurring part, dissenting in in part, joined by BELL, Judge. Chief join
I judgment join the of the Court and in Part III C of opinion the insofar as it majority judgment reverses the Court, sitting District Montgomery Juvenile Court in grounds County, that the court in ordering the erred pay and his mother to restitution to Kaiser Perma- nente, the in this I agree Maryland medical insurer case. that (1996, § Code 3-829 RepLVol., Supp.) of the Courts Proceeding permit Judicial Article not does court award an insurer restitution when the did directly insurer however, compensate the victim. majority, Unlike the I would affirm the of judgment Ryan the District Court adjudicating delinquent. Accordingly, respectfully S. as a I dissent from judgment of dismissing delinquency the Court petition. A preliminary in comment is order regarding tone of the case, In majority opinion. this the Court’s stern rebuke to the District precedential Court has little value inasmuch as the disjointed of trials is unlikely nature to reoccur in the now future proceedings County Montgomery have been transferred from the District Court the Circuit resources, Court. The Circuit Court has including back-up judges, to assist in the event case carries over to the day. next Such previously resources were unavailable to the This District Court. Court stronger administers a of dose medicine than “epidemic” is warranted since is over. view, my unnecessary Court uses and unwarranted harsh language to admonish and take to hard-working task a bench in a unlikely matter repeated to be in the future. judge charge Court, Division, the District Juvenile was far from cavalier problems about the in scheduling. The majority glosses over judge’s explanations and concerns delays example, of the trial. For expressed sooner, “distress that this case can’t heard I wish that it But, could ... unfortunately, ... given we have been termi- cases, parental out, nation rights long, which are drawn of protracted proceedings all our are getting calendars of not “place eases.” The court did with those kinds wp
filled rights accused rigidity of its docket ahead If court continued hear Maj. op. at delinquent.” previously of a scheduled delin- Ryan S. lieu case case, parental or CIÑA all rights quency, termination constraints, juvenile’s rights would another which have time suffer. suggest that the patently
I unfair for think unwilling move other cases judge simply trial 11-114 or that requirements accommodate the *27 scheduling the of this case. The unconcerned about court was keenly “about the administration of judge was aware that, completion, if this was heard to court” and the fact case from the bumped cases would be equally pressing other problem, and scheduling raised the offered judge docket. The chagrin much eight evening, o’clockin the sit until issue, scheduling judge After the raised defense counsel. following exchange occurred: Yeah, not that’s fine. We’re COUNSEL]: “[DEFENSE Oh, happy? Are we we’re complaining, happy. we’re happy. Well, got body language. I some bad
COURT: just I made a face COUNSEL]: DEFENSE [SECOND part. o-clock eight about to, have finish case in one have
COURT: We we session, do.” really trial we more no that “there is evidence on the majority asserts The honoring right to a petitioner’s that record reflects court from adjudication prevented would have timely timely juvenile’s right adjudication, a save honoring another court had juvenile judge that the mere assertion on its docket. parental rights cases several termination Again, specific explanation exigencies compet- a necessary will ing triage court’s before we cases denying a crowded court dockets as basis accept adjudication.” Maj. op. right timely judge’s a “mere asser- characterization concerns as ... tion that the court had cases on its several termination understanding docket” evinces a lack of of a trial court busy challenges and the inherent in court administration. September attorney
On assistant state’s appeared defense counsel the Circuit for Mont- before gomery County, Judge presid- Paul Administrative Weinstein ing, hearing at a Petition for a Habeas Writ Corpus. hearing Court, At the habeas before the Circuit explicitly Judge defense counsel told about the Weinstein problems. tape court docket record of recorded reveals as follows: your Honor’s urging, judge “[A]t we tried to see if [the charge] judge find us a days. could date within [The charge] possible violating said that is not without some juvenile respondent’s rights, other and that he was not willing that. He they every to do said that looked at date in to see possible calendar it was with this comply if ” rule, and that he 'was not to do it. able Center, v. Ryan See Noyes [S]. Children’s Circuit Alfred Court for Montgomery County, Misc. Pet. No. record ing of hearing. Defense counsel also told Weinstein Judge that the Juvenile Court had him day offered one in the middle Ryan’s rejected November. counsel the November date *28 offered the District Court because he had another trial date, scheduled for that and he believed that two consecutive days necessary. Thus, were it was not solely the docket, court’s Ryan’s schedule, crowded but also attorney’s delay Ryan’s to the hearing. contributed of Turning Court, imposed by to the sanction I the do not believe that delinquency petition the should be dismissed for first, petitioner two reasons: argument waived the that his hearing disjointed deny was so him expeditious a fair and adjudication; second, and petitioner was not prejudiced. The Court of Special Appeals, affirming that, judgment, held “[a]lthough are protracted we about concerned and dis- jointed of case, proceedings Ryan’s nature failure to timely continuity raise the argument below has resulted S., waiver of on appeal.” that issue In re Ryan Md.App. 139 60 (2001). 111, I do not condone the A.2d 1202 I proceeding, nature of the but
protracted non-sequential and Appeals that was agree Special with the Court of issue waived. waiver, the maintains that “the question majority
On of to his question, alerted the court concerns petitioner, without delays continuity about lack of and the duration op. at I hearings.” Maj. 35.1 read the record between the Special Appeals. majority differently, as did the Court Special says Appeals is when that “[t]he incorrect of, for, petition for significance basis glossed over the corpus by improperly qualifying writ of habeas ‘solely ground being on the that he was objection motion as an detained,’ length it is from the when clear record hearings also a element of his time crucial between Moreover, argument.” Maj. op. majority’s at 40. account inaccurate, is corpus proceedings speculative, of the habeas incomplete an based on record.2 analysis distinguish problem majority’s 1. The with the that it does not is 11-114(b)(1) objection, Rule between two distinct bases for one under 11-114(b)(1) 11-114(b)(2). succinctly, under and the other Stated right hearing juvenile’s adjudicatory specified within a creates a to an 114(b)(1), period following juvenile petition. service of the Under Rule hearing completed days, need not be within 30 but must although period, within that there is case law to the commenced time hearing completed degree effect with a reasonable that the must be that, meaning possible, day-to- continuity, where it must continue on a C., (1995). day Md.App. A.2d See In re Vanessa basis. hand, 11-114(b)(2), juvenile's right to be on the other addresses thirty days held within from the released if a date 11-114(b)(1) and which court ordered continued detention. Rule 11-114(b)(2) rights, Rules law create different and neither the nor case 11-114(b)(2) suggest objection objec- under an that an made constitutes 11-114(b)(1), tion versa. under or vice petitioner's objection majority incorrectly contin- reasons detention, 11-114(b)(2), equivalent raised was the to an uous under 11-114(b)(1). objection nonsequential under I to the nature the trial together by majority's attempt objec- am to cobble unconvinced 11-114(b)(1) objections petitioner's repeated to his tion under 11-114(b)(2). in violation of detention *29 Judge majority 2. The misstates the “verbal order” of Weinstein. Circuit did not order the court to "re-schedule the date reading petition A the habeas supports the Court of Appeals interpretation, Special does the fact that counsel, by petition was withdrawn defense by dismissed Court, upon Ryan’s Circuit from release detention.3 The petition, habeas Montgomery filed the Circuit Court for County, prayed that only the Circuit Court “order immedi- from appropriate ate release detention with conditions.” See Center, Noyes v. Ryan [S]. Children’s Circuit Court for Alfred No. Montgomery County, Misc. Pet.
Throughout hearings, Ryan’s concern with the schedul- Center, ing Noyes was that he was detained at the Children’s timely expeditious he denied hearing. Judge Krauser, wilting Peter for Special Ap- the Court of peals, stated: Ryan objected delay
“The record shows that to the of his adjudicatory hearing solely ground on the that was being he at the Noyes detained Children’s Center violation Rule 114(b)(2). He did not at that claim time that such a 11— delay constituted a process violation of due or a violation of (b)(1) fact, subsection of that Ryan Rule. never moved for hearing, expedited as the circuit court had originally hearing thirty days September within 1998” but instead i.e., proper corpus, focused aim of a writ habeas to release a person from unlawful detention. The court counsel told [judge charge] "tell if he does not set a 10th, conclude days September this matter within 30 that come And, Monday, releasing I'm Mr. you S. on certain conditions. can relay judge charge] procedures [the better that he establish some get people these who are incarcerated before the Court as ordered Otherwise, ... as going get directed the statute. he’s a rash of ordering orders from this Court him do it.” majority 3. The downplays the fact that when the District Court released detention, Ryan Ryan’s filed in counsel the Circuit Court a Motion Corpus, requesting to Dismiss Petition for Habeas the court dismiss the petition corpus for writ of habeas as moot because he was released on monitoring longer being electronic and that [was] "he no detained claims, illegally.” Contrary majority’s length to the the hearing detention, only Ryan’s was raised as a basis release from not as a complaint Ryan speedy adjudication. was denied a fair or *30 62 move, time, do, for a
suggested he nor did he at 114(b)(1).” mistrial based on 11— S., 111-112, re at at 1203 Ryan In Md.App. A.2d added). (emphasis 1998, first for a Ryan moved the time
On December tapes for the motion was the ground mistrial. The sole and, therefore, unintelligible he proceedings the were earlier for his re-cross-examination of adequately prepare could not disjointed. to court that the suggested Dent. never He right his to a fair trial. hearing nature of the violated After court that motion listening tapes, to the master denied Ryan’s understanding that counsel would be afforded with the tapes Dent opportunity to review the master before resumed tifying.4 tes 15, 1998, day, the court indicated that
The December next objection on that date. No was the case would not conclude hearing continuing January to to made defense counsel fact, counsel stated that continuance defense January suggested 1999 was “fine.” The court until 13th, 1999, that, January on the case resumed counsel when p.m., necessary, if proceedings last until 8:00 to conclude hearing. 13, 1999, Ryan hearing January When resumed mistrial, for the first time denial of alleging moved for a right protracted disjointed a fair of the and his trial because relief, As adjudicatory hearing. alternative nature of “review, that the requested counsel court listen Denying matter.” tape proceedings to the entire of the motion, stated, taking very “I been the mistrial have case, it, ... and if when comes down to I good notes recordings hearings failed majority 4. The that the "audio finds petitioner's capture significant portions of the cross-examination Maj. misleading op. This it is clear n. 8. because witnesses.” referring reading of the record as a whole that counsel was record, recording, copy which not the official court his cassette complete proceedings. provided record of the entire audible opportunity to listen the master trial court offered defense counsel recording tape proceedings. don’t feel that I make a reviewing decision without [can] I will do tapes, so.” concluded the court January 21,1999. its ruling deferred until proceedings January Ryan When the resumed on renewed his for mistrial moved motion and also to dismiss the motions, charges. noting The court denied both that there multiple “extraordinary justify cause” continuances in the simply case because the “Court’s calendar could not it.” possible accommodate *31 Appeals Court Special of was correct in finding waiver.
Judge Krauser noted: judice, Ryan
“In the case
January
sub
waited until
continuances,
of
following
two
to
days
testimony
five
and
unconditionally
move
for a mistrial
aor
dismissal of his
By waiting
object
case.
to
disjointed hearing
to
proce-
the
until
day
dure
final
of
adjudicatory hearing
the
the
when all
rulings Ryan gave
remained was the court’s
the court
no opportunity
possibly
to
any
correct
errors in
pro-
the
ceedings.
Ryan
Had
filed a
hearing,
motion for expedited
suggested
11,1998,
as the circuit
had
September
dismissal,
moved earlier for a mistrial or
the circuit court
could have addressed his concerns and rescheduled his case
an
earlier date.”
S.,
Ryan
In re
Md.App.
Turning remedy to the by perhaps crafted the there not extraordinary cause for granted by the continuances trial But, court. even assuming extraordinary cause was lacking, dismissal Ryan’s is unwarranted. case was preju- not by diced eyewitness witness’s death. He was an to the criminal any case, event or to material aspect and as the Special noted, Appeals testimony bearing his had no on the primary in Ryan issue whether acted self-defense. event, was an objection, agreement there any without testimony. prejudice.5 has no Petitioner shown dismissal, majority states that “the lack
As a basis for continuity adjudicatory proceedings inher- adjudication in that ability to a fair ently prejudiced his obtain on facts pass judgment finder of was forced to based fact four half-day hearings from held established in evidence majority is Maj. op. at 52. Unless the months before.” a fair was denied trial because implying petitioner nonsequential hearings judge gleaned facts trial ruled on months, therefore, he could not remember over four held case, I fail facts to see relevance its majority disguises to me that the It seems statement. steps had judge’s word that he taken accept refusal that was familiar with the salient facts and issues ensure he has by stating that “confidence
petitioner’s case the Court op. hearing] ability Maj. such court’s recall evidence.” [the trial Despite professed in the at 52. the Court’s confidence inherently concludes that “the ills judge, majority process” entirely were not remedied disjointed all suggest judge I the trial recalled judge’s actions. Id. fair hearing simply facts and was not denied delay hearings. there was a because *32 had a on judge grasp The record that the trial firm shows he legal delivering opinion, facts issues. In his and candidly explained preparation as follows: trial, end, and recordings
“To that I did obtain of the tape to, but entirety testimony, ... I have not of the listened that, I testimony those felt to be crucial parts And, end, I making a determination this case. Dent, testimony both and listened of Mr. on direct February 4th. relating cross as to the events of allegedly by Ryan personal prejudice S. 5. The Court discusses suffered 52, op. delay. Maj. 19. told as a result at n. Petitioner’s mother old, school, Ryan years was 17 that he the Circuit Court that was not job planning to in a GED that he had a offer and that he was enroll disjointed program. There is no evidence that nature hearings bright to his less than situation. contributed life, incidents in Dent’s respect With the other Mr. those, notes, I my they did not were listen reviewed the, Respon- ... I or the detailed. also effect rebuttal witnesses, who dent’s addressed those same issues testified trial, testimony very much later in the and their was fresh. So, testimony my if which anything, that was foremost mind or supplemental was ... the alternate versions ver- sions of those events.
But, respect 4th, February with to the of Dec ... events carefully I did listen to ... both the direct and the cross ... redirect of Mr. I compared Dent. also them with my notes found that ... I happy my was to note that were, *33 I Finally, last majority’s address the basis for the decision: Montgomery County Juvenile Court suffers from chronic inability to hear a reasonably cases in continu- See Op. Assuming at 44. that the District Maj.
ous manner.
“to beat the clock”
scheduled cases
under
repeatedly
In re Keith
11-114,
over. As
said
“practice”
is
we
W.,
(1987),
only