In the Matter of JOEL JAY ROGGE, an Attorney, Respondent. DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, Petitioner.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York
April 17, 2008
855 N.Y.S.2d 512 | 51 A.D.3d 367
Alan W. Friedberg, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York City (Joseph J. Hester of counsel), for petitioner.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Per Curiam.
Respondent Joel Jay Rogge was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on June 23, 1959, and was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1968. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent lived and practiced law in Massachusetts.
The Departmental Disciplinary Committee now seeks an order, pursuant to
Respondent was served with a petition for discipline in August 2007, which set forth charges of professional misconduct concerning one client matter. Respondent was alleged to have settled a matter without his client‘s consent, failed to inform his client that he had accepted the settlement and was holding settlement monies, and neglected to promptly inform the other party that his client had rejected the settlement.
Respondent subsequently entered into a stipulation in which he waived a disciplinary hearing and admitted to the disciplinary rule violations delineated in the petition, including that by settling a matter without his client‘s consent he violated Code of Professional Responsibility
The stipulation was submitted to the Board of Bar Overseers, which voted to accept it in full, and on September 28, 2007, the Board of Bar Overseers issued an order publicly reprimanding respondent for his professional misconduct.
In the present proceeding seeking reciprocal discipline pursuant to
Respondent was properly served with notice of this proceeding, yet has submitted no response to the Committee. Moreover, a review of the record establishes that respondent was afforded due process and there was sufficient evidence to establish his misconduct. Indeed, respondent, represented by counsel, stipulated to his misconduct, the disciplinary rules he violated and the sanction of public reprimand, and the rule violations under which respondent was disciplined in Massachusetts are covered by the identical, or essentially identical, provisions of the New York Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the imposition of reciprocal discipline is appropriate.
Finally, with regard to the issue of sanctions, it is generally accepted that the state where an attorney subject to discipline lived and practiced law at the time of the offense has the greatest interest in the matter and in the public policy considerations relevant to the disciplinary action (Matter of Milchman, 37 AD3d 77, 79 [2006]; Matter of Dranov, 14 AD3d 156, 163 [2004]), and great weight should be accorded to the sanction administered by the state where the charges were originally brought (Matter of Gentile, 46 AD3d 53, 55 [2007]; Matter of Harris, 37 AD3d 90, 93 [2006]).
In this matter, Massachusetts imposed a public reprimand upon respondent, which is the equivalent of public censure in this state (Matter of Power, 3 AD3d at 24; Matter of Maiorino, 301 AD2d 53, 56 [2002]) and no reason is offered to depart from
Accordingly, the Committee‘s petition for an order imposing reciprocal discipline should be granted and respondent should be publicly censured.
TOM, J.P., FRIEDMAN, NARDELLI, CATTERSON and MOSKOWITZ, JJ., concur.
Respondent publicly censured.