196 F. 758 | 8th Cir. | 1912
The American Gibson Heater Company owned a plant consisting of a foundry and machinery connected therewith at Et. Madison, Iowa. On April 3, 1906, it sold the same to the Novelty Grey Iron Foundry Company, an Illinois corporation, for $7,000, and on April 14, 1906, the Novelty Grey Iron Foundry Company mortgaged the entire plant to Aldo Sommer for the sum of $7,-000, which mortgage was duly recorded April 30, 1906. On July 2, 1906, for a named consideration of $15,000, the Novelty Grey Iron Foundry Company conveyed this plant to the Reliable Foundry & Machine Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Iowa. The latter continued the business until December 6, 1909, when it made a general assignment for the benefit of its creditors to William A. Scherfe. February 12, 1910, upon application of the petitioner Roger Brown & Co. and others, the Reliable Foundry & Machine Company was adjudged an involuntary bankrupt, and at the creditors' meeting William A. Scherfe was elected trustee. The petitioner and others filed their claims, and they were allowed. On June 23, 1910, the trustee applied for authority to sell the foundry plant free from liens. On July 29, 1910, Aldo Sommer filed a petition setting up his mortgage upon the real estate and objecting to the sale free from liens. August 1,1910, notice was given to each of the creditors, including the petitioner, of the application to sell free from liens. August 27, 1910, a dividend was declared of 10 per cent, on all claims proved and allowed, and this was drawn by the petitioner and all it represents. On August 18, 1910, the property was ordered sold, and the amount ascertained to be then due upon the mortgage, $9,005.23, was ordered transferred from the land to the proceeds, and it was also .ordered that, if the bidder at the sale was the holder of an established lien, he might have credit for die amount thereof upon his bid.
“The several Circuit Courts of Appeal shall have jurisdiction in equity, either interlocutory or final, to superintend and revise in matter of law the proceedings of the several inferior courts of bankruptcy within their jurisdiction. Such power shall he exercised on due notice and petition by any party aggrieved.”
It will be observed that by the exact wording of the statute the relief extends only to “revise in matters of law.” In re H. H. Coving, Trustee, 224 U. S. 183, 32 Sup. Ct. 446, 56 L. Ed.-; In re Mueller, 135 Fed. 711, 68 C. C. A. 349.
The equity of redemption of mortgaged property passes to the trustee, and the trustee in this case took and retained actual possession of the mortgaged property. If such property is so incumbered that nothing can be realized above the incumbrance, it is the duty of the trustee to abandon the property, but in this case the property was appraised at $15,000, and the trustee and referee both had reason to think something could be realized above the mortgage. The order of sale was not, therefore, ill advised, and it was ordered that the p'roperty he sold free from incumbrance, and the amount of the in-cumbrance was ascertained and ordered first paid out of the proceeds. The petitioner, Roger Brown & Co., was notified of the application to sell, and was hound by any limitation upon that order as made. The court thus acquired an incidental right to adjudicate the amount of the incumbrance and to provide that the same might he credited on the purchase price and had exercised that jurisdiction long before the action in the state court was commenced. The petitioner not only had notice of the application to sell, but the trustee, who represented it, actually appeared in the proceedings. The court had authority to make the order. In re Harralson, 179 Fed. 490, 103 C. C. A. 70, 29 I,. R. A. (N. S.) 737.
It is provided by General Orders 12, subd. 3 (89 Fed. vii, 32 C. C. A. xvi), that application for an injunction to stay proceedings of a court or officer of a state shall be heard and decided by the judge. It has been claimed that the bankruptcy act confers this authority upon the referee and the provision of the general orders is therefore void. In re Berkowitz (D. C.) 143 Fed. 598. But, aside from that question, this injunction did not stay a court or officer of a state, but left them free to proceed. It enjoined the plaintiff from prosecuting an action in the state court. Whether the provision of general orders No. 12 is valid or invalid, and whether the fact -that the referee enjoined not a state court or officer but a citizen will affect the applicability of the General Orders, need not be determined, for in this case the court below upon its own motion broadened and issued the injunction anew. In re Benjamin (D. C.) 140 Fed. 320.
Nothing amounting to an error of law has been called to the attention of the court, and the petition is dismissed.