In Re Robinson
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Shiff
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MOTION TO DISMISS CASE
ALAN H. W. SHIFF, Bankruptcy Judge.This matter comes before the court on the motion of the Olin Federal Credit Union (Olin) to dismiss the debtor’s Chapter 13 case on the ground that the debtor’s petition was not filed in good faith.
I
BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS
On February 5, 1981, the debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of 11 U.S.C. In the course of that case, a controversy arose involving Olin’s interest in the debtor’s automobile. On March 5,1981 Olin filed a complaint to reclaim the debtor’s automobile (Adversary No. 205-5-81-0084) which was ultimately dismissed as moot on July 21, 1981 because a discharge in the Chapter 7 case had been entered on May 14, 1981. Olin also filed a complaint for relief from the automatic stay on April 29, 1981 to reclaim possession of the automobile (Adversary No. 205-5-81-0155). The debtor filed a counterclaim seeking,
inter alia,
determination of the allowed value of the automobile, installment redemption pursuant to
II
ISSUES
The following questions are presented:
a) May a Chapter 13 case be dismissed because the petition was not filed in good faith?
b) Assuming that there is authority to dismiss a Chapter 13 case before the confirmation hearing for lack of good faith, does either the fact that the debtor filed her Chapter 13 petition after her Chapter 7 discharge or that the Chapter 7 case was still open when the debtor filed her Chapter 13 petition justify dismissal?
III
DISCUSSION
a.
The debtor objects to Olin’s motion to dismiss on the basis that a debtor’s good faith is not a prerequisite to filing a petition under Chapter 13. The debtor contends that good faith is only a proper issue at the Chapter 13 confirmation hearing. In support of that position, the debtor asserts that good faith is relevant to
The causes for dismissal pursuant to
Thus, although I disagree with the debt- or’s contention that the debtor’s good faith may not be evaluated prior to the confirmation hearing, I conclude that dismissal of a petition for lack of good faith prior to consideration of the plan should be ordered only under extraordinary circumstances.
b.
Olin bases its first claim of bad faith on the fact that the debtor’s Chapter 7 case was still pending when she filed her Chapter 13 petition. Based on the Chapter 7 trustee’s representation, the court finds that the Chapter 7 case remained open only because of the steady flow of pleadings regarding the debtor’s automobile. While the debtor’s action of filing the Chapter 13 petition when the Chapter 7 case was still open is not to be viewed as a model for emulation, it does not require dismissal of this case.
Cf.
Olin bases its second claim of bad faith on the fact that the Chapter 13 filing follows the debtor’s discharge under Chapter 7. Although the serial filing of a Chapter 7 and a Chapter 13 case may raise questions of good faith under
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
In summary and conclusion, Olin has not demonstrated the extraordinary circumstances which would justify the dismissal of a Chapter 13 petition for lack of good faith prior to the confirmation hearing.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, that Olin’s Motion to Dismiss the case is denied.
Notes
.
[0]n request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a pase under this chapter ... or may dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause, including—
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under Chapter 123 of title 28;
(3) failure to file a plan timely under section 1321 of this title;
(4) denial of confirmation of a plan undersection 1325 of this title and denial of additional time for filing another plan or a modification of a plan;
(5) material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a confirmed plan;
(6) revocation of the order of confirmation under section 1330 of this title, and denial of *893 confirmation of a modified plan under section 1329 of this title; and
(7) termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan.
.
The bankruptcy court may issue any order, process or judgment that is appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.
.
A bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty ...
. See e.g., Matter of Troutman, 11 B.R. 108, 7 B.C.D. 947 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y.1981); In re Sardella, 8 B.R. 401 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio, 1981); In re Diego, 6 B.R. 468 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Cal.1980); see also In re Anderson, 3 B.R. 160, 6 B.C.D. 73 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cal.1980).
. In
Branch,
which Olin claims exactly matches the instant case, the debtors had already received a discharge of their mortgage debt under Chapter 7 when they filed their Chapter 13 petition to cure the default on their mortgage. The court did not address the issue of the debtors’ good faith. Rather, the court denied confirmation after the mortgagee, who held the claim for the only debt provided for by the debtors’ plan, was granted relief from the automatic stay to continue its state court foreclosure action. The court granted relief from the automatic stay pursuant to
. During oral argument Olin claimed that its relationship with the debtor had ended at the time of the Chapter 7 discharge. This claim prompted the debtor in her brief to argue that Olin had lost its security interest in the automobile. Putting aside the questionable merits of the claims by both parties, their arguments are not responsive to the motion to dismiss and will not be discussed further in this opinion.