In Re Robert K.
Respondent, Robert K., appeals the trial court‘s order requiring him to submit a blood sample for genetic marker (DNA) profiling analysis pursuant to section 5-4-3(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (
On March 24, 2000, respondent admitted to charges that he committed the offenses of aggravated criminal sexual assault (
Following a hearing, the trial court placed respondent on probation for a period of five years. Additionally, pursuant to section 5-4-3(a) of the Code, the trial court ordered respondent to submit a blood sample for DNA profiling analysis and for registration of his DNA profile. Respondent objected to the taking of a blood sample, arguing that section 5-4-3(a) was invalid because it constituted an unreasonable search and seizure and contravened the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act. The trial court denied respondent‘s challenge to the statute, and respondent filed a timely notice of appeal.
Respondent‘s first contention on appeal is that section 5-4-3(a) of the Code violates his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Respondent argues that section 5-4-3(a) impermissibly allows the State to collect evidence of possible future crimes from an entire class of individuals without a warrant or probable cause.
We begin our analysis with a brief discussion of the statute. Section 5-4-3(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Any person convicted of, found guilty under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for, or who received a disposition of court supervision for, а qualifying offense or attempt of a qualifying offense * * * shall, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, be required to submit specimens of blood to the Illinois Department of State Police in accordance with the provisions of this Section, provided such person is:
* * *
(1.5) found guilty or given supervision under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for a qualifying offense or attempt of a qualifying offense on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1996[.]”
730 ILCS 5/5-4-3(a) (West 2000).
Qualifying offenses under the statute include aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse. See
Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.
This court has previously upheld section 5-4-3(a) of the Code against a fourth amendment challenge in People v. Wealer, 264 Ill.App.3d 6, 201 Ill.Dec. 697, 636 N.E.2d 1129 (1994). In Wealer, this court explained that, under certain circumstances, the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause is relaxed when the nature of the intrusion occasioned by a particular search or seizure is minimal and the government‘s interest in performing the search or seizure is significant. Wealer, 264 Ill.App.3d at 14, 201 Ill.Dec. 697, 636 N.E.2d 1129, citing Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). In determining whether the suspicionless search and seizure required by section 5-4-3(a) ran afoul of the fourth amendment, we balаnced the State‘s interest in obtaining DNA profiles, the degree to which the DNA profiles actually advanced that interest, and the gravity of intrusion upon personal privacy. Wealer, 264 Ill.App.3d at 14, 201 Ill.Dec. 697, 636 N.E.2d 1129, citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Applying this balancing test, we commented:
“It is beyond dispute that the State has a legitimate interest in deterring and prosecuting recidivist acts committed by sex offenders. Its interest is esрecially compelling when we consider that sex offenders frequently target children as their victims. Additionally, the State has an interest in establishing the identity of convicted sex offenders where traditional methods of identification might prove otherwise inadequate or inconclusive. Moreover, in addition to solving future crimes, the use of DNA evidence can be used to aid identification of repeat offenders who attempt to otherwise conceal or alter their identity. [Citation.]
The statutorily mandated DNA testing scheme is closely related to the State‘s interest in deterring and prosecuting recidivist acts cоmmitted by sex offenders because it provides an improved technological method for identifying and eliminating potential subjects.” Wealer, 264 Ill.App.3d at 16-17, 201 Ill.Dec. 697, 636 N.E.2d 1129.
We also found that the physical intrusion imposed by the testing mandated by section 5-4-3(a) was relatively slight and posed no threat to the health or safety of the individual tested. Wealer, 264 Ill. App.3d at 16, 201 Ill.Dec. 697, 636 N.E.2d 1129. Finally, we еxplained that a convicted sex offender has only a minimal privacy interest in his or her identity and that such an identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest to solve other past and future crimes. Wealer, 264 Ill.App.3d at 17, 201 Ill.Dec. 697, 636 N.E.2d 1129. Finding that the blood sampling required by section 5-4-3(a) was functionally equivalent to fingerprinting, we held that DNA profiling of convicted sex offenders did not violate the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly upheld the constitutionality of similar statutes requiring blood samples to be taken from sex offenders for DNA profiling. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.1999); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.1995); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.1992); Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4 (Ind.App.2000); Gaines v. State, 116 Nev. 359, 998 P.2d 166 (2000); Landry v. Attorney General, 429 Mass. 336, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (1999); Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699 (Mo.App.1997). Indeed, respondеnt fails to cite a single case supporting his assertions that statutes mandating blood samples from sex offenders violate the fourth amendment.
Although respondent acknowledges this weight of authority, he asserts that these cases are distinguishable because he is a minor and was only adjudicated delinquent under thе Juvenile Court Act as opposed to being tried and convicted as an adult. Respondent asserts that his privacy interests were heightened due to his status as a juvenile offender. Respondent notes that the Juvenile Court Act limits access to juvenile court and law enforcement records.
We agree with respondent that one of the goals of the Juvenile Court Act is to protect the privacy of juveniles; however, respondent‘s status as a minor does not provide him with a greater constitutional right to privacy than offenders who have already attained the age of majority. The juvenile court system is a purely statutory creation and the legislature has the authority to define its limits. See People v. P.H., 145 Ill.2d 209, 223, 164 Ill.Dec. 137, 582 N.E.2d 700 (1991) (noting that a minor has no constitutional right to adjudication under the Juvenile Court Act). As such, any privacy rights accorded by the Juvenile Court Act are not of a constitutional dimension. Therefore, for purposes of fourth amendment analysis, a juvenile offender has no greater privacy interest in his or her identity than an adult offender. See L.S. v. State, 805 So.2d 1004 (Fla.App. 2001) (holding that statute requiring juvenile offender to undergo DNA blood test was nоt an illegal search or seizure); State ex rel. Juvenile Department v. Orozco, 129 Or.App. 148, 878 P.2d 432 (1994) (same).
We therefore conclude that our decision in Wealer comports with decisions from other jurisdictions and controls the resolution of respondent‘s search and seizure argument. Any slight intrusion upon respondent‘s privacy in providing a blood sample is significantly outweighed by the State‘s compelling interest in solving other past and future crimes. See Wealer, 264 Ill.App.3d at 17-18, 201 Ill.Dec. 697, 636 N.E.2d 1129. As such, we hold that the warrantless and suspicionless blood sampling mandated by section 5-4-3(a) of the Code does not violate the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The respondent‘s second contention on appeal is that section 5-4-3(a) of the Code is invalid because it is irreconcilably inconsistent with the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act. Respondent argues that the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to rehabilitate juveniles and provide juveniles with a second chance.
In Nicholas K., this court considered whether the provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act (
Unlike the statute at issue in Nicholas K., section 5-4-3(a) of the Code is not ambiguous in its application to juveniles. As detailed above, the statute plainly requires that any person found guilty under the Juvenile Court Act for committing a qualifying offense shall “be required to submit specimens of blood to the Illinois Department of State Police.”
Lacking a statutory ambiguity, respondent is left to arguе that section 5-4-3(a) cannot be enforced because it is inconsistent with the philosophy and the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act. However, this is not a sufficient legal basis to overturn a statute. All statutes are presumed valid. Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill.2d 470, 480, 234 Ill.Dec. 189, 702 N.E.2d 529 (1998). Simply because section 5-4-3(a) conflicts with the philosophy or purpose of another statute does not necessarily render it invalid. Aside from his fourth amendment argument, respondent fails to raise any other constitutional or legal basis that would support his assertions that the statute is invalid. Although respondent argued at trial that the statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment, violated the separation of powers, and improperly required trial courts to exercise their contempt powers, he does not raise these issues for our consideration on appeal and we do not consider them here. See People v. Lantz, 186 Ill.2d 243, 261, 238 Ill.Dec. 592, 712 N.E.2d 314 (1999) (points not argued are waived).
As already noted, the juvenile court systems are creations of the legislaturе, and the legislature has the authority to establish the procedures governing such systems. See P.H., 145 Ill.2d at 233, 164 Ill.Dec. 137, 582 N.E.2d 700. Lacking evidence of a constitutional violation or that the two enactments are operationally inconsistent, we are without legal basis to invalidate section 5-4-3(a) of the Code.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County requiring respondent to submit a blood sample for DNA profiling.
Affirmed.
BOWMAN and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.