2004 Ohio 2560 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2004
{¶ 3} On August 5, 2002, the dispositional hearing commenced and CCDCFS moved for temporary custody. At the hearing, it was established that appellant had completed a four-month parenting program, but that appellant would need continuous supervision in order to provide R.N. with adequate care. Further, although it was indicated that appellant was taking medication, there was doubt as to her consistency. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court awarded temporary custody to CCDCFS.
{¶ 4} On September 19, 2002, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody to an order of permanent custody. Following the appointment of an attorney and a guardian ad litem for appellant, a hearing was held on February 26, 2003 to find whether or not CCDCFS had made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan for the child. Following this hearing, the court concluded all reasonable efforts had been made.
{¶ 5} On May 28, 2003, the case proceeded on CCDCFS' motion for permanent custody. Upon hearing the evidence, the court awarded permanent custody of R.N. to CCDCFS.2 It is from this decision that appellant advances two assignments of error for our review.
{¶ 7} In order for a child to be placed in the custody of an agency, the trial court must first determine the existence of one of four conditions, namely:
"1) The child is not abandoned or orphaned or has not been intemporary custody of one or more public children servicesagencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or moremonths of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on orafter March 18, 1999, and the child cannot be placed with eitherof the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not beplaced with the child's parents. 2) The child is abandoned. 3) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of thechild who are able to take permanent custody. 4) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or morepublic children services or private child placing agencies fortwelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month periodending on or after March 18, 1999."
{¶ 8} R.C.
{¶ 9} R.C.
{¶ 10} In determining the best interest of the child, the court must consider all relevant factors including, but not limited to, those contained in R.C.
{¶ 11} Reviewing the record and all relevant factors, we find the trial court had clear and convincing evidence in which to determine that granting permanent custody to the state was in the best interest of the child.
{¶ 13} Specifically, appellant argues that the court failed to find any of the conditions enumerated under R.C.
{¶ 14} The trial court found that appellant has failed to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the home. R.C.
{¶ 15} Regarding appellant's financial situation, she testified that she receives $66 a month in food stamps and almost $700 from Social Security. Of this amount, $435 went toward rent, with the remainder being applied to utilities and daily expenses. Appellant testified that at the time of the permanent custody hearing, the gas in her home was turned off.
{¶ 16} The trial court also found that appellant's chronic mental illness is so severe that she is unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year. R.C.
{¶ 17} Appellant's mental illness issues were a factor to be considered. R.C.
{¶ 18} Appellant has been diagnosed with chronic paranoid schizophrenia, a psychotic disorder characterized by auditory hallucinations, delusions, and difficulty with thought processing. Although appellant argues that she was taking her medication, Dr. Michael Hottois ("Hottois") testified that throughout the time he had seen appellant, she had failed to take her medication, failed to schedule follow-up appointments in a timely manner, and continued to hear voices. Hottois testified that appellant indicated she experienced daily, and often multiple, hallucinations.
{¶ 19} Additionally, Fitzgerald, in letters written to Lisaula in January 2002, wrote that appellant was failing to comply with the treatment plan and that appellant felt she did not need further medication.
{¶ 20} The trial court had clear and convincing evidence within which to rely in finding R.N. could not have been placed with appellant within a reasonable time.
{¶ 22} In support of her argument, appellant states that "a strong bond exists between mother and child that cannot be visually witnesses [sic] by any social worker." Regarding R.N.'s self-esteem issues, appellant argues he is receiving counseling and his condition exists regardless of her interaction with him. She argues R.N. has repeatedly expressed a desire to return home, he has spent eleven of thirteen years in her care, and the state's argument is far from compelling. We find appellant's arguments to be without merit.
{¶ 23} Regarding the relevant factors for the court to consider, the record indicates that there was little affection shown between R.N. and appellant. Although appellant argues a strong bond exists between the two, she has offered no evidence of same. To the contrary, Lisaula testified that she never saw R.N. and appellant hug or express feelings of love toward each other. Further, appellant had blamed R.N. for the fact he was in custody. Additionally, the guardian ad litem for R.N., Don Ristity ("Ristity"), testified that:
"Mother has maintained visits with some regularity, butusually upsets [R.N.] by her behavior and comments to him: it ismy understanding that she quite often blames him for hisseparation from the family, and the involvement with CCDCFS. Itappears that mother's personal issues have not been resolved, andwould appear that they continue to interfere with her commitmentto [R.N.]."
{¶ 24} R.N. indicated to Ristity that although he would like to see his mother, he did not want to live with her. Lastly, it is undisputed that R.N. had been in the temporary custody of CCDCFS for 25 months.
{¶ 25} Regarding R.N.'s need for a legally secure placement, his foster parents have maintained a positive, secure relationship, and R.N. has made a positive adjustment. Testimony reveals that R.N. calls his foster mother "mom" or "grandma," and his foster father is known as "dad."
{¶ 26} We find that more than one of the factors listed under R.C.
{¶ 27} Reviewing the circumstances of R.N.'s custody in their entirety, we find that the court did not err in granting permanent custody to CCDCFS.
{¶ 28} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 30} In a planned permanent living arrangement ("PPLA"), the court grants the state custody of a child without terminating parental rights. A PPLA is appropriate if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child and either:
"(a) the needs of the child require that the child remain inresidential or institutional care. R.C.
{¶ 31} R.C.
{¶ 32} In the case sub judice, it is clear from the record that R.C.
{¶ 33} In support of her argument that the trial court erred in not ordering a PPLA, appellant cites In re Campbell (Oct. 12, 2000), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 77552 and 77603. In Campbell, we held that the PPLA is, in effect, a "middle ground" between permanent custody and reunification with the parent that should be encouraged when circumstances clearly comport with R.C.
"CCDCFS presented significant evidence that Campbell sufferedfrom stress related symptoms that made it difficult for her toproperly function as a parent, that she had neglected herchildren in the past and that she missed scheduled visitations,although it is not exactly clear from the record which party wasat fault for the scheduling snafus which precipitated some of themissed visits. On the other hand, the trial court was correct inits assertion that the children retained a significant andpositive relationship with their mother and that Campbell, whilenot ready to assume custody of her children, had made significantstrides towards becoming a better parent and had completed mostof her case plan, including completing parenting classes * * *and testing negative for drugs on all of her urine drops."
{¶ 34} Appellant argues that the case sub judice is on point with Campbell. We disagree.
{¶ 35} We have consistently maintained that Campbell did not create an additional reason for granting a PPLA. In re I.M.ak.a. L.M.N., Jr. (Dec. 24, 2003), Cuyahoga App. No. 82669.Campbell simply described the obvious; that a PPLA is the middle ground when considering the spectrum upon which potential custody rests; that spectrum being permanent custody to the state on one hand, and placement with parents on the other. The use of a PPLA is only appropriate when the circumstances meet the statutory requirements of R.C.
{¶ 36} While appellant completed a four-month parenting program, testimony indicated that her interaction with R.N. remained, at time, inappropriate and deconstructive. The trial court found:
"Just by completing parenting, clearly doesn't mean that aparent — by attending, it doesn't mean a parent is, all of asudden, a good and suitable placement for the child, especiallybased on the social worker's testimony that the mother blames thechild for this situation and that it occurred all the time."
{¶ 37} Also, Ristity supported the award of custody to the state. Although R.N. was not afraid to see appellant and that they did in fact have a relationship of some kind, we have held that the mere existence of a good relationship is insufficient.In re Holyak, supra. Overall, we are concerned with the best interest of the child, not the mere existence of a relationship. Id.
{¶ 38} The trial court is in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted. We are not in a position to second-guess the trial court absent an abuse of discretion. In the case sub judice, we find no such abuse.
{¶ 39} Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 40} The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Celebrezze, Jr., P.J., and Rocco, J., concur.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.