In Re Rivermist Homeowners Assn.
This appeal is brought by Rivermist Homeowners Association, Inc., from the dismissal of its suit to quiet title to certain recreational land within a residential subdivision. We affirm, finding that the association has failed to state a claim for the relief sought.
Rivermist Corporation then constructed extensive improvements including a clubhouse on the recreational land, and in May, 1974 executed a deed to secure debt to the First National Bank of Gwinnett County to finance the improvements.
In August, 1974 Rivermist Corporation incorporated the Rivermist Homeowners Association, Inc., plaintiff-appellant herein, as a non-profit corporation to operate the recreational facilities. Subsequently, in 1976, Misty River, Inc. acquired title to the entire subdivision.
In 1978, the association filed its petition for quia timet seeking to quiet title to the recreation and clubhouse site. The association claimed fee simple title to that site free and clear of the $150,000 debt to the bank. Its petition grounded its claim for fee simple title upon the plat recorded in 1973 construed together with the subdivision regulations. The special master found the association to have no standing to pursue the suit because it had no title, and recommended the grant of certain defendants’ motions to dismiss. The trial court approved the special master’s report and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed, and requires a preliminary consideration of the breadth of relief available under Georgia statutes in suits to quiet title.
Georgia’s quia timet procedure is found in Code Ann. § 37-1407, reading as follows: "The proceeding quia timet
Georgia cases have tended to limit the applicability of the proceeding to those cases coming within the narrow statutory language. 25 EGL 232, Quieting Title, § 2 (1974). See generally Heller v. Fishman,
The 1966 Quiet Title Act was designed to broaden the relief available by supplementing and not supplanting the quia timet procedure. Code Ann. § 37-1423. This is the stated purpose of the new Act: "The purpose of this law [§§ 37-1411 thru 37-1423] is to create a procedure for removing any cloud upon the title to land, including the equity of redemption by owners of land sold at tax sales, and for readily and conclusively establishing that certain named persons are the owners of all the interests in land defined by a decree entered in such proceeding, so that there shall be no occasion for land in this State to be unmarketable because of any uncertainty as to the owner of every interest therein.” Code Ann. § 37-1421. The applicability of the new Act is as follows: "Any person . . . who claims an estate of freehold present or future or any estate for years of which at least five years are unexpired ... in any land in this State, whether in the actual and peaceable possession thereof or not, and whether such land is vacant or not, may bring a proceeding in rem against all the world to establish his title to such land and to determine all adverse claims thereto or to remove any particular cloud or clouds upon his title to such land, including an equity of redemption, which proceeding may be against all persons known or unknown who claim or might claim adversely to him, whether or not the petition discloses any known or possible claimants.” Code Ann. § 37-1411. (Emphasis supplied.)
The association claims standing under the 1966 Act
We think it plain that the purpose of the new Act was to expand the relief available. See also Mueller v. Mercer County,
The court considered a similar expectancy in
Myers v. Grant,
Section 37-1411 speaks of providing a proceeding for one "who claims an estate ... to establish his title...” The association has no title to "establish” — they make no claim of record nor of prescriptive title. Their claim is that they
should
be awarded title. Indeed, their mere
Nor can the association show title through dedication. They assert that the August, 1973 recordation of a final plat of the Rivermist subdivision contained an Owner’s Acknowledgment dedicating "all streets, alleys, parks, and water courses, drains, easements and public places thereon shown for the purposes and considerations therein expressed.” They recognize that it is generally true that dedication for public use does not deprive the owner of his title, under such cases as
Brown v. City of East Point,
In the words of Misty River, Inc.’s brief, "The recorded plat relied upon by the Association as a dedication was made prior to the Association’s existence, was made for the use, not ownership of the public, and makes no reference whatever to the clubhouse or other improvements located on the property.”
We find that the association has failed to bring itself within the language of Code Ann. § 37-1411 because it has shown no current claim to an estate of freehold nor an estate for years.
To the extent that the association may claim easement rights in the subject land under grants from individual homeowners, it still had no claim under Code Ann. § 37-1411 because an easement is neither an estate of freehold nor an estate for years.
The face of the pleadings shows that the association
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
"The plaintiffs, having failed to show either title to or possession of the premises, were not in a position to attack the proceedings in the back tax suit in any form of proceedings, either legal or equitable, and their bill was properly dismissed.” Fontaine v. Hudson,