IN RE RIDDLE, ALLEGED NEGLECTED/DEPENDENT CHILD.
No. 96-1304
Supreme Court of Ohio
July 23, 1997
79 Ohio St.3d 259 | 1997-Ohio-391
Certified by the Court of Appeals for Guernsey County, No. 96CA03. Submitted April 15, 1997.
{¶ 2} On July 12, 1995, appellee, Guernsey County Children Services Board (“GCCSB”), received a complaint that Travis, Jr. was not receiving proper care due to his parents’ transient lifestyles. This complaint alleged that Travis, Jr. was staying with different people in different locations, and that stability in Travis, Jr.’s care was lacking. At about the time appellee became involved, Travis, Sr., who had recently lost his job, acknowledged that he was not providing proper care for Travis, Jr.
{¶ 3} Travis, Jr.’s paternal grandparents, Jeff and Christy Riddle, were among the various caregivers the child had stayed with prior to appellee’s involvement. Jeff and Christy Riddle expressed concerns about the well-being of their grandson, and about the ability of either parent to provide regular, stable care. In response to the situation, a GCCSB caseworker mediated an agreement to address Travis, Jr.’s care. Signatories to this agreement or “contract” were
{¶ 4} The contract outlined two aspects of the parents’ problems regarding Travis, Jr.: that neither parent had permanent appropriate housing and that the custodial parent, Travis, Sr., had been unable to provide a stable environment. As a desired solution, the contract specified that the goal was to provide Travis, Jr. with a permanent stable environment. The contract recognized that the paternal grandparents’ home provided a stable environment on a temporary basis without court intervention.
{¶ 5} The contract set out “conditions” to be complied with to achieve the goal of providing Travis, Jr. with a permanent stable environment. The first condition was that Travis, Jr. would reside with his paternal grandparents until Travis, Sr. found suitable housing and achieved a source of income that would provide for his son’s basic needs. Other conditions addressed Aid to Dependent Children benefits for Travis, Jr., the child’s medical care, and parental visitation. The final condition specified that “Travis Riddle [Sr.] will accomplish his goals on or before September 10, 1995. If he is unable, Guernsey County Children Services Board will assist the paternal grandparents in receiving temporary legal custody of their grandchild to ensure his ongoing stability.”1
{¶ 6} As the contract was structured, Travis, Sr., as the custodial parent, was challenged to modify his situation with a goal of establishing a more stable environment for the child’s welfare. Travis, Sr. was given approximately forty-five days to display his commitment to the contract’s goals. The contract placed no similar responsibilities upon appellant to improve her situation.
{¶ 8} On September 26, 1995, the court appointed attorneys to represent each of the parents, appointed a guardian ad litem for the child, found probable cause to believe that Travis, Jr. was a neglected/dependent child, and awarded interim custody to the paternal grandparents, with protective supervision by appellee.
{¶ 9} On November 20, 1995, the court approved appellee’s case plan for Travis, Jr.’s care, which specified that the child’s parents would each obtain appropriate housing and income, that the paternal grandparents would meet the child’s daily needs, and that appellant and Travis, Sr. would each visit weekly with their son.
{¶ 10} The trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on December 18, 1995. Several individuals testified at the hearing that Travis, Jr. had not been receiving proper care prior to the time his paternal grandparents assumed responsibility for his care. Appellant apparently was unable to care for Travis, Jr. on a consistent basis, and therefore was unable to seek custody of the child. Further unrefuted testimony established that Travis, Jr. was well cared for after the paternal grandparents assumed their responsibilities for him.
{¶ 11} After the presentation of testimony, the trial court determined that Travis, Jr. was a neglected child, and the case proceeded to the dispositional hearing. After the dispositional hearing, the trial court journalized its decision
{¶ 12} Appellant appealed from the trial court determination that Travis, Jr. was a neglected child. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and certified its judgment as in conflict with the decisions of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County in In re Reese (1982), 4 Ohio App.3d 59, 4 OBR 109, 446 N.E.2d 482, In re Crisp (Feb. 5, 1981), Franklin App. No. 80AP-678, unreported, 1981 WL 2983, and In re Darst (1963), 117 Ohio App. 374, 24 O.O.2d 144, 192 N.E.2d 287. The certified question is, “Can a trial court make a finding of neglect under
{¶ 13} The cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists.
Charles E. McKnight, for appellant.
Josephine E. Hayes, Guernsey County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
{¶ 14} The court of appeals’ certification order invites this court to consider whether a juvenile court, as a matter of law, is foreclosed from entering a finding of neglect when it is uncontroverted that the allegedly neglected child is receiving proper care from a relative both at the time of the filing of the complaint and at the time of the adjudicatory hearing.2 For the reasons which follow, we distinguish the
{¶ 15} We do not approach this case by expressly focusing on the certified question, but instead examine the circumstances leading to the trial court’s finding of neglect to inquire whether the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. To determine that Travis, Jr. was a neglected child under former
{¶ 16} Our inquiry is guided by
“(A) To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code;
“* * *
“(C) To achieve the foregoing purposes, whenever possible, in a family environment, separating the child from its parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public safety[.]”
{¶ 17} Travis, Jr. was adjudged to be a neglected child pursuant to former
{¶ 18} For our purposes here, it is useful to recognize a distinction between an allegation under
{¶ 19} Crisp and Darst, two of the certified conflict decisions, were dependency cases involving allegations of a lack of proper care pursuant to
{¶ 21} Nevertheless, we find that a significant factual distinction exists between the situation in the Reese, Crisp, and Darst cases and the situation in this case. In Reese, as in Crisp and Darst, the parent voluntarily arranged for the child to be placed with a relative. One of the underlying concerns in cases of this type, as set out in
{¶ 22} The court of appeals below in its opinion stated, “Just because a child is safe, whether it be in a foster home or the grandparents’ home, does not negate a finding the child is neglected because of the acts or omissions of the parents.” Given the facts of this case, we do not disagree with the appropriateness of this observation. Similarly, we endorse the approach of In re Poth (June 30, 1982), Huron App. No. H-81-31, unreported, 1982 WL 9371, in which the Sixth Appellate District, in a situation where the county assumed care of a child because the parents were not providing care, rejected an argument that the child could not be adjudged dependent as a matter of law when the child was receiving excellent foster care.
{¶ 23} The certification-of-conflict order in this case invites us to consider whether the terms “guardian” and “custodian” in
{¶ 24} As one of her major arguments, appellant suggests that this case is at heart a custody dispute, and that a neglect/dependency action should not be used as a substitute for a custody proceeding. In Reese, 4 Ohio App.3d at 62, 4 OBR at 112, 446 N.E.2d at 485, the court cautioned that “[t]he statutory scheme * * * was not intended by the General Assembly for use as a tool by persons seeking custody of a child who has been temporarily entrusted to their care by a parent when the parent then requests the return of the child. See In re Kronjaeger (1957), 166 Ohio St. 172 [1 O.O.2d 459, 140 N.E.2d 773] * * *. * * * [W]here the primary objective of the complainant in filing a complaint under
{¶ 25} The requirement that the trial court hold bifurcated hearings in cases such as this helps to direct the focus of the initial inquiry into whether a child is neglected or dependent (the allegations in this case) away from the custody issue. See In re Baby Girl Baxter (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 17 OBR 469, 479 N.E.2d 257, paragraph one of the syllabus (construing and applying
{¶ 26} We share the Reese court’s concern that a neglect/dependency complaint should not be filed as a substitute for a custody action. However, given
{¶ 27} Appellant also suggests that the contract basically operated as an acquiescence that Travis, Jr. was neglected or dependent if its conditions were not met. Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court did not find Travis, Jr. to be a neglected child as a fait accompli solely on the basis of Travis, Sr.’s failure to meet the contractual conditions. The trial court did not approach this case as some hybrid-type of breach of contract/neglect action. Although Travis, Sr.’s failure to meet the contractual conditions was a factor in the trial court’s consideration, the trial court had before it other relevant evidence as well, and the adjudicatory hearing did not unduly dwell on the agreement. The hearing properly focused on the situations of all concerned, and the resulting necessity for the agreement and its conditions.
{¶ 28} In conclusion, because the paternal grandparents were caring for Travis, Jr. pursuant to an agreement initiated by the caseworker, rather than pursuant to a voluntary informal agreement initiated by the child’s parent, we distinguish this case from Reese. In addition, we find that this case is distinguishable from Crisp and Darst as well for the same reason. Although we believe that the evidence may have supported an adjudication that Travis, Jr. was a dependent child, we cannot say that the trial court decision that Travis, Jr. was a neglected child was against the manifest weight of the evidence. If the trial court
{¶ 29} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.