History
  • No items yet
midpage
In Re Request for Opinion of the Supreme Court Relative to Constitutionality of SDLC
379 N.W.2d 822
S.D.
1985
Check Treatment

*1 agency, Report Court, in a to the top dated asserting the mother from her natural 18, 1985, March adopting told the court parental rights. fundamental Nor can “biological rights that the Department mother’s were of Social Services’ error be terminated December vehicle, avenue, 1982 and the used as a Or- by or means Therefore, der was filed.” adoption which the mother lоses her child. While order knowing was entered without Department of Social Services should appeal adoption the case was on and an certainly most not be rewarded for commit rights order was entered when the mentioned, ting the error hereinbefore nei mother had finally not been ther terminated. punished should the mother be adoption order was flawed. Jus- emоtionally traumatized because of the re Fosheim, writing tice for this Court occurring sults therefrom. When the Everett, by 286 N.W.2d at mother’s sister closed stat- and brother-in-law did not ing: only procedure by “The adopt the which the child and the child was returned adopted Oaklands Dakota, could have the child to South expedi mother moved without Ms. Everett’s consent was tiously regain custody under of her child. provisions Furthermore, none this Court has held that a applicable.” which were parent may validly 25-6-4 was withdraw his/her con entirety. cited in its adoption refer to sent subsection proper under circum particularly applicable which is Everett, stance. Adoption Matter this 25-6-4(4), case. Please note SDCL which In Matter of D.D.D., reads: (S.D. 1980), N.W.2d over an

to the (S.D.1985): in a started linquishment, of notice vоluntariness of a natural father’s waiver this Court remanded a case to the lower court with instructions to determine the tion special termination of his out, Sichmeller, illegitimate concurrence in “A power which is the intended to proceeding child. As I of attorney to consent for Matter of provide only parental way voluntary expressed this case Adop rights re judge may who: consent of his custody of the (4) last No child tion is [*] Has been expired. (Emphasis resort final [*] waive consent from a judicially parents. the time for an [*] child, appeal adopted if n deprived of the to the court However, supplied.) without the $ adjudica- parent appeal $ parental relinquishment of unwanted children, relinquishment not for the of chil

dren genuinely who are par wanted

ent.” Id. at 875. I also approval, cited with for it is a work of humanity technical —not ity , Romero, In re — Id. No act of the

mother thus еstoppel creates error or and I would affirm previous ‍​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‍decision rendered REQUEST In re FOR OPINION OF the J.M.J., 368 N.W.2d 602. SUPREME COURT RELATIVE TO the CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SDCL 21- I find no fault with the trial court which 32-17 and Construction of SDCL 21-32- proceeded adoption with the and which 16. file, adoption Court, order of this No. 15187. part made a appeal this record. Little realize, did the trial court granted when it Supreme Court of South Dakota. ten-year-old girl parents, tо new Decided Dec. rights of the mother and the child were for, on appeal; agency this state filed a April

written document dated con- senting adoption to the child. This *2 excellency, Janklow,

To his William J. Governor of the State of South Dakota.

Pursuant to the vested in the Governor under Article 5 of the South Constitution, you requested have opinion an Court on an important question of law involved your power. exercise of The fac- tual basis is: Legislaturе In enacted SDCL 21-32-15 and SDCL 21-32-16. SDCL 21-32-15 authorized the State of South purchase public Dakota to liability insur- purpose ance insuring the lia- bility executive, leg- and its islative, officers, judicial agents, and or employees. provides SDCL 21-32-16 public liability to the extent that purchased under SDCL 21- 32-15, and to the extent there is cover- thereunder, age afforded the State shall be deemed to have waivеd the common sovereign immunity law doctrine of and consented to suit in the same manner any party other be sued. In Legislature enacted that, provides except which in SDCL execu- tive, legislative, judicial employee, and agent officer or of the State is immune damages from suit or sought against or him in either his capacity individual or official for min- discretionary isterial or аcts committed acting while of his em- ployment agency. the State entered into contract

with public liability Colonial Penn for insurance which afforded executive, varying legisla- limits to the tive, judicial employees, officers or following of the State in the ar- comprehensive general eas: liability, doctrine liability, per- waived common law have comprehensivе automobile errors injury liability, sovereign immunity and consented to sonal limit of liabili- aggregate omissions. in the same manner suit excluding de- payments, all claim ty for may be sued. party costs, policy Five fense under said officers, Immunity *3 ($5,000,000.00)in a one- Million Dollars pro- Except as employees agents. and year period. 21-32-16, any employee, offi- vided Office of October the State On state, acting while agent of the cer or Bureau of Ad- Management, Executive employment scope the his or within of from notification ministration received acts are ministerial agency, whether such Underwriters, Ltd., the of- Entity Public discretionary, from suit is immune or or Penn, of ‍​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‍representative for Colonial ficial brought against liability damages for desig- policy cancellation the insurance him in individual or official either his Employees the State of South nated as capacity. PEC400665, on Decem- effective Dakota questions Your are: Underwriters, Entity ber Public availability of rein- the lack of Ltd. cited as the for cancellation of surance reason I. policy. the Legislature enacting the Has Manage- of Executive

The State Office to constitutionаlly extended ex- 21-32-17 ment, has ex- Bureau of Administration ecutive, legislative, judicial employ- and a sim- possibility procuring the plored State, ees, or the in- agents officers special comprehensive governmental ilar cluding State boards and members of liability policy other sources. How- from commissions, immunity from suit or lia- ever, virtually no chance that there sought bility damages fоr or coverage will insurance be obtained such against them in their individual either or given the mass of the insurers exodus capacity or official for ministerial discre- coverage line due to the from this acting tionary acts committed while with- unavailablity of reinsurance. Several employment, agency of their the very prob- facing this states are likewise or duties? then, As of the lem. December executive, legislative, judicial em- and officers, the ployees, agents of State and II. liability cover- be without insurance will govern- Department of If the Executive age. implements procedure its own for ment in the factual Those sections of law cited defense, monies and establishes for and

statement relevant state: given and for ex- waived consent to suit Liability insurance —Pur- ecutive, legislative, judicial employ- of South Da- by state. The state chase ees, agents of the officers and kota, through commissioner ad- including boards members of State ministration, pub- pay for obtain and commissions, Legisla- liability the extent and lic insurance to ture under SDCL 21-32-16? expedient by purposes considered South Constitution purpose of in- the commissioner for the part, has provides, “The Governor au- state, its suring liability offi- require thority opinions cers, employees. important law upon questions of in- immunity to 21-32-16. Waiver ex- pow- volved in the exercise of his insurance tent —Consent upon solemn The can- er and occasions.” insur- To extent such suit. cellation of the state’s insurance 21-32- purchased pursuant to ance is inability to policy, coupled with the obtain coverage is to the extent afforded 15 and urgent thereunder, has raised replacement be deemed state shall Arcon, important questions concerning doctrine of immunity.” constitutionality construction and of SDCL supra, depar at 410. there is to be a “[I]f and the construction of SDCL rule, ture from the policy impact 21-32-16. Because оf the these must be declared and the extent of n government, circumstances have on state fixed legislature.” Merrill Bi your request we accommodate for an advis- rhanzel, 310 N.W.2d ory opinion. always acknowledged we have legislature’s found I. III, impose 27 to conditions and Any legislative act is accorded a upon bringing limitations an action presumption favor of constitutionality. the state. See Griffis Independent Community Bankers Ass’n *4 State, (S.D.1984). 346 N.W.2d v. That spoken subject; prior now our presumption is not overcome until the con “judge-made” law has been overruled and stitutionality clearly of the act is and un- SDCL 21-32-17 now defines mistakenly shown and there is no reason able doubt that it violates fundamental con interpretation limit our of the immu principles. stitutional South Dakota Ass’n nity granted protect by SDCL 21-32-17 to (S.D.1979). v. 280 N.W.2d 662 governmental employees, this case we limit our officers consideration of the question agents whether Article from for tort claims. This III, 27 of the South Dakota Constitution however, immunity, protect § does not indi law-making authority limits the leg of the viduals from for actions under islature to enact SDCL 21-32-17. See Kra federal statutes that U.S.C. 1983 or other § 112, v. County, mar Bon Homme Seе, protect federally guaranteed rights. 155 N.W.2d 777 (9th Jones, 607 F.2d 1269 e.g., Morrison v. “Sovereign Cir.1979), immunity principle denied, is the 445 U.S. cert. jurisprudence, ‍​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‍the state cannot (1980); be Hamp S.Ct. 64 L.Ed.2d sued it given unless has its consent or has (7th 484 F.2d 602 City Chicago, ton v. immunity.” otherwise waived its City Cir.1973), denied, 415 U.S. cert. Rapid Boland, City v. 271 N.W.2d (1974); also S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d see (S.D.1978). sovereign immunity of the Services, Department Monell v. Social recognized State South Dakota is in Arti- 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 436 U.S. 98 S.Ct. III, cle 27 of the South Dаkota Constitu- § Conway Humbert, tion. 21-32- By the enactment of SDCL 145 N.W.2d High-Grade Oil -16, legislature expressly 15 and Sommer, (S.D.1980). Co. v. 295 N.W.2d 736 immunity the ex waived its III, provides: Legisla- “The § purchased tent ture shall direct law in what manner afforded and to the extent and what courts suits Norgeot v. thereunder. See against the provision state.” This is not (S.D.1983). enacting By N.W.2d 501 self-executing. Arcon Constr. Co. v. 21-32-17, however, legislature Plant, defined South Cement it retаined the immuni that instance where III, Acting ty expressed in Article Prior to the enactment of SDCL 21-32- of South Dakota broad -16, -17, the doctrine of Ill, legislature Constitution art. III, immunity expressed in Article “impose clearly authority to was within its “judge-made” High-Grade law. See public such conditions and limitations as Co., supra; Oil Sioux Falls Constr. Co. policy may require.” Griffis, seem to su Falls, (S.D. City Sioux 364, 2 pra, 68 S.D. at N.W.2d at 668. Con 1980). consistently hаve it held that “[W]e 21-32- sequently, we conclude that SDCL province is the exclusive abrogate and not the courts to or limit the 17 does not violate Dakota Constitu- South Ill, your have also asked whether the tion and answer first You Immunity department question affirmatively. under establishment granted to members of SDCL 21-32-17 is of monies for the of claims will the extent state boards and commissions to meaning waive within they employees, are officers or for an effective SDCL 21-32-16. test of the state. statutory sovereign immunity

two-pronged. immunity may be An assertion of waived II. specific legislative au- ineffective unless inquiry We divide second into governmental entity thority to sue the First, two sections. if the executive de given, unless there are been partment government implements its funds available for satisfaction own for the defense of power reposed gov- in the judgment, or will the defense of claims constitute liabili entity raising ernmental of funds ty pursuant necessary satisfy recovery against a thereby waive and consent to added) (emphasis it. suit under SDCL 21-32-16? Shepard’s/McGraw-Hill, Civil Actions Generally, sovereign immunity 3.15, Against State Government § by defending cannot be waived a *5 (Winborne 1982). Maryland ed. The Court there is clear suit unless Appeals of held that to constitute an effec statutory authority a to effect such waiver. waiver, must tive statutes contain Dep’t Treasury, Ford Motor v. See Co. of immunity “both a clear waiver of as to 323 65 L.Ed. 389 U.S. ‍​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‍S.Ct. 89 agency’s matters (1945); Eidenmiller v. 120 Neb. obligations, duties and and an authorization (1930); 447 Eagle 233 N.W. State ex rel. appropriation satisfy for the of funds to a Hall, (Mo. 1965); ton v. 389 798 S.W.2d judgment against it in rendered tort.” Eaton, (10th Williams v. 443 F.2d 422 Cir. Washington Sanitary Katz v. Suburban 1971); Educ., Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of ’n, Comm 284 Md. 397 A.2d (W.D.Mich.1976); 73 F.R.D. 30 general see (1979). See also American Struc ly Darnall v. tures, Baltimore, City Inc. v. 278 Md. (1961). only recognize of A.2d E. Charles Bro express where there is an statu Trustees, Arcon, tory supra. waiver. hawn Bros. v. Board & of Md. 304 A.2d 819 The Ken statutes, construing this Court’s main tucky Appeals statutory of held that objective give is to ascertain and effect to provisions permitting the establishment of legislature. the intention of the Western malpractice a fund from which claims Surety Mydland, v. Co. paid a center were be medical N.W.2d 3 This intent is best ascer- ambiguous wholly inadequate were statutory language, tained from the Argo specifically waive Corp. Lathrop, Oil Kentucky, sovereign The court “In stated: (1955), N.W.2d 431 where wоrds used are immunity may by implication not be waived ordinary to be understood in their sense. because Section 231 of Constitution has 2-14-1. SDCL Under SDCL 21-32-16 the interpreted requiring specific been waiv legislature waived the common law doc- Assembly directing er the General sovereign trine of the ex- “[t]o what manner and in what suit courts purchased” tent such (citations omitted).” brought, be Freder coveragе and “to the extent is afforded Center, Kentucky ick v. Univ. Medical By express provisions thereunder.” (Ky.Ct.App.1979); legislature S.W.2d SDCL did not exr cf. S.D.Const, Ill, Likewise, tend the waiver to include the defense we express claim. have held that the absence of an waiver, statutory immunity. the doctrine of Colo.Rev.Stat. 24-10- Cf. immunity expressed 115(l)(a), in our will (1985 constitution 24-30-1510 Colo.Sess. Arcon, abrogated. supra; Laws, Kringen Session); nоt be Extraordinary Wyo.Stat. Shea, (S.D.1983); l-39-118(c). Mer Annot. the first re- rill, supra. quirement express legislative authority to sue is absent. Consequently, the fund provides: alone not will suffice as a waiver of sover-

To extent such is insurance eign immunity. purchased pursuant to 21-32-15 and to Respectfully day submitted this 18th the extent afforded thereun- December, 1985. der, the state be shall deemed to have waived the commоn law doctrine of sov- JON FOSHEIM ereign immunity and consented to suit Chief Justice the same party manner that GEORGE W. WUEST may be sued. E.W. HERTZ plain meaning provision tois Acting Justices waive immunity only to the extent I find query regarding Because an is a party a traditional unspecified procedure payment contract indemnifying state for to, vague respond claims to too losses it would be liable for the absеnce join part cannot opinion. immunity. 58-1-2(1). See SDCL Monies of claims is anti- clearly aware of the notion of concept thetical to the immuni- self-insurance it has because used this con- ty- cept the area of compensation. workers’ Sommer, In High Grade Oil v. Self-insurance, See how- (S.D.1980), we said that ever, is a concept different than *6 payment premiums of insurancе for state insurance. liability coverage did not waive premise start from the so- legislative because there was no called self-insurance is not at Oil, In High authorization. Grade the all. It is the antithesis of insurance. simply paying premiums state was to insur- The essence of an insurance contract is merely companies ance who came into shifting risk of loss from the court of and raised the defense to the insurer. insured essence Here, immunity. suggestion there is a self-insurance, colloquial a term of cur- department willing to use rency precise legal rather than of mean- some funds from unknown source to pay ing, is by the retention risk of loss directly. claims This smacks of a tort upon one it is directly imposed whom which, procedure claims if it is funded contraсt, (citations omitted) by law or action, legislative ‍​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‍could well constitute a American v. Passaic Nurses Ass’n Gener- I would 491, 486, Hosp., N.J.Super. al 471 A.2d have to more about this scheme know 66, (1984). Self-insurance “involves no the source of the I funds before could ordinarily in insurance as that term is used knowledgeably question. answer the In all statutes, statutes, regulatory tax respects, opinion. other I concur in Keeton, legal R. contexts.” Insur- ROBERT E. MORGAN (1971). 1.2(b)(6), Law ance 7-8 Under- Associate Justice standing the words of SDCL 21-32-16 sense, ordinary their respectfully grant statute does not I would decline to expressly state that request. self-insurance or Governor His Janklow’s legislative establishment of a fund for the belongs in the arena and should We, claims the state would be a waiver not be answered this in the Court. purse duty ic сontrols the branch,

judicial owe a constitutional for such strings appropriation and that the executive simply not to accommodate but, rather, monies must be defensive government, branch of legislative accomplished by an in futuro equal. That is Separate check on it. but content of such act act. The form and We need not “accommo- the watchwоrd. entirely appropriation is unknown office and/or requests date” from the Governor’s present time and this Court cannot has histori- at the legal opinions. This Court any opinion general as to the con- “render cally spurned parte opinions ex where legisla- (a) (b) stitutionality validity of future rights private parties exist or action, the terms of which neces- tive exact later be involved. could speculation and con- sarily entirely rest Opinion Judges, jecture.” In re QUESTION ONE 186, (1926). 210 N.W. S.D. question, the clear As concerns the first also, Opinion Judges, See question. import of the statute answers the N.W. This import peripherally addressed Its was also ques- opinions not render on Court should 63-3, Holland v. Yankton Sch. Dist. it, precedent, would bind on tions which Therefore, would legislature might legislative acts which advisory opinion to the decline to render an Therefore, I in the future. would pass Court, except This Governor. advisory opinion render an based decline to in South Dakota Constitution conjecture. When ac- speculation and legal of the Gover is not the advisor requests, commodating gubernatorial Attorney nor. The General is the Gover great cautiоn. In re is to exercise advisor, legal Reso nor’s see In re House Court, Opinion No. 72 N.W. lution 399, 402, 209 N.W.2d In re (1897), 1-11-1(6), and and SDCL 1890, 8 S.D. Chapter Session Laws of salary he 1—11— receives a therefor. SDCL 66 N.W. Attorney 2. The has a staff of General however, question, im- second Governor’s competent attorneys and the Governor many hypothetical situations such as plies questions to the Attor should address his for the defense” and “establish- “procedure ney than to short-circuit the General rather payment of claims” es monies orderly process judicial of law and usual vague meaning, which have such a This not bind itself channels. Court should future, exceedingly that it would be dan- *7 legal rights in and either lock in or lock out to bind itself gerous for this Court future, in factual situations which have precedent. not been in а court of law. tried E. HENDERSON FRANK

Associate Justice

QUESTION TWO question, this As concerns the second question hypotheti- vague and deals with geared legislation.

cal facts toward future Although question is couched terms department’s implementa- of the executive tion of defense and establish- although ment of monies the Governor constructs and submits 4-7, budget, state’s SDCL ch. neces- recommend measures he considers Const, IV, sary, it is axiomat-

Case Details

Case Name: In Re Request for Opinion of the Supreme Court Relative to Constitutionality of SDLC
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 18, 1985
Citation: 379 N.W.2d 822
Docket Number: 15187
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.