146 Minn. 80 | Minn. | 1920
The secretary of the state board of law examiners presented a petition to this court accusing Francis C. Cary, an attorney at law duly admitted to practice in this state, of unprofessional conduct in this: (1) That during the 1919 general session of the legislature he appeared before the Committee on Finance of the Senate advocating favorable action upon four bills, then under consideration by the committee, appropriating money to certain persons, and falsely and deceitfully represented
“I feel that something ought to be done in your case 'to hurry along information on which we can base a bill through the legislature.' I believe it would be well to make arrangements with a lawyer to undertake this on a commission basis so that he would make it his business to get * * * the bill introduced and push on it until the bill would go through. * * * I have in mind an attorney that we eould employ in your behalf who would charge nothing whatever if he doesn’t get the bill through, 'and would charge one-half of whatever was gotten if the bill goes through. I really believe it is the best thing to do and I believe he would get a bill through that would get something for you to help you along. If you feel the same way about it, please write me and I will take the matter up with him and try to get it moving.”
On March 15 he wrote among other matters: “We believe you are as deserving as anyone could be of getting relief' from the state, and we want to do all we can to help. We have made arrangements with Henry H. Wolfe, a lawyer, who is specializing in this work, to handle the claims on a fifty per cent basis, If he does not succeed he gets no pay whatever, so that you cannot lose anything; if he does get a good allowance for you you will be that much ahead. He has specialized [in] this work and for that reason it is better to pay him in case you win and we
We think this correspondence indicates ’an employment by respondent and that Eolfe’s name was only used as a subterfuge to make it easier to obtain the coveted fees. Eolfe absolutely denies that the claim was turned over to^him, or that he was employed to handle it. In answer to a letter from Captain Swedberg, the commander of Colles, Yader and Larson, respondent, under date of March 5, 1919, wrote, signing the name of his law firm to the communication:
“Answering your letter of March 4, regarding Pvt. Geo. Yader and Corp. Martin Larson, beg to state that the law firm I am connected with will handle these cases for the interested parties to the best of their ability.”
This clearly enough shows that respondent had procured employment from Mrs. Vader and Martin Larson.. There was also direct testimony from Mrs. Larson that respondent was employed and that he made the bargain for one-half of what might be secured as.fees for his services. Eespondent contends that whatever he did in the premises was gratuitous and as an official assisting members of the guards or their dependents, and that Eolfe was the attorney who handled the matters and bargained for and earned the fees. This Eolfe absolutely denies, except that on the Paulzine claim, which he brought into the office, he was to receive one-third of whatever respondent obtained 'as fees.
We are convinced, and so find the fact to be, that whether or not' any of the contracts with the four claimants was made in the name of Eolfe ostensibly, it was for the benefit of respondent, and that respondent was the real party to receive all the fees bargained for with each of said claimants, except that Eolfe was to receive one-third of the fees obtained by respondent in the Paulzine matter. We also find that such was the situation in regard to the arrangement for compensation when respondent appeared before the Senate Committee on Finance as hereinafter stated.
In January, 1919, the legislature convened. Some time, presumably in March, four bills were prepared in respondent’s office and under his
We find that respondent made the representations to the committee that neither he nor anyone connected with his law firm had any pecuniary interest in the bills mentioned as charged in the petition, and that such representations were wilfully false and made with intent to deceive the committee.
The bills as introduced were embodied 'and passed in the general appropriation act (Laws 1919, chapter 464, pp. 578, 579, §§ 39, 40, 41 and 42), for the specific sums named in the bills. Respondent caused the beneficiaries to give R'olfe a power of attorney, and armed therewith the latter procured the auditor’s warrants on the treasurer payable to Mrs. Colles, Martin Larson and John H. Paulzine. For some reason, not disclosed by the evidence, Mrs. Yader’s warrant was not secured. Rolfe delivered the three warrants mentioned to respondent. He procured the payee’s indorsements. One of the warrants respondent deposited to the credit of his individual bank account, and the other two he exchanged for certificates of deposit payable to his own order. Respondent provided the cash by which the payee or clients received their one-half of the amount of the warrants. He sent his stenographer with $1,000 in currency to Moose Lake with instructions to pay it to Mrs.
We find that respondent received and kept for his own nse $4,300 of the amounts received upon the warrants issued in payment of the Colles, Paulzine and Larson appropriations.
On the argument it was suggested that respondent’s appearance before the Finance Committee of the Senate was not in any legal proceeding and therefore his deceit there cannot come under the designation of unprofessional conduct as an attorney. We cannot adopt the suggestion. In People v. Meyerovitz, 278 Ill. 356, the court said: “The weight of authority holds that misconduct of an attorney outside his professional dealings may afford good ground for disbarment.” Such is also the holding in Delano’s Case, 58 N. H. 5, 42 Am. Rep. 555; In re Wilson, 79 Kan. 674, 100 Pac. 635, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 517, 17 Ann. Cas. 690; Penobscot Bar v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140; In re Radford, 168 Mich. 474, 134 N. W. 472. In re Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 227, it was said: “Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. So it is that we, in common with other courts, hold, as did Lord Mansfield more than a century ago, that misconduct, indicative .of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or nonprofessional, justifies dismissal as well as exclusion from the bar.” The Senate Committee was engaged in important public duties, as respondent well knew, and he undoubtedly also well knew of the practice that obtained with the committee of making provisions in the bill for attorney’s fees or other expenses that the state should bear, so that what the legislature meant to give would reach the object of its bounty intact. The motive for respondent’s deceit is readily discerned, and the facts above found prove, without further comment, that, if he 'ever had that good character which entitled him to enter the profession, he has lost it and is no longer worthy to continue therein. Even if there were any truth in his claim that Rolfe was the one who represented the parties named in the bills and received all the fees it would make respondent’s conduct and representations just as reprehensible and deceitful. Rolfe was an employee of respondent’s law firm, and respondent knew that the agreements for compensation which he claims to have made with Rolfe
Our conclusion is that the finding hereinbefore made requires that Francis C. Cary be removed from office.
It is ordered that respondent be removed from his office of attorney at law in this state and a formal judgment of disbarment be entered.