In re REALTY ASSOCIATES SECURITIES CORPORATION.
No. 200, Docket 20500
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
July 23, 1947
Writ of Certiorari Denied Dec. 8, 1947. See 68 S.Ct. 218.
389 F.2d 387
“The new barracks and administration buildings, however, are apparently separate units which are physically segregated from any existing buildings so that their construction constitutes, in our opinion, original construction work not covered by the Act.”
With this opinion we agree.
The appellants contend that they were “engaged in commerce” because a substantial part of their activities related to the ordering of goods from other states. It is true that substantial quantities of materials were purchased by the defendants from sources outside New York and delivered across state lines. It is also true that the drawings and bills of materials had to be prepared by the appellants before the defendants’ purchasing department could make the required purchases; their work, however, was merely preparatory to ordering the goods. If the bills of materials included items which the purchasing department necessarily had to order from sources outside the state of New York, then, in our opinion, the appellants were “engaged in commerce.” On the other hand, if the items listed in the bills of material could have been obtained either from depots within the state or from depots outside the state so that the decision as to which source to utilize rested wholly within the discretion of the purchasing department, we do not think that the plaintiffs were “engaged in commerce,” although in fact the goods were ordered from outside the state.9 In other words, the test of the “remoteness” or “closeness” of the plaintiffs’ activities to the movement of goods in interstate commerce depends upon the bill of materials itself, not upon the decision which the purchasing department made with respect to particular items listed in the bill of materials. The present record does not permit us to apply this test. Upon the new trial it may be possible to do so.
The final contention is that the court erred in finding Mertens exempt as an administrative employee. Although the evidence is not completely convincing, we cannot hold the finding “clearly erroneous.” Mr. Basile, the chief engineer, testified that Mr. Mertens “had men under his supervision,” was “the supervisor of his department,” architectural drafting, and his work of supervision required “the exercise of discretion.” This is enough to support the court‘s finding.
As to Mertens the judgment is affirmed; as to the other appellants it is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Newman & Bisco, of New York City (Perry A. Hull, of New York City, of counsel), for Manufacturers Trust Co., Indenture Trustee, appellant.
Percival E. Jackson, of New York City (Percival E. Jackson and Theodore N. Tarlau, both of New York City, of counsel), for Vanneck Realty Corporation, appellee.
Lewis, Marks & Kanter, of Brooklyn, and Julius Silver, of New York City (Julius Silver, of New York City, Lloyd B. Kanter, of Brooklyn, and Jack L. Rappaport, of New York City, of counsel), for Bondholders’ Protective Committee, appellee.
Roger S. Foster, Sol., and Robert S. Rubin, Associate Sol., both of Philadelphia, Pa., George Zolotar, Sp. Counsel, of New York City (Alexander Cohen, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Ezra Weiss and Kiva Berke, both of New York City, of counsel), for Securities and Exchange Commission.
Before L. HAND, SWAN, and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
SWAN, Circuit Judge.
These appeals present questions as to the interest payable upon bonds of the debtor after they became due on October 1, 1943. The debtor is a New York corporation organized to deal in mortgages and real estate securities. Prior to 1933 it had outstanding three issues of 6% bonds maturing respectively in 1937, 1939 and 1943. Pursuant to a composition in bankruptcy, effective as of July 10, 1933, the bonds then outstanding were reduced in amount and made subject to a new Indenture dated July 10, 1933, which fixed the maturity date for all the bonds as October 1, 1943 and provided that they were to bear interest at 5% per annum payable out of earnings, any unpaid portion of the interest to be cumulative and payable with the principal at maturity. The old bonds were required to be “stamped” to indicate the modification effected, and to be registered. On October 1, 1943 the principal amount of the outstanding stamped and registered bonds was $5,710,400 and, as the debtor had paid only about 3% interest out of earnings, the accumulated, accrued and unpaid interest thereon was $1,286,646.43. On September 28, 1943, three days before the maturity date, the debtor filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,
The first question is whether the contract between the debtor and the bondholders provides for a 5% interest rate after maturity as well as before. This turns upon the proper construction of the Indenture of July 10, 1933 which expressly declares that the rights and remedies of the parties and of the holders of the stamped bonds shall be governed by the New York law. It is common ground that under the New York decisions interest continues at the specified contract rate rather than at the legal rate of 6%, if the contract provides for payment of interest “until the principal shall be paid.”2 In Article III, section 1 of the debtor‘s Indenture the company covenanted “that it will pay to the registered holder of each Stamped Bond * * * until the reduced principal of each such Bond shall be duly paid * * * interest on the reduced principal amount thereof from July 10, 1933 at the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum * * *” Because of the phrase “duly paid” and a similar expression in Article IV, section 1,3 the district judge concluded that the word “duly” was used to denote the obligation of prompt payment at maturity and limited the debtor‘s promise to pay interest to the period prior to the maturity of the bonds. We cannot agree with this construction and are fortified in the view that no such limitation was intended by the
Irrespective of the contract provisions, the bondholders advance two alternative theories to support their right to the 6% rate. The first may be called the “judgment theory“: it asserts that allowance by the court of the claim on the bonds is a judgment which bears interest at the legal rate from the date of the Chapter X petition. In a straight bankruptcy case, In re John Osborn‘s Sons & Co., 2 Cir., 177 F. 184, 29 L.R.A.,N.S., 887, this court decided, relying upon National Bank of Commonwealth of New York City v. Mechanic‘s Nat. Bank, 94 U.S. 437, 24 L.Ed. 176, that allowed claims in bankruptcy are of the same efficacy as judgments with respect to bearing interest, where the assets of the bankrupt are sufficient. In that case the bankrupt had made no contract providing for the payment of interest, and the principal appellants contend that the decision does not control the case at bar for that reason. Assuming without decision that the attempted distinction would be invalid in an ordinary bankruptcy, we are not convinced that the “judgment theory” is applicable in a Chapter X reorganization, where the very purpose of the proceeding is to keep the debts in statu quo until a plan can be adopted under which the debtor may continue in business without having its property burdened with judgments. It is, of course, necessary to liquidate the debts, but the proposal is not that they will be paid at maturity but that they will be extended in whole or in part by means of substituted obligations; and it would run entirely counter to this purpose to treat them as peremptory demands, like judgments, upon which damages in the form of interest for delay in payment will commence to fall due as soon as the reorganization petition is filed. Until the “plan” is proposed and accepted, the debtor gets a moratorium; and the debts do not become finally due except to the extent and in the manner that the “plan” provides. That the practice has been to treat the contract rate of interest as continuing to the effective date of the plan in Chapter X and railroad reorganizations is amply shown by the cases cited by the debtor, although the point does not appear to have been discussed. See Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corporation, 318 U.S. 448, 455, 63 S.Ct. 692, 87 L.Ed. 892; Brooks v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 153 F.2d 312, 318, certiorari denied, 328 U.S. 867, 66 S. Ct. 1365, 90 L.Ed. 1638; Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. R. Co. Reorganization, 254 I.C.C. 707, 712; In re Adolph Gobel, Inc.,1 S.D.N.Y. In re McKeeson & Robbins, Inc., 8 S.E.C. 853, 876. Assum-
The alternative theory upon which the bondholders claim the 6% rate asserts that the moratorium obtained by the reorganization was solely for the debtors’ benefit and therefore upon equitable principles the legal rather than the contract rate should be applied. Great reliance is put upon Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 67 S.Ct. 237, which was decided after the district court‘s decision in the case at bar. In the Vanston opinion, 329 U.S. at page 165, 67 S.Ct. at page 241, the court said: “It is manifest that the touchstone of each decision on allowance of interest in bankruptcy, receivership and reorganization has been a balance of equities between creditor and creditor or between creditors and the debtor.”
In the case at bar the bondholders contend that the reorganization petition was not filed in “good faith” and that the whole proceeding has been a successful effort to secure a moratorium solely in the interest of the debtor. Conceivably Chapter X may permit a debtor to hold off its creditors, even though it has sufficient assets to pay them, merely because its business will suffer disproportionately if it is compelled to make the sacrifice. See In re Loch Apartments, 7 Cir., 89 F.2d 461. However, we shall do no injustice to the bondholders if we assume that the law is to the contrary and that a moratorium is proper only when appropriate to the protection of creditors. It is true that the debtor‘s assets on September 28, 1943 would seem to have been ample to pay the bonds maturing on October 1, 1943, and there were substantially no other debts. Nevertheless, we cannot know whether the mortgages and real estate, which constituted more than half of the total assets, were readily realizable, nor can we be sure that if the bondholders had been permitted to engage in a general scramble for them, with all the expenses and waste incident to that kind of distribution, there would have been enough to go around. The debtor‘s petition, to be sure, is singularly unconvincing; it did not allege that without reorganization the bondholders would not be paid—it said merely that they “might” not be. Almost immediately two creditors holding some $10,000 of bonds moved to dismiss the petition for lack of good faith, and on November 1, 1943, Judge Moscowitz denied their motion, saying that nothing could be a greater disservice to the creditors than not to give them the protection and benefit of the reorganization statute. The moving bondholders took no appeal from this order; nor did any others intervene to appeal, or make any motions of their own. For 18 months after that decision, so far as appears, no one questioned the good faith of the proceedings or suggested that the district judge was not right in saying that if the petition were dismissed all would suffer. Quite aside from any question of estoppel arising from the order of November 1, 1943, we think it would be most inequitable to permit creditors who so long acquiesced in the pendency of the proceeding, now to say that all the time it was nothing but a bad-faith moratorium to keep them out of their money. If, contrary to our assumption, a debtor may procure a moratorium solely in its own interest, the bad-faith argument is irrelevant. Under either view, therefore, we find no equities to override the bargain which the parties made for themselves, namely that overdue principal should bear interest at the rate of 5%.
Little need be added as to the claim of interest upon the interest accrued and unpaid on October 1, 1943. In the Vanston case, although the indenture specifically provided “for payment of interest on unpaid interest” (329 U.S. at p. 159, 67 S.Ct. 238), the Supreme Court, on the basis of equitable principles, did not allow it since “first mortgage bondholders would have been enriched and subordinate creditors would have suffered a corresponding loss, because of a failure to pay when payment had been prohibited by a court order entered for the joint benefit of debtor, cred-
Manufacturers Trust Company as Indenture Trustee has appealed from so much of the order of August 5, 1946 as relates to the application of an interim payment of interest authorized on December 10, 1943. The application complained of produces a difference in the amount payable to bondholders only if they are to receive more than the 5% contract rate of interest. In view of our decision that they are to get but 5%, the issues raised by Manufacturers Trust Company‘s appeal have become of only academic interest and require no discussion.
The order is modified to conform with the foregoing opinion on the appeal of the debtor and its sole stockholder, with appellate costs to them, and is affirmed on the appeal of the Indenture Trustee.
CLARK, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
This is an interesting problem; I agree with Judge Swan‘s scholarly analysis except for his rejection of the “judgment theory.” As to this also, what he says has much force; but I incline to believe that the opposite conclusion is the more equitable. This is now a contest between a solvent debtor and its creditors on a direct obligation which has become fixed and final by court proceedings between the parties. It should not be affected by the abortive reorganization proceedings. As the opinion substantially concedes, allowance of a claim in bankruptcy fixes it, just as does a judgment, and an ordinary judgment bears interest at the legal rate. The situation is one therefore where a debtor who has availed himself of the bankruptcy provisions ultimately is able to pay in full; he should not then be permitted to make use of the statute to reduce his claim. Obviously here, except for the proceedings, the creditors would have taken judgment at once; they should not be deprived of that advantage by the debtor‘s unassented-to act.
That this was a reorganization, rather than an ordinary bankruptcy, proceeding would seem not to change this situation. It is still only a question between the debtor and its creditors. The cases in railroad reorganization were cases involving equities between classes of creditors. The Vanston case, supra, 329 U.S. 156, 164, 165, 67 S.Ct. 237, 241, is, I believe, important authority for this view, because it stresses the “touchstone” of “a balance of equities between creditor and creditor or between creditors and the debtor.” (Italics added.) This is said just after a discussion of the two differing situations, thus: “To allow a secured creditor interest where his security was worth less than the value of his debt was thought to be inequitable to unsecured creditors. * * * But where an estate was ample to pay all creditors and to pay interest even after the petition was filed, equitable considerations were invoked to permit payment of this additional interest to the secured creditor rather than to the debtor.” What is considered fair in measuring obligations of different classes of creditors—and eventually assented to and approved as provided by law in a plan of reorganization—should be different from what a debtor by his unilateral act may secure by way of lessening his obligation upon his payment in full. These views would mean that at least from the time of allowance, the claim, including the interest due thereon at the time, would bear interest at the legal rate of 6 per cent.