In Re Randle
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Doyle
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CAROL A. DOYLE, Bankruptcy Judge.
The United States Trustee for the Northern District of Illinois (the “Trustee”) has moved to dismiss this case under
I. The Means Test
II. Factual Background
Ms. Randle filed her Chapter 7 petition and all of the schedules and other documents required by the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, including her Form B22A calculation under the means test and her Statement of Intention regarding secured debt. Line 42 of Form B22A tracks the statutory language of
The Trustee filed a Statement of Presumed Abuse alleging that Ms. Randle’s current monthly income less the allowed deductions (her “disposable income”), when multiplied by 60, yields an amount greater than the $10,000 threshold set forth in
III.
When interpreting any statute, “we [must] begin with the language of the statute itself.”
In re T.H. Orlando, Ltd.,
391 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir.2004);
see also Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980) (“[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.”). Here, the plain language of
A. Congressional Intent
The Trustee apparently recognizes this, because his primary argument is that the court must look to general Congressional intent with respect to BAPCPA and
The Trustee’s argument is not persuasive for several reasons. First, it ignores the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation — that the court must first look to the language of the statute to determine Congressional intent.
U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (“The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.”) (citations omitted). The plain language of
Second, even if Congressional intent is considered, the legislative history of the means test supports the court’s interpretation of
Congress’ intent to use a standardized or mechanical test and avoid reliance on individualized information as much as possible is demonstrated throughout
Consistent with this standardized approach, Congress dictated in
Finally, the court notes that, in any event, the Trustee’s assertion that Congress’ general intent was to require some debtors to repay their creditors does not help to resolve the specific issue at hand. The question presented here is not whether Congress intended to force some debtors out of Chapter 7 but where Congress intended to draw the line for purposes of the presumption between debtors who are entitled to relief under chapter 7 and those who are not. Evidence of general Congressional intent to draw such a line is of little help in determining where, exactly, that line is drawn. The specific language of
For all of these reasons, the court rejects the Trustee’s contention that general Congressional intent to force debtors who can repay their debts out of Chapter 7 requires the court to rewrite
B. Other Arguments
The Trustee makes four other arguments in support of his position. First, the Trustee argues that the court’s interpretation of
However, the debtor must fill out Form B22A as of the petition date, and on that date her mortgage payments were “due” under the contract whether the debtor planned to make them in the future or not. The filing of a bankruptcy petition does not abrogate that obligation. The automatic stay suspends the creditor’s right to foreclose on the collateral, and the debtor may ultimately be discharged of her liability to the mortgage company beyond the value of the collateral. But the filing of the bankruptcy petition does not alter the debtor’s contractual obligations under the note and mortgage agreement to make monthly payments until the debt is repaid. Therefore, the debtor’s mortgage payments are “due” under the contract for the next 60 months and may be deducted from her monthly income under
Second, the Trustee argues that Congress’ use of the word “scheduled” in
This argument is flawed for several reasons. First, the Trustee fails to explain how this argument supports his contention that secured debt may not be deducted from income if the debtor does not reaffirm the debt. There is no bankruptcy schedule that requires the debtor to list “all amounts contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date of the petition.” So there is no bankruptcy schedule to which
Next, the Trustee argues that courts adopting this court’s interpretation of
at the time of the filing, without reference to what the debtor will do in the future.”).
Finally, the Trustee argues that the court’s interpretation of
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the debtor may deduct her mortgage payments from her current monthly income for purposes of the means test. The Trustee’s motion to dismiss this case based on a presumption of abuse under
Notes
. “Current monthly income” is defined in
. The full text of
(iii) The debtor‘s average monthly payments on account of secured debts shall be calculated as the sum of -
(I) the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date of the petition; and
(II) any additional payments to secured creditors necessary for the debtor, in filing a plan under chapter 13 of this title, to maintain possession of the debtor’s primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor‘s dependents, that serves as collateral for secured debts; divided by 60.