In re Rabia K.
The respondent mother, whose minor child, R, was adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody and care of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, appealed to this court from the trial court‘s judgment, claiming that the court improperly found that R had been neglected, and that the Department of Children and Families had made reasonable efforts to prevent R‘s removal. After the mother had filed the present appeal, counsel for R filed a motion to revoke commitment in the trial court on the basis that R had returned home to the mother, who had moved to Massachusetts, and no longer wanted to be in the petitioner‘s custody. The trial court thereafter granted the motion to revoke commitment and closed the case, returning R to the care and custody of the mother. Subsequently, the petitioner moved to dismiss this appeal as moot, claiming that this court could not afford the mother any practical relief in light of the trial court‘s order revoking commitment of R. In her opposition, the mother acknowledged that the second issue on appeal, R‘s commitment to the petitioner, had been rendered moot but claimed that the first issue, the adjudication of neglect, was not moot because the mother could experience collateral consequences in Massachusetts as a result thereof, as the adjudication of neglect could be used against her in a future child protection proceeding in Massachusetts to establish a pattern of repeated parental neglect. The petitioner responded that there was no reasonable possibility that prejudicial consequences would occur for the mother as a result thereof because R no longer lived in Connecticut, would soon reach the age of majority, and the juvenile court would lose jurisdiction over her at that time. Held that the respondent mother‘s appeal was dismissed as moot, there being no practical relief that this court could afford the mother on the issue of adjudication of neglect given that the underlying case had been closed and R had been returned to the care and custody of her mother; moreover, vacatur of the trial court‘s judgment was appropriate in order to avoid the possibility, however remote, of collateral consequences to the mother in Massachusetts, the adjudication of neglect was adverse to the mother, the mother did not cause the appeal to be moot through any voluntary action, and she was prevented from challenging the court‘s adjudication of neglect as a result of the trial court‘s granting the motion to revoke commitment.
PER CURIAM. In this neglect proceeding, the respondent mother, Michelle K., appeals from the judgment of the trial court adjudicating Rabia K., the respondent‘s minor daughter, neglected and committing her to the care and custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families.1 On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly found that (1) Rabia had been neglected and (2) the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to prevent Rabia‘s removal.
After this appeal was ready for argument, Rabia‘s attorney filed in the trial court a motion to revoke commitment, representing that Rabia had returned home to the respondent in Massachusetts and no longer wanted to be in the custody of the petitioner. After a hearing, the court granted the motion to revoke commitment and closed the case. The petitioner did not oppose the motion and, thereafter, moved to dismiss this appeal as moot, arguing that this court is unable to grant the respondent any practical relief in light of the trial court‘s order revoking commitment of Rabia. The respondent opposed the motion to dismiss, and this court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to file supplemental memoranda giving reasons, if any, why we should not dismiss this appeal as moot and exercise the remedy of vacatur as to the trial court‘s judgment adjudicating Rabia neglected so as to avoid any possible collateral consequences as a result of the appeal being rendered moot. After considering the motion to dismiss and opposition thereto, as well as the parties’ supplemental memoranda, we conclude that the respondent‘s claims are moot and that vacatur is appropriate.
The record discloses the following relevant facts, as found by the court, and procedural history. Rabia‘s family moved from Massachusetts to Connecticut in 2016. On July 1, 2020, Rabia, who was fifteen years old, walked into the Willimantic Police Department and reported that her family had abused her for years. She informed the police officers that she did not recall attending public school and that she had not seen a doctor since she was eleven years old. After being alerted by the Willimantic Police Department, the petitioner filed a neglect petition on July 30, 2020, alleging that Rabia was being denied proper care and allowed to live under conditions injurious to her well-being. In May, 2021, the respondent was evicted from her residence in Willimantic and moved to Massachusetts, where she previously had resided.
On May 13, 2021, the court, Chaplin, J., granted the petitioner‘s motion for an order of temporary custody and issued an ex parte order vesting temporary custody of Rabia in the petitioner. The court, Carbonneau, J., held a consolidated hearing on the motion for an order
On March 2, 2022, the court, Chaplin, J., granted Rabia‘s motion to revoke commitment and closed the case, returning Rabia to the care and custody of the respondent. The petitioner subsequently moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. In her opposition to the motion to dismiss, the respondent acknowledged that the second issue on appeal, Rabia‘s commitment to the petitioner, had been rendered moot but claimed that the first issue, the finding of neglect, is not moot because she will face collateral consequences in Massachusetts as a result of the court‘s adjudicating Rabia neglected.2
‘‘Mootness is an exception to the general rule that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost by the occurrence of subsequent events.‘’ In re Alba P.-V., 135 Conn. App. 744, 747, 42 A.3d 393, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 917, 46 A.3d 170 (2012). ‘‘Mootness implicates [this] court‘s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve. . . . It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot. . . .
‘‘[D]espite developments during the pendency of an appeal that would otherwise render a claim moot, the court may retain jurisdiction when a litigant shows that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur. . . . [T]o invoke successfully the collateral consequences doctrine, the liti
Because the underlying case has been closed and Rabia has been returned to the care and custody of the respondent, an actual controversy no longer exists. See In re Kiara R., 129 Conn. App. 604, 610, 21 A.3d 883 (2011) (appeal rendered moot after minor child returned to respondent mother‘s care and custody). The respondent, however, contends that the appeal is not moot because there is a reasonable possibility that an adjudication of neglect could be used against her in a future child protection proceeding in Massachusetts. Specifically, she argues that the adjudication of neglect may be used against her in Massachusetts to establish a pattern of repeated parental neglect. Therefore, according to the respondent, ‘‘if the neglect adjudication were reversed, the respondent . . . would be able to argue that the state would be precluded from raising such an adjudication—and the facts used to support it—in any subsequent child protection case.‘’ The petitioner, noting that Rabia will turn eighteen years old in October of this year, responds that ‘‘there is no reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur for [the respondent] as a result of the neglect adjudication . . . given that Rabia no longer lives in Connecticut and will soon reach the age of majority.‘’ The petitioner further notes that the juvenile court will lose jurisdiction over her at that time.
We are not persuaded that the respondent has established that there is a reasonable possibility that the underlying adjudication of neglect will result in prejudicial collateral consequences to her. Specifically, the respondent fails to address why there is a reasonable possibility that a future child protection proceeding would be initiated in Massachusetts in light of Rabia‘s age. Although an appellant is not required to establish that these consequences are more probable than not, there must be ‘‘more than mere conjecture . . . .‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Private Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Torres, supra, 278 Conn. 299. Nevertheless, under the unique circumstances of the present case, we conclude that vacatur is appropriate in order to avoid the possibility—however remote—of collateral consequences for the respondent in Massachusetts.
In the present case, the judgment adjudicating Rabia neglected was adverse to the respondent. As a result of the court‘s granting Rabia‘s motion to revoke commitment, which we have concluded rendered the respondent‘s appeal moot, the respondent, through no fault of her own, has been prevented from challenging the court‘s adjudication of neglect. Neither the respondent nor the petitioner opposes vacatur under these circumstances. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as moot and vacate the judgment of the court. See Savin Gasoline Properties, LLC v. Commission on City Plan of Norwich, 208 Conn. App. 513, 515, 262 A.3d 1027 (2021) (dismissing appeal and granting appellant‘s motion for vacatur of court‘s judgment because appeal became moot through no fault of appellant).
The appeal is dismissed and the judgment is vacated.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of
** May 16, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
Notes
It is well established that ‘‘[a]n adjudication of neglect relates to the status of the child and is not necessarily premised on parental fault. A finding that the child is neglected is different from finding who is responsible for the child‘s condition of neglect. . . . [T]he adjudication of neglect is not a judgment that runs against a person or persons so named in the petition; [i]t is not directed against them as parents, but rather is a finding that the children are neglected . . . .‘’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Zamora S., 123 Conn. App. 103, 108–109, 998 A.2d 1279 (2010). At the same time, however, this court has explained that, ‘‘[a]lthough a court is not required to determine who was responsible for the neglect in adjudicating neglect of a child; see
In the present case, the respondent argues that the court found that she was at fault when it stated that she was ‘‘either unwilling or unable to provide the level of care that [Rabia] clearly needed . . . .‘’ We agree that the court found the respondent responsible for the neglect of Rabia.